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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party opposing 
a summary judgment motion must controvert the moving party's statement of 
material undisputed facts, or else the facts are deemed admitted. USA Power 
egregiously and repeatedly violated Rule 7 by arguing about the implication of 
PacifiCorp's material facts rather than controverting them. Should this court 
sustain the district court's ruling that PacifiCorp's material facts were deemed 
admitted because USA Power failed to actually controvert them as Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(c)(3)(A) requires? 
2. As the summary judgment movant, PacifiCorp had the initial burden 
of presenting evidence demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact 
existed and that it was entitled to judgment on USA Power's misappropriation of 
trade secrets and breach of contract claims. PacifiCorp presented three core 
groups of material undisputed facts in its opening memorandum demonstrating 
that: (1) another power plant developer (Panda Energy) selected and developed 
the Currant Creek power plant site near Mona, Utah, and later sold its project 
assets to PacifiCorp; (2) the precise location and technical details of USA 
1 
Power's power plant, to be located % mile north of the Panda Energy site, were 
publicly disclosed in an application for an air permit; and (3) the Currant Creek 
power plant was a typical air-cooled combined cycle power plant that was 
designed, engineered and constructed for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster 
and a replica of the Apex 1 power plant in Las Vegas, Nevada, also designed by 
Shaw/Stone & Webster that was under construction well before USA Power 
provided any information to PacifiCorp. Should this court sustain the district 
court's ruling that based on these undisputed facts, PacifiCorp met its burden? 
3. After PacifiCorp met its initial burden, the burden shifted to USA 
Power to present evidence that under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act there 
was a genuine issue for trial as to whether USA Power had a trade secret that 
PacifiCorp misappropriated. USA Power failed to present evidence that any of its 
information was a secret; that the information was not known within the industry, 
general public, or readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp by independent means 
based upon PacifiCorp's knowledge and experience in the industry. Should this 
court sustain the district court's ruling that USA Power failed to meet its burden? 
4. Similarly, USA Power had the burden to present by affidavits or 
discovery material evidence that there was a genuine issue for trial as to whether 
PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's information in violation of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act or the confidentiality agreement. Unable to present any direct 
? 
evidence of a misappropriation, USA urged that it be allowed to present a web of 
circumstantial evidence that relied primarily on the similarities between USA 
Power's proposed power plant and PacifiCorp's Currant Creek power plant, 
which was a near replica of an existing power plant in Las Vegas, Nevada. USA 
Power offered no evidence showing anything novel in its plans and no evidence 
of similarity between its calculations and financial projections and those actually 
developed by PacifiCorp and its engineering and construction contractor. Should 
this court sustain the district court's ruling that USA Power failed to meet its 
burden? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court reviews the district court's summary judgment ruling 
for correctness, and views all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, U 14, 184 P. 3d 578. 
The district court's determination to grant summary judgment on the basis 
that the non-moving party failed to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Anderson Development Company, LC. v. 
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, U 21, fn 3, 116 P. 3d 323. 
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CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT THE ISSUES WERE 
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
USA Power correctly stated where the issues raised in this appeal were 
preserved in the trial court. (USA Power Principal Brief at pp. 1-5.) 
STATUTES 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-1, et. seq. is 
included in the addendum at Tab 2. Utah R. Civ. P. 7 is included in the 
addendum at Tab 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This lawsuit comprises the claims of three related companies, USA Power, 
LLC, USA Power Partners, LLC, and Spring Canyon Energy, LLC (hereafter 
collectively "USA Power") owned and managed by three individuals who asserted 
that their publicly expressed "vision" or "concept" to build a power plant near 
PacifiCorp's1 electrical switching station just outside the Town of Mona in Juab 
County, Utah, was somehow a trade secret that PacifiCorp misappropriated. On 
summary judgment, they were unable to demonstrate that their project was a 
trade secret, either as a "concept" or as individual components. 
1
 In Utah, PacifiCorp operates under the assumed name Rocky Mountain Power in 
conducting its retail electricity business. 
A 
The claims in the case revolve around one of PacifiCorp's many power 
plants - Currant Creek - which was completed in 2005-2006 primarily to meet the 
growing demands of PacifiCorp's customers along the Wasatch Front. The initial 
development work for Currant Creek was actually performed by Panda Energy, 
an experienced power plant developer. Panda had intended to construct its own 
combined cycle power plant next to PacifiCorp's 345 kV Mona switching station, 
but when its economic fortunes turned, Panda sold its project assets to 
PacifiCorp which used them to build Currant Creek on the same 240 acre Panda 
site. 
Currant Creek is a typical 525 MW natural gas fired air-cooled combined 
cycle power plant. It was constructed by one of the world's leaders in power 
plant engineering and construction - Shaw/Stone & Webster - based on its 
standard plant design. In fact, Currant Creek is a virtual replica of the Apex 1 
power plant that Shaw/Stone & Webster designed and built in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. Significantly, the Apex 1 power plant was already designed and well 
under construction before the USA Power entities ever contacted PacifiCorp, let 
alone supplied any information to PacifiCorp. An article about Currant Creek that 
ran in Power magazine (R. 1852-1855) is included in the addendum at Tab 4. 
The USA Power entities were formed by Ted Banasiewicz (deceased), his 
wife Lois, and their associate David Graeber, who held themselves out as 
5 
developers of their proposed, but never designed, engineered or built, combined 
cycle power plant on a 40 acre site about % mile north of the Currant Creek 
power plant. 
USA Power claims that PacifiCorp "stole" their "vision" to build a power 
plant near Mona and that their water lawyer, Jody L. Williams, breached her 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality when she assisted PacifiCorp, her client of 
more than 20 years, in obtaining water for Currant Creek. 
In addition to their misappropriation of trade secrets claim against 
PacifiCorp, USA Power asserted that PacifiCorp used their confidential 
information in breach of a confidentiality agreement; that PacifiCorp breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and, that PacifiCorp was unjustly 
enriched. Not one of USA Power's claims against PacifiCorp survived summary 
judgment. 
On appeal of the claims against PacifiCorp, USA Power only challenges 
the summary judgment rulings on the misappropriation of trade secrets and 
breach of contract claims. 
The Course of Proceedings 
USA Power has accurately stated the course of proceedings. (USA Power 
Principal Brief at pp. 5-6). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
PacifiCorp sets out below the same three core groups of material 
undisputed facts (with the same numbering) that were presented to the district 
court in the Memorandum in Support of PacifiCorp's Motion For Summary 
Judgment. (R. 8555-8598). 
Panda Energy 
1. In late 2000 and early 2001 a successful power plant developer from 
Texas, known as Panda Energy,2 began its development of a combined cycle 
power plant site immediately adjacent to PacifiCorp's switching station near the 
town of Mona, in Juab County, Utah. The Deseret News reported Panda's plans 
in an article published July 19, 2001. Panda Energy's David Barlow Deposition 
taken September 6, 2006, at pp. 28-35, 40-41, 51, 83-86, 92-102 (R. 8600-8716). 
See, newspaper article about Panda produced by USA Power from their files, 
Bates Nos. USA 7341-7342 (R. 8718-8719); see also, Panda Monthly Report, 
dated October 2001, deposition exhibit 292 (R. 8721-8733). 
2. By the end of April 2001, Panda had secured options to purchase 
240 acres of land next to PacifiCorp's Mona switching station. The site was ideal 
for a combined cycle plant because of its immediate proximity to PacifiCorp's 
2
 For a listing of Panda Energy's successful projects, see http://www.pandaenergy.com. 
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transmission system and high pressure natural gas transmission pipelines owned 
by Questar Pipeline Company ("Questar") and Kern River Gas Transmission 
Company ("Kern River"). See, id.; Barlow Depo. at pp. 35 (R. 8609), 135-138 (R. 
8694-8697). 
3. In addition to acquiring land, Panda took the following steps to 
develop its power plant, among others: 
a. hired a market consultant (R.W. Beck) to prepare a report 
assessing the electric power market within the state of Utah; 
b. hired environmental and air quality firms to prepare an 
Environmental Site Evaluation and Planning Report and erect an on-site 
meteorological/monitoring station to gather meteorological data to support 
Panda's application to the Utah Division of Air Quality for an air permit; 
c. met with PacifiCorp's transmission group in Portland, Oregon, 
to arrange for an Interconnection Study at Panda's cost to provide an 
analysis of the cost of interconnecting Panda's power plant to PacifiCorp's 
transmission system at the Mona switching station; 
d. hired a lobbyist to lobby state and local officials; 
e. visited the Mona switching station with its engineers to design 
a transmission path from the power plant site to the switching station; 
f. located the nearby Questar Mainline 104 and Kern River 
natural gas transmission pipelines using available maps and visible 
markers; 
g. mapped out two alternate routes to place lateral gas lines to 
transport natural gas from Questar's and Kern River's gas transmission 
pipelines; and, 
h. hired a water lawyer to pursue the acquisition of water from at 
least three sources. 
Barlow Depo. at pp., 36-39 (R. 8610-8613), 42-67 (R. 8616-8640), 70-72 (R. 
8642-8644), 74-77 (R. 8645-8648), 81-82 (R. 8652-8653), 90-91 (R. 8658-8659), 
94-99 (R. 8662-8667), 118-119 (R. 8685-8688), 123-125 (R. 8689-8691), and 
133-138 (R. 8692-8697); see also, deposition exhibits 284 (R. 8735-8736), 287 
(R. 8739), 292 (R. 8721-8733), 290 (R. 8741-8744), 291 (R. 8746-8747), 294 (R. 
8749-8813), 295 (R. 8815-9022), 296 (R. 9024-9050). 
4. After all of these pieces of its power plant development were in 
place, Panda contacted PacifiCorp's Managing Director of Resource 
Development, Rand Thurgood, Ph.D.3, and set up a meeting in Salt Lake City, 
3
 Rand Thurgood holds a doctorate in chemical engineering from Brigham Young 
University. His dissertation addressed power plant combustion. Thurgood depo. at 
page 8 (R. 9054). Mr. Thurgood was formerly the director of power plant engineering 
for the whole PacifiCorp system. Id. at page 12 (R. 9055). In June, 2004 he was 
promoted to Vice President of Resource Development and Construction. Id. at page 
482 (R. 9124). 
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Utah. Barlow Depo. at pp. 102-116 (R. 8670-8684). Panda's hope at the time 
was that PacifiCorp would be interested in purchasing the power generated from 
Panda's power plant under a long term power purchase contract. See, Id. 
5. The meeting between Panda and Rand Thurgood took place June 
19, 2001, at PacifiCorp's offices at One Utah Center in Salt Lake City. Panda, 
with its maps and engineering design drawings in hand, made a full blown, 
detailed presentation to Mr. Thurgood, explaining the size, location and design of 
Panda's power plant. Barlow Depo. at pp. 69-70 (R. 8641-8642), 102-115 (R. 
8670-8683). 
6. Panda explained the intended combustion technology of its 
combined cycle plant based on Panda's standard plant design using General 
Electric 7FA gas turbines in a "2 on 1" (also referred to as 2x1) configuration. 
Panda explained how it was gathering a year's worth of meteorological data to 
support its application for an air permit. It explained how the electricity from the 
power plant would flow over PacifiCorp's transmission system from an 
interconnect at the Mona switching station. It explained how and where the 
natural gas would be transported to the plant from a new lateral pipeline 
connected to Questar's and Kern River's transmission pipelines along one of two 
routes that Panda had mapped out. It explained how water could be acquired 
from Kennecott and piped to the plant. And, it touted the positive attitude of local 
10 
zoning officials to a proposed zoning change and the enthusiastic response tnat 
Panda had received from legislative and community leaders. Barlow Depo. at 
pp. 102-115 (R. 8670-8683); Rand Thurgood Deposition, taken January 19-20, 
2006 (hereafter "Thurgood Depo."), at pp. 115-135 (R. 9052, 9080-9100). 
7. Although PacifiCorp did not have an interest in acquiring power from 
Panda's power plant under a long term contract, PacifiCorp did have an interest 
in acquiring the Panda project as a potential power plant site for PacifiCorp's 
electric generation system. Barlow Depo. at pp. 142-146 (R. 8698-8702); 
Thurgood Depo. at pp. 137-141 (R. 9101-9105). 
8. PacifiCorp periodically published its Integrated Resource Plans 
outlining the anticipated needs for electric power generation throughout 
PacifiCorp's system. As Managing Director of Asset Optimization (later as 
Director of Resource Development in 2001), Rand Thurgood had been given the 
task beginning in 2000 of assembling as many new resource (i.e., power plant) 
options as he could so that PacifiCorp could select from among the best 
resources to serve its customers' increasing demand for electricity. Thurgood 
Depo. at pp. 51-58 (R. 9056-9063), 67 (R. 9064), 80-81 (R. 9065-9066). 
9. Mr. Thurgood considered all available resource options, not just 
Panda. He met with Mirant Corporation ("Mirant") as early as 2001 about a 
possible equity interest in Mirant's Apex 1 combined cycle power plant in Las 
11 
Vegas. In June 2002, while it was still under construction, Mr. Thurgood visited 
the Apex 1 plant and he and his team of PacifiCorp engineers investigated Apex 
1's combined cycle equipment, plant layout and design. Thurgood Depo. at pp. 
99-103 (R. 9067-9071). While nothing further came of Mr. Thurgood's 
discussions with Mirant, his discussions with Panda were in the same vein, i.e., 
to assemble as many options for PacifiCorp as he could for possible new 
generation resources. Thurgood Depo. at pp. 99-109 (R. 9067-9077), 397 (R. 
9120), 465-466 (R. 9121-9122). 
10. Mr. Thurgood spoke with Panda several times between June 2001 
and July 2002, inquiring each time whether Panda would sell its project to 
PacifiCorp. Panda consistently rebuffed Mr. Thurgood's inquiries until finally, on 
July 31, 2002, Panda communicated to Mr. Thurgood that Panda would entertain 
selling its project to PacifiCorp. Barlow Depo. at pp. 78 (R. 8649), 142-153 (R. 
8698-8709), 229-230 (R. 8715-8716); Thurgood Depo. at pp. 137-141 (R. 9101-
9105). 
11. Negotiations and due diligence followed, and on February 20, 2003, 
PacifiCorp acquired Panda's project for approximately $1.0 million. Id.; Barlow 
Depo. at pp. 77-80 (R. 8648-8651), 142-147 (R. 8698-8703), 154-158 (R. 8710-
8714). PacifiCorp acquired the following Panda assets: (a) Option Agreements 
and Purchase Contracts to purchase 240 acres of land; (b) Environmental Site 
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Evaluation and Planning Report; (c) Ground Water Study Feasibility Screening 
Study Report; (d) Meteorological and Air Quality Monitoring Quality Assurance 
Plan; (e) Dispersion Modeling Protocol - approved by Utah Division of 
Environmental Quality; (f) Air Quality PSD Monitoring Protocol; (g) 1-year Audited 
Meteorological data from plant site property; (h) Meteorological Tower and 
associated equipment; (i) Market Study from R.W. Beck; (j) Transmission Study 
from R.W. Beck; and, (k) PacifiCorp Interconnect Study Report. Barlow Depo. at 
pp. 156-157 (R. 8712-8713); Thurgood Depo. at pp. 138-140 (R. 9102-9104); 
See, deposition exhibits 301 (R. 9169-9175) and 302 (R. 9177-9208). 
Spring Canyon Energy 
12. In February 2002, Spring Canyon Energy filed a Notice of Intent 
(NOI) with the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality, 
seeking an air permit for a combined cycle power plant to be located on a 40 
acre parcel located approximately V2 mile north of the Panda plant site. The NOI 
immediately became a public document. Ted Banasiewicz Deposition, taken 
March 6-9, 2006, at pp. 803 (R. 9280), 815-816 (R. 9291-9292), 821-826 (R. 
9293-9298); see, Affidavit of Kenneth "Ian" Andrews (R. 4135-4138), including 
the NOI attached thereto (R. 4144-4172)4; see also, Utah Division of Air Quality 
file for Spring Canyon Energy marked as deposition exhibit 168 (R. 7345-7548) 
4
 A copy of Kenneth "Ian" Andrews Affidavit is included in the addendum at Tab 5. 
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at Bates No. UDAQ0108 (R. 7437), UDAQ0110 (R. 7439), UDAQ0115-0117 (R. 
7444-7446), UDAQ0147-0175 (R. 7477-7505). 
13. Spring Canyon's NOI not only identified the location of Spring 
Canyon's plant site, it laid out many of the details of the proposed plant. For 
instance, it identified the plant's combustion technology based on General 
Electric 7FA gas turbines, and it confirmed that the Spring Canyon plant would 
have heat recovery steam generators equipped with selective catalytic reduction 
systems, supplemental duct firing and a steam turbine generator. The NOI 
explained that the proposed plant would take natural gas from the two high 
pressure natural gas transmission sources in the area, meaning the Questar 
Mainline 104 and Kern River transmission pipelines, and that the proposed plant 
would interconnect to PacifiCorp's transmission system at the Mona switching 
station. The NOI identified the manufacturer of the proposed plants' pollution 
control equipment, the heat input rate for the gas turbine and the duct burners, 
and the expected capacities of the gas turbine generator and the steam turbine 
generator. According to Spring Canyon's public filing, Spring Canyon selected 
an air cooled condenser to air cool, rather than wet cool, the condensed steam 
from its plant, because an air cooled condenser uses less water. See, Ian 
Andrews Affidavit (R. 4135-4138) and the NOI attached thereto (R. 4144-4172); 
Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 800-813 (R. 9277-9290). 
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14. As part of the air permitting process, a notice of Spring Canyons 
application for an air permit was published in the Nephi Times on October 16, 
2002.5 Like the NOI, the published notice laid out many of the details of the 
project concept. See, newspaper notice in deposition exhibit 168 at Bates No. 
UDAQ0032-0034 (R. 7364-7366); Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 812-813 (R. 
9289-9290). 
15. The NOI ultimately culminated in the issuance of an Approval Order 
(i.e., air permit) to Spring Canyon from the Executive Secretary of the Utah Air 
Quality Board on November 27, 2002. Like the NOI and the newspaper notice, 
the publicly available Approval Order laid out many of the details of the proposed 
Spring Canyon plant. See, Approval Order attached to Ian Andrews Affidavit (R. 
4176-4186); see also, deposition exhibit 168 at Bates No. UDAQ001-0018 (R. 
7345-7356). 
16. The first meeting between PacifiCorp and USA Power occurred on 
August 22, 2002. This first meeting occurred: (a) more than a year after Panda 
made its detailed presentation to PacifiCorp; (b) two months after Mr. Thurgood 
had toured the Apex 1 plant in Las Vegas; and, (c) three weeks after Panda had 
told PacifiCorp that Panda would consider selling its Mona project assets. Ted 
5
 A copy of the Notice published in the Nephi Times is included in the addendum at 
Tab 6. 
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Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 155-156 (R. 9211-9212). See, Undisputed Facts ffl| 5, 
9-10, above. 
17. A week prior to the August 22, 2002 meeting, PacifiCorp's Ian 
Andrews requested and immediately received a faxed copy of Spring Canyon's 
NOI from the Division of Air Quality. He immediately e-mailed Rand Thurgood 
outlining details of the NOI. Ian Andrews Aff. at ffll 3-4 (R. 4135-4138), including 
e-mail dated August 15, 2002 (Bates No. 31456) attached thereto (R. 4174); 
Kenneth "Ian" Andrews Deposition taken February 15, 2006 at pp. 79-82 (R. 
9434-9438). 
18. USA Power met with PacifiCorp a second time on September 11, 
2002. At the beginning of the meeting Mr. Thurgood signed a Confidentiality and 
Non-Disclosure Agreement with USA Power Partners, LLC. Thurgood Depo. at 
pp. 288-289 (R. 9114-9115); Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement, 
deposition exhibit 9 (R. 9452-9455). 
19. On August 21, 2002, the day before their first meeting with 
PacifiCorp, the USA Power principals met with Tom Florence of Utah Associated 
Municipal Power System (UAMPS) in Salt Lake City, Utah. They handed Mr. 
Florence a copy of the same volume of information that they later gave to 
PacifiCorp. Mr. Florence and UAMPS did not sign a confidentiality agreement. 
See, Affidavit of Tom Florence (R. 4210-4212). 
Currant Creek Power Plant 
20. PacifiCorp utilized the project assets that Panda had started 
assembling in late 2000 and early 2001, including land options and purchase 
contracts, environmental studies, and most significantly a year's worth of 
meteorological data, to apply for and obtain an air permit and construct the 
Currant Creek power plant on the Panda site. Thurgood Depo. at pp. 111-112 
(R. 9078-9079), 124-125 (R. 9089-9090), 163-164 (R. 9109-9110); Bob Van 
Engelenhoven Deposition, taken September 29, 2006, at pp. 74-75 (R. 9463-
9464); Ian Andrews Depo. at pp. 160-161 (R. 9442-9443). 
21. Currant Creek was designed, engineered and constructed for 
PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster, which designed, engineered and 
constructed the Apex 1 plant for Mirant Corporation in Las Vegas, Nevada. Apex 
1 was completed in 2003. Affidavit of Mark Green at U 5 (R. 4128-4134).6 
22. Like the Apex 1 plant and many other combined cycle plants, 
Currant Creek is a 2x1 combined cycle design, meaning it has two natural gas 
turbine generators and a single steam turbine generator. Currant Creek and 
Apex 1 were both designed and engineered based on Shaw/Stone & Webster's 
standard plant design for a 2x1 combined cycle power plant with air cooling. 
Currant Creek, like Apex 1, is based on a recognized and proven 2x1 combined 
6
 A copy of Mark Green's Affidavit is included in the addendum at Tab 7. 
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cycle configuration that is well understood and widely utilized in the electric 
power plant industry. Id. at U 8 (R. 4128-4134). 
23. Although there are minor differences in output rating between Apex 
1 and Currant Creek,7 the plants are essentially sisters. Both plants utilize two 
General Electric 7FA7241 gas turbines with almost identical nominal ratings; both 
plants have two similarly sized heat recovery steam generators equipped with 
selective catalytic reduction systems; both plants have a single similarly sized 
steam turbine generator; both plants have duct firing with similar capability; both 
plants are 100% dry (air) cooled; and both plants are designed for zero 
wastewater discharge. Id. at U 7 (R. 4128-4134). 
24. In 2002, a combined cycle plant in a 2x1 configuration was not a 
secret. A combined cycle plant with General Electric 7FA gas turbines was not a 
secret. A combined cycle plant with heat recovery steam generators was not a 
secret. A combined cycle plant with additional duct burner capacity was not a 
secret. A combined cycle plant with a steam turbine generator was not a secret. 
A combined cycle plant with air cooling was not a secret. A combined cycle plant 
designed for zero wastewater discharge was not a secret. All of these features 
of a combined cycle power plant were openly used in the electric generation 
industry well before 2002. Id. at U 8 (R. 4128-4134). 
1
 The minor differences are due primarily to differences in elevation, and higher 
expected temperatures and the use of steam injection at Apex 1. 
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25. At PacifiCorp's request, Shaw/Stone & Webster assembled a 
detailed project cost analysis for Currant Creek, which was a second-level design 
(i.e., beyond the conceptual or preliminary design), so that PacifiCorp would have 
available a cost estimate that was worthy of consideration for budgetary 
purposes and in a Public Service Commission process. Shaw/Stone & 
Webster's employees began their work on the project cost analysis in late April 
2003 and submitted the project cost analysis to PacifiCorp in a large binder on or 
about June 9, 2003. Completing this work during the period from late April to 
early June was not unusual for Shaw/Stone & Webster. The detailed project cost 
analysis utilized Shaw/Stone & Webster's in-house databases and reference 
plant designs, and was a normal part of Shaw/Stone & Webster's regular 
business designing and engineering combined cycle power plants like Currant 
Creek, Apex 1, and other combined cycle plants in the United States and around 
the world. Id. at fflj 9, 11 (R. 4128-4134); Thurgood Depo. at p. 182 (R. 9111). 
26. PacifiCorp used Shaw/Stone & Webster's project cost analysis, plus 
operational and maintenance information that was furnished by General Electric, 
as well as operational and maintenance studies that PacifiCorp had already 
performed on its gas fired Gadsby plant, and manpower requirements that 
PacifiCorp developed from its Hermiston combined cycle plant in Oregon, and 
put this information together with financial information compiled by its financial 
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analyst, to form its Currant Creek project. See, Ian Andrews Depo. at pp. 227-
231 (R. 9446-9450). 
27. Currant Creek is located adjacent to the Mona switching station, 
where Currant Creek interconnects to PacifiCorp's transmission system. The 
Mona switching station is connected to three transmission lines that are operated 
at 345 kV and run north and south along the eastern edge of the Oquirrh 
Mountains through Juab County. Green Aff. at U 4 (R. 4128-4134); see also, 
CH2MHill Critical Issues Analysis Mona Site, deposition exhibit 363 at Bates No. 
PAC004986 (R. 9467-9468). 
28. The route of the 20" lateral gas line to bring natural gas to Currant 
Creek from Questar's Mainline 104 gas transmission pipeline was designed by 
Questar Pipeline Company. Questar not only designed the route of the lateral 
line, it performed the environmental work, obtained the necessary permits and 
rights of way, did all of the necessary engineering, and hired a contractor to 
construct the lateral line. Questar paid for all of the costs and maintains 
ownership of the lateral line. PacifiCorp has entered into long term contracts to 
re-pay Questar for the lateral line over time. Deposition of Lynn Arnold, taken on 
September 28, 2006, at pp. 4-6, 18-21, 24, 26, 31-32 (R. 9493-9504). 
29. The design, engineering and construction of Currant Creek 
represents Shaw/Stone & Webster's own efforts. Shaw/Stone & Webster did not 
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use any information from, or about, USA Power, USA Power Partners, Spring 
Canyon Energy, or the Spring Canyon Energy project, in any aspect of the 
Currant Creek power plant, whatsoever. Green Aff. at fl 14 (R. 4128-4134). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In moving for summary judgment, PacifiCorp set forth 29 paragraphs - the 
same set forth in this brief- of material facts. Under Rule 7(c)(3)(B), USA Power 
could have controverted those facts and/or provided a "separate statement of 
additional facts in dispute." USA Power did neither. Instead, it filibustered. The 
district court used nicer words, ruling that USA Power had "employed a practice 
contrary" to Rule 7 by "arguing about the implication of the facts instead of 
specifically controverting them with the factual record." 
On appeal, USA Power now argues that the district court erred in so ruling 
because USA Power had literally complied with the form of Rule 7(c)(3)(B). The 
gist of USA Power's argument is that because it quoted verbatim PacifiCorp's 
facts, "provided an explanation" of its position, and had citations to the record, 
there must be questions of material fact. But, to use an appropriate cliche, that 
elevates form over substance. Following the form of the rule does not mean that 
the facts were controverted. Although USA Power repeatedly used the word 
"disputed" followed by a lengthy text with references to the record, a careful 
reading of USA Power's responses, which the district court clearly performed, 
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shows that USA Power did not convert any of the material facts cited in 
PacifiCorp's 29 paragraphs. Therefore, as the district court held, PacifiCorp's 
three core groups of material facts were deemed admitted. 
USA Power's abuse of Rule 7 required the district court, in its words, "to 
engage in the tedious practice of separating fact from argument." In this brief we 
have attempted to reduce the tedium by using examples of USA Power's abuse. 
But unfortunately, this Court will of necessity be forced to review many of 
PacifiCorp's material facts and USA Power's purported "dispute" with those 
material facts. But reading USA Power's lengthy responses to PacifiCorp's 
material facts and concluding that, despite all the words used, USA Power has 
not actually controverted the material facts is not making "credibility" 
determinations or "weighing" the evidence. Rather, it is, in the district court's 
words, "separating fact from argument." And, just because USA Power cites to 
many other "facts," some of which may have been undisputed, does not 
necessarily controvert PacifiCorp's material facts. 
Thus, as detailed below, the district court correctly held that three core 
groups of facts were uncontroverted: (1) Panda had the idea first of building a 
power plant near Mona and had assembled the assets necessary to build such a 
plant, except for the water. PacifiCorp acquired Panda's development assets; (2) 
USA Power publicly disclosed the technical details of its power plant when it filed 
79 
for an air permit; (3) PacifiCorp's power plant was designed and built by 
Shaw/Stone & Webster. Shaw/Stone & Webster had already designed and 
commenced construction on Apex I, a nearly identical power plant in Las Vegas, 
before USA Power ever provided any information to PacifiCorp. 
Faced with these three core groups of facts being uncontroverted, USA 
Power struggled before the district court, and now on appeal, to say what was 
secret and what PacifiCorp used. It argued below (and again on appeal) that 
because PacifiCorp considered buying USA Power's development rights (as it 
had bought Panda's development rights), something USA Power had must be a 
trade secret. That argument fails both logically and factually. USA Power had, 
among other things, options on land and water and an approved air permit from 
the State of Utah. All had value, but none was a trade secret. 
The district court repeatedly asked counsel for USA Power to describe just 
what was secret and what PacifiCorp improperly used. Counsel's response was 
"the entire concept," and particularly the air-cooling, were trade secrets stolen by 
PacifiCorp. But as the undisputed facts show, the "concept" or "vision" of a 
power plant near Mona was never a trade secret. Panda had it first and USA 
Power clearly disclosed its entire concept when it filed for an air permit. And air-
cooling was not secret either. It was fully disclosed in the air permit and 
Shaw/Stone & Webster was already using it at Apex 1. Nor were any of the 
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other things USA Power now claims to be secret because they were not 
expressly disclosed in the air permit. We take up each of them and demonstrate 
that they were not secret. 
Finally, USA Power claims that while its many facts may not controvert 
PacifiCorp's material facts, USA Power's facts create circumstantial evidence of 
trade secrets and that PacifiCorp wrongfully misappropriated such secrets. 
First, there is no authority from any court that circumstantial evidence can create 
evidence of the existence of a trade secret. The use of circumstantial evidence 
is only allowed after the predicate of a trade secret is established. The law in 
Utah is clear that the plaintiff has the burden to prove by direct evidence that it 
has a trade secret. What some courts have said is that because there is seldom 
a "smoking gun" proving misappropriation, misappropriation can be shown 
circumstantially by comparing what is truly secret with what the defendant did. 
Therefore, whether or not Utah would accept circumstantial evidence to prove 
misappropriation is irrelevant here since USA Power never offered evidence of a 
trade secret. Second, the district court did accept USA Power's argument that 
circumstantial evidence could be used to show misappropriation, but held that 
USA Power's proffered circumstantial evidence was nothing more than 
speculation and argument. Similarities between the two power plant projects 
was not enough. There must have been similarities between both projects of 
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something that was innovative or secret. Nor was it enough to contend that 
because USA Power did various calculations that were not publicly disclosed, 
PacifiCorp "must have used" these calculations in order to build its power plant. 
As detailed below, these were not secret calculations and even if they were, USA 
Power never offered evidence comparing the water balances, energy penalty and 
performance curves done by or on behalf of PacifiCorp to show that they were 
similar to those done by or on behalf of USA Power. 
In sum, USA Power never presented evidence to the district court from 
which a jury could find a trade secret, let alone evidence that showed that 
PacifiCorp used anything that was secret. On appeal, USA Power does no 
better. The district court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PACIFICORP'S UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS WERE DEEMED 
ADMITTED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT CONTROVERTED. 
A party opposing a summary judgment motion is required by Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(c)(3)(A) to actually controvert the movant's material undisputed facts, or else 
those facts are deemed admitted. PacifiCorp's material facts were very specific 
and were incontrovertible. So, instead of controverting them, USA Power 
quibbled about the phrasing, stated that certain facts were disputed without 
demonstrating how or why, or in most instances repetitiously argued that 
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PacifiCorp "must have" stolen USA Power's information. The district court was 
not fooled. 
A. PacifiCorp's Material Facts Were Incontrovertible. 
In its opening summary judgment memorandum (R. 8555-8598), 
PacifiCorp provided twenty-nine (29) statements of undisputed facts (the same 
facts that are set forth above), each supported by sworn affidavits or appropriate 
deposition or other documentary evidence. In their opposition memorandum 
(R.5904-5995), USA Power responded with a specific statement that they did not 
dispute five (5) paragraphs of the undisputed facts.8 USA Power also omitted 
any mention of three (3) paragraphs of undisputed facts, thus admitting them.9 
Although USA Power purported to controvert the remaining paragraphs, 
the district court, after carefully reviewing what USA Power had submitted, found 
that USA Power had not actually controverted twenty (20) paragraphs,10 and 
therefore deemed those paragraphs as admitted.11 (Memorandum Decision at 
pp. 5-7, R. 7599-7624, included in addendum at Tab 1). 
B
 i.e., paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, and 25. 
9
 i.e., paragraphs 18, 27 and 28. 
10
 (i.e., paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29. 
11
 There were only three paragraphs of undisputed facts (i.e., paragraphs 4, 16, and 
19) that were either not specifically admitted by USA Power or were not found by the 
district court to be deemed admitted. We have included in the addendum at Tab 8 a 
verbatim restatement of these undisputed facts and USA Power's responses. It is 
readily apparent that these three paragraphs were also not controverted by USA 
Power. 
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According to the district court those undisputed facts established the 
following three core matters which met PacifiCorp's burden of presenting 
evidence that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether USA Power 
had any trade secrets, or that PacifiCorp used any information about USA 
Power's power plant project: 
(1) The undisputed facts identified Panda's independent 
development of a power plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's electrical 
transmission station, PacifiCorp's knowledge of Panda's development 
before ever meeting with the USA Power principals, and PacifiCorp's 
ultimate purchase of Panda's assets necessary for the development of the 
Currant Creek power plant in Mona. (Memorandum Decision at pp. 5-6); 
(2) The undisputed facts confirmed that Shaw/Stone & Webster 
designed and built a virtually identical sister plant to Currant Creek, known 
as the Apex 1 power plant, in Las Vegas, Nevada, that was already 
designed and under construction before the USA Power principals first met 
with PacifiCorp. The Currant Creek power plant represented PacifiCorp's 
and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. The Currant Creek power plant 
and the Apex 1 power plant, with all of their own component parts and 
technologies, were well understood and widely utilized in the electric power 
plant industry. The design, engineering and construction of the Currant 
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Creek power plant was not based upon nor utilized any information from or 
about USA Power. (Memorandum Decision at pp. 6-7); 
(3) The undisputed facts identified USA Power's public filings with 
the Utah Division of Air Quality, including its application for an air permit, 
which confirmed that USA Power's "concept," "vision," and claimed 
confidential information, were of public record, and were disclosed to 
PacifiCorp by the public record. (Memorandum Decision at p. 7) 
B. Utah R. Civ. P. 7 Required USA Power to Actually Controvert the 
Material Undisputed Facts. 
On summary judgment, if the responding party fails to controvert the 
moving party's material facts, the facts are deemed admitted. Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(A). 
In Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, 156 P. 3d 175,12 the court of 
appeals reviewed prior case law, Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration, and Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and concluded 
that the district court has discretion for a responding party's failure to comply with 
the Rule 7; it may grant the motion for summary judgment based on the other 
side's failure to comply with the requirements of the rule, or it may decide the 
motion on the merits. Id. 2007 UT App. 25 at "fl 9; see also, Salt Lake County v. 
12
 Included in the addendum at . 
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Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, 89 P. 3d 155; Anderson Development 
Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323. If the party opposing the motion for 
summary judgment fails to substantially comply with Rule 7, and the failure 
amounts to more than just a technical violation of the rule, the court is clearly 
justified in granting the motion for summary judgment for non-compliance with 
the rule. Id. at TJ12. Regardless of which course the district court takes, the law 
remains that "motions for summary judgment should be granted when 'there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law'." Id. at fl 4. 
USA Power argues on appeal that the district court erred because it 
wrongly insisted that USA Power had to "specifically" controvert PacifiCorp's 
facts. USA Power contends that all it needed to do to survive summary judgment 
was restate PacifiCorp's facts verbatim, give an explanation of the grounds for 
any dispute, and support the explanation with affidavits and discovery material. 
But the explanation of the grounds for the dispute and the cited evidence must 
actually controvert the moving party's material facts, otherwise Rule 7(c)(3)(A) 
and the word "controverted" have no meaning. 
When Rule 4-501 was replaced, the procedural content of the rule was 
located in Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) and (c)(3)(B). See id, fl 5, fn 1. While 
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revised Rule 7(c)(3)(A)13 does not use the word "specifically" controverted as did 
Rule 4-501,14 the two rules are comparable and the meaning of Rule 7 has not 
changed. Id. fl 8. The burden is still on the responding party to show that the 
fact is controverted, and to do so in a coherent manner. Id. fl 11. 
What the district court was looking for in USA Power's motion papers was 
an actual dispute about PacifiCorp's material facts. Instead, USA Power 
quibbled about PacifiCorp's phrasing, speculated about PacifiCorp's motives, 
and repetitiously argued USA Power's view of the world that was supposed to 
circumstantially prove that their asserted trade secrets had been 
misappropriated. The district court correctly observed that USA Power had not 
followed the rule: 
"[Plaintiffs have employed the practice contrary to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of 
arguing about the implication of the facts asserted instead of 
"specifically controverting" them with the factual record. This 
practice has required the Court to engage in the tedious exercise of 
13
 Rule 7(c)(3)(A) reads in relevant part: "[EJach fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
controverted by the responding party." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). (underline added). 
14
 Rule 4-501 required the party opposing a summary judgment motion to begin its 
opposition memorandum with a section containing a verbatim restatement of each of 
the movant's facts to which the non-movant claimed a genuine issue existed, 
followed by a concise statement of material facts which supported the non-movant's 
contention. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement that were properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record were deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless they were "specifically controverted" by the 
opposing party's statement. Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 (2)(B) (repealed) (included in 
the addendum at Tab 10). 
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separating fact from argument throughout plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
opposition." 
Memorandum Decision at page 5. 
C. Specific Examples Demonstrate USA Power's Non-Compliance With 
Rule 7. 
USA Power's blatant failure to follow Rule 7 can be found by examining 
USA Power's responses to the material undisputed facts. 
By way of example, we examine some of USA Power's responses to the 
undisputed material facts to demonstrate USA Power's non-compliance with the 
rule. 
1. The Uncontroverted Material Facts About Panda Energy. 
PacifiCorp separated its undisputed material facts into three core groups 
that demonstrated that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The first 
group of facts - undisputed facts nos. 1 through 1 1 - dealt with Panda Energy. 
By way of example, we refer just to undisputed facts nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 (with 
PacifiCorp's record references and citations omitted) and USA Power's 
responses in order to demonstrate USA Power's improper tactics and why these 
facts were deemed admitted. 
Undisputed Fact No. 1: 
In late 2000 and early 2001 a successful power plant 
developer from Texas, known as Panda Energy, began its 
development of a combined cycle power plant site 
immediately adjacent to PacifiCorp's switching station near 
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the town of Mona, in Juab County, Utah. The Deseret News 
reported Panda's plans in an article published July 19, 2001. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. PacifiCorp's description of Panda as "successful" is 
not a material fact but a self-serving statement. In fact, Panda 
never took any substantive steps to develop the Mona project 
besides buying the land ("which was amazingly cheap") and 
acquiring the meteorological data. (Barlow Depo. at 51; Ex. 
355] Panda's initial objective in 2001-2002 was to build a 
merchant plant, but the project had become "kind of iffy" when 
Panda's financing began to dwindle. [Barlow Depo. at 47, 
116]. 
As the district court held, USA Power did not controvert any of the material 
facts in this paragraph. (Memorandum Decision at p. 5). USA Power did not 
controvert the fact that Panda began its development efforts in 2000 and 2001, 
which was material because Panda selected Mona as the site for its combined 
cycle power plant before USA Power chose a much smaller 40 acre site VA mile 
to the North. (See USA Power's Real Estate Purchase Contract, dated January 
4, 2002) (R. 5139-5142). USA Power also failed to controvert the fact that 
Panda's plans were published in the Deseret News over a year before USA 
Power came to PacifiCorp with USA Power's idea to build a power plant. The 
publication of Panda's plans in the newspaper was material because the idea to 
build a combined cycle plant near Mona was no one's secret, and certainly not 
USA Power's. 
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The argument that USA Power substituted for actually controverting the 
material facts was also inaccurate. Panda did much more than acquire land and 
gather meteorological data for an air permit. By the time Panda met with 
PacifiCorp, Panda had already assembled all of the elements for Panda's power 
plant, except the acquisition of water. The extent of Panda's efforts was detailed 
in undisputed facts nos. 2, 3, 6 and 11. 
USA Power's pattern of non-compliance with Rule 7 was repeated in each 
response to the other numbered undisputed facts. In none did USA Power 
specifically dispute any fact. Instead, at best, USA Power cited to other "facts" 
that even if true, did not put PacifiCorp's facts in dispute. 
Undisputed Fact No. 2: 
By the end of April 2001, Panda had secured options to 
purchase 240 acres of land next to PacifiCorp's Mona 
switching station. The site was ideal for a combined cycle 
plant because of its immediate proximity to PacifiCorp's 
transmission system and high pressure natural gas 
transmission pipelines owned by Questar Pipeline Company 
("Questar") and Kern River Gas Transmission Company 
("Kern River"). 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. See Response to paragraph 1. The description by 
PacifiCorp of the Mona spot as "ideal" and "obvious" is not a 
material fact but rather a self-serving statement. In fact, 
Mona had never previously been the site of a power plant 
and was not seriously considered by PacifiCorp as a site prior 
to 2002. [Exs. 1-2, 354-55; Ted Depo. at 188-190]. 
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Although it responded to undisputed fact no. 2 with six lines of argument, 
USA Power did not controvert the material fact that by April 2001, Panda had 
already acquired options to purchase 240 acres for a power plant site next to 
PacifiCorp's Mona electrical switching station. This fact was important because it 
was a significant milestone for Panda's power plant development that was in 
place by the time Panda met with PacifiCorp and laid out Panda's plans to build 
a power plant over a year prior to PacifiCorp's introductory meeting with the USA 
Power principals, and the 240 acre site that Panda optioned ultimately became 
the site for the Currant Creek power plant. 
Furthermore, although undisputed fact no. 2 did not say that Mona was an 
"obvious" place to build a power plant, it was undisputed that the convenient 
confluence at Mona of PacifiCorp's 345 kV electric transmission system and 
Questar Pipeline Company's natural gas transmission line really did make Mona, 
Utah an "ideal place" to put a natural gas fired power plant. Rand Thurgood 
called Mona "ideal." Thurgood Depo. at 119:13 (R. 9084). Panda's Dave Barlow 
was more effusive. He testified that Mona was "absolutely perfect" for a power 
plant. Dave Barlow Depo. at 35:9 (R. 8609). Significantly, USA Power cited no 
testimony or other evidence to the contrary. 
Undisputed Fact No. 3: 
In addition to acquiring land, Panda took the following steps to 
develop its power plant, among others: 
i. hired a market consultant (R.W. Beck) to prepare a 
report assessing the electric power market within the 
state of Utah; 
ii. hired environmental and air quality firms to prepare an 
Environmental Site Evaluation and Planning Report 
and erect an on-site meteorological/monitoring station 
to gather meteorological data to support Panda's 
application to the Utah Division of Air Quality for an air 
permit; 
iii. met with PacifiCorp's transmission group in Portland, 
Oregon, to arrange for an Interconnection Study at 
Panda's cost to provide an analysis of the cost of 
interconnecting Panda's power plant to PacifiCorp's 
transmission system at the Mona switching station; 
iv. hired a lobbyist to lobby state and local officials; 
v. visited the Mona switching station with its engineers to 
design a transmission path from the power plant site 
to the switching station; 
vi. located the nearby Questar Mainline 104 and Kern 
River natural gas transmission pipelines using 
available maps and visible markers; 
vii. mapped out two alternate routes to place lateral gas 
lines to transport natural gas from Questar's and Kern 
River's gas transmission pipelines; and, hired a water 
lawyer to pursue the acquisition of water from at least 
three sources. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. See Response to paragraphs 1-2. The "steps" 
described by PacifiCorp are carefully phrased but actually 
reveal the limit of Panda's work, e.g. it "hired" a water lawyer 
but never found water, it "met" with PacifiCorp transmission 
and "visited" the switching station but never obtained a 
transmission agreement, it "hired" a market expert but never 
developed a financial analysis, it "located" the pipelines but 
never entered a supply agreement, it "hired" a lobbyist but 
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never obtained a property rezoning or an air permit. In sum, 
these steps added no value to the Panda project (and were 
not used in any way by PacifiCorp in its decision to site its 
project at Mona). [Exs. 301, 302, 355] The only valuable 
assets for the plant, as described by Thurgood in his 
deposition, were the land and the "met data" collected by 
Panda. In fact, even Panda's engineering work was not 
transferred to PacifiCorp because it was considered 
proprietary. [Thurgood Dep. at 118-128, 138-139]. 
Notice that not one of these facts was controverted in USA Power's 
response. These material undisputed facts not only established the elements 
Panda assembled for a Mona power plant site, including market reports, phase 1 
environmental assessment, interconnection study, transmission study, marketing 
study, land options, air dispersion protocol, meteorological data, etc. (see 
undisputed fact no. 11), but also demonstrated conclusively that the idea of 
putting a power plant next to the Mona switching station was not a secret or 
unique to USA Power. 
Undisputed Fact No. 6: 
Panda explained [to Rand Thurgood] the intended combustion 
technology of its plant based on Panda's standard plant design 
using General Electric 7FA gas turbines in a "2 on 1" (also 
referred to as 2x1) configuration. Panda explained how it was 
gathering a year's worth of meteorological data to support its 
application for an air permit. It explained how the electricity from 
the power plant would flow over PacifiCorp's transmission system 
from an interconnect at the Mona switching station. It explained 
how and where the natural gas would be transported to the plant 
from a new lateral pipeline connected to Questar's and Kern 
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River's transmission pipelines along one of two routes that Panda 
had mapped out. It explained how water could be acquired from 
Kennecott and piped to the plant. And, it touted the positive 
attitude of local zoning officials to a proposed zoning change and 
the enthusiastic response that Panda had received from 
legislative and community leaders. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. The description in the above paragraph is not 
supported by the citations. [See Barlow Dep. At 102-115; 
Thurgood Depo at 115-135] 
USA Power did not say how or why PacifiCorp's facts were not supported 
by the record. Nor did they direct the district court to contrary evidence. 
Although not necessary to sustain the district court, USA Power's brief response 
was also inaccurate.15 
15
 As demonstrated to the district court in PacifiCorp's reply memorandum (R. 6674-
6712), these material facts in paragraph no. 6 were supported by the record. Dave 
Barlow and Rand Thurgood did meet for the first time on June 19, 2001. Barlow Depo. 
at 102:14-103:11 (R. 8670). During the meeting, Barlow made a "[fjull presentation of 
everything that we had done just to show [Thurgood] everything we had completed." Id. 
at 106:16-18 (R. 8674). Barlow told Thurgood about the intended combustion 
technology of Panda's plant based on Panda's standard plant design using General 
Electric 7FA gas turbines in a "2-on-1" configuration. Id. at 104:16-105:11 (R. 8672), 
106:17-18 (R. 8674), 111:22-112:12 (R. 8679-8680). Barlow explained to PacifiCorp's 
transmission group in Portland, even before he met with Thurgood, that Panda was 
gathering a year's worth of meteorological data to support its application for an air 
permit. Id. at pages 37, 48-49 (R. 8611, 8622-8623). Barlow explained to Thurgood 
how the electricity from the power plant would flow over PacifiCorp's transmission 
system from an interconnect at the Mona switching station. Id. at 110:11-25 (R. 8678). 
Barlow also explained how and where the natural gas would be transported to the plant 
from a new lateral pipeline connected to Questar's and Kern River's transmission 
pipelines along one of two routes that Panda had mapped out. Id. at 106:19-107:13 (R. 
8674-8675), 111:8-14 (R. 8679). He explained how water could be acquired from 
Kennecott and piped to the plant. Id. at 111:15-21 (R. 8679). And, Barlow touted the 
positive attitude of local zoning officials to a proposed zoning change and the 
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In sum, the undisputed facts nos.1-11 concerning Panda, including its 
efforts to develop a power plant starting in 2000, amply supported the district 
court's conclusion that: 
"These undisputed facts identify Panda Energy's development of a 
power plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's transmission station, 
PacifiCorp's knowledge of Panda's development before ever 
meeting plaintiffs and PacifiCorp's ultimate purchase of Panda's 
assets necessary for the development of the Currant Creek Power 
plant in Mona .. . With respect to Panda, it is undisputed that Panda 
initially had the idea to build a combined cycle power plant in Mona, 
started its development efforts in late 2000, secured options to 
purchase 240 acres of land next to PacifiCorp's Mona transmission 
station, undertaken meteorological and other assessments pivotal to 
PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek and the publication of 
Panda's development in the Deseret News demonstrate the vision 
and concepts underlying the Currant Creek Power Plant in Mona 
was no secret and was not a trade secret of plaintiffs as defined 
under the Trade Secrets Act." 
Memorandum Decision at pp. 5-6. 
2. The Uncontroverted Material Facts About USA Power's Public 
Filings With The Division Of Air Quality. 
PacifiCorp's second group of core facts - undisputed facts nos. 12 through 
19 - dealt with the public documents that were part of USA Power's (actually 
Spring Canyon Energy's) application for an air permit (a/k/a Notice of Intent or 
NOI). These documents revealed that USA Power's power plant project near 
Mona was no secret. By way of example, we refer here just to undisputed facts 
enthusiastic response that Panda had received from legislative and community leaders. 
Thurgood Depo. at 120:18-121:1 (R. 9085-9086), 122:4-6 (R. 9087). 
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nos. 13 and 17 (with PacifiCorp's record references and citations omitted) and 
USA Power's responses to demonstrate why the district court correctly held that 
these facts were deemed admitted. 
Undisputed Fact No. 13: 
Spring Canyon's NOI not only identified the location of Spring 
Canyon's plant site, it laid out many of the details of the 
proposed plant. For instance, it identified the plant's 
combustion technology based on General Electric 7FA gas 
turbines, and it confirmed that the Spring Canyon plant would 
have heat recovery steam generators equipped with selective 
catalytic reduction systems, supplemental duct firing and a 
steam turbine generator. The NOI explained that the 
proposed plant would take natural gas from the two high 
pressure natural gas transmission sources in the area, 
meaning the Questar Mainline 104 and Kern River 
transmission pipelines, and that the proposed plant would 
interconnect to PacifiCorp's transmission system at the Mona 
switching station. The NOI identified the manufacturer of the 
proposed plants' pollution control equipment, the heat input 
rate for the gas turbine and the duct burners, and the 
expected capacities of the gas turbine generator and the 
steam turbine generator. According to Spring Canyon's 
public filing, Spring Canyon selected an air cooled condenser 
to air cool, rather than wet cool, the condensed steam from 
its plant, because an air cooled condenser uses less water. 
USA Power's Response: 
Not disputed, except for the material omissions. PacifiCorp 
fails to mention that the items identified by USA Power as 
part of their air permit application did not include the 
confidential detailed findings and studies USA Power had 
conducted over the past several months (and years) and 
based their design decisions upon them. Among other 
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important and confidential information the application did not 
include was the following items: 
1. A report from Waldron Engineering on the 
economic feasibility of the "2 on 1" combined cycle operation. 
2. A report from Waldron Engineering on the 
feasibility of operating Spring Canyon within the restrictions 
of the anticipated air permit. 
3. A report from Waldron Engineering on the 
feasibility of operating Spring Canyon within the boundaries 
of the anticipated water supply. 
4. A "Fatal Flaw Analysis" by ABB Consulting 
calculating the transferability of any electric power originated 
and sold by Spring Canyon. 
5. Scaled drawings by Waldron Engineering 
demonstrating how the generators, turbines and related 
buildings would fit together on site. 
6. Sales contracts showing price and option terms 
for land in Juab County. 
7. Sales contract showing location, price and option 
terms for water rights in Juab County. 
8. Legal opinions from Jody Williams and HRO 
regarding title to water rights for the Garret and Keyte 
properties. 
9. Marketing studies in the fall of 2002 and early 
2003 demonstrating the economic need for a 500 megawatt 
facility at Mona and potential cost savings to PacifiCorp. 
10. Pro forma economic assumptions, preliminary 
cost breakdown and detailed economic analysis (forty pages 
of single-spaced calculations) amortizing initial investment 
and factoring cost of fuel supply, financing, et al. for a long-
term power purchase agreement arising from the Mona site. 
[SeeExs. 10,11, and 16] 
11. Financial Pro formas that demonstrated the 
financial viability of the Spring Canyon project. fSee Exs. 10, 
11 and 16]. 
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These items were the confidential work product shared with 
PacifiCorp in 2002-2003 which demonstrated the actual 
financial viability of the proposed plant, and gave USA Power 
a competitive edge as the "first to market." 
The first line in USA Power's response admitted they were not disputing 
these material facts. We drew the district court's attention to the undisputed 
facts in paragraph 13 because the publicly available information that the Division 
of Air Quality maintained in its file for the USA Power project, including the 
Notice of Intent (i.e., application)(R. 4141-4172) and the Approval Order (i.e., air 
permit)(R. 4176-4186), disclosed the very information about USA Power's 
project that Ted Banasiewicz said in his deposition was "stolen" by PacifiCorp. 
For instance, Banasiewicz initially said that USA Power's selected location 
for a power plant was a secret that had been stolen by PacifiCorp.16 He then 
conceded that the public information in the Division's file gave the precise 
location for USA Power's proposed plant site.17 Banasiewicz said the type of 
gas turbines that USA Power intended for its power plant was a secret,18 but on 
cross-examination he confirmed that the public information listed the gas turbine 
manufacturer (General Electric) and the exact turbine model number 
(PG7241FA).19 When his lawyer asked the questions, Banasiewicz said that 
16
 Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at page 370 (R. 6843). 
17
 Id. at pages 804-805 (R. 6856-6857). 
18
 Id. at pages 370-371 (R. 6843-6844). 
19
 Id. at page 806 (R. 6858). 
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USA Power's plan to supplement its proposed plant's megawatt output with duct 
firing was a secret that had been stolen by PacifiCorp,20 but when he was cross-
examined, Banasiewicz conceded that the public air permit file for USA Power 
gave these details about duct firing, too.21 As shown in its appellate brief, USA 
Power's theme was that PacifiCorp "stole" their secret idea to air-cool, rather 
than water-cool, Currant Creek. All anyone had to do was read the public file to 
realize that USA Power planned to air-cool their power plant in order to cut down 
on the amount of water the plant would use.22 It was no secret. Banasiewicz 
also said that PacifiCorp stole USA Power's secret to transport natural gas to 
Mona through Questar's gas transmission line23 and that PacifiCorp stole the 
idea to transmit electricity from the plant to PacifiCorp's own nearby electrical 
switching station.24 In the end, all of this information was in the public 
documents.25 
In short, as soon as USA Power applied for an air permit with the Division 
of Air Quality, its "vision" and "concept" for a power plant near Mona, including 
the location and power plant technology, was, as a matter of law, not a trade 
secret. None of the 11 items listed in USA Power's response altered those facts. 
20
 Id. at pages 372-373 (R. 6845-6846). 
21
 Id. at page 803 (R. 6855). 
22
 Id. at page 804, 810 (R. 6856, 6862). 
23
 Id. at page 377 (R. 6850). 
24
 Id. at pages 374-375 (R. 6847-6848). 
25
 Id. at pages 800-814 (R. 6852-6866). 
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As we discuss later in this brief, USA Power never demonstrated that 
anything they had, let alone the eleven items they listed in their response to 
undisputed fact no. 13, was a trade secret or confidential information, or that 
PacifiCorp used any of the information. 
The information furnished by Waldron Engineering was, according to the 
engineer who created it, nothing more than preliminary calculations that were not 
secret. See pp. 62-69, infra. 
The Fatal Flaw analysis that was prepared for USA Power (R. 5117) was 
an analysis of PacifiCorp's own transmission system and load forecast - hardly a 
secret to PacifiCorp. USA Power never identified how or why this information 
was a trade secret, or that PacifiCorp ever used the information. 
The precise location of USA Power's proposed plant site was identified in 
its public air permit. (R. 4176, 4178). Its option contract to acquire that 40 acre 
parcel was irrelevant to PacifiCorp. Panda was the first to acquire the options to 
purchase its 240 acre parcel immediately adjacent to PacifiCorp's electrical 
switching station and PacifiCorp purchased those land options from Panda.26 
USA Power never provided the district court with evidence that its land options, 
which were contracts with third parties, were trade secrets, or that PacifiCorp 
ever made use of the information. 
See Assignment and Assumption Agreement (R. 9205-9208). 
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The list of owners of water rights in the State of Utah is public information, 
and when the two individuals (Keyte & Garrett) from whom USA Power had 
optioned water rights filed Change Applications with the State Engineer, that 
information became public too.27 Although the price USA Power offered to pay 
for its water rights may have been confidential, it was no trade secret and USA 
Power never provided evidence to the district court that it was. More 
importantly, USA Power never provided evidence that the price was relevant or 
material to what PacifiCorp actually did. It is undisputed that PacifiCorp acquired 
its water for Currant Creek from W.W. Ranches, LLC, which was owned by two 
experienced water rights lawyers.28 They conceived the idea of taking water 
rights originating in a different county that had been designated for a different 
purpose and changing the location and use to suit PacifiCorp's needs.29 The 
price that W.W. Ranches charged PacifiCorp for irrigation company stock bore 
no relationship to the price USA Power had agreed to pay Messrs. Keyte and 
Garrett for their certificated water rights.30 What PacifiCorp paid W.W. Ranches 
for irrigation company stock was based on the price W.W. Ranches had paid to 
acquire the water, how long they had held it, how risky the transaction was, the 
27
 Affidavit of Jody L. Williams at fflf 18-20 (R. 8251 -8257). 
28
 See Affidavit of Marc T. Wangsgard. (R. 8467-8470)(included in addendum at Tab 
11). 
29
 /d.1|10(R. 8469). 
30
 See Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde (R. 8484-8498) at p. 9 (R. 8494); see also, Revised 
and Restated Water Rights Purchase Agreement (R. 8471-8483) at p. 3 (R. 8473). 
opportunity to market the water somewhere else and what the market would 
bear.31 USA Power offered the district court no evidence to the contrary. 
USA Power commissioned a marketing study (R. 5088) for their own 
purposes to determine which electric utility companies (including PacifiCorp) 
were potential customers for the electricity USA Power expected to produce if 
they ever built a power plant. However, every two years during the period 2000-
2005, PacifiCorp published its own strategic report known as its Integrated 
Resource Plan (R. 5088p - 5088v and 5088k-5088n) that assessed the needs 
for electricity in its own market.32 USA Power never provided evidence to the 
district court that their marketing study was a trade secret, or that PacifiCorp ever 
made use of the study. 
Finally, aside from the fact that USA Power never provided evidence to the 
district court that their pro formas (R. 10,073-10,090) were trade secrets, those 
pro formas were useless to PacifiCorp. USA Power's pro formas were an 
attempt to estimate the "profit" USA Power might make from the sales of 
electricity from their proposed power plant to a utility company such as 
PacifiCorp. However, within PacifiCorp's regulated environment the concept of a 
"profit" has absolutely no meaning. Rather, PacifiCorp is allowed a specified rate 
31
 Id. at H13 (R. 8469). 
32
 Thurgood depo. at pp. 52-58 (R. 9057-9063), 105-106 (R. 9073-9074). 
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invested capital and any excess is returned to its customers. Whether USA 
Power's pro formas were confidential, or not, they had no relevance to 
PacifiCorp's business.34 We asked Dave Graeber point blank whether it was 
USA Power's contention that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's pro 
formas. His vague answer demonstrated that he had no evidence that 
PacifiCorp made any use of the information.35 
During discovery, PacifiCorp produced its own complex financial 
projections for Currant Creek that took into account its allowed regulatory 
recovery. If PacifiCorp had misappropriated USA Power's pro formas, USA 
Power should have been able to provide evidence of misappropriation by 
offering the district court a comparison of USA Power's pro formas and 
PacifiCorp's financial projections. Significantly, USA Power did not. 
" Terrell Spackman Depo. at pages 14 (R. 7018), 23-27 (R. 7019-7023), 37-49 (R. 
7024-7037). 
34
 Id. 
35
 Q. (By Mr. Badger) Do you contend that PacifiCorp misappropriated the pro formas 
found in volume three? 
MS. TOMSIC: I object to the question on the grounds it calls for a legal 
conclusion, on the grounds there is lack of foundation, on the grounds the 
Second Amended Complaint speaks for itself. 
A. THE WITNESS: The pro formas tied the entire concept that we provided and 
demonstrated to PacifiCorp in volumes one, two and three and included a pro forma 
that determined in our estimation, and in all probability in the estimation of 
PacifiCorp, that that design was feasible, doable, achievable and efficiently put 
together so that it represented a power plant opportunity that they did not 
contemplate before they received volumes one, two, and three. 
Deposition of David Graeber at 443:1-16 (R. 1420). 
Af. 
Undisputed Fact No. 17: 
A week prior to the August 22, 2002 meeting, PacifiCorp's Ian 
Andrews requested and immediately received a faxed copy of 
Spring Canyon's NOI from the Division of Air Quality. He 
immediately e-mailed Rand Thurgood outlining details of the 
NOI. Ian Andrews Aff. atffi] 3-4, including e-mail dated 
August 15, 2002 (Bates No. 31456) attached thereto; Ian 
Andrews Deposition taken February 15, 2006 at pp. 79-82, 
attached hereto as Exhibit P. 
USA Power's Response: 
"Disputed. The repeated use of the word "immediately" is not 
an undisputed material fact and is self-serving. 
Clearly, USA Power did not controvert the material facts. 
What was material and undisputed was that PacifiCorp knew all about 
USA Power's plans before USA Power provided any of its claimed "confidential 
information" to PacifiCorp. The public filings also announced that USA Power 
believed (accurately or not) they had an economically and technically viable 
project; otherwise they would not have bothered to seek an air permit, which was 
both an expensive and time consuming endeavor. 
Thus, as demonstrated by this discussion of undisputed facts nos. 13 and 
17, the district court was correct in concluding the following: 
"The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 13 and 17, 
which identify Spring Canyon's public filings and application for an 
air permit, are not 'specifically controverted' and thus deemed 
admitted. These undisputed material facts demonstrate that 
plaintiffs' concept, vision and claimed confidential information were 
of public record, and were disclosed to PacifiCorp by the public 
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record. Consequently, the information contained therein being 
generally known and readily ascertainable from the public record by 
PacifiCorp and other persons in the field cannot possibly constitute 
trade secrets as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4): 
Memorandum Decision at page 7. 
3. The Uncontroverted Material Facts About Shaw/Stone & 
Webster. 
PacifiCorp's third group of core undisputed facts - nos. 20 through 29 -
dealt with the design, engineering and construction of the Currant Creek power 
plant by Shaw/Stone & Webster. Again, although USA Power did not controvert 
any of these undisputed facts, by way of example we refer to undisputed facts 
Nos. 22, 23, 24 and 29 (with PacifiCorp's record references and citations 
omitted) and USA Power's responses to demonstrate that USA Power did not 
comply with Rule 7 and why these facts were deemed admitted. 
Undisputed Fact No. 22: 
Like the Apex 1 plant and many other combined cycle plants, 
Currant Creek is a 2x1 combined cycle design, meaning it 
has two natural gas turbine generators and a single steam 
turbine generator. Currant Creek and Apex 1 were both 
designed and engineered based on Shaw/Stone & Webster's 
standard plant design for a 2x1 combined cycle power plant 
with air cooling. Currant Creek, like Apex 1, is based on a 
recognized and proven 2x1 combined cycle configuration that 
is well understood and widely utilized in the electric power 
plant industry. 
A9 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. All the statements related here by PacifiCorp, 
including its description of various technologies are 
"recognized," "proven," "well understood" and "widely utilized," 
are not statements of material fact but rather opinions. In fact, 
Currant Creek was developed based upon the concept put 
forward by USA Power Partners in their Spring Canyon project. 
[Ted Dep. at 372-379, 402-407] See Response to paragraph 
21. 
Undisputed Fact No. 23: 
Although there are minor differences in output rating between 
Apex 1 and Currant Creek, the plants are essentially sisters. 
Both plants utilize two General Electric 7FA7241 gas turbines 
with almost identical nominal ratings; both plants have two 
similarly sized heat recovery steam generators equipped with 
selective catalytic reduction systems; both plants have a 
single similarly sized steam turbine generator; both plants 
have duct firing with similar capability; both plants are 100% 
dry (air) cooled; and both plants are designed for zero 
wastewater discharge. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. The statements related here by PacifiCorp are not 
statements of material facts but rather opinions. The site 
conditions at Mona were substantially different than Las 
Vegas. This is both a reason why site-specific testing was 
essential at Mona and why Thurgood was initially skeptical of 
USA Powers' idea to construct a plant utilizing dry-cooling at 
that elevation. See PSF Nos. 11-26, 33-41. 
Undisputed Fact No. 24 
In 2002, a combined cycle plant in a 2x1 configuration was 
not a secret. A combined cycle plant with General Electric 
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7FA gas turbines was not a secret. A combined cycle plant 
with heat recovery steam generators was not a secret. A 
combined cycle plant with additional duct burner capacity was 
not a secret; a combined cycle plant with a steam turbine 
generator was not a secret. A combined cycle plant with air 
cooling was not a secret. A combined cycle plant designed 
for zero wastewater discharge was not a secret. All of these 
features of a combined cycle power plant were openly used in 
the electric generation industry well before 2002. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. The characterization of plaintiffs' claim here 
misrepresents the essence of the claim. The surface 
characteristics and actual function of the proposed power 
plant is not a trade secret - it was (and is) visible to the 
public. The trade secret consisted of the combination of the 
individual details, and underlying testing, data and evaluation, 
which formed the Spring Canyon vision and demonstrated its 
technical and financial viability at an extremely challenging 
physical location - this vision was subsequently was built as 
Currant Creek. [Ted Dep. At 372-379, 402-407] See 
Response to paragraph 13; PSF Nos. 1-26. 
Undisputed Fact No. 29: 
The design, engineering and construction of Currant Creek 
represents Shaw/Stone & Webster's own efforts. Shaw/Stone 
& Webster did not use any information from, or about, USA 
Power, USA Power Partners, Spring Canyon Energy, or the 
Spring Canyon Energy project, in any aspect of the Currant 
Creek power plant, whatsoever. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. As stated in response to paragraph 23-25, Shaw did not 
become involved in the Currant Creek project until two months after 
PacifiCorp had purchased the Mona site and committed all its 
resources to developing a project there. This decision - which was 
<n 
the only tangible response by Thurgood's group in acquiring an 
option to respond to PacifiCorp's own RFP - was made in January -
February 2003 after PacifiCorp reviewed all the confidential 
information and work product of Spring Canyon for developing an 
air-cooled 500-megawatt combined cycle power plant at that site. 
Shaw/Stone & Webster had no role in that process [Thurgood Dep. 
at 72-73]. 
It is clear that USA Power did not controvert these material facts which 
were all supported by the affidavit of Mark Green, Shaw/Stone & Webster's 
project manager. Significantly, USA Power did not cite to any evidence disputing 
that: (1) Apex 1 was virtually identical to the Currant Creek power plant; (2) 
Shaw/Stone & Webster designed and constructed both Apex 1 and Currant 
Creek with their own work; and, (3) both Apex 1 and Currant Creek were built 
using Shaw/Stone & Webster's standard design well known in the industry. 
Thus, the district court was correct in concluding that: 
"With respect to Shaw/Stone & Webster, it is undisputed that they 
built a sister plant to the Currant Creek Power Plant (Apex 1), and 
that the Currant Creek Power Plant represents PacifiCorp's and 
Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. That the Currant Creek Power 
Plant and Apex 1 Power Plant with all of their own component parts 
and technologies are well understood and widely utilized in the 
electric power plant industry. Significantly, plaintiffs concede in their 
response to PacifiCorp's Undisputed Fact No. 24 that 'The surface 
characteristics and actual function of the proposed power plant is 
not a trade secret - it was (and is) visible to the public.' The Court 
finds the undisputed material facts establish that the design, 
engineering and construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was 
not based upon nor utilized any information from or about USA 
Power, USA Power Partners, Spring Canyon Energy or the Spring 
Canyon Energy project (Undisputed Fact No. 29)." 
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Memorandum Decision at pp. 6-7. 
II. USA POWER DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
IT HAD A TRADE SECRET. 
As the movant, PacifiCorp had the initial burden to present evidence 
establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Orvis v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, U 16,177 P. 3d 600. PacifiCorp met its burden; its facts 
were undisputed. The burden then shifted to USA Power to demonstrate that 
there was a genuine issue for trial as to whether USA Power had a trade secret 
and whether PacifiCorp misappropriated the trade secret or breached the 
confidentiality agreement? Id. at ffl[ 16-18. As demonstrated below, the district 
court correctly held that USA Power did not meet its burden 
A. A Trade Secret First and Foremost Has To Be A Secret. 
The Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines trade secret misappropriation 
as follows: 
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or 
implied consent by a person who: 
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(B) acquired [the trade secret] under circumstances giving rise to a 
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2)(b)(i)(B). The threshold issue in determining 
whether a trade secret has been misappropriated is "whether, in fact, there is a 
trade secret to be misappropriated." Medspring Group v. Feng, 368 F. Supp. 2d 
1270 (D. Utah 2005)(included in the addendum at Tab 12) (quoting 
Microbiological Res. Corp. v. Muna, 625 P. 2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981)) (included in 
the addendum at Tab 13). The Trade Secrets Act defines a Trade Secret as: 
[information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(1999). The burden is on the plaintiff to prove the 
existence of a trade secret, and there is no presumption in his favor. Utah 
Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 
1290, 1311 (D. Utah 1999)(included in the addendum at Tab 14) (citing Muna at 
696). In order to constitute a trade secret, the information "must be unknown; it 
should not be in the public domain nor within the knowledge of the trade . . . " Id. 
(citing Muna at 696). 
USA Power had the burden to bring forth specific trade secret information 
that was not generally known or readily ascertainable. Id. at 1312. "This 
standard cannot be viewed as whether the information is generally known and 
readily ascertainable to the general public, but, based on [PacifiCorp's] 
knowledge and experience, whether the information was known or ascertainable 
to [PacifiCorp]." Id. (citing Muna at 699). "[T]he 'subject matter of the trade 
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secret must be unknown; it should not be in the public domain or within the 
knowledge of the trade'." Id. Thus, even if the supposedly secret information was 
not known by PacifiCorp, such information that is generally and widely known 
within the electric power generation industry cannot be a trade secret within the 
meaning of the Trade Secrets Act. See, Medspring Group, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 
1278. 
It was USA Power's burden to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue 
for trial as to whether it had a trade secret. As we demonstrate below, USA 
Power failed to meet its burden. 
B. What USA Power Claimed Were Trade Secrets Were Nothing More 
Than The Similarities Common To All Combined Cycle Power Plants 
From the inception of this lawsuit, USA Power routinely sidestepped their 
burden to identify their trade secret(s). Instead of identifying anything secret, 
they argued that they must have had a trade secret because PacifiCorp at one 
point made a non-binding offer to purchase USA Power's development rights.36 
While it is true that PacifiCorp did make a non-binding "expression of interest", 
subject to further investigation, to purchase USA Power's development rights37 
(including its land and water rights options and its air permit that the Division of 
36
 Rand Thurgood thought that the material he received from Ted Banasiewicz, aside 
from the air permit (a public document), was remedial engineering and had no value. 
Thurgood Depo. at page 322 (R. 6733). 
37
 Id. at pages 357 (R. 6734), 375-376 (R. 6735-6736), 414-415 (R. 6737-6738). 
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Air Quality had approved for a power plant one-half the size of Currant Creek), a 
deal was never reached.38 But extending a non-binding "expression of interest" 
to possibly purchase these assets did not make them trade secrets. At best, it 
showed only that PacifiCorp at one time thought that these assets had some 
value to PacifiCorp which was worth further investigation. 
Each of USA Power's principals was deposed and repeatedly asked to 
identify their trade secrets. Asked in his deposition to create a written list, Ted 
Banasiewicz wrote down a list of things which, as it turned out, were primarily the 
similarities between USA Power's proposed power plant and Currant Creek.39 
Because Currant Creek is the sister plant of Apex 1, Banasiewicz's list of 
supposed trade secrets also described Apex 1. 
When questioned about each item on his list, Banasiewicz conceded that 
the features of Currant Creek and USA Power's plant were found in every one of 
the dozens of combined cycle power plant he had ever visited.40 Significantly, 
PacifiCorp gave three reasons why it cut off its negotiations to acquire Spring 
Canyon's land and water options and air permit: (1) PacifiCorp had acquired 
Panda's assets, which was all PacifiCorp needed; (2) the Utah Division of Air Quality 
had advised PacifiCorp that it would not be able to use the air permit that had been 
issued to USA Power; and, (3) the price USA Power was asking was simply too 
high. Rand Thurgood 30(b)(6) Depo. at pages 29-32, 35 (R. 6740-6744, 6746). 
Ted Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 672-688 (R. 9218-9231); See deposition exhibit 166 
(R. 10386 - a page from a large easel pad - too large to be hyper-linked). 
Ted Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 691-708, 714 (R. 9234-9251, 9253). 
55 
he admitted that there was nothing secret about air-cooling a power plant.41 
Indeed, Apex 1, like Currant Creek and many other combined cycle power 
plants, is air-cooled.42 
After giving this testimony, Banasiewicz went to lunch with his attorney. 
When he returned he testified that USA Power's trade secret was actually their 
"entire project concept" for a combined cycle power plant near Mona.43 
However, when pressed by the district court at oral argument, USA Power was 
never able to identify anything that met the definition of a trade secret. 
C. USA Power's Vague Notion of its "Vision" For A Power Plant Was 
Not A Trade Secret. 
In response to PacifiCorp's summary judgment motion, USA Power set out 
the following explanation of their supposed trade secret: 
"The trade secret consisted of the combination of individual 
details, and underlying testing, data and evaluation, which 
formed the Spring Canyon Vision and demonstrated its 
technical and financial viability at an extremely challenging 
physical location - this vision was built as Currant Creek."44 
(bold in original). 
"USA Power has repeatedly and narrowly defined its trade 
secrets as the concept; site-specific modeling, evaluations 
and consequent findings that provided the formula for the 
41
 Id. at 708:11-709:4 (R. 9251). 
42
 See, undisputed facts no. 23. 
43
 Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 738-749 (R. 9254-9265). 
44
 See USA Power's opposition memorandum at page xxiv (R. 5932). 
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Spring Canyon development; and the financial pro forma that 
demonstrated the development was economically viable. 
The totality of the development and the interrelation of its 
parts which formed USA Power's trade secret are 
represented by Volumes 1-3 and the related information 
presented to PacifiCorp between September 11, 2002 and 
March 2003. It was this formula and 'proof of viability' which 
USA Power presented to PacifiCorp and which PacifiCorp 
utilized to develop and accelerate the development of Currant 
Creek. The misappropriation allowed PacifiCorp to skip the 
crucial, time consuming and expensive development stage.'"*5 
The district court struggled with this vague statement during USA Power's 
lengthy oral argument and repeatedly asked USA Power's counsel which 
combination of factors for USA Power's proposed power plant were not 
commonly known in the industry.46 The district court obviously focused on the 
proper inquiry and counsel had a difficult time answering. When the district court 
continued to press, the answer finally came, although no less vague than before. 
Counsel responded: 
"What is the trade secret is the financial viability, the viability of 
these factors put together. The factors themselves are not 
extraordinary. Air-cooling is unusual but they themselves are 
nothing that's novel, for example, but it's the work product that was 
put in to pull these factors together, that is the trade secret. It's the 
viability. It's the proof of viability. That's the trade secret. "47 
The district court continued to press for a specific secret that was unknown, 
not in the public domain, and not within the knowledge of the trade. Counsel's 
45 See id. at page 15. 
47
 Id. 222:18-25. 
46
 Tr. 9/24/07 vol.1, at page 218:18 - 222:16. 
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final response was that the trade secret was the work USA Power had done to 
demonstrate that an air-cooled power plant would be profitable to USA Power: 
The Court: And again, the most important factor you're relying 
on for that site specific evaluation is the feasibility of 
the dry cooling process at Mona? 
Mr. Peterson: Yes sir. 
The Court: Is that your strongest point? 
Mr. Peterson: Yes. 
The Court: Is it your only point that you're relying on in 
identifying it as a trade secret? 
Mr. Peterson: No, Your Honor, because as I said, the overall 
combination of details is the fact we showed that to 
be profitable. It's the air cooling -
The Court: Profitable as a dry cooling facility. 
Mr. Peterson: As a dry cooling facility, yes, Your Honor. I mean, 
we showed that basically the entire project would be 
viable but the dry cooling as I said, that's where you 
need to have specific testing, precise testing and we 
were the only ones that did it. 
The Court: Move on. Thank you.48 
Not only did USA Power not demonstrate that this was a trade secret, USA 
Power's engineer had earlier testified in his deposition that no analysis was ever 
done to weigh the economics of air-cooling against the water-cooling alternative, 
and USA Power's choice of an air-cooled power plant was public information. 
Id. at 239:25-240:17 
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Air-cooling a combined cycle power plant means that the steam exiting the 
steam turbine is condensed back to water droplets by means of an air-cooled 
condenser (like a big automobile radiator, in this case with 30 very large fans). 
Air-cooling is a well understood technology that is always a viable option for a 
combined cycle plant, although it is not necessarily the most economical 
alternative.49 The alternative to air-cooling is a water-cooled method that uses 10 
times more water.50 USA Power's expert published a paper explaining that air-
cooling can be designed to work under environmental conditions that are 
expected to occur 99.44% of the time.51 Currant Creek at Mona, and Apex 1 in 
Las Vegas, are both air-cooled. In the end, whether to go with water-cooling or 
air-cooling is an economic decision driven by the availability and cost of water 
and the impact an air-cooled condenser has on plant performance.52 
Air-cooling Currant Creek was never PacifiCorp's first choice, nor was it 
USA Power's first choice. PacifiCorp ran its own extensive economic analysis 
(which was produced during discovery), which took into account its anticipated 
regulatory recovery, the cost of water, the cost of equipment, and the impact an 
49
 Rand Thurgood Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition at pp. 117, 121-122, 126 (R. 9149-9151, 
9155); Ian Andrews depo. at pp. 159-160 (R. 6764-6765), 221-222. (R. 9444-9445). 
50
 See Power magazine article in addendum at Tab 4. 
51
 See Wayne C. Micheletti and John M. Burns, Estimating Energy Penalties For Wet 
and Dry Cooling Systems At New Power Plants, deposition exhibit No. 425 
(R. 6777-6790) at p. 5 (R. 6781). 
52
 Ray Racine Depo. at pages 39-41 (R. 6871-6873). 
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air cooled condenser would have on plant performance, and concluded that 
water-cooling Currant Creek was the most economical cooling alternative.53 The 
company's management even approved the expenditure of $16.0 million to 
acquire enough water to water-cool Currant Creek.54 However, water ultimately 
proved to be too scarce and the agricultural area in and around Mona was in the 
middle of a draught, so PacifiCorp changed course and instead built a less 
economical air-cooled power plant.55 
USA Power's counsel repeatedly told the district court that USA Power's 
engineers had done "literally years of testing" of air-cooling versus water-cooling 
to determine if an air-cooled power plant design was viable for Mona,56 Although 
Ted Banasiewicz testified in his deposition in response to his own attorney's 
questioning that he had instructed USA Power's engineer, Ray Racine, to 
perform "testing" that Banasiewicz described as: (1) an analysis of the amount of 
water required to water-cool and air-cool a power plant; and (2) the identification 
of the capital costs associated with the two cooling methods (which was clearly 
See deposition exhibit 369 (R. 9634-9636) and deposition exhibit 367 (R. 8428-
8465); see also, fn. 55. 
Id. 
See, deposition exhibit 375 (R. 9647-9691 )(included in addendum at Tab 15); 
Thurgood 30(b)(6) depo. at pp. 93-114 (R. 9127-9148), 117 (R. 9149), 121-130 (R. 
9150-9159); Thurgood depo. at pp. 481-482 (R. 9123-9124); Ian Andrews depo. at 
pp. 146-147 (R. 6760-6761). 
Tr. at 223:15-19. 
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not testing), Ray Racine testified in his deposition that he did no testing. He 
merely performed preliminary calculations adding up the number of gallons of 
water that a water-cooled plant design would use so that USA Power could 
decide how much water it would need.58 Mr. Racine further testified that an 
analysis was never performed to compare the relative economics of water-
cooling versus air-cooling.59 Had Racine performed such an economic analysis, 
USA Power certainly could have compared it for any similarities against 
PacifiCorp's own economic analysis that was produced during discovery.60 No 
comparison was ever offered. 
Mr. Racine also revealed, not surprisingly, that the sheer expense of 
acquiring enough water, not "years of testing," drove USA Power's decision to 
opt for an air-cooled plant design.61 
As with its many of its other claimed secrets, USA Power's air permit 
application explained that USA Power's proposed plant was to be air-cooled. In 
other words, that was no secret. In describing the proposed plant, the NOI 
stated: "An air-cooled condenser will condense spent steam back into water for 
recycling to the [boiler]. Use of the dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces 
57
 Ted Banasiewicz Depo at 231:25-233:5 (R. 2154-2156). 
58
 Ray Racine Depo. at pages 103:11-23 (R. 6897). 
59
 Ray Racine Depo. at pages 39-42 (R. 6871-6874). 
60
 Seefn. 55. 
61
 Seefn. 59. 
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the plant's water usage." USA Power's conclusion that an air-cooled design 
would be profitable to USA Power was obviously implicit in its decision to apply 
for an air permit. Again, that was no secret. 
Having questioned its attorney and having considered USA Power's vague 
written statements of its supposed trade secrets, the district court correctly 
decided that: 
"The Court finds from the undisputed material facts set forth herein, 
in plaintiff's Memorandum in opposition, and plaintiff's oral 
argument, that plaintiffs have not defined with sufficient particularity 
or precision what constitutes the trade secrets which PacifiCorp 
allegedly misappropriated. Instead, plaintiffs allude to the trade 
secrets as consisting of their "project concept," "vision," "formula," 
and "test data" for the Spring Canyon Power Plant. However, these 
vague and conclusory assertions fall short of actually describing 
those specific features of the power plant development, including 
specific features of the data and formula which were not generally 
known and not readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp .. . Plaintiffs' 
identifying and labeling of documents they claim contain trade 
secret information, including the economic and technical viability of 
their project, which at oral argument was stated to be the essence 
of their trade secret, is insufficient." 
Memorandum Decision at pp. 7-8. 
D. The Information in USA Power's Three-Ring Binders Was Not 
Secret. 
USA Power argued that the papers they had given to PacifiCorp in 3 three-
ring binders were trade secrets, but they failed to show how or why. And, even if 
the papers contained trade secrets, USA Power never presented any evidence 
eo 
that PacifiCorp used them. We addressed some of these documents in 
reference to undisputed fact no. 13, above, and will address the other documents 
here. 
It was USA Power's burden to bring forward sufficient evidence that the 
information in its three-ring binders was not already known to PacifiCorp; that 
PacifiCorp could not have readily ascertained the information by proper means; 
that the information was not within the knowledge of the trade; that the 
information had not been published; and that the information was not in the 
public domain. See, Utah Medical Products, supra at p. 1312 (citing Muna at 
696). The district court searched for this evidence in USA Power's motion 
papers, in the affidavits and deposition transcripts, and at oral argument, but 
never found it. 
USA Power posited that the following four things prepared for it by Ray 
Racine, an engineer at Waldron Engineering, were trade secrets: (1) site 
drawings; (2) water balances; (3) a performance curve; and, (4) a letter from Mr. 
Racine that referred to Racine's "informal studies" to determine the energy 
penalty associated with an air cooled condenser. USA Power asserted, without 
proof, that the later three things represented "comprehensive and sophisticated 
testing" and were secret. However, Racine testified otherwise. 
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Before discussing these four things it is important to note what Racine said 
during his deposition about all of his work for USA Power's project. He explained 
that there are three phases of a power plant project: (1) development; (2) 
detailed design; and, (3) construction. The development phase is all of the 
preliminary work leading up to the issuance of an air permit and everything 
Racine and Waldron Engineering ever did for USA Power was only preliminary 
work.62 Racine added that Waldron Engineering was simply not capable of doing 
anything more than preliminary work.63 
1. Site Plans Were Not Secret. 
The site plans that Mr. Racine drew for the USA Power project, that 
incidentally did not represent the site layout for Currant Creek, were found in the 
Division of Air Quality's file for USA Power and were public information (R. 7498-
7500). They could not have been a trade secret. 
2. Water Balances Were Not Secret. 
Water balances are simply flow charts of the calculated gallons of water 
used by a power plant at each stage of the electricity making process.64 Racine 
testified that the water balances he created were hypothetical and 
62
 Racine Depo. at pages 16, 28-29 (R. 6869-6870). 
63
 Id. at page 29 (R. 6870). 
64
 Ian Andrews Depo. at pages 193-194 (R. 6768-6769). 
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preliminary and would have needed to be re-done had USA Power's planning 
ever advanced to the next stage.65 
What Racine did to create the water balances made the information, by 
statutory definition, not a trade secret. Racine simply e-mailed or telephoned the 
vendors of each piece of major plant equipment and asked how much water 
each plant component would use.66 Then, he put the information into an Excel 
spreadsheet.67 There was nothing secret about the information or the 
spreadsheet. 
It was undisputed that Shaw/Stone & Webster, not Racine, prepared the 
plant water balances for Currant Creek that were included in the Project Cost 
Analysis that Shaw/Stone & Webster completed for PacifiCorp in June 2003.68 
Mark Green swore under oath that Shaw/Stone & Webster did not use any of 
USA Power's information69 and that fact was never controverted. 
During discovery, PacifiCorp produced the actual water balances that 
Shaw/Stone & Webster had prepared for Currant Creek70 and gave USA Power 
b5
 See, Ray Racine Depo. at pages 41 (R. 6873), 88-104 (R. 6881-6898) and 
specifically page 93 (R. 6886). 
66
 Id. at pages 99-102 (R. 6893-6896). 
67
 Id. 
68
 Ian Andrews Depo. at pages 193-194 (R. 6768-6769). 
69
 Mark Green Aff. atU 11 (R. 4128-4134). 
70
 PacifiCorp's Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and documents 
attached thereto (R. 6907-7015). 
65 
the names and telephone numbers of the engineers who had prepared them. If 
there had been some comparison between Racine's work and Shaw/Stone & 
Webster's work, USA Powers could, and should, have pointed it out to the district 
court. They never did. 
3. Energy Penalty Calculation Was Not Secret. 
An air-cooled condenser impacts the performance of the power plant's 
steam turbine generator.72 The impact on performance is reflected in a 
calculated "energy penalty"73 Racine wrote a letter to Ted Banasiewicz 
referencing his "informal studies" to calculate the energy penalty for an air-cooled 
condenser at the Mona site. Banasiewicz shared the letter with Rand Thurgood. 
Racine testified, however, that his energy penalty calculation was nothing more 
than his informal manual calculation,74 that Ian Andrews later pointed out failed to 
include a number of variables that were necessary to make the calculation 
meaningful.75 Most importantly, Racine's calculation was not a trade secret 
because the information was within the knowledge of the trade; it was undisputed 
that PacifiCorp's engineers were perfectly capable of performing energy penalty 
Id. at Interrogatory No. 3. 
72
 Ian Andrews Depo. at page 96 (R. 6757). 
73
 Id. 
74
 Ray Racine Depo. at pages 145-147 (R. 6903-6905). 
75
 Ian Andrews Depo, at pages 213-214 (R. 6770-6771). 
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calculations themselves. USA Power characteristically offered absolutely no 
evidence to the contrary. USA Power failed to provide any proof that Racine's 
energy penalty calculation was a trade secret. 
Shaw/Stone & Webster and another engineering firm, Burns & McDonnell, 
performed the actual detailed energy penalty calculations that were necessary to 
design and engineer Currant Creek.77 This fact too was undisputed. USA Power 
never dared suggest that either engineering firm used Racine's inadequate 
informal manual calculation, or any of USA Power's other information. This was 
not lost on the district court which correctly concluded that: 
u[\]t is important to note that the design, development, and 
construction analyses prepared for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & 
Webster/Burns, independently, without any evidence of reliance or 
use of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets, is undisputed." 
Memorandum Decision at pp. 12-13. 
4. Performance Curves Were Not Secret. 
The output of a combustion turbine is directly proportional to the density of 
air that enters the combustion turbine inlet. Because cold air is more dense, a 
combined cycle power plant (which mates one and often two combustion 
turbines with one steam turbine) is capable of generating more electricity in cold 
Id. at pages 96-98 (R. 6757-6759). 
Id. at pages 146-147, 157 (R. 6904-6905, 6762); Rand Thurgood 30(b)(6) Depo. at 
pages 128-130 (R. 6749-6751), 135-136 (R. 6752-6753), 179 (R. 6754). 
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weather than in hot weather. Racine had prepared a one page performance 
curve for General Electric combustion turbines which estimated plant megawatt 
output at different air temperatures. USA Power gave PacifiCorp a copy of 
Racine's performance curve. 
During his deposition, Racine conceded that there was nothing secret 
about his performance curve. He created it by inputting temperature and 
elevation data for Mona into two software programs licensed by General 
Electric;78 one provided at no cost, the other requiring a licensing fee.79 Racine 
confirmed that both software programs were readily available to utility 
companies, including PacifiCorp.80 The data Racine used with the General 
Electric software programs was filed with the Division of Air Quality as part of 
USA Power's application for an air permit. It became public information.81 We 
obtained a copy of the data during discovery simply by making a GRAMMA 
request to the Division of Air Quality for a copy of the entire USA Power file.82 
It was also undisputed that PacifiCorp's in-house engineer did his own 
preliminary performance calculations for Currant Creek,83 and Shaw/Stone & 
78
 Racine Depo. at pages 69-74 (R. 6875-6880). 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. 
81
 Racine Depo. at pages 126-129 (R. 6899-6902). 
82
 See Affidavit of Michele Hardgrave (R. 6671-6673). 
83
 Rand Thurgood 30(b)6) Depo. at pages 103-104 (R. 6747-6748); Bob Van 
Engelenhoven Depo. at pages 54-55 (R. 6830-6831). 
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Webster created the actual performance curves for Currant Creek when they 
designed and engineered the plant.84 These were produced during discovery. 
Ignoring the fact that Racine's performance curve was not a secret, a simple 
comparison between Racine's performance curve and Shaw/Stone & Webster's 
actual performance curves for Currant Creek would have revealed any 
similarities. Not surprisingly, USA Power never explored or offered the 
comparison. 
The district court properly recognized USA Power's failure to demonstrate 
that any of the information related to its project was a trade secret. 
"[WJith respect to each item or document which plaintiffs purport to 
be trade secrets, including the documents plaintiffs claim were not 
part of their public filings, there is no aspect of this information which 
plaintiffs make any effort to demonstrate specifically that PacifiCorp 
could not have readily ascertained either through public information, 
the plaintiffs' filings with the Utah Division of Air Quality, knowledge 
generally known in the industry, the independent analysis and 
evaluations performed by Shaw/Stone & Webster, and PacifiCorp's 
prior knowledge and purchase of the Panda assets. Plaintiffs' 
identifying and labeling of documents they claim contain trade 
secret information . . . is insufficient." 
Memorandum Decision at page 8. 
III. USA POWER DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THERE WAS A MISAPPROPRIATION 
USA Power, as an essential element of both their misappropriation of trade 
secrets claim and their breach of contract claim, was required to establish a 
Id. at pages 68-69 (R. 6832-6833). 
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genuine issue of material fact that PacifiCorp used or disclosed their claimed 
trade secrets and confidential information. USA Power did not meet that burden. 
A. Circumstantial Evidence of Misappropriation Requires Similarity With 
the Innovative Features of a Claimed Trade Secret. 
Because USA Power could not identify any direct proof that PacifiCorp 
misappropriated any of its information, regardless of the fact that the information 
was neither a trade secret, nor confidential information, USA Power responded 
that they ought to be able to satisfy their burden with a tangled web of 
circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact could then draw inferences 
which would convince the trier of fact that it was more probable than not that 
PacifiCorp misappropriated trade secrets. 
While recognizing that there was no Utah law on point, the district court 
accepted USA Power's proposition, acknowledging that there may be no 
"smoking gun." (Memorandum Decision at page 9). Even with this concession, 
USA Power failed to meet its burden. 
Several years prior to the district court's decision, the federal court in Utah 
decided Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., 
supra. In that case the plaintiff sought to meet its burden to demonstrate that a 
trade secret misappropriation had occurred by arguing that: "I don't know how 
[the defendant] couldn't have used trade secrets." Id. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. 
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Justifiably, the court held that this was not nearly enough to meet the accuser's 
burden. To meet its burden, "the plaintiff must offer more than just argument." Id. 
Since the district court entered its Memorandum Decision, Judge Ted 
Stewart published a federal court decision ruling that if faced with the issue, Utah 
appellate courts would allow circumstantial evidence of a trade secret 
misappropriation if the following could be shown: (1) access by the accused party 
to the trade secret; and, (2) similarity in the respective designs or products of the 
accused party and the trade secrets owner. Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman, 
2008 WL 2004327 (D. Utah) (attached to USA Power's principal brief at Tab 7). 
Judge Stewart was of the opinion that the Utah Supreme Court had already 
implicitly recognized the possibility of using circumstantial evidence to prove 
misappropriation in Water & Energy Systems Technology v. Keil, 974 P. 2d 821 
(Utah 1999)(included in the addendum at Tab 16). Because circumstantial 
evidence does not encompass "evidence that is as consistent with the fact 
sought to be proved as with its opposite," see, Dep't of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 924 F. Supp. 449 (S.D. N.Y. 1996), the Hammerton case 
cannot be construed to stand for the proposition that any similarity between two 
designs is circumstantial evidence of a misappropriation. And if it does, 
Hammerton is wrongly decided. 
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In Keil, the Supreme Court explained that mere similarity between two 
designs is not necessarily evidence of misappropriation: "Similarities which can 
be explained by industry or regulatory demands cannot suffice to meet the 
requirement that [the new employer] copied [the former employer's] confidential 
formulae, especially in light of the substantial amount of information in the 
public domain involving water treatment chemicals." Keil at fl 14. 
Judge Stewart in Hammerton cited Stratienko, M.D. v. Cordis Corporation, 
429 F. 3d 592 (6th Cir. 2005)(included in the addendum at Tab 17), which 
provides useful guidance about which similarities in design might fairly support 
an inference of a trade secret misappropriation. Stratienko involved a design for 
a catheter device. The Sixth Circuit explained that once the summary judgment 
movant demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden 
shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate by sufficient evidence that a 
misappropriation occurred. If there is no direct evidence the non-movant may 
rely on indirect circumstantial evidence. But still, there must be sufficient 
evidence of access and similarity to create a genuine issue of material fact of 
misappropriation worthy of submitting the matter to a jury. Inferences that are 
simply too tenuous do not create genuine issues of material fact as to use of the 
trade secret. Id. at 599. And, most importantly, the requisite "similarity" to permit 
7? 
a circumstantial inference of misappropriation must relate to the "innovative" 
features of the claimed trade secret. Id. at 600. 
B. Even Assuming That A Circumstantial Case Was Enough to Get to a 
Jury, USA Power Failed to Meet its Burden. 
Having given USA Power the benefit of the doubt that "a web of 
circumstantial evidence" might spare them from summary judgment, the district 
court marshaled USA Power's eleven pieces of circumstantial evidence, noting 
that: 
"Plaintiffs rely heavily on the similarities of Spring Canyon and 
Currant Creek and suggest that because of PacifiCorp's access to 
their trade secrets and the significant similarities, a "powerful" 
inference of misappropriation arises for the jury to determine that 
PacifiCorp misappropriated the trade secrets." 
Memorandum Decision at pp. 10-11. 
Although USA Power pointed out the similarities between its proposed 
power plant project and Currant Creek, it never demonstrated that any of these 
similarities were innovative, let alone secret. Ted Banasiewicz went through his 
list of features for USA Power's plant project and admitted that they were obvious 
in dozens of other power plants.85 USA Power conceded in its response to 
undisputed fact no. 24 that "[t]he surface characteristics and actual function of 
the proposed power plant is not a trade secret - it was (and is) visible to the 
Ted Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 691-708, 714 (R. 9234-9251, 9253). 
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public At oral argument, USA Power's counsel conceded that: "the hardware 
in the ground is not a trade secret."87 Ultimately, the fact that Currant Creek, its 
air-cooled sister plant Apex 1, and USA Power's proposal, were all similar, only 
demonstrated that there was nothing innovative about any of them. Accordingly, 
the district court correctly concluded that: 
"[N]o such reasonable inference [of misappropriation] can be 
inferred from the similarities of the two projects in the present case 
because the undisputed facts establish the design development, 
construction, location and component parts and their arrangement 
are not secret, are all well known in the industry and the similarities 
can be found in almost every combined cycle power plant built in the 
industry. .. [T]he undisputed facts establish that dry-cooling versus 
wet-cooling at all locations is an economic decision based upon the 
availability of water, and that the dry-cooling and wet-cooling 
technologies are widely recognized and understood in the 
industry..." 
Memorandum Decision at pp. 11-12. 
In reference to USA Power's three-ring binder materials the district court 
found no direct or circumstantial evidence worthy of submitting the case to a jury: 
"Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
that specifically identifies any trade secrets that were used or 
misappropriated by PacifiCorp. This includes... performance 
curve data intended to show the megawatt output at different air 
temperatures actually disclosed in plaintiffs' public application for an 
air permit, plaintiffs' energy penalty and water balances calculations, 
both of which are readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp's engineers 
and performed by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, and plaintiffs' pro 
formas which contain projections of profitability of a non-regulated 
See USA Power's response to undisputed fact no. 24 at p. 50, supra. 
Tr. at 220:14. 
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entity which fails to consider PacifiCorp's structured specified rate of 
return on its capitol investments as a highly regulated entity. " 
Memorandum Decision at page 12. 
Although they lacked any specific evidence that PacifiCorp used their 
materials, USA Power argued in the district court, and again on appeal, that 
PacifiCorp never could have developed the Currant Creek project in four months 
without using USA Power's supposed "confidential information." The four month 
reference apparently came from a statement Ian Andrews made that this was the 
length of time it took PacifiCorp to assemble its proposal for Currant Creek that 
was submitted to an independent outside evaluator as part of a regulatory bid 
process approved by the Public Service Commission of Utah.88 USA Power 
argued that because they took much longer than four months to develop their 
power plant proposal, PacifiCorp "must have" used the supposed "confidential 
information" in order to develop Currant Creek so quickly. 
Of course, what USA Power ignored (and the district court did not) was 
that the development of Currant Creek did not begin four months before 
PacifiCorp proposed Currant Creek. The development of Currant Creek actually 
began in late 2000 when Panda began developing its Mona plant site. By the 
See, Ian Andrews depo. at pp. 227-231 (R. 9446-9450). For more details about the 
regulatory bid process, see PacifiCorp's opening summary judgment memorandum 
(R. 8555-9691) at pages 24-27 ( R. 8582-8586, 10386). 
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time Panda sold its Mona project to PacifiCorp, Panda had already: (1) 
assembled 240 acres of land with land options and purchase contracts; (2) 
erected a meteorological monitoring tower and hired consultants who compiled 
an air modeling protocol that was submitted to, and accepted by, the Utah Dept. 
of Environmental Quality; (3) gathered a year's worth of on-site meteorological 
data that was submitted to, and audited by, the Utah Dept. of Environmental 
Quality to support a full PSD air permit89; (4) met with PacifiCorp's transmission 
group in Portland, Oregon, and arranged for an Interconnection Study Report 
that provided an analysis of the cost of interconnecting the power plant to 
PacifiCorp's 345 kV transmission system at the Mona switching station; (5) hired 
a lobbyist who lobbied state and local officials and gained consensus among 
them for the power plant and a zoning change; (6) designed a transmission path 
from the power plant site to the switching station; (7) located the nearby Questar 
Mainline 104 and Kern River natural gas transmission lines and mapped out two 
alternate routes for lateral gas lines to transport natural gas to the plant; and (8) 
hired a water lawyer who talked to at least three potential sources of water for the 
plant. See, undisputed fact nos. 3,6, 11. 
Once PacifiCorp submitted this meteorological information and it became publicly 
available in support of the Currant Creek air permit, USA Power took this same data 
from the public record and used it to support their application for an air permit for a 
2x1 configured, rather than a 1x1 configured, combined cycle plant. Ted 
Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 824-826 (R. 9296-9298). 
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Furthermore, Apex 1 had already been designed, engineered, and was 
well under construction by Shaw/Stone & Webster before USA Power gave 
PacifiCorp any supposed "confidential information." The two months it took 
Shaw/Stone & Webster to complete the detailed project cost analysis for 
PacifiCorp, utilizing Shaw/ Stone's existing in-house databases and reference 
plant designs, was standard fare for Shaw/Stone & Webster. See, undisputed 
facts nos. 20, 21-23, 25. 
To compile its proposal for Currant Creek, PacifiCorp used: (a) 
Shaw/Stone & Webster's project cost analysis; (b) operational and maintenance 
information furnished by General Electric; (c) existing operational and 
maintenance studies that PacifiCorp had already conducted on its gas-fired 
Gadsby plant; (d) manpower requirements compiled from PacifiCorp's combined 
cycle power plant in Hermiston, Oregon; and, (e) financial information compiled 
by PacifiCorp's financial analyst. See, undisputed fact no. 26. 
Four months was all it took PacifiCorp to assemble its Currant Creek 
proposal in 2003, because Panda had been working since late 2000. USA 
Power certainly had no evidence to the contrary and the district court was not 
fooled by USA Power's omission of the undisputed facts: 
"Plaintiffs' argument that PacifiCorp could not have developed 
Currant Creek in four months without use of their trade secrets... 
is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory. The undisputed 
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material facts establish that Current Creek's development through 
Panda was not of short duration." 
Memorandum Decision at page 11. 
Neither Hammerton, Keil, nor Stratienko support USA Power's resort to 
sheer speculation which was really nothing more than the "they must have" 
argument that was eschewed in Medical Products, Inc., supra. 
The district court was correct. Even though it was no trade secret, USA 
Power did not present sufficient evidence, indirect or otherwise, that PacifiCorp 
misappropriated any of USA Power's information. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT THAT USA POWER'S 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM HAD NO MORE MERIT THAN THEIR 
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS CLAIM. 
At USA Power's second meeting with PacifiCorp, which took place on 
September 11, 2002, USA Power Partners, LLC and PacifiCorp signed a 
Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (R. 9452-9455). USA Power 
claimed that PacifiCorp breached this agreement by using the information in the 
3 three-ring binders previously mentioned. For the same reasons explained 
above, PacifiCorp did not violate the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement, 
because the information provided by USA Power was neither secret, nor 
"Confidential Information." 
As noted above, much of the information USA Power gave to PacifiCorp 
was either public information, or was information that was already known to 
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PacifiCorp and to everyone else in the power plant industry, or was information 
that PacifiCorp learned from others including Panda and Shaw/Stone & Webster 
and was, therefore, not "Confidential Information" under the terms of the 
Confidentiality Agreement.90 Still, PacifiCorp treated all of USA Power's 
information as confidential and did not use it for any purpose.91 USA Power had 
no evidence to the contrary which is what led the district court, in addition to all of 
the foregoing, to conclude the following: 
"After carefully considering the parties' respective legal arguments, 
the Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any 
specific evidence from which a jury could draw a reasonable 
Paragraph 3 of the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (with emphasis 
added) reads: 
Definition of "Confidential Information". As used in this Agreement, "Confidential 
Information" means all information that is identified as confidential or proprietary when 
furnished to Receiving Party or its Representatives by Disclosing Party that concerns 
the Potential Transaction, Disclosing Party, its partners or co-venturers, affiliates, or 
subsidiaries, and that is either confidential, proprietary, or otherwise not publicly 
available. Any information furnished to Receiving Party or its Representatives by a 
director, officer, employee, stockholder, partner, co-venturer, consultant, agent, or 
representative of Disclosing Party will be deemed furnished by Disclosing Party for the 
purpose of this Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following does not 
constitute Confidential Information for purposes of this Agreement: (i) information that is 
or becomes publicly available other than as a result of a disclosure by Receiving Party 
or its Representatives; (ii) information that was already known to Receiving Party on a 
non-confidential basis prior to being furnished to Receiving Party by Disclosing Party; 
(iii) information that becomes available to Receiving Party on a non-confidential basis 
from a source other than Disclosing Party or a representative of Disclosing Party if such 
source, to Receiving Party's knowledge, is neither subject to any prohibition against 
transmitting the information to Receiving Party nor bound by a confidentiality agreement 
with Disclosing Party; and (iv) information that is independently developed by Receiving 
Party or its Representatives without use of or reference to Confidential Information. 
91
 Rand Thurgood depo. at pp.302-303, 306-307 (R. 9116-9119). 
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inference that PacifiCorp used any of the plaintiffs' confidential 
information. The plaintiffs' suggestion that PacifiCorp "must have" 
used their confidential information in order to develop Currant Creek 
in a short time frame simply overlooks or ignores the undisputed 
facts referenced hereinbefore." 
Memorandum Decision at page 14. 
The district court was correct. There was no credible evidence from which 
a jury could have concluded that PacifiCorp breached the confidentiality 
agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, the Utah Supreme Court should affirm the district 
court decision granting PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract claims. 
DATED this / ^ " " d a y of January, 2009. 
'^tee^/ ^0c<f^>7 
P. Bruce Badger 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee PacifiCorp 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING CANYON 
ENERGY, LLC, : CASE NO. 050903412 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS, and : 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for hearings on September 24, 2007 
and October 2, 2007, in connection with the following Motions: 
PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment; PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment with respect to the Claim for Intentional Interference 
with Existing Contractual Relations; Defendants Jody L. Williams and 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP's (Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen are 
collectively referred to as "HRO") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: 
Confidential Information; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: 
Loyalty Claim; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against USA 
Power, LLC/ and USA Power Partners, LLC, for Lack of Standing and 
Speculative Damages; USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit 
of Jody L. Williams; and USA Power's Motion for Leave to File 
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Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic. At the conclusion of these 
hearings, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider 
the parties' written submissions, counsels' oral argument and the 
relevant legal authority, Being now fully informed, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The standard for determining Motions for Summary Judgment is 
settled. Summary Judgment is proper only upon a showing "that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Initially, defendant as the moving party has the burden of presenting 
evidence demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exist and 
that Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) . 
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 must set forth specific 
facts showing that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. 
The nonmoving party is required to produce more than just conclusory 
assertions or theories that an issue of material fact exists to establish 
genuine triable issues in order to survive summary judgment. Shaw Res. 
Ltd., L.L.C., v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell , 2006 UT App 313, 142 P. 3d 
560; Orvis v Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, 146 P.3d 886. In substance, the 
Court is required to examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 
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drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and only 
grant summary judgment when reasonable minds could not differ on the 
facts to be determined from the evidence presented. Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P. 2d 445 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, PacificCorp first argues that 
it is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' First Count for 
violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("the Act"). In 
assessing whether a violation of the Act has occurred, the Court must, 
as threshold matter, determine whether the plaintiffs had a trade secret 
which PacificCorp misappropriated. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical 
Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1311 (D. Utah 1999) 
(internal citations omitted). 
The Act defines the term "Trade secret" to mean: 
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4). 
USA POWER V. PACIFICORP PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The burden of establishing the existence of a trade secret is the 
plaintiffs7 and there is no presumption in plaintiffs' favor. 
Microbiological Research Corp. V. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981); Utah 
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., supra. 
The essential elements of a claim for misappropriation of trade 
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act require a plaintiff to prove 
(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade 
secrets to PacifiCorp under an express duty not to disclose or use it, 
and (3) PacifiCorp's use of the trade secret information that injures 
plaintiffs. Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 
1999). Elements (1) and (2) are the focus of this Decision. 
In its Motion, PacifiCorp contends they are entitled to Summary 
Judgment because the information plaintiffs claim were trade secrets were 
actually known within the industry, general public or readily 
ascertainable by PacifiCorp by independent proper means based upon 
PacifiCorp's knowledge and experience in the industry. Significantly, 
PacifiCorp further asserts that based upon the undisputed material facts, 
plaintiffs have produced no evidence that PacifiCorp ever used or 
misappropriated any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. Plaintiffs 
counter that the trade secrets which PacifiCorp misappropriated consisted 
of a combination of details, including tests and evaluations which were 
site specific and which formed the Spring Canyon "vision". Plaintiffs 
contend that PacifiCorp stole their Spring Canyon Power Plant trade 
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secrets in order to build the competing Currant Creek Power Plant, which 
is a replica of the Spring Canyon Power Plant in the same Mona location. 
At the outset, it is important to note that Rule 7 of the Utah R. 
Civ. P. requires that with respect to Summary Judgment Motions, that: 
"Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the responding party." Rule 7(c)(3)(A). Throughout plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in opposition, as noted by PacifiCorp, plaintiffs have 
employed the practice contrary to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of arguing about the 
implication'of the facts asserted instead of "specifically controverting" 
them with the factual record. This practice has required the Court to 
engage in the tedious exercise of separating fact from argument 
throughout plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition. In many instances as 
referenced hereinafter, plaintiffs' failure to "specifically controvert" 
defendants' undisputed facts results in those facts being deemed 
admitted. Those facts deemed admitted identified hereinafter are 
incorporated into this Decision by this reference. The Court finds that 
PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 
which are not "specifically controverted" are thus deemed admitted. 
These undisputed facts identify Panda Energy's development of a power 
plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's transmission station, PacifiCorp's 
knowledge of Panda's development before ever meeting plaintiffs' and 
PacifiCorp's ultimate purchase of Panda's assets necessary for the 
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development of the Currant Creek Power plant in Mona. With respect to 
Panda, it is undisputed that Panda initially had the idea to build a 
combined cycle power plant in Mona, started its development efforts in 
late 2000, secured options to purchase 240 acres of land next to 
PacifiCorp's Mona transmission station, undertaken meteorological and 
other assessments pivotal to PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek 
and the publication of Panda's development in the Deseret News 
demonstrate the vision and concepts underlying the Currant Creek Power 
Plant in Mona was no secret and was not a trade secret of plaintiffs as 
defined under the Trade Secrets Act. 
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 20, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, which identify PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone 
& Webster's'design, engineering and construction of the Currant Creek 
Power Plant are not "specifically controverted", thus deemed admitted. 
Again, at their core, plaintiffs' responses to PacifiCorp's undisputed 
facts argues theories and implications of the facts without "specifically 
controverting" the facts. With respect to Shaw/Stone & Webster, it is 
undisputed that they built a sister plant to the Currant Creek Power 
Plant (Apex 1), and that the Currant Creek Power Plant represents 
PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. That the Currant Creek 
Power Plant and Apex 1 Power Plant with all of their component parts and 
technologies are well understood and widely utilized in the electric 
power plant industry. Significantly, plaintiffs concede in their 
Ko<$ 
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response to PacifiCorp's Undisputed Fact No. 24 that "The surface 
characteristics and actual function of the proposed power plant is not 
a trade secret--it was (and is) visible to the public." The Court finds 
the undisputed material facts establish that the design, engineering and 
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor 
utilized any information from or about USA Power, USA Power Partners, 
Spring Canyon Energy or the Spring Canyon Energy project (Undisputed Fact 
No. 29). 
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 13 and 17, 
which identify Spring Canyon's public filings and application for an air 
permit, are not "specifically controverted" and thus deemed admitted. 
These undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs' concept, 
vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and 
were disclosed to PacifiCorp by the public record. Consequently, the 
information contained therein being generally known and readily 
ascertainable from the public record by PacifiCorp and other persons in 
the field cannot possibly constitute trade secrets as defined by Utah 
Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4). 
The Court finds from the undisputed material facts set forth herein, 
in plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition, and plaintiffs' oral argument, 
that plaintiffs have not defined with sufficient particularity or 
precision what constitutes the trade secrets which PacifiCorp allegedly 
misappropriated. Instead, plaintiffs allude to the trade secrets as 
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consisting of their "project concept," "vision," "formula," and "test 
data" for the Spring Canyon Power Plant. However, these vague and 
conclusory assertions fall short of actually describing those specific 
features of the power plant development, including specific features of 
the data and formula which were not generally known and not readily 
ascertainable by PacifiCorp. Further, with respect to each item or 
document which plaintiffs purport to be trade secrets, including the 
documents plaintiffs claim were not part of their public filings, there 
is no aspect of this information which plaintiffs make any effort to 
demonstrate specifically that PacifiCorp could not have readily 
ascertained either through public information, the plaintiffs' filings 
with the Utah Division of Air Quality, knowledge generally known in the 
industry, the independent analysis and evaluations performed by 
Shaw/Stone & Webster, and PacifiCorp7s prior knowledge and purchase of 
the Panda assets. Plaintiffs' identifying and labeling of documents they 
claim contain trade secret information, including the economic and 
technical viability of their project, which at oral argument was stated 
to be the essence of their trade secrets, is insufficient. See, Utah 
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations, supra. 
Plaintiffs, as an essential element of their misappropriation of 
trade secrets cause of action, are required to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact that PacifiCorp used or misappropriated their claimed 
trade secrets information. Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2, states that a 
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defendant misappropriates a trade secret when it uses or discloses 
another's trade secret without that party's express or implied consent. 
This Court acknowledges plaintiffs' general proposition that it may be 
rare to have a "smoking gun" or direct evidence of use or 
misappropriation of trade secrets. Sokol Crystal Prods., v. DSC 
Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs also 
claim that they are only required to "construct a web of. . .circumstantial 
evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince 
him that it is more probable than not that what the plaintiffs allege 
happened did in fact take place." Citing Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo 
Trust & Banking Co. , 914 F.2d 556 (4 th Cir. 1990). It should be noted 
that the holding in the Eden Hannon case has nothing to do with 
authorizing plaintiffs to construct a web of circumstantial evidence from 
which a jury may draw inferences which convince a jury that it is more 
probable than not that defendants used plaintiffs' trade secrets. The 
Court in Eden Hannon expressly stated that: "Since our disposition of 
this case does not depend on knowing whether Sumitomo (defendant) 
actually used this information, we will not dwell on this point." The 
dicta relied upon by plaintiffs cited in Eden Hannon is found in 
Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., et al. , 378 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 
1974), a case with remarkably distinguishing facts which will not be 
addressed here. Although the parties have not referred to and I have not 
discovered any Utah cases that hold in a trade secrets cause of action, 
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a plaintiff is only required to construct a web of circumstantial 
evidence from which the jury may draw inferences which convince them that 
it is more probable than not that PacifiCorp used plaintiffs' trade 
secrets, for the purpose of this Motion and Decision the Court assumes 
this to be an accurate statement of Utah law. 
Plaintiffs' web of circumstantial evidence consists primarily of (1) 
PacifiCorp's access to the claimed trade secrets and the significant 
similarities between the Spring Canyon Power Plant and Currant Creek; (2) 
that in response to an observation regarding the similarities of the two 
projects, PacifiCorp stated (Thurgood), "We learned a lot from you guys"; 
(3) that without trade secret information, PacifiCorp could not have 
developed Currant Creek in four months; (4) PacifiCorp deleted emails and 
lost a key notebook relating to plaintiffs and PacifiCorp; (5) that 
PacifiCorp never planned or tested a dry-cooled plant and could have only 
made the decision for dry-cooling after receiving plaintiffs' dry-cooling 
data; (6) PacifiCorp's abrupt stoppage of negotiations regarding purchase 
of Spring Canyon assets; (7) that Mona has only a finite amount of room 
for large scale power plants; (8) that plaintiffs had the only site 
developed that could meet PacifiCorp's 2005 need for electricity; (9) an 
internal memo from PacifiCorp (Ian Andrews) to "stress dry-cooling 
experience and experience with inlet chillers"; (10) that PacifiCorp 
committed to the Currant Creek project without any preliminary 
engineering; and (11) the retention of Jody Williams, plaintiffs' lawyer. 
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Plaintiffs rely heavily on the similarities of Spring Canyon and 
Currant Creek and suggest that because of PacifiCorp's access to their 
trade secrets and the significant similarities, a upower/full" inference 
of misappropriation arises for the jury to determine that PacifiCorp 
misappropriated the trade secrets. 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 
2001). The dourt finds that no such reasonable inference can be inferred 
from the similarities of the two projects in the present case because the 
undisputed facts establish the design development, construction, location 
and component parts and their arrangement are not secret, are all well 
known in the industry and the similarities can be found in almost every 
combined cycle power plant built in the industry. Plaintiffs' suggestion 
that PacifiCorp's deletion of emails, loss of a key note book, and 
statement that "we learned a lot from you guys" (Thurgood) , is sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation is a stretch, no such 
reasonable inference of use or misappropriation can be drawn from these 
facts. Plaintiffs' argument that PacifiCorp could not have developed 
Currant Cre^k in four months without use of their trade secrets, that 
PacifiCorp did not test for dry-cooling and therefore could not have made 
the decision to go with dry-cooling until reviewing their claimed dry-
cooling trade secrets is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory. 
The undisputed material facts establish that Currant Creek's development 
through Panda was not of short duration. The undisputed facts establish 
that dry-cooling versus wet-cooling at all locations is an economic 
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decision based upon the availability of water, and that the dry-cooling 
and wet-cooling technologies are widely recognized and understood in the 
industry. The fact that an internal memo from PacifiCorp (Andrews) notes 
"stress dry-cooling experience and experience with inlet chillers," 
technologies common and known in the industry, cannot reasonably support 
an inference of misappropriation. Finally, as determined hereinafter, 
plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence that Williams/HRO 
disclosed any confidential information. 
Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
that specifically identifies any trade secrets that were used or 
misappropriated by PacifiCorp. This includes the trade secrets 
plaintiffs claim were not publicly disclosed, including plaintiffs' 
performance curve data intended to show the megawatt output at different 
air temperatures actually disclosed in plaintiffs' public application for 
an air permit, plaintiffs' energy penalty and water balances 
calculations, both of which are readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp's 
engineers and performed by Shaw/Stone &. Webster/Burns, and plaintiffs' 
pro formas which contain projections of profitability of a non-regulated 
entity which fails to consider PacifiCorp's structured specified rate of 
return on it^ s capitol investments as a highly regulated entity. It is 
important to note that the design, development, and construction analyses 
prepared for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, independently, 
without any evidence of reliance or use of plaintiffs' claimed trade 
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secrets, is undisputed. Absent from the record is any comparison of any 
of the independent work performed at PacifiCorp's direction against 
plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets, and identification with specificity 
of exactly what trade secrets were used. At best, plaintiffs offer 
indirect circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could only 
speculate and could not reasonably conclude that PacifiCorp used 
plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. Plaintiffs have not presented a web 
of circumstantial evidence from which a jury may draw reasonable 
inferences that it is more probable than not that PacifiCorp used 
plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. The fact, if it be a fact, that 
PacifiCorp "must have felt confident that an air cooled condenser 
remained a viable option" (Micheletti), or that Spring Canyon was uan 
opportunity not contemplated before we gave them our stuff," is pure 
speculation, conjecture and does not raise a genuine issue of material 
fact as to misappropriation of any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. 
It may very well be that PacifiCorp was further motivated and encouraged 
to pursue the development of Currant Creek after review of the three 
volumes of claimed trade secrets. However, I can find no authority that 
suggests motivation and encouragement are actionable. Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Next, PacificCorp seeks Summary Judgment as to the plaintiffs' 
Second Count, for Breach of Contract, and Third Count, for Breach of the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Both of these Counts 
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are premised on the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement 
("Confidentiality Agreement"). 
After carefully considering the parties' respective legal arguments, 
the Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any specific 
evidence from which a jury could draw a reasonable inference that 
PacificCorp used any of the plaintiffs' confidential information. The 
plaintiffs' suggestion that PacificCorp "must have" used their 
confidential information in order to develop Currant Creek in a short 
time frame simply overlooks or ignores the undisputed facts referenced 
hereinbefore. 
As indicated hereinbefore, PacifiCorp's acquisition of Panda's 
project assets was clearly instrumental to the time frame because it 
provided a foundation for the development of Currant Creek. In addition, 
PacifiCorp's involvement of Shaw/Stone & Webster, with its existing 
database oft information and experience, also created advantages and 
assisted PacificCorp in moving the project forward more quickly. Since 
the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that PacificCorp used 
its confidential information, in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement 
and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, PacifiCorp's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Counts Two and Three is granted. 
Finally, the Court determines that unjust enrichment is not 
available to plaintiffs because of the existence of the enforceable 
written Confidentiality Agreement. Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 
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19 P.3d 392 (UT App 2001). Further, based upon the decision set forth 
hereinbefore, the plaintiffs have not presented any facts upon which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that PacifiCorp used any of the 
plaintiffs7 confidential information, plaintiffs cannot establish a 
genuine issue of material fact that plaintiffs conferred a benefit upon 
PacifiCorp, that PacifiCorp appreciated or has knowledge of the benefit, 
or that the benefit was accepted or retained by PacifiCorp under 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for PacifiCorp to retain without 
payment of its value. Accordingly, PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Count Seven of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is 
granted. 
PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Claim for Intentional 
Interference with Existing Contractual Relations). 
In the case of Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P. 2d 293 
(Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme Court outlined the three requirements for 
a plaintiff to establish a claim for intentional interference with 
economic relations. Under Leigh, "the plaintiff must prove " (1) that 
the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations (2) for an improper purpose or by improper, 
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id. at 304. 
In this case, the plaintiffs' Sixth Count alleges that PacificCorp 
intentionally interfered with their contractual relationship with HRO by 
hiring them to represent it in the development of its Currant Creek 
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project. PacifiCorp seeks Summary Judgment on this claim, arguing that 
Rand Thurgood, who was then PacifiCorp's Director of Resource 
Development, specifically inquired of Ms. Williams whether she had a 
conflict of interest in representing PacificCorp and whether there was 
any reason that she could not represent PacifiCorp in acquiring water for 
Currant Creek. According to Mr. Thurgood's deposition testimony, Ms. 
Williams indicated that her work for the plaintiffs was complete and that 
she was free to represent PacifiCorp. Based on these facts, PacificCorp 
argues that no reasonable jury could find that by engaging Ms. Williams, 
PacifiCorp intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' contractual 
relationship with HRO. PacifiCorp adds that the plaintiffs also cannot 
establish the ''improper purpose" element of their intentional 
interference claim. 
The Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any 
actual evidence that in engaging HRO, PacifiCorp acted with the requisite 
intent necessary to establish a claim of intentional interference. 
Indeed, there is no evidence which would suggest that in engaging HRO, 
PacifiCorp had any purpose other than to simply acquire water rights for 
its Currant Creek power plant. In addition, the uncontroverted evidence 
is that Ms. Williams specifically informed Mr. Thurgood that her work was 
complete and that there would be no conflict of interest. At the same 
time, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Thurgood was informed 
by USA Power that it had already acquired the necessary water rights. 
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The plaintiffs argue that Mr. Thurgood's and Ms. Williams' 
testimony is "pretextual," "concocted" and "fabricated" or, 
alternatively, that Mr. Thurgood inquired simply to give the appearance 
that he was acting ethically. These arguments and theories are without 
factual support and amount to conjecture and speculation, rather than 
evidence capable of supporting reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' 
favor. In addition, the plaintiffs have not presented any facts 
specifically controverting this testimony. 
In addition, it cannot be overlooked that Ms. Williams had been 
PacifiCorp's water lawyer continuously since 1982. Further, it is 
undisputed that by the time PacifiCorp engaged HRO in connection with 
Currant Creek, Ms. Williams had already acquired water rights for the 
plaintiffs' Spring Canyon project. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that no reasonable jury 
could draw the necessary inference that PacifiCorp intended to interfere 
with the plaintiffs' contractual relationship or that it had the 
knowledge that interference was substantially certain to occur as a 
result of it engaging HRO. Mumford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 
P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993). 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that 
PacifiCorp's predominant purpose in engaging Ms. Williams was to injure 
the plaintiffs. Rather, the undisputed facts can only support the 
conclusion that PacifiCorp, having acquired Panda's project assets, 
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turned to Ms. Williams, as it had done m the past, to acquire the water 
it needed. These facts demonstrate that PacifiCorp engaged Ms. Williams, 
its water lawyer, for the legitimate purpose of acquiring water relative 
to its planned development of a power plant 
Based on the undisputed facts, the Court determines that PacifiCorp 
is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' Sixth Count as a 
matter of law. Therefore, PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (Claim for Intentional Interference with Existing Contractual 
Relations) is granted. 
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Confidential Information 
The plaintiffs have alleged two causes of action against HRO: Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty and Breach of Duty of Confidentiality. HRO's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment concerning confidentiality asserts that the 
plaintiffs have failed to show that HRO breached its fiduciary duties to 
the plaintiffs by obtaining and communicating or using the plaintiffs' 
confidential information to their detriment In making this argument, 
HRO primarily relies on Shaw Res Ltd , L L C , v Pruitt, Gushee & 
Bachtell, 142 P.3d 560, 565 (UT App. 2006) 
In Shaw Resources, the plaintiffs asserted that their former counsel 
obtained certain confidential maps showing possible gas formations and 
confidential drilling locations and thereafter sought to develop that 
area, m competition with the plaintiffs. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed summary judgment m favor of the defendants The court stated-
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When a law firm represents clients in the same business and 
geographic area, it owes great caution to clients in 
maintaining their confidentiality and loyalty. That is even 
more true when attorneys in the law firm have personal stakes 
in clients' businesses or in similar businesses. Nonetheless, 
the evidence here does not allow us to conclude that 
Defendants breached their duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs 
because Plaintiffs have failed to specifically identify 
material facts and have provided arguments based only on 
speculation or "conclusory assertions." 
Id. at 569. Relying on Shaw Resources, HRO argues that the plaintiffs 
have similarly failed to provide any evidence which is "nonspeculative 
or nonconj ectural." 
HRO also relies on Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P. 3d 
1130 (Utah 2001), for the proposition that the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that PacifiCorp had confidential information that could have 
come from HRO (i.e. information beyond what PacifiCorp obtained directly 
from the plaintiffs) . The defendants point out that the information 
which the plaintiffs allege was disclosed to PacifiCorp had already been 
disclosed by the plaintiffs themselves to PacifiCorp. 
In opposition, the plaintiffs contend that they need only present 
evidence that would allow a jury to infer that HRO used and/or disclosed 
confidential information. 
At the outset, the Court determines that there are genuine issues 
of material fact concerning the scope of the information acquired by Ms. 
Williams in her representation of the plaintiffs. As a corollary, it is 
unclear whether this information was truly confidential or generally 
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known. The Court also cannot determine whether this information was 
indeed virtually identical to the information previously provided to 
PacifiCorp by the plaintiffs themselves, as HRO claims. 
Notwithstanding the factual disputes surrounding the type of 
information allegedly acquired by Ms. Williams, the dipositive issue for 
the purpose of this Motion is whether the plaintiffs have presented 
actual evidence that HRO communicated their confidential information to 
PacifiCorp. Shaw Resources, 142 P. 3d at 567. The Court finds that 
simultaneous representation (assuming such occurred in this case), 
without more, is not sufficient alone to support an inference that an 
attorney has improperly used and/or disclosed confidential information. 
Further, the plaintiffs' reliance on legal authority to the contrary 
(including cases which suggest that simultaneous representation actually 
gives rise to a presumption) is unpersuasive. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 
suggested inferences that HRO must have used or disclosed their 
confidential information simply by virtue of the simultaneous 
representation or the fact that both the plaintiffs and PacifiCorp sought 
to acquire water rights or that they had similar projects is 
insufficient. 
Further, the plaintiffs have not identified any evidence which 
would support a reasonable inference that HRO used or disclosed 
confidential information. Rather, the plaintiffs have provided mere 
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argument based on speculation and conclusory assertions, without any 
material factual support. Id. at 569. 
Accordingly, the Court grants HRO's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Re: Confidential Information. 
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Loyalty Claim 
In this Motion, HRO is seeking Partial Summary Judgment as to 
plaintiffs' Count Four for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. HRO argues that it 
has not breached any duty of loyalty to the plaintiffs and that the 
plaintiffs cannot establish causation. 
In their opposition, the plaintiffs contend that they were in direct 
competition with PacifiCorp and that HRO's representation was a conflict 
of interest and a breach of the duty of loyalty. The plaintiffs further 
contend that HRO's breach of its duties was the legal cause of PacifiCorp 
terminating negotiations with the plaintiffs, resulting in the 
plaintiffs' failure to sell the Spring Canyon assets to PacifiCorp and 
ultimately causing the rejection of the plaintiffs' RFP bid. 
At the outset, the Court notes that there are genuine issues of 
material fact concerning the duration of HRO's representation of the 
plaintiffs, the scope of that representation and the scope of HRO's 
representation of PacifiCorp with respect to Currant Creek. Therefore, 
the Court cannot determine whether the duty owed to the plaintiffs by HRO 
was the duty owed to a former client under Rule 1.9 or the duty owed 
under Rule 1.7, pertaining to concurrent representation. Since it is 
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unclear which of these Rules applies, the Court will not engage in an 
either-or analysis, but instead rules that there are genuine issues of 
material fact which preclude it from determining, as a matter of law, 
whether HRO did or did not breach its obligations to uhe plaintiffs. 
However, the Court determines that the dispositive issue presented 
by this Motion is not whether HRO breached its duties to the plaintiffs, 
but rather whether the plaintiffs can establish the element of causation. 
Under Kilpatrick, 990 P.2d at 1291 and Shaw Resources, 142 P.2d at 569, 
in order to establish the element of causation, plaintiffs must present 
evidence that but for HRO's breach of its obligations, the plaintiffs 
would have been benefitted. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not 
presented any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation 
and actual damages as claimed by plaintiffs. 
Instead, the plaintiffs merely hypothesize without any evidence to 
support that if HRO had not represented PacifiCorp with respect to 
Currant Creek, PacifiCorp would have certainly purchased their Spring 
Canyon assets and signed a Joint Development Agreement with USA Power, 
LLC. The plaintiffs alternative scenario is that if HRO had not assisted 
PacifiCorp in securing water, PacifiCorp would have accepted their bid 
on the RFP and entered into a power purchase agreement with plaintiffs. 
Finally, plaintiffs claim that PacifiCorp terminated its negotiations 
with plaintiffs "as a direct result of HRO's representation of 
PacifiCorp". As HRO points out, there is a complete absence of evidence 
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to support these various scenarios. Clearly, these scenarios are highly 
speculative and are based on conjecture that HRO's representation 
influenced PacifiCorp's decision with respect to its negotiations with 
the plaintiffs or affected the outcome and decision-making process 
involved in the RFP. Each of the plaintiffs' scenarios of what could 
have been is based entirely on speculation unsupported by any record 
evidence. 
The undisputed material facts establish that HRO's representation 
was not necessary for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights based upon the 
availability of equally capable water rights lawyers in Salt Lake City 
and PacifiCorp's budget commitment of $16.2 million for water rights in 
connection with the Currant Creek Power Plant. It should be noted here 
the Court previously determined that plaintiffs have failed to produce 
any evidence that HRO used or disclosed any of plaintiffs' confidential 
information to PacifiCorp. Further, the undisputed material facts 
demonstrate plaintiffs' negotiations with PacifiCorp were terminated 
prior to PacifiCorp's acquisition of water rights for the Currant Creek 
project. Accordingly, HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to 
plaintiffs' Loyalty claim is granted. It is important to note that 
plaintiffs' claim for Disgorgement for breach of the duty of loyalty 
survive this decision, because this claim does not require evidence of 
causation for disgorgement purposes. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 
(Tex. 1999). 
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HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Lack of Standing 
and Speculative Damages 
HRO/Williams, by this Motion, seeks an Order dismissing all claims 
asserted by USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, for lack of 
standing and alternatively, for speculative damages. The law is settled 
in Utah that to establish standing, USA Power Partners and USA Power, 
LLC, need only demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
[them] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute7' to establish 
standing. Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. , 148 P.3d 975 (Utah 2006) . 
The Court finds that USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, have 
stated a distinct and palpable injury that gives both a personal stake 
in the outcome of the case, particularly in the form of attorney fees 
related to the remedy of disgorgement. Accordingly, HRO/Williams' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims for lack of 
standing is denied. HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
dismissing plaintiffs' claims alternatively as speculative damages has 
been rendered moot based upon decisions in favor of HRO/Williams' Motions 
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Confidential Information and Re: Loyalty 
Claim. 
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams 
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Jenkins' Affidavit and paragraphs 
7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams is denied in 
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full. The Court finds both Affidavits have adequate foundation, are based 
upon personal knowledge, and are therefore admissible. 
USA Power7s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. 
Tomsic 
USA Power's Motion to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic 
is granted. 
Counsel for defendants PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO are instructed 
to submit Orders consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision and Rule 
7(f), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Dated this YS day of October, 2007. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
•\rj Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-* §13-24-1. Short title 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Trade Secrets Act." 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989,c. 60, § 1. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness 
Title 13 Commerce and Trade 
^ j Chapter 24 Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-f § 13-24-2. Definitions 
As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise 
(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means 
(2) "Misappiopnation" means 
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret 
was acquired by improper means, or 
(b) disclosuie or use of a tiade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who 
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the tiade seciet, or 
(n) at the time of disclosuie oi use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was 
(A) derived from or through a pet son who had utilized impropei means to acquire it, 
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use, or 
(C) denved from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy 
or limit its use, or 
(in) befoie a matei lal change of his position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that 
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake 
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint ven-
tuie, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity 
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, tech-
nique, or process, that 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being 
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use, and 
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(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989, c. 60, §2. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13 Commerce and Trade 
\ j Chapter 24 Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 13-24-3. Injunctive relief 
(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be 
terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional reas-
onable period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the mis-
appropriation 
(2) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty 
for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been prohibited Exceptional cncumstances in-
clude, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reas-
on to know of misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable 
(3) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by court order 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989,c 60, § 3 
Cuirent thiough 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuteis/West No claim to ong U S govt 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13 Commerce and Trade 
\ j Chapter 24 Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-t § 13-24-4. Damages 
(1) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquinng knowledge or reason 
to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover dam-
ages for misappropriation Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust 
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss In lieu of dam-
ages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be measured by imposition 
of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret 
(2) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplaiy damages in an amount not 
exceeding twice any award made under Subsection (1) 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989, c 60, §4 
Cunent through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to ong U S govt 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
*,=) Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
_• § 13-24-5. Attorneys* fees 
If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad 
faith, or willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the pre-
vailing party. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989,c. 60, §5. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
^d Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 13-24-6. Preservation of secrecy 
In an action under this chapter, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, 
which may include granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hear-
ings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an al-
leged trade secret without prior court approval. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989, c. 60, §6. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Kd Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 13-24-7. Statute of limitations 
An action for misappropriation shall be brought within three years after the misappropriation is discovered or, 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered. For the purposes of this section, a continu-
ing misappropriation constitutes a single claim. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989, c. 60, §7. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
=^1 Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 13-24-8. Effect on other law 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of 
this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret. 
(2) This chapter does not affect: 
(a) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; 
(b) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or 
(c) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989, c. 60, § 8. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
*y Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 13-24-9. Uniformity of application and construction 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with re-
spect to the subject of the chapter among states enacting it. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1989, c. 60, §9. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated C unentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rets & Annos) 
\ j Pail 111 Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
^ RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS, MEMORANDA, HEARINGS, ORDERS, OB-
JECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDER 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross claim, 
if the answer contains a cross claim, a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is 
summoned under the provisions of Rule 14, and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is served No 
other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer 
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing 
or trial oi in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule A motion 
shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought 
(b)(2) Limit on oidei to show cause An application to the court for an order to show cause shall be made only 
tor enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an existing order An application for an order 
to show cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a party has violated a court 
oi dei 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memo/anda requited exceptions filing times All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall 
be accompanied by a supporting memorandum Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memoiandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition Within five days after ser 
vice of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited 
to rebuttal ot matters raised in the memorandum in opposition No other memoranda will be considered without 
leave of court A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum 
(c)(2) Length Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the court Reply 
memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court The court may permit a party to file 
an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good cause 
(c)(3) Content 
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(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts 
as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists Each fact shall be separately stated and 
numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials Each fact set 
forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless con-
troverted b> the responding party 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of 
each of the moving paity's tacts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explana-
tion of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each tact shall be separately stated 
and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents and a table of 
authorities with page references 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited in the memor-
andum, such as affidavits or discovery materials 
(d) Request to submit tor decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for 
Decision ' The request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the 
opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a 
hearing has been requested If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion A party may request a hearing in the motion, in a 
memorandum or in the request to submit for decision A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the 
caption of the document containing the request The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under 
Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds 
that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in 
a judgment An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment 
Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated 
or modified by the judge who made it with or without notice Orders shall state whether they are entered upon 
trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise 
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the oth-
er parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision Objections to the proposed order shall be 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7 Page 3 
filed within five days after service The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served 
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object 
(0(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate documents and shall not m-
corpoiate any matter by reference 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court commissioner is the 
order of the court until modified by the court A party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection 
in the same manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open court oi, if the 
court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is 
served A party may lespond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective November 1, 2003, April 1, 2004, November 1, 2005, April 1, 2008 ] 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2008 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to ong U S govt 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works 
Tab 4 
Currant Creek Power Plant 
Mona, Utah 
- ,S •*& 
Owner/operator PacifiCorp 
,;,;n riierciai operation of PacifiCorp's first new power plant In more than 
20 years coincided with the company's acquisition by MidAmerican 
Energy Holdings Company this past March. Currant Creek treads lightly 
on the environment provides needed power to PacifiCorp's eastern con-
not aiea, and has demonstrated its commitment to be a good corporate 
citizen of the local community. By any account, Currant Creek is a model 
for how to develop a power project. 
By Qcfte F. Hill, Jr., PE, The Shaw Group, and Robert Van Engetenhoven, PacrfiCorp 
hen Des Momes-based Mid-
Amencan completed the puichase 
ol PacifiCorp from Scottish-
Powei in late March of this year, one of its 
prizes was the new, natural gas-fired 525-
MW Cunant Creek Powei Plant outside of 
Mona, Utah (Figure I) Baton Rouge-based 
The Shaw Gioup Inc (wwwshawgrp com), 
through its subsidiary Shaw Stone & Web-
ster, provided all of the engiiieenng, some 
of the procuiement (PacifiCorp purchased 
the combustion tuibines, the heat-recovery 
steam generators, the mam tiansformer, and 
the sw itchy aid components), and all of the 
construction services for the combined-cycle 
pioject—which is notable for having "gone 
commercial" twice, as we'll explain latei 
PacifiCorp, one of the lowest-cost elec 
tncity producers in the U S , has 8,470 MW 
of net geneiation capacity representing a 
bioad mix of fuels coal, hydro, natural gas, 
wind, and geothermai energy PacifiCorp 
operates as Utah Power in Utah and Idaho, 
and as Pacific Power in Oregon, Wyoming, 
Washington, and California 
In Utah, summer peak electricity demand 
has been growing at a sizzling 5% a year, 
about twice the national average of 2 6% 
Accordingly, PacifiCorp's resource plan-
ners detemiined that the company's system 
1. F ly ing h i g h . PacifiCorp's new 525-MW Currant Creek Power Plant is 80 miles south of Salt Lake City, at an elevation of more than 5,000 
feet Courtesy PacifiCorp 
EXHIBIT 
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STOP PLANTS 
2. Barga in b u i l d i n g . Currant Creek is an outdoor plant that uses a huge air-cooled condenser to recover turbine exhaust steam. I he entire 
plant cost just S350 million to build. Courtesy: PacifiCorp 
• ~: ' • ": — r - g ^ -^^r^-" '"- - — — r r - - ~-j 
:JH 
3. Sa fe ty first. The Currant Creek project was awarded the 2006 PacifiCorp CEO Safety 
Award for its outstanding safety record compiled during simple-cycle plant operations during 
the summer of 2006. Accepting the award are (left to right) Clint Winn, PacifiCorp construction 
manager; Odis Hill, Shaw project manager; John Bowater, PacifiCorp Currant Creek plant man-
ager; and Bob Van Engelenhoven, PacifiCorp project manager. Courtesy: PacifiCorp 
would require new summer peaking capacity 
and new baseload capacity by 2005 and 2006, 
respectively. Thus the Currant Creek project 
was conceived as the first large (>300 M"W) 
power plant built by PacifiCorp since 1983, 
when the third unit of the Hunter Power Plant 
in central Utah came on-line. 
That the final bill for the project came in 
under $350 million (about $660/kW) shows 
that Shaw and PacificCorp know a thing or 
two about squeezing a plant construction dol-
lar. For comparison's sake, a very similar, util-
ity-built 2 x 1 plant equipped with the-same 
gas turbines (but with a less-costly wet cool-
ing system) that recently went into service in 
California cost over $410 million to build. 
Western ratepayers got a real bargain with 
Currant Creek (Figure 2). 
Managing construction costs on this proj-
ect was essential, due to its remote site, lack 
of rail access, and fast-track project schedule. 
To expedite erection and mitigate risk to craft 
labor, Shaw Group shops in Louisiana and 
Utah were used to assemble major pipe racks, 
large portions of boiler feedwater, main steam 
and reheat piping, and other modular compo-
nents. These major subassemblies were then 
trucked to die 160-acre site when required 
50 
IQ<1 
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TCP PLANTS 
as part of the construction sequence. This 
helped the site io achieve an excellent safety 
record: more than 1.5 million hours worked 
without a lost-time accident (Figure 3). 
The same, but different 
At first glance, Currant Creek is similar to 
many 2 x 1 combined-cycle plants based on 
the ubiquitous General Electric 7FA gas tur-
bine (see the profiles of PSEG Power's Lin-
den Generating Plant and Bethlehem Energy 
Center on pp. 59 and 40, respectively). It has a 
nominal generating capacity of 145 MW at its 
elevation of 5,051 feet. The two triple-pres-
sure, horizontal gas-flow heat-recovery steam 
generators (HRSGs)—manufactured by 
Louisville-based Vogt Power International 
Inc., a subsidiary of Babcock Power Inc. 
(Danvers, Mass.)—generate low-pressure 
(LP) steam at 78 psig and 565F, intermediate-
pressure (IP) steam at 462 psig and 1,048F, 
and high-pressure (HP) steam at 1,950 psig 
and 1,050F from turbine exhaust gas at 1,125F 
(Figure 4). Currant Creek is supplied by a 
1,075-psig dedicated pipeline that brings gas 
to the plant from a trunk line 13 miles away. 
Each HRSG is fitted with natural gas-fired 
duct burners from Forney Corp. (Carrollton, 
Texas) that boost the unit's output by 52 MW 
when they kick in. NOx emissions are kept 
under control by a selective catalytic reduc-
tion (SCR) system; its reagent of choice is 
aqueous ammonia. CO emissions are likewise 
reduced by a catalyst incorporated into each 
HRSG (see the table). Currant Creek's steam 
turbine, from Toshiba, is rated at a nominal 
250 MW. Its combined HPAP cylinder is con-
nected to a separate, double-flow LP cylinder 
(Figure 5). 
All power plants are local 
Currant Creek's design incorporates an air-
cooled condenser that uses only 10% of the 
amount of water that a similarly sized plant 
with wet cooling towers would require. Sup-
plied by GEA Power Cooling Inc. (Lakewood, 
Colo.), the condenser uses thirty 250-hp vari-
able-speed fans (controlled by a computer) 
to maintain optimum vacuum conditions and 
maximize steam turbine performance over the 
wide range of ambient conditions at the plant 
site. In winter, the fans' motors are reversed 
to pull warmer air across the finned-tube sur-
faces, ensuring that no part of the condenser 
could possibly freeze. The condenser is sized 
to maintain a vacuum of 6.7 inches (Hg) at 
87F and to operate effectively during the sum-
mer, when the temperature may reach more 
than 100F (Figure 6). 
What little water the plant needs (for feed-
water and auxiliaries) comes from two deep-
bore wells on the outskirts of Mona, near the 
1-15 freeway, 3 miles from the project site. A 
•;.. "~vljki ?; i ; r . Vogt Power International supplied the two triple-pressure heat-recovery 
steam generators. Courtesy: PacifiCorp 
i 
* 
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Currant Creek's emissions limits 
Source: PacifiCorp 
Pollutant 
PM/PM,U 
W04 
CO 
Simple-cycle operation 
limits <@15%0,) per 
turbine 
0.066 Ib/mmBtu 
(10.8 Ib/hr) 
9.0 ppmvd 
(54.0 Ib/hr) 
7.8 ppmvd 
(28.0 Ib/hr) 
Simple-cycle 
averaging 
period, hours 
18 
18 
24 
Combined-cycle 
operation Huiit$ 
<fe 15% GJ per turbine* 
0.066 Ib/mmBtu 
(108 Ib/hr) 
2.25 ppmvd 
(17.0 Ib/hr) 
3.0 ppmvd 
(11.6 Ib/hr) 
Combined-cycle 
averaging period 
hours 
24 
•3 
3 
Note: a. Excluding start-up and shutdown events. 
5, SVlade In J a p a n . Toshiba supplied the single 250-MW steam turbine. Courtesy: 
PacifiCorp 
/?s¥ POWffS? July/August 2006 
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3. i i i o w f r i g h o t & u d COld . Thirty 250-
hp variable-speed fans maintain optimum 
vacuum conditions in the air-cooled con-
denser year-round (top). Air f low is reversed 
during the freezing winter months to prevent 
subcooling of the condensate (bottom). Cour-
tesy: PacifiCorp 
Radiator cooling units 
Exhaust sleam . •' 
from turbine ''' 
wet cooling system would have been much 
cheaper to build but more costly (in a different 
sense) in the long run. Locally, water is scarcer 
than hens' teeth, and multi-year droughts have 
occurred twice in the past 20 years. PacifiCorp 
realized that buying up agricultural land to se-
cure the necessary water rights wouldn't have 
been neighborly. Investing in the air-cooled 
condenser was a no-brainer. 
PacifiCorp paid just as much attention to 
effluent as influent. All wastewater streams 
from drains, boiler and evaporative cooler 
blowdown, and the water treatment plant are 
directed to a 20-acre evaporative pond near-
by. Sewerage goes to an on-site septic tank. 
An all-volatile chemistry regime enables the 
plant to maintain satisfactory water chemistry 
without the use of hydrazine. The mixed beds 
of the water treatment plant are designed to be 
regenerated off-site, eliminating the need to 
bring in bulk acid and caustic and store them 
on-site. 
One-two punch 
The Currant Creek Plant was built in two 
phases, beginning in January 2004. The first 
phase focused on installing and placing into 
service the two simple-cycle gas turbines (to-
taling 280 MW) by the summer of 2005. Both 
were completed on June 10. 2005, and de-
clared commercial on June 20, 2005—when 
they were turned over to PacifiCorp opera-
tions for dispatching to help meet summer 
peak demand. The second phase—completing 
the steam plant—took a back seat to serving 
prime-time load. 
The safe operation of the two simple-cycle 
GTs last summer, while almost 500 tradesmen 
were on-site installing the steam turbine and 
HRSGs, was a testament to the skill and dedi-
cation of The Shaw Group and PacifiCorp. 
Personnel from the two companies had to 
work closely, on a daily basis, to identify and 
solve problems quickly—or court disaster. 
One example of their ingenuity was install-
ing a large hydraulic damper and a second 
steel safety plate (with an air gap between 
the damper and the HRSG) as the solution to 
the problem of keeping operators and crafts-
men safely apart. Others included setting up 
a lock out/tag out procedure that worked for 
both teams and commissioning of the final 
plant's distributed control system during the 
first phase. 
The simple-cycle turbines ran without any 
forced outages throughout the 2005 summer 
peak season. On September 23,2005,Currant 
Creek was removed from commercial ser-
vice and put back under control of The Shaw 
Group for completion of construction of the 
steam plant. During the second phase, the two 
HRSGs and the steam turbine were installed, 
increasing the plant's generating capacity by 
245 MW to 525 MW. The entire combined-
cycle plant was declared commercial on 
March 22,2006, months before this summer's 
peak-demand season. 
Jump? How high? 
Nearly continuous variable plant output 
and fast system response are two key fea-
tures of Currant Creek's design. The plant's 
capacity can be set for any of several load 
ranges within 90 minutes of a call from dis-
patch. "One thing that's really great about 
this plant is its flexibility," explained John 
Bowater, Currant Creek's manager. uOn 
high-demand days, it can respond very 
quickly and precisely." 
Currant Creek's flexibility is particularly 
valued by PacifiCoip's commercial and 
trading group. They realize that any capac-
ity that can be bid in discrete blocks has a 
better chance of being dispatched. Follow-
ing are the five ways that Currant Creek can 
be configured, and the capacity range pro-
duced by that configuration: 
Single gas turbine + steam turbine: 134 
to210MW 
Single gas turbine + steam turbine + one 
HRSG with duct firing: 154 to 262 MW 
; Two gas turbines + steam turbine: 268 to 
430 MW 
Two gas turbine + steam turbine + one 
HRSG with duct firing: 288 to 482 MW 
Two gas turbines + steam turbine 4- both 
HRSGs with duct firing: 304 to 525 
MW 
The plant is designed for 250 to 260 
starts per year and is typically dispatched 
for 12 to 15 hours per day, depending on 
the spark spread. To facilitate rapid start-
ups, the HRSGs are equipped with stack 
dampers, and an-auxiliary boiler has been 
provided to maintain vacuum in the steam 
turbine during overnight shutdowns. Those 
are two pieces of equipment that should be 
standard in any cycling plant. 
The incredible shrinking staff 
In keeping with advances in modern control 
technology, Currant Creek has a small com-
plement of staff responsible for day-to-day 
operations and maintenance. Technical sup-
port from PacifiCorp's engineering group in 
Salt Lake City eliminates the need to assign 
full-time engineering specialists to the site. 
Currant Creek has a staff of 24. How-
ever, five of those 24 —the plant manager, a 
chemist/environmental specialist, a safety/ 
training guru, a procurement professional, 
and an administrative whiz—will be respon-
sible, beginning next summer on a 50/50 
basis, for duty at the new Lake Side Power 
Plant being built by Summit Vineyard LLC 
and Siemens Power Corp. 40 miles south 
of Salt Lake City. As a result, the effective 
FTE (full-time equivalent) position count at 
Currant Creek will be a stingy 21. 
First, do no harm 
Bringing in almost as many construction 
workers as residents of the town of Mona 
(population: 750) would have been a rec-
ipe for disaster if The Shaw Group and 
PacifiCorp managers hadn't recognized the 
potential for problems and dealt with them 
in a respectful way before groundbreaking. 
Many meetings with the town and county 
leadership paved the way for a wonderful 
working relationship. 
It was The Shaw Group's intent to leave 
the community better off than it had been 
before the workers arrived. They took the 
time to help with cancer and blood drives, 
for example, and to contribute to many 
other worthwhile projects. "We are mighty 
thankful you came to our county," said 
Robert Steele, Juab County commission-
er. PacifiCorp also funded over $180,000 
worth of projects that will directly benefit 
Juab County residents, c 
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P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Peter W. Billings (A0330) 
Kevin N. Anderson (A0100) 
Jason W. Hardin (A8793) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Michael G. Jenkins (A4350) 
Assistant General Counsel, PacifiCorp 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801) 220-2233 
Facsimile: (801) 220-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant PacifiCorp 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER ) 
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, ) KENNETH IAN ANDREWS 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 050903412 
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS and ) Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, ) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kenneth "Ian" Andrews, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am currently Manager, Resource Development for PacifiCorp Energy, a division 
of PacifiCorp. 
2. I have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of Utah and a 
MBA from Brigham Young University. 
3. On August 15, 2002,1 contacted Milka Radulovic at the Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality, by telephone and requested a copy of Spring 
Canyon Energy's Notice of Intent (NOI), which is a publicly available document. I was told that 
Spring Canyon had initially proposed a 2x1 combined cycle power plant, but that Spring Canyon 
had amended its NOI and was proposing a lxl combined cycle plant. Ms. Radulovic was kind 
enough to fax me a copy of the NOI that same day. A true and correct copy of the NOI that I 
received on August 15, 2002, is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. On August 15, 2002, after I had received and read the NOI, I prepared a memo to 
Rand Thurgood concerning some of the relevant information in the NOI. A true and correct 
copy of my memo to Mr. Thurgood is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
5. The NOI identified the location of the proposed Spring Canyon plant site. It also 
laid out the other details of the proposed Spring Canyon combined cycle power plant, which are 
typical features of a combined cycle plant. Notably, the NOI detailed the combustion technology 
of the proposed Spring Canyon plant based on using a General Electric 7FA (PG7241FA) gas 
turbine, and the plaint's other features, including inlet air chilling (which is not common), a heat 
2 
recovery steam generator equipped with a selective catalytic reduction system, supplemental duct 
firing with Coen (or equivalent) burners, and a steam turbine generator. 
6. The NOI also explained that the proposed Spring Canyon plant would be located 
near existing high capacity power lines, obviously referring to PacifiCorp's 345 kV transmission 
system, and near a high pressure natural gas supply line, which was a reference to two nearby 
gas transmission pipelines - the Mainline 104 transmission pipeline owned by Questar, and a 
transmission pipeline owned by Kern River Gas Transmission Company. According to the NOI, 
the proposed Spring Canyon plant was to be dry (air) cooled, meaning it would have an air 
cooled condenser which, according to the NOI, would greatly reduce the plant's water usage. 
7. By reading the NOI, I was also able to determine the manufacturer of the 
proposed plant's pollution control equipment, the heat input rate for the gas turbine and the duct 
burners and the expected capacities of the gas turbine generator and steam turbine generator.. 
8. The NOI ultimately culminated in the issuance of an Approval Order (or air 
permit) from the Division of Air Quality on November 27, 2002. I obtained a copy of the 
Approval Order from the Division of Air Quality after it was issued. Like the NOI, the publicly 
available Approval Order laid out the details of the proposed Spring Canyon combined cycle 
plant, including the precise GPS coordinates for the proposed plant site. A true and correct copy 
of the Approval Order that I obtained is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
Dated this 25th day of April, 2007. 
Kenneth Ian Andrews 
3 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this & * day of April 2007. 
#zo 
Notary Public 
TERE8ALLYOM 
HOTARYPUBUC • STAR Of UTAH 
1712 CBmERBROOK DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CmrUT 6411Q 
COMM EXP. 04/21/2006 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 30th day of April, 2007,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH IAN ANDREWS as follows: 
Via Hand Delivery 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Kristopher S. Kaufman 
TOMSIC & PECK 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Via Hand Delivery 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams 
and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP 
Via U.S. Mail 
J. Chapman Petersen 
Robert Surovell 
Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy 
4010 University Drive, Suite 200 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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EXHIBIT A 
Utah Division of Air Quality 
New Source Review Section 
Form 1 
General Information 
Application for; dC initial Approval Order 
RECEIVED 
AUG I 3 ?C02 
AIR QUALITY 
a Approval Order Modification 
A PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT MUST BE APPROVED BEFORE ANY ACTUAL WORK IS BEGUN ON THE 
FACILITIES, This is not a stand alone document Please refer to the Permit Application Instructions for 
>edf»c details required to complete the applicatbn. Please print or type all information requested. All Information requested 
?rein must be completed and submitted before an engineering review can be completed. Contact the Engineering Section 
the Division of Air Quality with any questions at (801) 536-4000. Written Inquiries may be addressed to: Division of Air Quality, 
igineering Section, P.O. Box 144820, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820. 
. (fcneral 0*mo_r and Facility Information l 
Company name and address: 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC 
PO Box 774000-359 
Steamboat Springs CO 80477 
Phone No,: (970) 871-6223 
Fax No.: (970)871-6234 
Facility address (if different from above): 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC 
same addres s , phone and fax 
Phone no.: ( ) 
Fax no.: ( ) 
County facility is located in: 
Juab 
2. Company contact for environmental issues: J 
Dr. Ted Guth | 
Phone No.: (619)670-3157 j 
Fax No.: ( 619 670-9454 1 
4. Owners name and addres$: 
Same as company namej address , phone, fax 
! II 
Phone no.: { ) ; [ 
Fax no,: ( ) i I 
6. Latitude & longitude^ township & range, | 
and/or UTM coordinates of plant NAD27 Zone 12 I 
422810 Easting X 4410042 Northing I 
Directions to Installation (street address and/or directions to site) (include U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey map if | 
necessary):
 F r o m S a l t L^KQ c i t y . 1 5 south approximately 77 m i l e s to Hwy 54 . Take e x i t J 
and proceed west through Mona. Go 1/2 mile north on Goshen Canyon Road, Plant s i t e i s 
1/2 mile to the vest 
Identify any current Approval Order(s): | 
AO#. Date AO# Date 1 
AO# . Date AO# Date | 
AO# Date _ AO# JDate | 
If request for modification, previous permit # and date: DAQE # . _... DATE: / / | 
Type of business at this facility: E l e c t r i c i t y Genera t ion | 
Total company employees greater than 100? 
n YP<; r y Kin 
12. Standard Industrial Classification Code 
4 _ _ 9 _ 1 _ 1 I 
1 
PAC007341 
Form 1 (Continued) 
13. Application for: 
XP New construction 
D Existing equipment operating without permit 
*% o Change of permit condition 
Q Modification 
n Permanent site 
a Change oi location 
14. For new construction or modification, enter estimated start date: ^-01 - 02 Estimated completion date: 10-01-03 
5. For change of permittee, location or condition, enter 
date of occurrence: N / A 
16. For existing equipment in operation without pnor permit. 
enter initial operation date: M A 
7, Has facility been modified or the capacity increased since November 29,1969: a Yes a No 
Process Information 
B Site plan of facility (Attach as Appendix A): 
9. Flow diagram of entire process to include flow rates and other applicable information (Attach as Appendix B): 
0. Detailed process/equipment description. (Attach as Appendix C) 
Description must include: 
Process/Equip specific form(s) identified in the instructions 
Fuels and their use Equipment used In process 
Raw materials used Operation schedules 
Production rates (including daily/seasonal variances) 
Description of produces) 
Description of changes to process (if applicable 
1. Does this application contain confidential data? Xi Yes D No 
Emissions Related Information 
2, Describe all potential emissions of air pollutants. (Attach as Appendix D). 
Include the following: 
(2 Emissions for which the source is major. 
00 Emissions of regulated and/or hazardous air pollutants. 
M Description of any operational constraints or work practices imposed that limit the amount of regulated or hazardou 
air pollutants. 
£J Emissions above described »n terms of Ibs/hr, lbs/day, and tons/yea/. 
Qfl All calculations used to support the emissions data above. 
83 AH Material Safety Data sheets for products used in process. 
'•-— Identify °o the site plan (see #18 above) all emissions points, building dimensions, stack parameters, etc^ 
Air Pollution Control Equipment Information 
List all air pollution control equipment and include equipment specific forms identified in the instructions 
Attach as Appendix E. 
List and describe all compliance monitoring devices and/or activities (suet) as CEM. pressure gages). Attach as 
Appendix F. 
Submit modeling for the project if required. See attached instructions. 
As part of BACT, Attach as Appendix G an evaluation of the control technologies that have been considered 
I hereby certify that the information and data submitted in and with this application is completely true, accurate and 
complete, based on reasonable inquiry and to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Signature: Title: Managing Member/ SpringCanvon Energy, LLC 
Ted Banasiewicz 
Name (Type or print) 
Telephone Number: 
(979 871-6223 
30 Date; 
2 -11 -02 
PAC007342 t(lcfU 
j p h . . n # ?nn?. 
Utah Division of Air Quality 
New Source Review Section 
Form 2 
Process Information 
Date 
Company Spring Canyon Energy, LLC 
Sjte Sprang Canyop/frona 
Process Data 
1. Name of process; G a s - f i r e d e l e c t r i c 
generation 
3. Primary process equipment: . . g^ft tu rb ine Manufacturer Gen* 
Make or model:GE Model PG 724r_FA „ Identification #: _ _ 
2. End product of this process: E l e c t r i c i t y 
Capacity of equipment (Ibs/hr): combined cyc le Year installed: 2002/2003
 m 
Rated 270 MW _ _ Max. 285 MW . 
(Add additional sheets as needed) Gas turbine only: Nominal 170MW . a t iso condit ions 
k Method of exhaust ventilation; 
(X Stack D Window fan o Roof vent • Other, describe 
Are there multiple exhausts: 30 Yes 2 o No 
Operating Data 
Maximum operating schedule: 24 hrs/day 
7. days/week 
52 weeks per yr 
6» Percent annual production by quarter. 
Winter 25 Spring 25 
Summer 2$ Fall 25 
Hourly production rates (lbs): ( T o t a l P l a n t ) 
Average ^2J9jtSS Maximum 270 MW 
8. Maximum Annual production (indicate units) 
2 ,3 m i U f o n MW hours 
Projected percent annual increase in production 
Type of operation: iX Continuous 
D Intermittent 
Batch 10. If batch, indicate minutes per cycle. 
Minutes between cycles . 
Materials Used in Process 
Raw Materials Principal Use Amounts 
(Specify Units) 
Natural Gas source of fuel for combustiord 2155 MMBTU/hr (HHV) 
tfater converted to steam 177 gpm 
\ir source of oxygen for combusti bn 0-7 MMcfm 
\mroonia reactant to reduce N0Y 60 lb /h r 
PAC007343 
Process 
Form 2 (Continued) 
•*2. Control Equipment (attach additional pages if necessary) 
Item Pnmary Collector Secondary Collector 
IYPP SCR Catalyst, 
b. Manufacturer Englehardt (or equivalent) 
Model Selective Catalytic Reduction (MPr) , removal 
d Year installed 2003 
e Serial or ID# TBD 
f. Pollutant controlled NO* 
g Controlled pollutant emission 
rate (if known) N0X 2.0 ppmv; CO^ppmv 
Pressure drop across control 
device 8" 
Design efficiency NOy. 86,6% 
Operating efficiency N0X 03% 
Stack Data 
(attach additional pages if necessary) 
3 Stack identification* 
3TS 1 
14. Height-Above roof NA ft 
Above ground _269 ft. 
5 Are other sources vented to this stack, 
a Yes AC No 
If yes. identity sources: 
16 ex Round, top inside diameter dimension 19 f e e t 
D Rectangular, top inside dimensions 
length x width 
sufm 
23Q_ °F Volume 744999 . .acfm Velocity jjOOQ ft/min 
a no 
7 Exit gas Temperature, 
8 Continuous monitoring equipment. OC yes 
If yes, indicate- Type NQKr CD, 02 Manufacturer 
KVB, Aldora (or equivalent) 
Make or Model. Pollutant(s) monitored 
NOx, CO, 0 2 
3 Emission data. Supply maximum annual emission rates (in tons/year) of PM10, S02, NO,, Volatile Organic 
Compounds, CO, and Hazardous Air Pollutants from source see at tached * 
Check source of data a Stack test %i Emission factor 
o Material balance -p Manufacturer 
PAC007144 
Utah Division of Air Quality 
New Source Review Section 
Form 22 
Combustion Turbines 
Date Feb. 11 , 2002 
Company_JSp£ing CanYQEL-Energy, LLC 
Facility Spring ^nyon/M^n^ 
Equipment Information 
1. Manufacturer: General 
Model no.: Model PG 7241 ?k 
un i t 
Operating time of Emission Source: 
AVERAGE MAXIMUM 
24 Hours/day 24 Hours/day 
7. Days/week _ 7 Days/week 
57 Weeks/year 52 Weeks/yeai 
3. Manufacturer's rated output at baseload, ISO J3IL 
Proposed site operating range __- _. 170 
Manufacturer's rated heat rate at baseload. ISO , ?48Q_ 
.XDMWorDhp 
XD MW or o hp 
(BTU/kW-hr) ( t u r b i n e only) 
4. Percent of annual heat input: 
Dec-Feb _ 2 5 _ % Mar-May 25 % Jun-Aug25 % Sep-Nov ^ 5 _ % 
GAS FIRING 
5. Ongin of gas: 
ex Pipeline D Distillate fuel a Other liquid a Solid fuel 
oil gasification fuel gasification gasification 
u Byproduct: 
specify source 
6. Are you on an Interruptible gas supply: 
a Yes X? No 
If "yes", specify alternate 
fuel: 
Annual consumption of fuel. 
1 7 , 6 7 0 MM scf 
•8. Heat content: HHV 1011 
(na tura l gas)
 m 
"9. Sulfur content 
BTU/scf %bywt. 
10. Maximum firing rate: 2 , 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 * * s c f / h r (I unji 
scf/hr 
[L tt). Average finng rate: 
2,030,00 per un i t scf/hr 
"if the gas fired is natural gas, these items need not be completed. 
**1.6 MMscf/hr ( turb ine) plus 0.57 (duct f i r i ng ) = 2.17MMscf/hr 
Combustion Turbine 
Form 22 (Continued) 
Oil Firing 
17. Direction of firing: D horizontal Q tangential o other: specify 
- t t . 
13. 
JJL. 
Type of oil: N/A 
Grade number n 1 
Annual consumption: 
Sulfur content: 
0 2 D 4 0 5 0 6 
gallons 
% bywt 
a Other: specify . 
14. Heat content: 
16. Ash content 
a BTU/tb 
a BTU/qal 
%bywt 
18. Average firing rate: gal/hr 19. Maximum firing rate: gal/hr 
20. 
* 
D 
X 
D 
Application: 
Electric generation 
X Base load Peaking 
Driving pump/compressor 
Exhaust heat recovery 
Other (specify) 
Operation 
21. Cycle 
o Simple cycle 
o Regenerative cycle 
a Cogeneration 
8 Combined cycle 
22. Is turbine equipped with exhaust heat recovery equipment? B Yes D NO ( f o r both u n i t s ) 
If yes, supply the size, flaw rate, steam output capacity and temperature profile. 
0.633 MMlb/hr 188 psi lOOpOp high pressure steam; 0.790 MMlb/hr 432 psi 989°F hot 
23. Is turbine equipped with duct burners? Xi Yes o No ( f o r both u n i t s ) 
If yes, provide burner description, fuel usage, combustion air input and location of the burners. Show all heat transfer 
surface locations with the waste heat boiler and temperature profile. 
Coen (or equivalent bu rne r s ) - 512 MMBTU/hr (HHV) see at tached heat balance 
Emissions Data 
14. Attach manufacturer's information showing emissions of NO,, CO, VOC, SQ, and P^0 for each proposed fuel a 
turbine loads and site ambient temperatures representative of the range of proposed operation. The information mus 
be sufficient to determine maximum hourly and annual emission rates. Annual emissions may be based on z 
conservatively low approximation of site annual average temperature. Provide emissions in pounds per hour anr 
except for PM10. parts per million by volume at actual conditions and corrected to dry, 15% oxygen conditions. 
lethod of Emission Control: 
Lean premixcombustors c Oxidation catalyst o . . . ,_ ^ 
Other low-NO, combustor X3 SCR catalyst n Steam injection Pry-LoNOx 
Water injection j? Other (specify) 
Additional Information 
On separate sheets provide the following: 
A. Details regarding principle of operation of emission controls. If add-on equipment is used, provide make an 
model and manufacturer's information. Example details include: controller input variables and operations: 
algorithms for water or ammonia injection systems, combustion mode versus turbine load for variable mod 
combustors, etc. 
B. Exhaust parameter information on attached form. 
PAC007346 
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1.0 Introduction 
Summary 
In an effort to ensure a reliable supply of electrical generation to Utah, Spring 
Canyon Energy, LLC intends to install a natural gas fueled turbine-generator at a 
new power plant to be located in Spring Canyon near Mona in Juab County. 
(see Appendix A). The facility will consist of one natural gas fueled gas turbine 
(GT) engine generator set operating in a combined cycle configuration with heat 
recovery steam generator (HRSG) and a single steam turbine-generator. The 
HRSG will be supplementary fired with natural gas duct burners to augment 
waste heat from the gas turbine exhaust which produces steam for powering the 
steam turbine generator. The Spring Canyon Energy facility will have a nominal 
generating capacity of 270 MW (net) at 59°F with duct firing and inlet chillers 
operating. 
The gas turbine emissions (corrected to 15% 02) will be 2.0 ppm NOx and 4.0 
ppm CO (9.0 ppm with duct firing). Annual emissions from the facility are 
estimated to be no greater than 63.5 tons of NOx, 97.5 tons of CO, 70.6 tons of 
fine particulates (PMIQ), 44.7 tons of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 4.9 
tons of S0 2 and 5.7 tons of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). Modeling of these 
emissions indicates no violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) as a result of operations. The complete modeling study, performed 
after approval of the proposed air dispersion modeling protocol, is being 
submitted to Division of Air Quality with this application. This Notice of Intent 
(NOI) is being submitted to obtain an Approval Order (AO) for the installation of 
the gas turbine at the Spring Canyon site. 
Background 
The need for the facility is a result of a significant increase in the electrical 
demand. Addftionally, the plant will act as a hedge against high prices for 
independent operators in the Utah area as well as to provide voltage support. 
Power generation from natural gas fuel provides the lowest emission option. It is 
necessary to locate the facility within the Juab Valley near the existing high 
capacity power lines and high pressure natural gas supply line. 
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2.0 Process Description 
The Spring Canyon facility will consist of one natural gas fueled turbine genenitor 
set. Natural gas (no other fuel will be used) will be introduced with ambient air 
(chilled when ambient temperatures are above 59°F) into a General Electric 
Frame 7-FA (PG7241FA) gas turbine to produce approximately 170 MW output, 
gross. 
The gas turbine is a heavy-duty industrial type frame unit representing state of 
the art current day technology. Gas turbine inlet air is compressed and fuel is 
then introduced and ignited to produce hot exhaust gases that are then 
expanded through the turbine section of the machine. The rotating turbine in turn 
drives the generator that produces electricity, the only product delivered by the 
facility. Waste exhaust heat from the gas turbine is augmented by natural gas 
fired duct burners and is then directed into a heat recovery steam generator to 
produce steam. This steam is used internally at the plant to drive a steam 
turbine to create up to 100 MW of additional "combined cycle" power for export. 
An air- cooled condenser will condense spent steam back into water for recycling 
to the HRSG. Use of the dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the 
plants water usage. 
It is anticipated that the gas turbine will be purchased from General Electric. The 
unit is being manufactured in Greenville, South Carolina, and is being configured 
with the latest technology Dry Lo-NOx combustion systems and catalyst for 
Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) for NOXl CO and the remaining criteria 
pollutants. NOx emissions in the turbine exhaust gas will be controlled to 12-15 
ppm by Dry Lo-NOx prior to passing through the selective catalytic NOx removal 
(SCR) system. NOx emissions willbe reduced to 2.0 ppmvd at the stack exit with 
the SCR catalyst and CO emissions will be 4.0 ppmvd at the stack exit (9.0 ppmi 
when the turbine is augmented with duct firing). 
The plant is designed to operate up to 8760 hours per year in base load 
configuration 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, wrth only minimal down time for 
required maintenance. Raw materials used at the Spring Canyon plant in 
addition to natural gas and air are water (to generate the steam) and ammonia 
for the selective catalytic (NOx) reduction process. 
The Spring Canyon facility will have a maximum generating capacity of 
approximately 270 MW at 59°F and is projected to begin operation in September 
2003. Annual emissions from the facility (assuming 8,760 hours of operation per 
year) are estimated to be 63.5 tons of NO*, 97.5 tons of CO, 70.6 tons of fine 
particulates (PM10), 44.7 tons of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 4,9 tons of 
S0 2 and 5.7 tons of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). All levels are well-below 
the 250 ton-per-year PSD threshold. Modeling of the emissions indicates no 
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violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) will result from 
operation of the plant. 
Monitoring of emissions from these units will be performed pursuant*to 40 CFR 
60.334 (a) and 40 CFR Part 75. 
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3.0 Emissions Summary 
Emissions estimates for NOx, and CO are based on emissions data provided by 
equipment manufacturers. S0 2 emissions are based on sulfur content data from 
Questar. Emissions estimates for VOC's are based on the EPA's Compilation of 
Air Pollutant Emission Factors (AP-42), Ammonia slip from the SCR will be 
limited to approximately 10 ppmvd, (also based on vendor design data). 
The hourly emission rates listed in Table 1 are the maximum rates for operation 
of the proposed turbine and duct burners firing natural gas at 100 percent load. 
The annual emissions from the turbine running with SCR control are also 
displayed. This assumes a maximum fuel throughput with duct firing of 2017 
MMBtu/hr (HHV at 59°F) and 8760 hours of annual operation for the turbine. 
See Appendix D for detailed emissions model/summary 
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TABLE 1 
Spring Canyon Turbine Emissions Summary with SCR Catalyst Control1*8 
Pollutant 
Criteria Pollutants 
Nitrogen Oxides 
Carbon Monoxide 
Sulfur Dioxide 
VOCs (Hydrocarbons) 
Paniculate Matter4 
F'm» Particulate Mater (PM10) 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs) 
1.3 Butadiene 
Acetaldehyde 
Acrolein 
Benzene 
Ethylbenxene 
Formaldehyde 
Naphthalene 
PAH 
Propylene Oxide 
Toulene 
Xylenes 
Annual 
Emissions (tpy) 
63.5 
97.5 
4.9 
44.7 
70.6 
70.6 
.017 
.015 
.015 
0.17 
1.35 
1.51 
0.01 
0.002 
1.20 
1.12 
0.26 
_ _ 
Hourly 
Emissions (IboV) 
14.5 
39.4 
1.1 
10.2 
16.1 
16.1 
.004 
.035 
.003 
.04 
.30 
.346 
.002 
.0005 
.27 
.25 
.06 
131 " 
Emission Factor 
Reference 
Vendor 
Vendor 
Questar S data 
5 
Vendor 
\/endor 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
1. The emissions values provided in the tables are the cumulative emissions for both turbines. 
2. The hourly emission rates are the maximum rates for operation of th^ proposed turbines with duct burners firing natural 
gas at 100 percent loads based on operation at 59°F. 
3. Annual emissions are based on operation for 8760 hours per year on natural gas, with duct firing. 
4. The PM and PM,0 emissions are condensible and ttterable. 
5. AP-42 
6. Ventura County (CA) Air Pollution Control District 
Notes: 
CO = Carbon monoxide 
hrs/yr - hours per year 
ib/hr * pounds per hour 
NO* « Oxides of nitrogen 
PM = Particulate matter 
PM10 = Particulate matter less than 10 microns in size 
SO2 = Sulfur dioxide; based on fuel sulfur = 2 gr/1000 cu ft 
Tpy = tons per year 
VOC - Volatile organic compound 
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4,0 Regulatory Review 
This section provides a regulatory review for the installation of the turbine at the 
Spring Canyon facility in Utah. The review is divided into two sections. The first 
section addresses approval order permitting requirements, and the second section 
addresses other air quality regulatory requirements. 
4.a. Air Permit Requirements 
Notice of Intent and Approval Order 
As required by UAC R307-401, Permit: Notice of Intent and Approval Orderf this 
Notice of Intent application (NOI) is required to be submitted to UDAQ to obtain an 
approval order (AO) permit prior to installation of the turbine. Juab County is 
attainment for all pollutants. As required by R307-401-6, best available control 
technology (BACT) will be used to control carbon monoxide (CO) emissions. In 
fact, LAER is being proposed for all remaining criteria pollutants. 
New and Modified Sources in Non-attainment Areas 
and Maintenance Areas 
UAC R307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Non-attainment Areas 
and Maintenance Areas describes the requirements for proposed source permit 
approval. R307-403-3, Review of Major sources of Air Quality Impact, requires; the 
Executive Secretary to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation 
of the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) as of the sources projected 
start-up date. The installation of the turbine at the Spring Canyon plant will not 
cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS. The air quality impact analysis 
demonstrating this is presented in Section 6. 
Offsets: General Requirements 
The project location is in Juab County, which is an attainment area for all 
pollutants. Hourly, daily, and annual emission levels are below any and all offset 
threshold levels. Additionally modeling results show insignificant impact of the 
project on adjacent non-attainment (for PM10) Utah County. As such, offsets are 
not required for any pollutant. Thus, provisions of UAC R307-403-4(2)t 403-5 and 
420 do not apply. 
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Operating Permit Requirements 
The Spring Canyon turbine is required to obtain a Title V Operating Permit. An 
application for operating permit is required within 12 months of the commencement 
of operation (UAC R307-415A (B), Permits: Operating Permit Requirements.) 
4.b Other Air Quality Regulatory Requirements 
New Source Performance Standards 
NSPS Subpart GG is applicable to the turbine at Spring Canyon-
Subpart GG- Standards of Performance for Stationary Gas Turbines -
Subpart GG of 40 CFR 60 establishes emission limits for NO* and SOz emissions 
from stationary gas-fired turbines with a heat input at peak load equal to or 
greater than 10.7 gigajoules per hour (10 MMBtu/hr), based on the lower heating 
value of the fuel fired. The turbine at the Spring Canyon facility is subject to this 
regulation. The higher heating value heat input (fuel flow) of the facility is 
approximately 2017 MMBtu per hour at 59°F at full load when burning natural 
gas. This is equal to approximately 1590 gigajoules per hour on a lower heating 
value basis. 
The Spring Canyon facility turbine also meets the Subpart GG definition for 
electric utility stationary gas turbines, since the heat input of the turbine at peak 
load is greater than 107.2 gigajoules per hour (100 MMBtu/hr), The Spring 
Canyon turbine is therefore subject to the standards for nitrogen oxides 
requirements in 40 CFR 60.332. The turbine is also subject to the S0 2 provisions 
of 40 CFR 60.333. 
The applicable standard limiting the discharge of NOx into the atmosphere from 
the turbine described in 40 CFR 60.332 is expressed as: 
STD = 0.0075 (14.4)/Y + F, 
Where , ^ 
STD = allowable NOx emissions (percent by volume at 5% 
Oxygen [02 ] , and on a dry basis) 
Y = manufacturer's rated heat rate in kilojoules per watt 
hour(kJ/W~hr), not to exceed 14.4 
F = fuel-bound nitrogen allowance. 
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The heat input rate for the Frame 7 turbine is approximately 10 kJ/W-hr at 100% 
load and 59°F. The resulting NSPS limitation for NOx is approximately 100 pairts 
per million by volume (ppmvd). The maximum emission rate for the turbine of 12 
-15 ppmvd before SCR control and 2.0 ppmvd with SCR control will be well 
below the NSPS emission limit for NOx. 
The S0 2 standard of Subpart GG restricts gaseous discharges form the turbine 
to a maximum SOz content of 0.015% by volume at 15% 0 2 and on a dry basis. 
The S 0 2 content of the discharged gases when combusting natural gas will be 
negligible 
40 CFR 60.334 describes monitoring requirements for stationary gas turbines. 
NOx, CO and 0 2 will be the parameters monitored continuously. 
This part also contains requirements for monitoring the sulfur and nitrogen 
content of the fuel being fired in the turbine; 40 CFR 60.334(b) details the 
frequency with which the fuel must be tested. 
Acid Deposition Regulations 
The requirements for affected sources under the Acid Rain Program, established 
pursuant to Title IV of the CAA, are covered under 40 CFR 72 through 78. The 
turbine at Spring Canyon is subject to these requirements. Specifically this 
facility will be subject to 40 CFR 72, Permit Regulations, and 40 CFR 75, 
Continuous Emission Monitoring. 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Source Categories 
The turbine at Spring Canyon will not emit or have the potential to emit 10 
tons/year or greater of any hazardous air pollutant (HAP) or 25 tons/year or 
greater of any combination of HAPs; therefore, the Spring Canyon facility is not a 
major source of HAPs. As such, the requirements of 40 CFR part 63 do not 
apply to the Spring Canyon turbine. 
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5,0 Control Technology Analyses 
In accordance with EPA's "top-down" policy for NOXf CO and S02 , this section 
presents the required best available control technology (BACT) analyses. The 
section also addresses lowest achievable emission rates (LAER) requirements 
for PM, PM10, and VOC emissions. 
5.a Applicability 
UACR R307-401-6 states, "The Executive Secretary shall issue an approval 
order if he determines through plan review that the following conditions have 
been met: The degree of pollution control for emissions, to include fugitive 
emissions and fugitive dust, is at least BACT except as otherwise provided in 
these regulations". 
The following analyses are presented to determine the BACT/LAER controls for 
each criteria pollutant being emitted for this project. 
5.b Top-Down BACT Process 
EPA developed a process for conducting BACT analyses, referred to as the "top-
down" method. The steps to conducting a top-down analysis were listed in 
EPA's New Source Review Workshop Manual, Draft, October 1990. 
Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies 
The following were conducted; A thorough search of the EPA's 
RACT/BACT/LAER clearinghouse; Federal/state/local NSR permits; control 
technology vendors; and environmental consultants. 
Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options 
Technically feasible option means a technology that is available and applicable 
to the permitee's operations. The analysis is based on chemical, physical and 
engineering principles or empirical data. 
Step 3 - Rank Remaining Control Technologies by Control 
Effectiveness 
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Step 4 - Evaluate Most Effective Controls and Document Results 
The factors considered while evaluating the most effective control options are 
energy impacts, environmental impacts, and economic impacts. 
Step 5 - Select BACT 
Each of these steps has been conducted for CO, and are 
described below. A LAER analysis of NO* SO2, PM, PMi0f and VOC has also 
been conducted. Note - it is the Spring Canyon project applicant's desire to 
install LAER for these criteria pollutants. 
5x LAER NOx Control Analysis 
Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies 
Potential NOx control technology options are: 
• Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) and Dry Lo-NOx (DLN); 
• Xonon 
• SCONO* 
• DLN only 
• SCR only 
• Water or Steam Injection 
Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options 
Conventional SCR requires an exhaust temperature in the 400°F to 800°F range, 
and when combined with Dry Lo-Nox, achieves 2.0 ppm NOx. No other 
technology has achieved this level on gas turbines of this size. 
XONON is not available as a control technology for this application. XONON is 
being developed by Catalytica Combustion Systems, Inc. It is a catalytic 
combustion system that reduces the production of NOx. Extensive information on 
the technology's development indicates that the technology has only been tested 
on small turbines (less than 10 MW) and is not yet used commercially. This 
technology has not yet been tested on turbines in the size range of this project's 
turbine^ 
Catalytica has entered into an agreement with GE to collaboratively develop the 
technology for installation on GE Frame E-cfass and F-class turbines. Catalytica 
cautions potential investors that adaptation of the technology to GE's turbines will 
require anywhere from 12 to 24 months. In fact, in a comparison of NOx control 
technologies on the website, Catalytica indicates that the technology is I n 
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process" of being proven in practice. XONON cannot be considered an available 
technology for this project. 
Another promising developing technology is SCONOx SCONOXl like SCR, 
operates effectively in temperatures ranging from 300°F to 700°R SCONO* has 
not been demonstrated in practice on gas turbines of this scale. 
Water injection into the combustion process is an option to reduce NOx 
production. Water or steam injection can be utilized to reduce NOx levels. By 
injecting water or steam into the flame, flame temperatures are reduced, thereby 
lowering thermal NOx formation and overall NOx levels. Water or steam injection 
can reduce NOx levels by up to 80% (when firing natural gas) and can achieve 
greater reduction when firing oil. There is a practical limit to the amount of water 
or steam that can be injected into the flame before flame stability problems are 
experienced. Additionally, under normal operating conditions, water/steam 
injection can result in 3-10% efficiency loss. Many times water or steam injection 
is used in conjunction with other NOx control methods such as burner 
modifications or flue gas recirculation. Water or steam injection alone can only 
achieve NO* levels of 25 ppm. 
In summary, for gas turbines of this size, SCR (combined with Dry-Lo-NO*) is the 
only viable option to achieve 2.0 ppm NO* for exhaust temperatures cooled to 
between 400°F to 850°F. The control effectiveness of any other viable options 
and possible combinations are presented in Step 3. 
Step 3 - Rank Remaining Control Technologies by Control 
Effectiveness 
There is only one other proven NOx reduction control technology combination 
proven on the large General Electric frame units. A combination of water 
injection and SCR control can lower emission rates to 5 ppmvd for NOx. Since 
the top (minimum NOx emissions) alternative is proposed for NO*, no cost, 
environmental or energy impact analyses are required-
Step 4 - Evaluate Most Effective Controls and 
Document Results 
For combined-cycle operation, LAER is a combination of Dry Lo-NO* and SCR 
controls for NOx. 
Step 5 - Select LAER 
The final step is to select LAER for the General Electric Frame 7-FA combined 
cycle operations at Spring Canyon, For the combined cycle GE Frame 7-FA 
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turbine operations, Dry Lo-NOx and SCR control with a corresponding emission 
limit of 2.0 ppmvd is proposed as LAER. 
5.d BACT Ana lys i s for CO Emiss ions (see Appendix E) 
Step 1 - Identify AH Control Technologies 
Only two control technologies have been identified for CO control: 
1. Combustion Controls 
2. CO catalyst 
Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options 
Both identified control technologies are technically feasible for this project. 
Step 3 - Rank Remaining Control Technologies by 
Control Effectiveness 
CO catalyst vendors quote guarantee emissions levels of 4.0 ppm. For this 
project, the turbine vendor has indicated that proper operation of the turbine will 
result in CO emissions from the combustor of 4.0 ppmvd (corrected to 15% O2). 
Thus there is no additional cost to achieve 4.0 ppm CO on the turbine. This level 
is below that listed in the California Air Resources Board BACT guidance 
document (6 ppm), 
TABLE 5-1 
Control Technology Emission Rate Ranking 
CO Emissions 
Control Technology (ppmv) Reduction 
Combustion Controls 4 NA 
CO Catalyst 4 0% 
Step 4 - Evaluate Most Effective Controls and 
Document Results 
This step involves the consideration of energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts associated with each control technology. The top-down process 
requires that the evaluation begin with the most effective technology. The "top1' 
technologies are Combustion Controls or a CO catalyst. Since the top alternative 
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is proposed as BACT for CO, the cost, environmental, and energy impact 
analyses ^re not required. 
Step 5 - Select BACT 
The final step in the top-down BACT analysis process is to select BACT. Good 
combustion control is proposed as BACT for this project. Good combustion 
control with CO emissions of 4,0 ppm is proposed as BACT for this project. 
Note: CO emissions will be kept below 9.0 ppm when the turbine is augmented 
with duct firing. 
5.e LAER Analysis for PM/PM™ Emissions 
Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies 
Three control methods have been identified for PM/PM10 control in power 
generation units: 
• Electrostatic precipitators (ESPs) 
• Fabric filters 
• Combustion of pipeline-quality gas (primary) as the primary fuel 
Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options 
Neither electrostatic precipitators nor fabric filters are considered to be technically 
feasible options for combined cycle combustion turbines because of the high 
exhaust flow rates and the low concentration of particulate in the turbine exhaust. 
The particle resistivity associated with gas turbine exhaust is a major problem for 
ESPs. ESPs remove particles by charging the particles and then collecting them 
on plates. ESP performance is greatly affected by the ability of the particles to 
accept and maintain a charge. Because of the resistivity of the exhaust particles 
from gas turbines, ESPs are not an effective control of turbine particulate matter. 
LAER control 
The only remaining feasible control method is the use of pipeline-quality natural 
gas as combustion fuel This option is PM and PM10 LAER for this project. 
5.f LAER Analysis for S 0 2 Emissions 
Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies 
Four potential control methods have been identified for S0 2 control: 
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• Wet flue gas desulfurization (FGD) systems; 
• Dry FGD systems; 
• Spray dryers 
• Combustion of pipeline-quality gas as the combustion fuel. 
Step 2 - Select LAER 
No wet FGD systems, dry FGD systems, nor spray dryers have been applied to the 
exhaust gases from turbines, and significant technological difficulties are 
envisioned to apply all of these technologies. The low SO2 emissions levels 
inherent with firing natural gas in a turbine constitutes BACT. In a review of the 
EPA Clearinghouse, the only control methods for S02 with turbines were related to 
the fuel combusted. Each turbine listed in the database was required to fire either 
pipeline-quality natural gas or a low sulfur fuel oil. 
For this application, LAER for S02 is the use of pipeline-quality natural gas as the 
combustion fuel. 
5.g LAER Analysis for VOC Emissions 
Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies 
A review of EPA's Clearinghouse showed LAER control for combined cycle gas 
turbine combustion units is combustion of pipeline-quality natural gas as the 
primary fuel. 
Select LAER 
Use of only pipeline-quality natural gas as the fuel for the turbine is LAER for 
VOCs for this project 
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6.0 Ambient Air Quality Impact Analysis 
(attached) 
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7.0 Alternate Siting Analysis 
As the Spring Canyon project is located in a county (Juab) in attainment with all 
national air quality standards, no alternate siting analysis is required. 
Appendix A 
Site Plan of Facility 
(attached) 
There are is one emission point - a stack (269 ft high, 19 feet in diameter). 
Building dimensions are shown on the Site Plan and the Elevations Drawing. 
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Appendix B 
Flow Diagram 
(attached) 
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Appendix C 
Process/Equipment Description 
Natural gas (no other fuel will be used) will be introduced with ambient air (chilled 
when ambient temperatures are above 59°F) into one General Electric Frame 7-
FA gas turbine. The gas turbine is an oversize version of the turbines on the 
wings of aircraft. The gas turbine inlet air is compressed and fuel is then 
introduced and ignited to produce hot exhaust gases that are expanded through 
the turbine section of the machine. The rotating turbine in turn drives the 
generator that produces electricity, the only product delivered by the facility. 
Waste exhaust heat from the gas turbine is augmented by natural gas fired duct 
burners and is then directed into a heat recovery steam generator to produce 
steam. This steam is used internally at the plant to drive a steam turbine to 
create additional "combined cycle" power for export. An air-cooled condenser 
will condense spent steam back into water for recycling to the HRSG. Use of the 
dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the plant's water usage. 
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Appendix D 
Potential Emissions of Air Pollutants 
TABLE 1 
Spring Canyon Turbine Emiwions Summary with SCR Catalyst Control''" 
Criteria Pollutants 
Nitrogen Oxides 
Carbon Monoxide 
Sulfur Dioxide 
Annual 
Pollutant Emissions (tpy) 
VOCs (Hydrocarbons) 
Particulate Matter4 
Fine Particulate Mater (PM10) 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP*) 
1,3 Butadiene 
Acetaldehyde 
Acrolein 
Benzene 
Ethylbenzene 
Formaldehyde 
Naphthalene 
PAH 
Propylene Oxide 
Toulene 
Xylenes 
1. The emission* 
63.5 
97.5 
4.9 
44.7 
70.6 
70.6 
.017 
.015 
015 
0.17 
1.35 
1.51 
0.01 
0.002 
1.20 
1.12 
0.26 
_ 
Hourly Emission Factor 
Emissions (Ib/hr) 
14.5 
39.4 
1.1 
10.2 
16.1 
16.1 
.004 
.035 
.003 
.04 
.30 
.346 
.002 
.0005 
27 
25 
.06 
T31 "~ 
i values provided in the tables are the cumulative emissions for both turbines. 
Reference 
Vendor 
Vendor 
Questar S data 
5 
Vendor 
Vendor 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
2. The hourly emission rates are the maximum rates tor operation of the proposed turbines with duct burners firing natural 
gas at 100 percent loads based on operation at 59°F. 
3. Annual emissions are based on opcroHon for 8760 hours per year on natural gas, with duct firing. 
4. The PM and PM,0 emissions are condensibJe and filterable. 
5. AP-42 
6. Ventura County (CA) Air Pollution Control District 
Notes: 
CO 
hrs/yr 
Ib/hr 
NO* 
PM 
PM,0 
SO* 
Tpy 
VOC 
= Carbon monoxide 
~ hours per year 
= pounds per hour 
» Oxides of nitrogen 
=5 Particulate matter 
» Particulate matter less than 10 microns in size 
- Sulfur dioxide; based on fuel sulfur - 2 gr/1000 
= tons per year 
= Votatfle organic compound 
cuft 
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Appendix E 
Air Pollution Control Equipment 
Air pollution control equipment for this project includes: 
Combustion Control for CO 
Dry Lo-NOy Combustor 
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) Catalyst (NOx) 
Note: Natural Gas is the only fuel proposed for use at the Spring Canyon Energy 
plant. Natural gas is LAER for PM-10, VOC and SQ2 control. 
Maximum stack exhaust flow is 744,999 ACFM @230°F at low ambient 
temperature conditions. 
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Appendix F 
Compliance Monitoring Devices and/or Activities 
1. Monitoring of emissions from this unit will be performed pursuant to 40 CFR 
60.334 and 40 CFR 75. 
2. Applicable test methods used to determine compliance will be confined to 
those methods defined in 40 CFR 60-335. 
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EXHIBIT B 
From: Andrews, Kenneth 
Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2002 1:47 PM 
To: Thurgood, Rand 
Subject: Spring Canyon 
Have a faxed copy of the NOI. here \s some of the relevant info based on their latest NOI application: 
1-1x1 GE FA machine. Total max generating capacity = 270 MW (includes duct firing); 8760 
hours/year operation 
Natural gas firing only; Inlet chilling (this is not common); Dry cooling. 
Fuel consumption (LHV implied based on GE data) = 1.6 MMScf/hour; 2.17 MMScf with duct 
firing. 
FA machine equipped with DLN to 15 ppm with an SCR for a stack rate of 2.0 ppm NOx/10 ppm 
NH3 slip. 
No CO catalyst; assumed can maintain CO below 4 ppm based on manufacturer's claims (this 
may be an issue) 
Estimated start date: June 1, 2002. 
Projected on-line date: September, 2003 (See start date?) 
Stack Height - 269* 
Data submitted by Ted Banasiewicz, Managing Member, Spring Canyon Energy LLC, 970-871-
6223 
Company Name: Spring Canyon Energy Steamboat Springs, CO 80477. 
Company contact for environmental issues: Dr. Ted Guth, 619-670-3157. 
Site: "located in Spring Canyon in Juab County" Hlt is necessary to locate the facility within Juab 
Valley near the existing high capacity power lines and high pressure natural gas supply line." 
Directions: Take Highway 54 west through Mona. 1/2 mile north on Goshen Canyon Road. Plant 
site is 1/2 mile to west. 
Originally proposed as two machines, now they are just looking at one. UDAQ said that there may be 
requirements for offsets based on modeling impacts with more generation on non-attainment area (Utah 
County). 
It looks like there are a few issues with the calcs (used LHV heat rate) but as Fred would say "our dog is 
not in that fight". 
I will see about meeting UDAQ this afternoon, if you need more information. 
Some other related information you may be interested in. Both Lehi Independent Power Assodates and 
Geneva Steel have recently banked a few credits in Utah County. If someone needs credits in Utah 
County, they should be available. 
Lehi Ind Power. 
IMOx - 249.87 
S02 - 5.31 
PM10-1.86 
Geneva Steel: 
NOx - 705.2 
S02 - 434.2 
PM10-187 
PacifiCorp: 
NOx - 458.7 
S02-1.4 
PM10-24.5 
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EXHIBIT C 
STATE OF UTAH 
Department of Environmental Quality 
Division of Air Quality 
APPROVAL ORDER: POWER GENERATING FACILITY 
WITH ONE NATURAL GAS FIRED COMBINED CYCLE 
TURBINE GENERATOR SET WITH DUCT BURNER 
Prepared By: Milka M. Radulovic, Engineer 
(801) 536-4232 
Email: mllkar@utah.gov 
APPROVAL ORDER NUMBER 
DAQE-AN2627001-02 
Date: November 27, 2002 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC. 
Source Contact 
Lois Banasiewicz 
(970) 871-6223 
Richard W. Sprott 
Executive Secretary 
Utah Air Quality Board 
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Abstract 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC (SCE) is proposing to construct, own, and operate a new power 
generating facility in the Juab Valley, Juab County, just west of the Mona Reservoir. The facility will 
consist of one natural gas turbine generator set in a combined cycle configuration [with one heat 
recovery steam generator (HRSG) and one steam turbine-generator]. In addition, there will be one 
diesel fired emergency generator, one diesel-fired emergency fire pump, small dieselfuel storage tanks, 
an air- cooled condenser (to condense spent steam back into water for recycling to the HRSG), and 
aqueous ammonia storage and handling equipment The HRSG duct burners will be fired with natural 
gas to augment waste heat from the gas turbine exhaust The power facility will operate with a 
combined net maximum generating capacity of about 280 MW at (fF. It is anticipated that the gas 
turbine will be purchased from General Electric with Dry Lo-NOx combustion system. NOx emissions 
from the gas turbine will be controlled to 2 ppmvd at 15% 02 reference (by selective catalytic reduction 
system), CO to 4 ppmvd at 15% 02 reference (9 ppmvd with duct firing), and ammonia slippage to 10 
ppnu The turbine will not be designed to operate in a simple-cycle mode (Le., bypassing the HRSG 
unit). Raw materials used at the Spring Canyon plant in addition to natural gas and air, are water (to 
generate the steam) and ammonia for the selective catalytic (NO*) reduction process. Use of the dry 
type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the plant's water usage. 
Juab County is an attainment area of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for all 
pollutants-
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 40 CFR 60, Subpart GG (Standards of Performance for 
Stationary Gas Turbines) applies to the proposed turbine. NSPS 40 CFR 60, Subpart Da (Standards of 
Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which Construction is Commenced After 
September 18,1978) applies to the duct burners. 
Estimated annual emissions from the entire facility, in tons per year, will be as follows: 66,4 ofNO„ 
97.5 of CO, 5.3 of SO* 70.9 ofPMj* 67.12 of VOC, and 5J tons of hazardous air pollutants (mainly 
formaldehyde). 
Since the emissions have increased above modeling threshold levels for the NO*, CO, PM!09 and 
formaldehyde, an air quality modeling assessment consistent with UAC R307-41Q-2 was performed. 
The US EPA and the State accepted Industrial Source Complex Short Term - Version 3 (ISCST3) 
model was used by the Applicant to predict air pollutant concentrations under a simple/complex 
terrain/wake effect situation. The modeling analysis indicated, and the State verified, that there would 
be no violations of NAAQS and Prevention of Significant Deterioration increments consumption for 
the proposed project 
The project has been evaluated and found to be consistent with the requirements of the Utah 
Administrative Code Rule 307 (UAC R307). A public comment period was held in accordance with 
UAC R307-401-4 and comments were received. The comments were evaluated and no comment was 
found to be adverse to the proposed AO. This air quality Approval Order (AO) authorizes the project 
with the following conditions, and failure to comply with any of the conditions may constitute a violation 
of this order. 
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General Conditions: 
1. This Approval Order (AO) applies to the following company: 
Corporate Office Location 
USA Power Partners, LLC 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC 
PO Box 774000-359 
Steamboat Springs, Colorado 80477 
Phone Number (970)871-6223 
Fax Number (970) 871 -6234 
The equipment listed in this AO shall be operated at the following location: 
From Salt Lake City take 1-15 south approximately 77 miles to Hwy 54. Take exit and 
proceed west through Mona. Go Vi mile north on Goshen Canyon Road; Plant site is Vi 
mile to the west. 
Juab County 
Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Coordinate System: UTM Datum NAD27 
4,410.042 kilometers Northing, 422.81 kilometers Easting, Zone 12 
2. All definitions, terms, abbreviations, and references used in this AO conform to those 
used in the Utah Administrative Code (UAC) Rule 307 (R307) and Title 40 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (40 CFR). Unless noted otherwise, references cited in these AO 
conditions refer to those rules. 
3. The limits set forth in this AO shall not be exceeded without prior approval in accordance 
withR307-40l. 
4. Modifications to the equipment or processes approved by this AO that could affect the 
emissions covered by this AO must be reviewed and approved in accordance with 
R307-401-1. 
5. All records referenced in this AO or in applicable NSPS standards, which are required to 
be kept by the owner/operator, shall be made available to the Executive Secretary or 
Executive Secretary's representative upon request, and the records shall include the two-
year period prior to the date of the request Records shall be kept for the following 
minimum periods: 
A. Emission inventories Five years from the due date of each emission statement 
or until the next inventory is due, whichever is longer. 
B All other records Two years 
6. Spring Canyon Energy, LLC shall install and operate one natural gas fueled combined 
cycle turbine generator set with duct burner and ambient air inlet chiller with maximum 
combined rating of approximately 280 MW, one diesel fired emergency generator rated 
at 700 bhp, one diesel fired fire pump rated at 250 bhp, and miscellaneous small diesel 
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fuel storage tanks (each with storage capacity of less that 10,000 gallons) at the Spring 
Canyon Energy power generating facility in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
this AO, which was written pursuant to Spring Canyon Energy, LLC's Notice of Intent 
submitted to the Division of Air Quality (DAQ) on August 13, 2002 and additional 
information submitted to the DAQ on August 15, 2002, August 29, 2002, September 18, 
2002, September 26, 2002, and October 10, 2002. 
7. The approved installations shall consist of the following equipment or equivalent*: 
A. One (1) General Electric Frame 7-FA (PG7241 FA)* gas turbine, with one (1) 
HRSG, and one (1) steam turbine generator set. 
The gas turbine is provided with ambient inlet air chiller coils. The Heat 
Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) is equipped with a Selective Catalytic 
Reduction System for abatement of NOx emissions from the Duct Burner and the 
Gas Turbine. Continuous Emission Monitoring System (CEMS) for the HRSG 
stack is provided for monitoring emissions from the gas turbine and duct burners. 
The power generating facility has the following characteristics: 
Maximum plant site rated output at 100% Load, 
0°F, 12.19 psia and 25% relative humidity: 280 MW 
Heat input at the baseload, ISO (59^, site elevation): 1,472.9 x Btu/hr (HHV)*** 
Maximum gas turbine firing rate: 1,621.5 x 106 Btu/scf (HHV) 
B. One (1) Coen Power Plus* duct burner state of the art, low emission technology 
Coen Power Plus* (subject to 40 CFR 60, Subpart Da) 
Maximum firing rate: 520 x 106 Btu/hr (HHV) 
C. One (1) Diesel Fired Emergency Generator rated at 700 bhp 
D. One (1) Diesel Fired Emergency Fire Pump rated at 250 bhp 
E. Miscellaneous diesel fuel storage tanks, each individual tank storage capacity is 
less than 10,000 gallons 
F. One (1) Dry type air-cooled condenser.** 
* Equivalency shall be determined by the Executive Secretary. 
** This equipment is listed for informational purposes only. There are no emissions from 
this equipment. 
** *Fuel Higher Heating Value 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC shall notify the Executive Secretary in writing when the 
installation of the equipment listed in Condition #7 has been completed and is 
operational, as an initial compliance inspection is required. To insure proper credit when 
notifying the Executive Secretary, send your correspondence to the Executive Secretary, 
attn: Compliance Section. 
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If construction and/or installation have not been completed within eighteen months from 
the date of this AO, the Executive Secretary shall be notified in writing on the status of 
the construction and/or installation. At that time, the Executive Secretary shall require 
documentation of the continuous construction and/or installation of the operation and 
may revoke the AO in accordance with R307-401-11. 
Limitations 
9. Visible emissions from the following emission points shall not exceed the following 
values: 
A. Natural gas combustion exhaust stacks - 10% opacity 
B. All other points - 20% opacity 
Opacity observations of emissions from stationary sources shall be conducted according 
to 40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 9. 
10. The following limits shall apply: 
A. Gas Turbine, Stack Height - no less than 295.27 feet (90 meters) as measured 
from the ground 
B. Gas Turbine, Stack Exit Diameter - not greater than 17 feet 
1 L Combined source wide CO emissions shall be no greater than 97.5 tons per rolling 12-
month period. 
Compliance to the above emission limitation shall be determined as follows: 
CO from the gas turbine and the duct burner shall be obtained from CEMS recorded data 
(conversion from ppmvd into pounds shall be done using the procedure in the EPA 
reference Method 19 or other procedure approved by the Executive Secretary). 
CO from the emergency generators shall be obtained by multiplying the engine rating, 
recorded hours of operation and emission factors from the Vendor data if available or 
EPA' s Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors, AP-42 
To determine compliance with a rolling 12-month total the owner/operator shall calculate 
a new 12-month total by the twentieth day of each month using data from the previous 12 
months. Records of hours of operation and emissions rates shall be kept for all periods 
when the plant is in operation. For emergency generator and the emergency lire pump 
hours of operation shall be determined by supervisor monitoring and maintaining of an 
operations log. The records of consumption/production shall be kept on a daily basis. 
12. Combined emission rate of PM,0+ NOx + SO? shall not be greater than of 780.72 lb per 
any rolling 24-hour average at the stack exhaust (turbine and the duct burner) 
Compliance to the above emission limitation shall be determined as follows: 
NOx from the gas turbine and the duct burner shall be obtained from CEMS recorded data 
(conversion from ppmvd into pounds shall be done using the procedure in EPA reference 
Method 19 or other procedure approved by the Executive Secretary). 
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PMio from the gas turbine and the duct burner shall be from the latest emission test 
recorded data. 
S02 from the gas turbine and the duct burner shall be from the latest emission test or if 
testing is not required by the other alternative method as approved by the Executive 
Secretary or Administrator. 
To determine compliance with rolling 24-hour total the owner/operator shall calculate 
average hourly rate and sum them over 24-hour period. New 24-hour total shall be 
calculated by the noon of the next day. Records of hours of operation and emissions rates 
shall be kept for all periods when the plant is in operation. 
13. Emergency generators shall be used for electricity producing operation only during the 
periods when electric power from the public utilities is interrupted, or for regular 
maintenance of the generators. Records documenting generator usage and fire pump 
usage shall be kept in a log and they shall show the date the generator was used, the 
duration in hours of the generator usage, and the reason for each generator usage. 
Fuels 
14. The owner/operator shall use only natural gas, as fuel in the gas turbine and duct burner; 
fuel oil #2 or better in the emergency generator and the fire pump. 
15. The sulfur content of any fuel oil or diesel burned shall not exceed: 
0.5 percent by weight for diesel fuels 
The sulfur content shall be determined by ASTM Method D-4294-89 or approved 
equivalent. Certification of other fuels shall be either by USA Power, LLC=s own testing 
or test reports from the fuel marketer 
Federal Limitations and Requirements 
16. In addition to the requirements of this AC), all applicable provisions of 40 CFR 60, New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) Subpart A, 40 CFR 60.1 to 60.18, Subpart GG, 40 
CFR 60.330 to 60.334 (Standards of Performance for Stationary Gas Turbines) and 
Subpart Da, 40 CFR 60.40a to 60.49a (Standards of Performance for Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units for Which Construction is Commenced After September 18, 
1978) apply to this installation. 
17. In addition to the requirements of this AO, all applicable provisions of 40 CFR Part 72, 
73, 75, 76, 77, and 78 Federal regulations for the Acid Rain Program under Clean Air Act 
Title IV apply to this installation. 
Limitations and Tests Procedures 
18. Emissions to the atmosphere from the indicated emission points shall not exceed the 
following rates and concentrations: 
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Source: Turbine GE Frame 7-FA (PG7241FA)) and Duct Burner Exhaust Stack 
Pollutant 
NOx 
CO 
ppmvd* 
(15%Oidry) 
(30-day rolling 
average) 
2 
4 
ppmvd** 
(15%02dry) 
(30-day rolling 
average) 
2 
9 
ppmvd 
(15%02dry) 
*** 
NA 
19. 
•Total emissions concentration from the gas turbine under steady state operation not 
including startups and shutdowns 
••Combined emissions concentration from the gas turbine and the duct burner under 
steady state operation not including startups and shutdowns 
••• Emissions from the gas turbine (in accordance with 40 CFR 60 Subpart GG 
requirements) 
Emissions testing, and compliance monitoring to the atmosphere from the duct burner 
shall be performed in accordance with all applicable provisions of 40 CFR 60, New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) Subpart A and Subpart Da, 40 CFR 60.40a to 
60.49a (Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which 
Construction is Commenced After September 18, 1978) apply to this installation. 
20. Stack testing to show compliance with the emission limitations stated in the above 
condition shall be performed as specified below 
Emissions Point Pollutant 
Testing 
Status 
Test 
Frequency 
Gas turbine NO, •, • • CEMs 
only CO • CEMs 
Gas turbine & NOx * CEMs 
duct burner CO * CEMs 
Gas turbine PMl0 ••* NA 
Gas turbine & duct burner PM|0 **** NA 
Duct Burner ***** 
•Initial compliance shall be demonstrated with Relative Accuracy Testing Audit. 
••Initial compliance testing for NOx for the gas turbine shall be performed in 
accordance with the 40 CFR 60 Subpart GG. 
••*, ••••Initial test to establish emission rate value for the calculations in the 
Condition #12 
••*** Initial compliance testing for the Duct Burner shall be performed in 
accordance with the 40 CFR 60 Subpart Da. 
Initial compliance testing shall be performed within 60 days after achieving the 
maximum production rate at which the affected facility will be operated and in 
no case later than 180 days after the start up of a new emission source. 
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B. Notification 
The Executive Secretary shall be notified at least 30 days prior to conducting any 
required emission testing. A source test protocol shall be submitted to DAQ 
when the testing notification is submitted to the Executive Secretary. 
The source test protocol shall be approved by the Executive Secretary prior to 
performing the test(s). The source test protocol shall outline the proposed test 
methodologies, stack to be tested, procedures to be used. A pretest conference 
shall be held, if directed by the Executive Secretary. 
C. Sample Location 
The emission point shall be designed to conform to the requirements of 40 CFR 
60, Appendix A, Method 1, or other methods as approved by the Executive 
Secretary. An Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) approved access shall be provided to 
the test location. 
D. Volumetric Flow Rate 
40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 2 or other testing methods approved by the 
Executive Secretary. 
E. PMio 
For stacks in which no liquid drops are present, the following methods shall be 
used: 40 CFR 51, Appendix M, Methods 201,201a, 202 or other testing methods 
approved by the Executive Secretary. The back half condensibles shall also be 
tested using the method specified by the Executive Secretary. All particulate 
captured shall be considered PM^. 
For stacks in which liquid drops are present, methods to eliminate the liquid 
drops should be explored If no reasonable method to eliminate the drops exists, 
then the following methods shall be used: 40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 5, 
5a, 5d, or 5e as appropriate, or other testing methods approved by the Executive 
Secretary. The back half condensibles shall also be tested using the method 
specified by the Executive Secretary. The portion of the front half of the catch 
considered PMio shall be based on information in Appendix B of the fifth edition 
of the EPA document, AP-42, or other data acceptable to the Executive 
Secretary. 
The back half condensibles shall not be used for compliance demonstration but 
shall be used for inventory purposes. 
F. Calculations 
To determine mass emission rates (Ib/hr, etc.) the pollutant concentration as 
determined by the appropriate methods above shall be multiplied by the 
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volumetric flow rate and any necessary conversion factors determined by the 
Executive Secretary, to give the results in the specified units of the emission 
limitation. 
G. New Source Operation 
For a new source/emission point, the production rate during all compliance 
testing shall be no less than 90% of the production rate listed in this AO. If the 
maximum AO allowable production rate has not been achieved at the lime of the 
test, the following procedure shall be followed: 
1. Testing shall be at no less than 90% of the production rate achieved to 
date. 
2. If the test is passed, the new maximum allowable production rale shall be 
110% of the tested achieved rate, but not more than the maximum 
allowable production rate. This new allowable maximum production rate 
shall remain in effect until successfully tested at a higher rate. 
3. The owner/operator shall request a higher production rate when necessary. 
Testing at no less than 90% of the higher rate shall be conducted. A new 
maximum production rate (110% of the new rate) will then be allowed if 
the test is successful. This process may be repeated until the nmximum 
AO production rate is achieved. 
H. Existing Source Operation 
For an existing source/emission point, the production rate during all compliance 
testing shall be no less than 90% of the maximum production achieved in the 
previous three (3) years. 
Monitoring - Continuous Emissions Monitoring 
21. The owner/operator shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate a continuous monitoring 
system for measuring nitrogen oxides, oxygen and carbon monoxide emissions 
discharged to the atmosphere from each turbine stack and record the output of the system. 
The monitoring system shall be used for measuring and determining compliance. The 
continuous monitoring system shall comply with applicable provisions of UAC, R307-
170 and applicable Federal regulations for the Acid Rain Program under Clean Air Act 
Title IV. 
22. Spring Canyon Energy, LLC shall submit for review and Executive Secretary approval 
CEMs monitoring plan 45 days before the turbine become operational. The plan shall 
address the number of monitors to be used, the method of measuring the rate in tons per 
hour, and the method of calculating emissions during the CEMs breakdowns. 
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Records & Miscellaneous 
23. At all times, including periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction, owners and 
operators shall, to the extent practicable, maintain and operate any equipment approved 
under this Approval Order including associated air pollution control equipment in a 
manner consistent with good air pollution control practice for minimizing emissions-
Determination of whether acceptable operating and maintenance procedures are being 
used will be based on information available to the Executive Secretary which may 
include, but is not limited to, monitoring results, opacity observations, review of 
operating and maintenance procedures, and inspection of the source. AH maintenance 
performed on equipment authorized by this AO shall be recorded. 
24. The owner/operator shall comply with R307-150 Series. Inventories, Testing and 
Monitoring. 
25. The owner/operator shall comply with R307-107. General Requirements: Unavoidable 
Breakdowns. 
The Executive Secretary shall be notified in writing if the company is sold or changes its name. 
Under R307-150-1, the Executive Secretary may require a source to submit an emission inventory for any 
full or partial year on reasonable notice. 
This AO in no way releases the owner or operator from any liability for compliance with all other 
applicable federal, state, and local regulations including R307. 
A copy of the rules, regulations and/or attachments addressed in this AO may be obtained by contacting 
the Division of Air Quality. The Utah Administrative Code R307 rules used by DAQ, the Notice of 
Intent (NOI) guide, and other air quality documents and forms may also be obtained on the Internet at the 
following web site: http://www.deq.state.ut.us/eqair/aq^ home.htm 
The annual emission estimations below include point source and do not include fugitive emissions, 
fugitive dust, road dust, tail pipe emissions, etc. These emissions are for the purpose of determining the 
applicability of Prevention of Significant Deterioration, non-attainment area, maintenance area, and Title 
V source requirements of the R307. They are not to be used for determining compliance. 
The Potential To Emit (PTE) emissions for this source (the entire plant, or specify what portion) are 
currently calculated at the following values: 
Pollutant Tons/yr 
A. PM!0 70.9 
B. SO, 5.3 
C. NOx 66.4 
D. CO 97.5 
E. VOC 67.12 
PAC007382 
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HAPs 
Acetaldehyde 0.015 
Acrolein 0.015 
1,3 Butadiene 0.017 
Benzene 0.17 
Ethylbenzene 1.35 
Formaldehyde 1.51 
Naphthalene 0.01 
PAH 0.002 
Propylene Oxide 1.20 
Toluene 1.12 
Xylenes 0.26 
Totals 5.7 
Approved By: 
Richard W. Sprott, Executive Secretary 
Utah Air Quality Board 
PAC007383 
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Department of Environmental Quality 
Division of Air Quality 
Michael O Leavitt 
Governor 
Diamie R Nielson, Ph D 
Executive Director 
Richard W Sprott 
Director 
150 North 1950 West 
PO Box 144820 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820 
(801) 536-4099 Fax 
(801) 536-4414 T D D 
www deq Utah gov 
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October 11, 2002 
Nephi Times News 
P.O.Box 77 
Nephi, UT 84648 
RE: Legal Notice of Intent to Approve 
This letter will confirm the authorization to publish the attached NOTICE in the Nephi Times News on 
October 16, 2002. 
Please mail the invoice and affidavit of publication to the Utah State Department of Environmental 
Quality, Division of Air Quality, P O. Box 144820, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114^820. 
Sincerely, 
^c (^yruA^i 
Renae Emery 
Office Technician 
Utah Division of Air Quality 
Enclosure 
cc: Juab County 
Juab Co Courthouse 
160 N Main 
Nephi UT 84648 
Six-County Association of Governments 
Sevier County Courthouse 
250 N Main 
PO Box 820 
Richfield UT 84701 
UDAQ0032 
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NOTICE 
The following notice of intent to construct, submitted in accordance with Section R307-401-1, Utah Air 
Quality Rules, has been received for consideration by the Executive Secretary, Utah Air Quality Board: 
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC. 
Location: From Salt Lake City take 1-15 south approximately 77 miles to Hwy 54. Take 
exit and proceed west through Mona. Go Vi mile north on Goshen Canyon Road; Plant 
site is Vi mile to the west. Juab County 
Project Description: Spring Canyon Energy, LLC (SCE) is proposing to construct, 
own, and operate a new power generating facility in the Juab Valley, Juab County, just 
west of the Mona Reservoir. The facility will consist of one natural gas turbine generator 
set in a combined cycle configuration [with one heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) 
and one steam turbine-generator]. In addition, there will be one diesel fired emergency 
generator, one diesel-fired emergency fire pump, small diesel fuel storage tanks, an air-
cooled condenser (to condense spent steam back into water for recycling to the HRSG), 
and aqueous ammonia storage and handling equipment. The HRSG duct burners will be 
fired with natural gas to augment waste heat from the gas turbine exhaust. The power 
facility will operate with a combined net maximum generating capacity of about 280 MW 
at 0°F. It is anticipated that the gas turbine will be purchased from General Electric with 
Dry Lo-NOx combustion system. NOx emissions from the gas turbine will be controlled 
to 2 ppmvd at 15% 0 2 reference (by selective catalytic reduction system), CO to 4 ppmvd 
at 15% 0 2 reference (9 ppmvd with duct firing), and ammonia slippage to 10 ppm. The 
turbine will not be designed to operate in a simple-cycle mode (i.e., bypassing the HRSG 
unit). Raw materials used at the Spring Canyon plant in addition to natural gas and air 
are water (to generate the steam) and ammonia for the selective catalytic (NOx) reduction 
process. Use of the dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the plant's water 
usage. It has been determined that the conditions of the Utah Administrative Code R307-
401-6 and the Federal rules have been met. The Executive Secretary intends to issue an 
Approval Order after a 30-day public comment period is held. This comment period is 
being held to receive and evaluate public input on the project proposed by Spring Canyon 
Energy, LLC. 
The Proposed Emissions increase will be: 
PM10 70.90 tons/year 
S02 5.30 tons/year 
NOx 66.40 tons/year 
CO 97.50 tons/year 
VOC 67.12 tons/year 
HAPs 
Ethylbenzene 1.35 
Formaldehyde 1.51 
Propylene Oxide 1.20 
Toluene 1.12 
Xylenes 0.26 
Miscellaneous HAPs 0.26 
T o t a l s 5
-
7
 UDAQ0033 
DAQE-NN2627001-02 
Page 3 
The completed engineering evaluation and air quality impact analysis showed that no new violations of 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards or Prevention of Significant Deterioration Increments will occur. 
It is the intent of the Executive Secretary to approve the construction project. 
The construction proposal and estimate of the effect on local air quality are available for public inspection 
and comment at the Utah Division of Air Quality, Department of Environmental Quality, 150 North 1950 
West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820. Any questions may be directed to Milka Radulovic, (801) 536-
4232, Email:Milkar@utah.gov. There will be a 30-day comment period held. Written comments 
received by the Division, at the same address on or before November 15,2002 will be considered in 
making the final decision on the approval/disapproval of the proposed construction. 
If anyone so requests to the Executive Secretary at the Division in writing, within 15 days of publication 
of the Notice, a hearing will be held to explain the project and technical rationale for the proposed action. 
The hearing will be scheduled as close as practicable to the proposed project location. Comments 
obtained during the hearing will be evaluated and considered by the Executive Secretary before making a 
final decision on the approval/disapproval of the project. 
Date of Notice: October 16, 2002 
UDAQ0034 
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P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Peter W. Billings (A0330) 
Kevin N. Anderson (A0100) 
Jason W. Hardin (A8793) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Michael G. Jenkins (A4350) 
Assistant General Counsel, PacifiCorp 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone: (801)220-2233 
Facsimile: (801) 220-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant PacifiCorp 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER ) 
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING ) AFFIDAVIT OF MARK GREEN 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 050903412 
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS and ) Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, ) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF GEORGIA ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF FULTON ) 
Mark Green, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am currently employed by Mirant Corporation as Program Manager for Air 
Quality and Construction. 
2. I was employed by Shaw/Stone & Webster from October 2001 to August 2006. 
3. I was the project manager for the study and estimate phase and ultimately the 
Manager of Projects, Gas Turbines for the design, engineering and construction of the combined 
cycle power plant that Shaw/Stone & Webster designed, engineered and constructed for 
PacifiCorp named Currant Creek, which is located next to the Mona switching station in Juab 
County, Utah. 
4. The location of Currant Creek is a logical choice for a combined cycle power 
plant because it is next to PacifiCorp's switching station, which provides transmission of the 
electricity produced by the power plant, and it is in proximity to two natural gas transmission 
lines that can provide fuel for the plant. Currant Creek was designed to interconnect to 
PacifiCorp's transmission system at the Mona switching station at 345 kV, because this is the 
voltage carried on PacifiCorp's transmission system at the switching station. 
5. Shaw/Stone & Webster designed, engineered and constructed the Apex 1 
combined cycle power plant in Las Vegas, Nevada, for Mirant Corporation, that was completed 
in 2003. 
2 
6. Like the Apex 1 plant and many other combined cycle plants with which I am 
familiar, Currant Creek is a 2 on 1 combined cycle design, meaning it has two natural gas 
turbines and a single steam turbine generator. Currant Creek and Apex 1 were both designed and 
engineered based on Shaw/Stone & Webster's reference plant design for a 2 on 1 combined 
cycle power plant with air cooling. Currant Creek, like Apex 1, is based on a recognized and 
proven 2 on 1 combined cycle configuration that is well understood and widely utilized in the 
electric power plant industry. 
7. Although there are minor differences in output rating between Apex 1 and Currant 
Creek, due primarily to differences in elevation, higher expected temperatures at Apex 1, and the 
use of steam injection at Apex 1, the plants are essentially sisters. Both plants utilize two General 
Electric 7FA7241 gas turbines with almost identical nominal ratings; both plants have two 
similarly sized heat recovery steam generators equipped with selective catalytic reduction 
systems; both plants have a single similarly sized steam turbine generator; both plants have duct 
firing with similar capability; both plants are 100% dry cooled; and both plants are designed for 
zero wastewater discharge. 
8. A combined cycle plant in a 2x1 configuration was not a secret; a combined cycle 
plant with General Electric 7FA gas turbines was not a secret; a combined cycle plant with heat 
recovery steam generators was not a secret; a combined cycle plant with additional duct burner 
capacity was not a secret; a combined cycle plant with a steam turbine generator was not a 
secret; a combined cycle plant that is air cooled was not a secret; a combined cycle plant 
designed for zero wastewater discharge was not a secret. All of these features of a combined 
cycle power plant were openly used in the electric generation industry well before 2002. 
3 
9. At PacifiCorp's request, Shaw/Stone & Webster performed and assembled a 
detailed Project Cost Analysis for what was to become the Currant Creek power plant. As the 
project manager, I oversaw this work. 
10. Shaw/Stone & Webster prepared its Project Cost Analysis for the following 
scenarios: 
a. A simple cycle plant with two "F" class gas turbines to be converted into a 
nominal 500 MW 2x1 combined cycle power plant; 
b. A simple cycle plant with two "F" class gas turbines to be converted into a 
nominal 500 MW 2x1 combined cycle power plant, and an additional 2x1 power block 
configured for combined cycle yielding an additional nominal 500 MW; 
c. A simple cycle plant with two "F" class gas turbines; 
d. A simple cycle plant with four UF" class gas turbines to be converted into 
a nominal 1000 MW 2x1 configured combined cycle power plant. 
11. A number of Shaw/Stone & Webster's employees, including Dave Galpin, Rich 
Sowers, Rod Gartner, Rob Gappa and Elmer Mitchell began this work in late April 2003. The 
Project Cost Analysis, which included plant configuration, site arrangements, conceptual design, 
preliminary plant water balance calculations and the basis of design, was completed and 
submitted to PacifiCorp in a large binder on or about June 9, 2003. Completing this work during 
the period from April-June was not unusual. The detailed Project Cost Analysis utilized Shaw/ 
Stone & Webster's in-house databases and reference plant designs, and was a normal part of 
Shaw/Stone & Webster's regular business designing and engineering combined cycle power 
4 
plants like Currant Creek, Apex 1, and other combined cycle plants in the United States and 
around the world. 
12. Shaw/Stone & Webster began the preliminary engineering for the Currant Creek 
power plant when PacifiCorp issued a Limited Notice to Proceed in August 2003. A number of 
Shaw/Stone & Webster's employees participated in the engineering work, including Dennis 
Reed, Rod Gartner, Rich Sowers, Steve Pozder, Ray Herrera and John Hunt. As the Manager of 
Projects, Gas Turbines, I oversaw this work. The Limited Notice to Proceed was in effect until 
the contract with PacifiCorp was signed in February 2004. 
13. Shaw/Stone & Webster began construction of the Currant Creek power plant in 
January 2004 under an interim construction contract associated with the Limited Notice to 
Proceed. The simple cycle phase went into commercial operation in June 2005. The combined 
cycle phase went into commercial operation in March 2006. 
14. The design, engineering and construction of Currant Creek represents Shaw/Stone 
& Webster's own efforts. Shaw/Stone & Webster did not use any information from, or about, 
USA Power, USA Power Partners, Spring Canyon Energy, or the Spring Canyon Energy project, 
in any aspect of the Currant Creek power plant, whatsoever. 
DATED this 11 day of April, 2007. 
Mark Green 
5 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this I 7 * - day of April 2007. 
My Commission Expires: 
JuML {p. 2.00*7 
Notary Public x „ 
Residing in VMb Ldurrhf 
r °k ... 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 30th day of April, 2007,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF MARK GREEN as follows: 
Via Hand Delivery 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Kristopher S. Kaufman 
TOMSIC & PECK 
136 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Via Hand Delivery 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams 
and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP 
Via U.S. Mail 
J. Chapman Petersen 
Robert Surovell 
Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy 
4010 University Drive, Suite 200 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
/v J-T*- <~ '"Q.'l: 
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Three Material Undisputed Facts That Were Not Mentioned In 
The District Court's List of Facts That Were Deemed Admitted 
Undisputed Fact No. 4: 
After all of these pieces of its power plant development were in place, 
Panda contacted PacifiCorp's Managing Director of Resource Development, 
Rand Thurgood, PhD., and set up a meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah. Barlow 
depo. at pp. 102-116. Panda's hope at the time was that PacifiCorp would be 
interested in purchasing the power generated from Panda's power plant under a 
long term power purchase contract. See, Id. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. There were no "pieces in place" for the development of the 
Panda project prior to its abandonment. See Response to paragraphs 1-3. 
Undisputed Fact No. 16: 
The first meeting between PacifiCorp and USA Power occurred on August 
22, 2002. This first meeting occurred (a) more than a year after Panda made its 
detailed presentation to PacifiCorp, (b) two months after Mr. Thurgood had 
toured the Apex 1 plant in Las Vegas, and (c) three weeks after Panda had told 
PacifiCorp that Panda would consider selling its Mona project assets. Ted 
Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 155-156; See, Undisputed Facts fflj 5, 9-10, above. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed. See Response to paragraphs 5, 7, and 9. 
The characterizations of PacifiCorp, e.g. that Panda's presentation was 
"detailed," are inherently self-serving and belied by the actions of PacifiCorp in 
delaying purchase of Panda. 
Undisputed Fact No. 19: 
On August 21, 2002, the day before their first meeting with PacifiCorp, the 
USA Power principals met with Tom Florence of Utah Associated Municipal 
Power System (UAMPS) in Salt Lake City, Utah. They handed Mr. Florence a 
copy of the same volume of information that they later gave to PacifiCorp. Mr. 
Florence and UAMPS did not sign a confidentiality agreement. See, Affidavit of 
Tom Florence, filed concurrently herewith. 
USA Power's Response: 
Disputed: The statement by PacifiCorp ignores the fact that the materials 
given to UAMPS were given on the condition that UAMPS agree to keep them 
confidential and sign a confidentiality agreement. UAMPS agreed to keep them 
confidential, and did not misuse the information. [Graeber Dep. at 340-42; Exs. 
225-226] 
[USA Power did not accurately controvert this fact. What Dave Graeber 
said in his deposition was that he had no memory of the meeting with UAMPS 
and he could not even confirm that UAMPS was given a copy of USA Power's 
volume of information Graeber Depo. at page 339-342 (R.7039-7043). Tom 
Florence's affidavit stating that Volume 1 of USA Power's supposed "confidential 
information" was handed to him without any assurance of confidentiality was 
uncontroverted.] 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Taylor SMITH, an individual; and Wallingford De-
velopment, Inc., a Utah corporation, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 20051020-CA. 
Feb. 1,2007. 
Background: City brought action against defend-
ants, alleging breach of contract, promissory estop-
pel, and unjust enrichment. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Judith S. Atherton, J., 
granted city summary judgment. Defendants ap-
pealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held 
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing summary judgment based on defendants' non-
compliance with rule of civil procedure regarding 
requirements for memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment motion. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
(11 Judgment 228 C^>183 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228k 183 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
The trial court has discretion in requiring compli-
ance with rule of civil procedure regarding require-
ments for memorandum in opposition to summary 
judgment motion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 7. 
[2J Judgment 228 €=>183 
228 Judgment 
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228 V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228kl 82 Motion or Other Application 
228k 183 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
city summary judgment against defendants based 
on defendants' noncompliance with rule of civil 
procedure regarding requirements for memorandum 
in opposition to summary judgment motion; de-
fendants' memorandum failed to provide the specif-
ic disputed facts together with applicable record 
references. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 7(c)(3)(B). 
*175 David K. Smith, Midvale, for Appellants. 
Dale F. Gardiner and Craig R. Kleinman, Parry An-
derson & Gardiner, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., DAVIS and 
THORNE, JJ. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
% 1 Defendants Taylor Smith and Wallingford De-
velopment, Inc. appeal the district court's order 
granting Plaintiff Bluffdale City's motion for sum-
mary judgment based on Defendants' failure to 
comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 On July 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint 
against Defendants alleging claims for breach of 
contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrich-
ment. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on all alleged claims, together with a support-
ing memorandum and the affidavits of Shane Jones 
and Brent Bluth. Defendants filed an opposing 
memorandum with the affidavit of Taylor Smith. 
Defendants' opposing memorandum contained then-
own statement of the facts and an argument section. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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The argument section consisted of a brief statement 
of the law pertaining to summary judgment, as well 
as a list enumerating approximately six issues of 
fact that Defendants deemed disputed. 
f 3 Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum arguing that 
summary judgment should be granted because De-
fendants failed to comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B). See 
id. Plaintiff asserted that Defendants failed to con-
trovert the facts because Defendants' opposing 
memorandum did not contain a verbatim restate-
ment of Plaintiffs stated facts, noting which fact or 
portion was disputed, and did not cite to any relev-
ant materials, such as affidavits or discovery mater-
ials. The district court agreed that Defendants had 
failed to comply with the directives of rule 
7(c)(3)(B). See id. The district court concluded that 
Plaintiffs arguments therefore remained unop-
posed, *176 accepted the facts as stated by 
Plaintiff, and granted Plaintiffs motion for sum-
mary judgment. Defendants appealed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
% 4 Defendants contend that the trial court erred in 
granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
because Defendants substantially complied with 
rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Motions 
for summary judgment should be granted when 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
[1] f 5 We review a district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for correctness, affording no defer-
ence to the district court. See Ford v. American 
Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70, K 21, 98 P.3d 
15. "However, 'the trial court has discretion in re-
quiring compliance with [rule 7 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure].' " Gary Porter Constr. v Fox 
Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App'354, % 10, 101 P.3d 371 
(quoting Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, H 9, 
77 P.3d 339\cert denied, 123 P.3d 815 (Utah 
2005).FNt 
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FN1. Both Gary Porter Constr. v Fox 
Constr., Inc. 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d 
371, cert, denied, 123 P.3d 815 (Utah 
2005), and Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 
291, 77 P.3d 339, were decided under 
former rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration. See Utah R. 
Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (2000 & 2002). 
The procedural content of rule 4-501 (2)(B) 
is presently located in rule 7(c)(3)(B) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SeeUtzh R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B); Gary Port-
er Constr., 2004 UT App 354 at % 15 n. 2, 
101 P.3d371. 
ANALYSIS 
K 6 Defendants assert that they substantially com-
plied with rule 7(c)(3)(B) because the portions of 
Plaintiffs statement of facts that were in dispute 
were set forth in and controverted by the Smith af-
fidavit attached to Defendants' opposing memor-
andum. Defendants maintain that the Smith affi-
davit is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material 
fact to defeat summary judgment. 
f 7Rule 7(c)(3)(B) states: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of 
each of the moving party's facts that is controver-
ted, and may contain a separate statement of addi-
tional facts in dispute. For each of the moving 
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party 
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any 
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any 
additional facts set forth in the opposing memor-
andum, each fact shall be separately stated and 
numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Defendants admit that 
their opposing memorandum did not contain a ver-
batim restatement of each of Plaintiffs facts that 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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they sought to contest. Thus, we must determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in ad-
mitting as uncontroverted the facts submitted by 
Plaintiff in support of its request for summary judg-
ment, which were not addressed by Defendants in 
accordance with rule 7(c)(3)(B). 
f 8 The district court's discretion in enforcing com-
pliance with Rile 7(c)(3)(B) has been addressed in 
several cases decided under the former but compar-
able rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. This court in Fennel! v. Green, 
2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339, relying on the su-
preme court's ruling in Lovendahl v. Jordan School 
District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705, held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming 
facts admitted due to noncompliance with rule 
4-501(2)(B). See Fennel I, 2003 UT App 291 at 1) 8, 
77 P.3d 339; Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130 at H 50, 63 
P.3d 705 ("[A]ll facts set forth in the movant's 
statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the pur-
pose of summary judgment unless specifically con-
troverted by the opposing party's statement.5 " 
(emphasis added) (quoting Utah R. Jud. Admin. 
4-501(2)(B))). 
f 9 Since then, the supreme court in Salt Lake 
County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, 
89 P.3d 155, declined to accept, for purposes of 
summary judgment and appeal, the facts as stated 
by the defendant based on the plaintiffs failure to 
comply *177 with rule 4-501 (2)(B). In Metro West, 
the plaintiffs "opposing memorandum did not set 
forth disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in 
a separate section." Id. at f 23 n. 4. However, the 
supreme court, in a footnote, ruled plaintiffs failure 
to comply with the technical requirements of rule 
4-501(2)(b) to be harmless because "the disputed 
facts were clearly provided in the body of the 
memorandum with applicable record references." 
Id. Later, the supreme court in Anderson Develop-
ment Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323, ac-
knowledged that the trial court had discretion to 
either grant summary judgment for noncompliance 
with rule 4-501 or to hear the motion on its merits. 
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See id. at f 21 n. 3 ("While the district court could 
have granted [the defendants'] motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of [the plaintiffs] noncom-
pliance with rule 4-501, it exercised its discretion to 
address the motion on its merits...."). 
[2] f 10 Defendants maintain that this case is ana-
logous to Metro West, and that their failure to in-
clude a verbatim restatement of the contested facts 
is merely a technical violation. Defendants assert 
that this failure, as in Metro West, was harmless be-
cause the disputed facts were set forth in and con-
troverted by the Smith affidavit that was attached to 
the opposing memorandum. We disagree. This case 
is distinguishable from Metro West.Here, Defend-
ants failed to provide the specific disputed facts to-
gether with applicable record references in the body 
of their opposing memorandum. The entire body of 
Defendants' opposing memorandum purporting to 
address the disputed facts is as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff asserts that there is a breach of con-
tract. No physical evidence has been produced to 
suggest that there was ever a written agreement 
between the parties that would require the Defend-
ants would [sic] pay for water provided by the 
Plaintiff for the city's own parking strip. 
2. The Plaintiff asserts that there was an implied 
contract to provide water service. Again, the De-
fendant, in his affidavit, denies that either he or 
Wallingford Development, Inc. ever agreed 
verbally either implicitly or explicitly to pay for 
water provided by Bluffdale to the city's parking 
strip. 
3. The Plaintiff attempts, by letter dated September 
9, 1999, some three months after the water began to 
be supplied to the parking strip, to suggest that it 
implies that the [D]efendant[s] as alleged de-
velopers are responsible for the water "until each 
lot has its own irrigation system." 
4. This was never agreed to by the Defendants, and 
in fact the Defendants deny that they agreed to such 
a proposal, and specifically allege they wrote to 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Bluffdale City advising them they were not going 
to be responsible for any water supplied to the city's 
parking strips. 
5. The Defendants further aver in their affidavit, 
they were not owners of Heritage Industrial Park, 
nor signers of the Restrictive Covenants. 
6. The Defendants further allege that there was a 
global settlement reached between SK Develop-
ment and Bluffdale City on May 20, 2004[,] which 
renders the Plaintiffs lawsuit moot. 
7. As to each theory for relief there remain issues of 
disputed fact to preclude any entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
f 11 The preceding passage readily demonstrates 
that Defendants' failure to comply with the require-
ments of mle 7(c)(3)(B) was not merely technical 
in nature and thereby harmless. Defendants' oppos-
ing memorandum, to the extent controverted facts 
were raised therein, did not include a coherent ex-
planation of the grounds for the dispute as required 
by rule 7(c)(3)(B). SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). 
Nor did Defendants, with the exception of two non-
specific references to the Smith affidavit, provide 
supporting citations as the basis for any dispute of 
fact. Thus, we are unpersuaded that Defendants 
substantially complied with rule 7(c)(3)(B), and we 
conclude that the district did not abuse its discre-
tion when it granted Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment based on Defendants' noncompliance 
with rule 7(c)(3)(B)™2 
FN2. Even had we determined that De-
fendants substantially complied with rule 
7(c)(3)(B), we would still affirm the dis-
trict court's order granting summary judg-
ment on the alternate ground of unjust en-
richment. To establish an unjust enrich-
ment cause of action, Plaintiff must meet 
three elements: 
First, there must be a benefit conferred 
on one person by another. Second, the 
conferee must appreciate or have know-
ledge of the benefit. Finally, there must 
be the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such cir-
cumstances as to make it inequitable for 
the conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value. 
Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 
2003 UT App 67,^21. 68 P.3d 1015. 
Plaintiff, in its motion for summary 
judgment, maintained that Plaintiff had 
conferred the benefit of water services 
on Defendants' parking strip, and De-
fendants accepted and retained said ser-
vices with knowledge and without com-
pensation to Plaintiff Defendants' op-
posing memorandum and attached affi-
davit both fail in their entirety to provide 
any evidence to dispute that Defendants 
(1) received water services from 
Plaintiff, (2) knew Plaintiff was supply-
ing them with water services, and (3) re-
tained the water. Although Defendants 
refer to the parking strip as the "city's 
parking strips," they do not provide any 
reasoned argument or evidence pertain-
ing to ownership of the parking strip, nor 
do they deny receiving and benefitting 
from the water services. Thus, because 
Defendants failed to present evidence 
sufficient to raise a factual dispute re-
garding any element of unjust enrich-
ment, they would not have been able to 
defeat summary judgment on Plaintiffs 
unjust enrichment claim. 
*178 CONCLUSION 
f 12 Defendants' opposing memorandum fails to 
substantially comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' failures 
amount to more than a technical violation of the 
rule. Defendants do not provide an explanation of 
the basis for any dispute, nor do they provide ap-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
156P.3d 175 
156 P.3d 175, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 64,2007 UT App 25 
(Cite as: 156 P.3d 175) 
propriate supporting citations. Rather, Defendants' 
opposing memorandum contains only a separate 
statement of additional facts and a list of facts 
deemed disputed without further explanation or 
support. As a result, Defendants' opposing memor-
andum does not controvert each of Plaintiffs facts. 
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it enforced rule 
7(c)(3)(B) by deeming Plaintiffs facts to be admit-
ted. We affirm the district court's order granting 
summary judgment. 
f 13 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge. 
Utah App.,2007. 
Bluffdale City v. Smith 
156 P.3d 175, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 2007 UT 
App 25 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Rule 4-406 RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1160 
(5)(E) The clerk of the court shall enter the payment due 
the juror or witness in the State Accounting System (FINET). 
The state will mail the payment to the juror or witness within 
3 days. The clerk of court shall maintain both a list of 
undeliverable juror and witness checks and the checks. A 
payment is considered abandoned one year after it became 
payable and will be sent to the Division of Unclaimed Property 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 67-4a-301. 
(6) Audit of records. At least once per month, the clerk of 
the court or a designee shall compare the jurors summoned 
and the witnesses subpoenaed with the FINET log of pay-
ments. Any unauthorized payment or other irregularity shall 
be reported to the court executive and the audit department of 
the Administrative Office of the Courts. The Administrative 
Office of the Courts shall include the audit of juror and witness 
payments within the scope of their regularly scheduled audits. 
Rules 4-406, 407. Repealed. 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are 
hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: Amer-
ican Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; Layton; Orem; Roosevelt; 
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) The following unincorporated areas of a county are 
designated as locations of trial courts of record: the Silver 
Summit area of Summit County 
(3) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of 
record may hold court in any location designated by this rule. 
Rule 4-408.01. Responsibil i ty for administration of trial 
courts. 
Intent: 
To designate the court locations administered directly 
through the administrative office of the courts and those 
administered through contract with local government pursu-
ant to § 78-3-21. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the 
administrative office of the courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered 
directly through the administrative office of the courts. 
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered 
directly through the administrative office of the courts, except 
the following, which shall be administered through contract 
with county or municipal government pursuant to § 78-3-21: 
Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, 
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem. 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, support-
ing memoranda and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and sched-
uling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of 
record except proceedings before the court commissioners and 
small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for 
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(1)(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions 
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents 
relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting 
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length 
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in 
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on 
ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file 
an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the 
length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum 
is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a 
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(1KB) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The respond-
ing party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days 
after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to th? 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding 
party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion 
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party 
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (1)(D) of this rule. 
(1)(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve 
and file a reply memorandum within five days after service of 
the responding party's memorandum. 
(1)(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of 
the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party 
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate 
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Deci-
sion/'The Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on 
which the motion was served, the date the memorandum in 
opposition, if any, was served, the date the reply memoran-
dum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mail-
ing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will 
not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(2)(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and 
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall 
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue 
exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sen-
tences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the movant relies. 
(2)(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points 
and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judg-
ment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim 
restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a 
concise statement of material facts which support the party's 
contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies. All 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and prop-
erly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment un-
less specifically controverted by the opposing party's state-
ment. 
(3) Hearings. 
(3)(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a 
hearing unless ordered by the court, or requested by the 
parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below. 
(3KB) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any claim in the action on the ments 
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Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER ; 
PARTNERS, LLC and SPRING ] 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ) 
PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and ; 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MARC T. 
) WANGSGARD 
> Civil No. 050903412 
) The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
Marc T. Wangsgard, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
EXHIBIT 
1. I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, having been admitted 
in October, 1988. 
2. From the onset of my legal career, and until I ceased the full-time private practice 
of law in May, 2000, ninety percent (90%) of my practice focused on water rights and related 
property issues. 
3. During the course of my water law practice, I became acquainted with another 
Salt Lake lawyer, Bill White, whose practice also focused on water rights issues. 
4. Around 1999, Mr. White and I began a business of buying and selling water 
rights, primarily in Salt Lake County, Wasatch County and Utah County. 
5. Our specialty was acquiring one type of water from one location, and changing 
the use and location of the water right to make it more valuable. 
6. In late July/August, 2003, I became aware of the potential of our selling water 
rights to PacifiCorp for industrial use in Juab County. 
7. Jody Williams, another water lawyer with whom Mr. White and I both had 
previously worked on other water rights issues and transactions, advised us of PacifiCorp's water 
needs for a potential power plant to be located in Juab County. It was left entirely up to Mr. 
White and me to figure out how to supply the quality of water needed by PacifiCorp at the 
specific location. 
8. At this time, Mr. White and I were conducting our water rights business through a 
Utah limited liability company, WW Ranches, LLC (UWW Ranches"), which is solely owned by 
Mr. White and myself. 
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9. Based on my understanding of PacifiCorp's water rights needs, and after meeting 
with Jim Riley at the State Engineer's office, I prepared and sent to Jody Williams, on August 6, 
2003, a proposal to sell PacifiCorp a firm water supply for 800 acre feet to use near Mona, Utah. 
10. Mr. White and I conceived the idea of taking water rights originating in a 
different county, a different water right area, and from a different source and changing the 
location and use of those water rights to that requested by PacifiCorp near Mona, Juab County, 
Utah. We had previously accomplished numerous similar transactions. Jody Williams played no 
role in coming up with the idea or in finding the water rights we sold to PacifiCorp. 
11. The package of water rights that WW Ranches put together for PacifiCorp 
included water rights WW Ranches already owned in water coming from Utah Lake and also 
included shares of irrigation water from Utah County that WW Ranches acquired to sell to 
PacifiCorp. 
12. On September 2, 2003, WW Ranches and PacifiCorp entered into a Water Rights 
Purchase Agreement. Subsequently, on October 6, 2003, WW Ranches and PacifiCorp entered 
into a Revised and Restated Water Rights Purchase Agreement. A copy of that agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
13. The price that WW Ranches charged PacifiCorp for the water rights was based on 
Mr. White's and my consideration of several factors, including, the price we had paid for the 
water, how long it had held it, how risky the transaction was, the opportunity to market the water 
somewhere else and what the market would bear. 
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14. The price set by WW Ranches was not based on any pricing information provided 
to WW Ranches by Jody Williams. 
15. Jody Williams never discussed with us the price that Spring Canyon Energy had 
agreed to pay for the Keyte and Garrett water rights or any aspect of Spring Canyon Energy's 
agreements with Keyte and Garrett. 
DATED this / / day of January, 2007. 
Marc T. Wangsgard 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / Q d a y of January, 2007. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: S \JL_V\ m 'ft 
My Commission Expires: z? j S ^ V T NOTARY PUBLIC DEBBIE PURVIS 
1483NewparkBlvd 
PO Box 981748 
My Commission Expires 
March 15, 2009 
STATE OF UTAH 
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REVISED AND RESTATED WATER RIGHTS PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is entered into this /? ~* day of (yQAlnJ^A^ 2003 between 
WW Ranches, LC, a Utah limited liability company ("Seller"), and PacifiCorp, an 
Oregon Corporation doing business as Utah Power ("Buyer"). 
RECITALS 
A. Seller owns water rights evidenced by shares of stock in Goshen Irrigation 
and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company, both Utah corporations 
(collectively, the "Shares"). The Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company water rights are 
identified as Water Right Nos. 53-988, 53-1089 and 53-1094 with priority dates of 1858, 
1859 and 1858 respectively. The Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company water right is 
identified as Water Right No. 59-3499 with a priority date of 1870. 
B. Buyer desires to acquire the right to divert and totally consume 400 acre-
feet of water annually from one or more groundwater wells to be located in north Juab 
County. The water will be used for industrial purposes for cooling, and for domestic uses 
in Buyer's proposed power generating facility (hereinafter the "Plant") to be located near 
Mona in Juab County, Utah. 
C. In addition to the 400 acre feet of consumptive use water, Buyer desires to 
acquire from Seller sufficient water to provide return flow owed to Utah Lake and 
downstream users as a result of the consumptive use of the 400 acre feet and provide any 
required carrier water to the remaining shareholders of Goshen Irrigation and Canal 
Company and other water users in the Currant Creek system. The return flow and carrier 
water requirement may be as high as 400 acre-feet but will be set out definitively in the 
State Engineer's Memorandum Decision authorizing the use of the water as described in 
HRO-PC 000259 #l53842v! 
this Agreement. This return flow water and carrier water are collectively referred to in 
this Agreement as the "Return Flow Requirement." 
D. Seller intends to file companion "Applications for Permanent Change of 
Water" (the "Change Applications") which are described in detail in paragraph 3, with 
the Shares to be assigned new Water Right numbers by the Utah State Engineer. The 
Change Applications will request approval of the Utah State Engineer for Buyer annually 
to totally consume 400 acre-feet of water for power generation and domestic uses at the 
Plant and provide the Return Flow Requirement designated by the State Engineer as a 
condition to approval of the consumptive use of the 400 acre-feet of water. The Change 
Application to be filed on the Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company Shares will also 
provide for Buyer's annual leaseback of that portion of water Buyer does not intend to use 
in any given year to Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company. Seller intends to prosecute 
the Change Applications to final approval, as set forth in this Agreement. The combined 
Shares and the Change Applications approved for the annual diversion from Buyer's 
groundwater wells of the 400 acre feet of consumptive use water at the Plant together 
with the annual Return Flow Requirement are referred to hereinafter as the "Water 
Rights." 
E. Buyer desires to purchase and Seller desires to sell the Water Rights 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
AGREEMENT 
In consideration of the covenants and promises contained herein, the parties agree 
as follows: 
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1. Quantity of Water to be Purchased. Buyer agrees to purchase from Seller 
and Seller agrees to sell and deliver to Buyer the Water Rights sufficient for the annual 
diversion and total consumptive use of 400 acre-feet of water at the Plant together with 
the annual Return Flow Requirement. 
2. Purchase Price. The purchase price for the Water Rights is Two Million 
Seven Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand, Eight Hundred and Forty Six Dollars 
($2,769,846.00), to be paid as set forth in paragraph 4 of this Agreement. 
3. The Change Applications. 
A. Utah Code Ann. section 73-3-3 controls the Change Application process. 
As a condition precedent to the purchase and sale of the Water Rights, Seller shall obtain 
State Engineer approval of companion Change Applications that will 
(i) entitle Buyer to the right to annually divert and consume 400 acre-feet of 
water made available from the Water Rights from one or more groundwater wells 
for the purpose stated in Recital B of this Agreement; and 
(ii) provide the annual Return Flow Requirement sufficient to insure the right to 
the annual diversion and use of the 400 acre-feet of consumptive use water. 
B. The Change Applications, when approved by the State Engineer, shall 
authenticate the annual consumptive use of the 400 acre-feet of water at Buyer's Plant 
and the satisfaction of the annual Return Flow Requirement from water made available 
by the Water Rights. The forms of the Change Applications are attached to this 
Agreement as Exhibit "A." 
C. At its sole expense, Seller shall diligently and continuously prosecute the 
approval of, and complete all tasks necessary to obtain the State Engineer's approval of, 
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the companion Change Applications. Buyer will consult and cooperate with Seller to 
prepare and file the Change Applications to insure that they meet Buyer's approval. Each 
party will bear its own attorney's fees and other costs in the Change Application process. 
Seller will keep Buyer fully informed of all proposals, correspondence and developments 
that occur during the administrative proceedings related to the Change Applications. 
Buyer may, at its sole discretion, participate in the proceedings in support of the approval 
of the Change Applications to insure that such approval meets its needs, including 
appearing at public hearings and submitting pleadings and evidence in support of the 
Change Applications. 
D. The Change Applications shall be considered final 30 days following the 
date of the State Engineer's written Memorandum Decision consistent with Buyer's 
requirements, unless a timely request for reconsideration is filed with the State Engineer 
or a judicial review action is filed in the Utah District Court. If a request for 
reconsideration or a judicial review action is filed challenging the approval of one or both 
of the Change Applications, at Buyer's request both parties will pursue the defense of 
such action with each party to be responsible for its own costs, expenses and attorney's 
fees. The date on which the. Change Applications shall be considered final will be 
extended for the period of the reconsideration or the court proceedings, including any 
appeals, until such time that all appeals to the State Engineer's written Memorandum 
Decisions have been decided in favor of the terms of the Change Applications. If the 
Change Applications have not received final approval, including the expiration of all 
rights of appeal, by March 1, 2004, either party may terminate this Agreement without 
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penalty upon notification to the other party Alternatively, the parties may extend the 
March 1, 2004 date by mutual agreement 
E Each party shall use its best efforts to timely satisfy all of the conditions of 
this paragraph 3 and to obtain the approval of the Change Applications 
F Seller shall pay all assessments against the Shares existing as of the date 
of Closing Buyer will assume responsibility for all assessments that may be levied 
against or upon the Shares after the Closing 
4 Closing The Closing of the purchase and sale transaction descnbed in 
this Agreement shall occur on or before 10 days after the date of final approval of the 
Change Applications descnbed in paragraph 3 D of this Agreement Prior to the Closing, 
Seller shall instruct Buyer to whom the payment is to be made and in what amounts the 
check(s) should be wntten At the Closing, Seller shall deliver assignments to Buyer of 
Seller's interest in the Change Applications and appropnate certificates for the Shares 
issued in Buyer's name evidencing the Water Rights, together with any agreements 
obligating Buyer to meet certain requirements subsequent to the Closing, including 
agreements descnbed in paragraph 5 below with Goshen Imgation and Canal Company 
and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company At the Closing, Buyer shall deliver to Seller the 
total purchase pnce payable in funds acceptable to Seller and the executed assumption 
agreements The parties do not expect there to be any costs associated with the Closing, 
however, any closing costs shall be shared equally 
5 Agreements to be Assumed by Buyer, Including Agreements with 
Imgation Companies Goshen Imgation and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake 
Canal Company may require Seller to enter into vanous agreements as conditions of 
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gaining such companies' consents to the filing of the Change Applications. Buyer shall 
have 10 days to review and approve said agreements prior to Seller's execution of such 
agreements. Seller does not anticipate executing agreements which will obligate Buyer 
to meet certain requirements subsequent to the Closing other than those with Goshen 
Irrigation and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company. However, prior 
to executing such agreements, if any, Buyer shall have 10 days to review and approve 
said agreements prior to Seller's execution of them. 
6. Seller's Representations. The Parties acknowledge that it is essential to 
Buyer's business that the Water Rights are available to Buyer as contemplated hereby, 
and that Buyer is relying upon Seller's commitments, agreements and covenants 
contained herein. Based upon this reliance, Seller represents and warrants to Buyer as 
follows: 
A. Seller is a limited liability company that is duly organized, validly existing 
and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah. It possesses the authority and 
power to execute and deliver this Agreement and perform all acts and obligations 
required of it by this Agreement. The Water Rights, consisting of the Shares and the 
approved Change Applications, will be transferred free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances and security interests and all other obligations other than those set forth in 
the State Engineer's Memorandum Decisions approving the Change Applications, or 
such agreements described in paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
B. Seller is in compliance with each judgment, order, writ, injunction, 
decision, law, ordinance or regulation of any court or governmental authority to which it 
is subject and is not in breach of any lease, mortgage, and other agreement to which it, 
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the Water Rights or any portion thereof is or might be subject, or with respect to any 
matter which might prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby or affect the right, title and interest or condition of the Water Rights. 
The execution and delivery of this Agreement, and the performance by Seller of its 
obligations hereunder will not (i) result in the breach or termination of or violate or 
constitute a default under any lease, mortgage or other agreement to which Seller is a 
party, (ii) result in the creation or imposition of any lien, charge or encumbrance upon the 
Water Rights, or (iii) violate any law, regulation, judgment or order of any governmental 
entity. 
C. Each person who executes this Agreement on behalf of Seller has all 
necessary legal right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement and to 
consummate the transactions contemplated hereby. The execution and delivery of this 
Agreement by or on behalf of Seller and the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby have been duly and validly authorized by Seller, have been duly 
executed and delivered by it, and all instruments and documents executed and delivered 
by or on behalf of Seller will constitute legal, valid and binding agreements of Seller, 
enforceable in accordance with their terms. 
D. Seller is not in default in respect to any judgment, order, writ, injunction, 
decision, law, ordinance or regulation of any court or governmental authority or under 
any lease, order or other agreements to which Seller is or might be subject, or which 
might prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transaction contemplated 
hereby. 
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E. Seller has not received any notice of and is not otherwise aware of any 
claim, action, suit or other proceeding, pending or threatened, that would constitute a 
basis for any claim or litigation which might prohibit, delay or interfere with the 
consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby. 
F. Except as contemplated hereby, there is no requirement applicable to 
Seller to make any filing, declaration of, or registration with, to obtain any permit, 
authorization, consent or approval of, any governmental entity as a condition to the 
consummation by Seller of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
G. The Water Rights to be transferred pursuant to this Agreement are and will 
be owned by Seller, free and clear of any mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, 
encumbrance or claim of any third party. Upon consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby, Buyer will acquire good and marketable title to the Water Rights 
free and clear of any restrictions, liens, or adverse claims. No person or entity other than 
Seller has any right or interest in Water Rights. 
H. There are no claims, actions, suits, inquiries, proceedings or investigations 
against Seller which are currently pending or, to the best of Seller's knowledge, 
threatened at law or in equity by or before by any court, administrative body or 
governmental entity. Seller is not in default under or with respect to any judgment, order, 
writ, or decree of any court or any governmental entity which could reasonably be 
expected to have a material adverse effect on the use of the Water Rights or the 
transactions contemplated hereby. 
I. Seller is not aware of any facts pertaining to the Water Rights or the 
transactions contemplated hereby which it believes may affect or are likely in the future 
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to affect the Buyer's business. The statements, representations and warranties of Seller 
herein taken together do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, nor do they 
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the representations and 
warranties contained herein not misleading. 
7. Buyer's Representations. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller as 
follows: 
A. Buyer is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Oregon and is duly qualified to do business in the 
State of Utah. It possesses the corporate authority and power to execute and deliver this 
Agreement and perform all acts and obligations required of it by this Agreement.. 
B. Buyer is in compliance with each judgment, order, writ, injunction, 
decision, law, ordinance and regulation of any court or governmental authority to which 
it is subject that relates in any way to the Water Rights, and is not in breach of any lease, 
mortgage or other agreement to which it, the Water Rights, the Change Applications or 
any portion thereof, is or might be subject, or with respect to any matter which might 
prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transactions contemplated 
hereby. The delivery of this Agreement and the performance by Buyer of its obligations 
hereunder will not (i) result in the breach or termination of or violate or constitute a 
default under any lease, mortgage or other agreement to which Buyer is a party, (ii) result 
in the creation or imposition of any lien, charge or encumbrance upon the Water Rights, 
or (iii) violate any law, regulation, judgment or order of any governmental entity. 
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C. The operation of its business by Buyer has been conducted in all material 
respects in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations and other requirements of any 
governmental agency. 
D. Buyer is not aware of any facts pertaining to the transactions contemplated 
hereby which it believes may affect or is likely in the future to affect the Buyer's 
purchase of the Water Rights. The statements, representations and warranties of Buyer 
herein taken together do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, nor do they 
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the representations and 
warranties contained herein not misleading. 
8 Assignment. This Agreement may be assigned by Buyer prior to the 
Closing upon the fiill payment of the Purchase Price and the consent of Seller, which 
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
9. Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence regarding the dates and 
time constraints set forth in this Agreement. 
10. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representation, understanding, or contracts, including that certain "Water Rights Purchase 
Agreement" relating to the purchase and sale of Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company 
and Utah Lake Distributing Company shares, between the parties with respect to the 
Water Rights to be purchased and sold hereunder. 
11. Default. An "Event of Default" shall occur under this Agreement if either 
party fails to perform any of its obligations hereunder when those obligations are due and 
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the defaulting party has not cured or satisfied the delinquent obligations within 10 days 
following delivery to the delinquent party of written notice of such delinquency. 
12. Remedies. 
A. Seller shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Buyer, and each of its 
shareholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, successors and assigns, from any and 
all liabilities, losses, damages, claims, costs and expenses, interest, awards, judgments 
and penalties, (including legal costs and expenses and interest on the amount of any loss 
from the date suffered or incurred) (a "Loss") arising out of or resulting from or caused 
by (i) any failure by the Seller to perform its obligations under this Agreement; or (ii) any 
inaccuracy in or breach of any representation or warranty made by or covenant or 
agreement of Seller contained in this Agreement. 
B. Buyer shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Seller, and each of its 
members, managers, officers, directors, employees, agents, successors and assigns, from 
any and all Losses arising out of or caused by (i) any failure by Buyer to perform its 
obligations under this Agreement, or (ii) any inaccuracy in or breach of any 
representation or warranty made by, or covenant or agreement of Buyer contained in this 
Agreement. 
C. In addition to its other rights hereunder, either party may avail itself of all 
remedies provided in law or in equity, including specific performance. The parties agree 
that the obligations under this Agreement may not necessarily be compensated by 
monetary damages. In addition to Buyer's other remedies, it may sue to rescind this 
Agreement and retain any monies previously recovered by it, may claim title to the 
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portions of the Water Rights not released and conveyed pursuant to this Agreement and 
may utilize the Water Rights. All of these rights and remedies are cumulative. 
13. Notice. Any and all notices, demands or other communications required 
or desired to be given hereunder by Buyer and Seller shall be in writing and shall be 
validly delivered to the other Party if served either personally or if delivered by a 
reputable courier firm such as Federal Express or UPS to the following addresses: 
To Buyer: PacifiCorp 
201 South Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to: 
Jody L. Williams 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
To Seller: WW Ranches LC. 
206 Seemore Drive 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Either Party may change its address for the purpose of receiving notices, demands and 
other communications as herein provided by written notice given in the manner set forth 
above. 
14. Further Assurances. Each of the parties hereto shall execute and deliver 
any and all additional papers, documents and other assurances and shall do any and all 
acts and things reasonably necessary in connection with the performance of their 
obligations hereunder and to carry out the intent of the parties hereto. 
15. Knowledge. The parties have read this Agreement and executed it 
voluntarily after having been apprised of all relevant information and risks and having 
had the opportunity to obtain legal counsel. 
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16. Drafting Party. This document has been and shall be deemed to be a 
product of joint drafting by the parties and there shall be no presumption otherwise. 
17. Authority. Each party warrants that the signatory to this Agreement is 
executing it with full authority on behalf of the party. 
18. 1031 Exchange. Seller intends to apply the proceeds of the sale of the 
Water Rights to purchase property that will qualify for an exchange of like property 
under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. So long as Buyer does not incur 
additional expense, Buyer will cooperate with Seller by executing the documents 
normally required to fulfill the 1031 Exchange requirements. 
EXECUTED on the date written above. 
WW RANCHES, LC 
Its: 
PACIFICORP 
Its: 
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c 
United States District Court, D. Utah, Northern Di-
vision. 
MEDSPRING GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Vicky FENG, an individual; Gate International, a 
California corporation; and Does I through V, De-
fendants. 
No. 1:05 CV 00042 DAK. 
April 25, 2005. 
Background: Medical device company brought 
state court action against former employee, alleging 
employee's misuse of proprietary information after 
starting her own company. Action was removed. 
Company moved for preliminary injunction. 
Holdings: The District Court, Kimball, J., held that: 
(!) company failed to establish likelihood of suc-
cess on claims under Utah Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act; 
(2) company failed to establish likelihood of suc-
cess on claim for breach of non-disclosure agree-
ment; 
(3) company did not demonstrate irreparable harm; 
(4) balance of harms favored former employee; and 
(5) public interest weighed against injunction. 
Motion denied. 
West Headnotes 
IIJ Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>410 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29T1V(A) In General 
29Tk410 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k981 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5)) 
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Under Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, threshold 
issue in determining whether trade secret has been 
misappropriated is whether, in fact, there is trade 
secret to be misappropriated. West's U.C.A. § 
13-24-2(2)(b)(ii)(B). 
12] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>431 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29TIV(B) Actions 
29Tk429 Evidence 
29Tk431 k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k 1001 Trade Regulation, 379k27) 
Under Utah law, burden is on plaintiff to prove ex-
istence of trade secret, and there is no presumption 
in his favor. 
|3 | Injunction 212 €^138.33 
212 Injunction 
2121V Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
2I2IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief 
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances 
and Encumbrances 
212k 138.33 k. Trade Secrets; Cus-
tomer Lists. Most Cited Cases 
Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>420 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29TIV(A) In General 
29Tk420 k. Particular Cases, in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k990 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5)) 
Medical device company that sued former employ-
ee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary in-
formation after starting her own company, failed to 
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establish likelihood of success on claim under Utah 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act regarding methods of 
obtaining Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ap-
proval for new devices, for purpose of obtaining 
preliminary injunction; approval methods were not 
"trade secrets," since FDA provided general public 
information on different regulatory classes and on 
how to properly classify and describe devices. 
West's U.C.A. § 13-24-2(2). 
[4] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>417 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29TIV(A) In General 
29Tk417 k. Necessity That Information 
Be Secret. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k987 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5)) 
In order to constitute "'trade secret" under Utah law, 
information must be unknown; it should not be in 
public domain nor within knowledge of trade. 
[5| Injunction 212 €^>138.33 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief 
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances 
and Encumbrances 
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Cus-
tomer Lists. Most Cited Cases 
Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €==>420 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29TIV(A) In General 
29Tk420 k. Particular Cases, in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k990 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5)) 
Medical device company that sued former employ-
ee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary in-
formation after starting her own company, failed to 
establish likelihood of success on claim under Utah 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act regarding methods of 
marketing products, for purpose of obtaining pre-
liminary injunction; marketing methods were not 
"trade secrets," since such information was gener-
ally known within medical device industry, com-
pany did not make efforts to keep its marketing 
strategy confidential, and former employee's 
strategy differed substantially from that relied upon 
by company. West's U.C.A. § 13-24-2(2). 
|6| Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>421 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29TiV(A) In General 
29Tk421 k. Customer Lists and Informa-
tion. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k991 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5)) 
In order to constitute "trade secret" under Utah law, 
identity of customers must not be readily ascertain-
able outside employer's business as prospective 
users or consumers of employer's service or products. 
[7] Injunction 212 €^>138.33 
212 Injunction 
2121V Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief 
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances 
and Encumbrances 
212k 138.33 k. Trade Secrets; Cus-
tomer Lists. Most Cited Cases 
Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>421 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
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tion 
29TIV(A) In General 
29Tk421 k. Customer Lists and Informa-
tion. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k991 Trade Regulation, 379k 10(5)) 
Medical device company that sued former employ-
ee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary in-
formation after starting her own company, failed to 
establish likelihood of success on claim under Utah 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act regarding methods of 
identifying customers, for purpose of obtaining pre-
liminary injunction; customers' identities were not 
fttrade secrets," since they were readily ascertain-
able by others. West's U.C.A. § 13-24-2(2). 
[8] Injunction 212 €^>138.33 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief 
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances 
and Encumbrances 
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Cus-
tomer Lists. Most Cited Cases 
Medical device company that sued former employ-
ee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary in-
formation after starting her own company, failed to 
establish likelihood of success on claim for breach 
of non-disclosure agreement under Utah law, for 
puipose of obtaining preliminary injunction; all al-
legedly misappropriated information was either de-
veloped by former employee independently, was 
generally available to public, or was disclosed by 
company to third party without restriction of con-
fidentiality. 
[9] Injunction 212 €^>138.6 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)2 Grounds and Objections 
212k 13 8.6 k. Nature and Extent of In-
jury; Irreparable Injury. Most Cited Cases 
"Irreparable harm," for purpose of preliminary in-
junctive relief, is suffered where injury cannot be 
adequately atoned for in money. 
[10] Injunction 212 €^>138.33 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
2121V(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief 
212kl38.30 Property, Conveyances 
and Encumbrances 
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Cus-
tomer Lists. Most Cited Cases 
Medical device company that sued former employ-
ee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary in-
formation after starting her own company, failed to 
establish that it would be irreparably harmed if pre-
liminary injunction were not entered against em-
ployee's enterprise; any damages potentially in-
curred by company during time that three-year non-
disclosure agreement was in effect would have been 
identifiable and calculable. 
(Ill Injunction 212 €^>138.33 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
2I2IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief 
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances 
and Encumbrances 
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Cus-
tomer Lists. Most Cited Cases 
Medical device company that sued former employ-
ee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary in-
formation after starting her own company, failed to 
establish that its threatened injury would have out-
weighed resultant harm to employee from issuance 
of preliminary injunction; any threatened injury to 
company would have been for limited time, while 
injunction would have prevented employee's enter-
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prise from marketing or selling its products for dur-
ation of litigation. 
[12] Injunction 212 €>^>138.33 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief 
212kl38.30 Property, Conveyances 
and Encumbrances 
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Cus-
tomer Lists. Most Cited Cases 
Medical device company that sued former employ-
ee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary in-
formation after starting her own company, failed to 
establish that issuance of preliminary injunction 
against employee's enterprise would not adversely 
affect public interest; although public policy sup-
ported development of new technologies by author-
izing protection of trade secrets, there was strong 
interest in encouraging competition and supporting 
individual's right to exploit her own skill and know-
ledge. 
*1272 Peter W. Guyon, Esq., Salt Lake City, UT, 
for Plaintiff 
Robyn L. Phillips, Esq., Workman Nydegger, Salt 
Lake City, UT, for Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
KIMBALL, District Judge. 
This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction. A hearing on the motion 
was held on April 19, 2005 at 10:30 a.m. At the 
hearing, Plaintiff was represented by Peter W. Guy-
on and Defendants were represented by L. David 
Griffin and Robyn L. Phillips. Before the hearing, 
the court carefully considered the memoranda and 
other materials submitted by the parties. Since tak-
ing the motion under advisement, the court has con-
sidered all additional materials submitted by the 
parties since the hearing and has further considered 
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the law and facts relating to the motion. Now being 
fully advised, the court renders the following 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Medspring Group, Inc. ("Medspring") is a 
corporation located in Bountiful, Utah, which re-
searches, develops and markets medical devices. 
Medspring's products include a Hemostatic Biode-
gradable Gauze (the "S-99 Gauze") and Hemostatic 
Satin Gauze (the "S-100 Gauze"), a medical device 
made out of a gauze material which speeds up 
bleeding coagulation and then dissolves at the 
bleeding wound. In the spring of 2002, Plaintiff 
hired Defendant Vicky Feng (uFeng") as a consult-
ant. Medspring claims that in this capacity, Feng 
was exposed to confidential information and trade 
secrets relating to Medspring's medical devices, in-
cluding the S-99 and S-100 Gauze. In order to pro-
tect its confidential information and trade secrets, 
Medspring had Feng execute a Mutual Non-
Disclosure Agreement ("Agreement") by which 
Feng agreed not to disclose Plaintiffs "Confidential 
Information," including trade secrets. Plaintiff 
claims that Feng executed the Agreement on May 
31, 2002, in both her individual capacity and as the 
C.E.O. for Defendant Gate International, a Califor-
nia corporation. 
Feng terminated her employment with Medspring 
on August 1, 2002. In early 2005, Medspring be-
came aware that Feng had started her own com-
pany, Regional Medical Solutions, Inc., through 
which she has been marketing a medical device 
identical to that of the S-99 and S-100 Gauze under 
the name of "BloodSTOP." Medspring believes 
that Feng is illegally and wrongfully using trade 
secrets belonging to MedSpring in order to market 
her "BloodSTOP" products. Medspring has *1273 
accordingly brought suit against the Defendants al-
leging a cause of action for injunctive relief based 
on Defendants' breach of the Agreement as well as 
causes of action for Violation of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, Tortious Interference with Business 
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Relationships and Civil Conspiracy. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 24, 2005, Medspring filed a Verified 
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief (the 
"Complaint") and a Motion for Temporary Re-
straining Order and for Order to Show Cause (the 
"Motion") in the Second District Court of Davis 
County, State of Utah. On the same day, the Second 
District Court held a hearing on the Motion and is-
sued a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") 
which was to remain in place until April 3, 2005. 
The TRO essentially prohibits the Defendants from 
"using, referring to, disclosing and appropriating" 
or "encouraging, helping, aiding or abetting others 
to use, refer to, disclose and appropriate" any num-
ber of listed items relating to MedSpring's products, 
including the S-99 and S-100 Gauze. It also orders 
Defendants to immediately deliver to MedSpring all 
"Confidential Information" in Defendants posses-
sion or control. 
On April 1, 2005, before the scheduled preliminary 
injunction hearing had occurred, the Defendants re-
moved this action to federal court based on di-
versity jurisdiction. Upon removal, this court issued 
an Order construing Medspring's Motion as a Mo-
tion for Preliminary Injunction. This court addition-
ally ordered that the state court issued TRO was to 
stay in effect until the court could hear argument on 
the Motion and enter an order either granting or 
denying the Motion. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court finds that the following facts have been 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence: 
Feng's Employment with MedSpring 
1. MedSpring is a Utah corporation which re-
searches, develops and markets a number of medic-
al devices, including a product known as the Hemo-
static Biodegradable Gauze (the "S-99 Gauze") and 
a product known as the Hemostatic Satin Gauze 
(the "S-100 Gauze"). 
2. On or around May 22, 2002, MedSpring hired 
Defendant Vicky Feng ("Feng"), a native of China 
who speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese, as a consult-
ant. At the time Feng was hired, she had no experi-
ence in the medical industry. 
3. At the time MedSpring hired Feng, it was a star-
tup company in need of operating capital to further 
its business activities, especially its business activ-
ities in China. Feng was hired to qualify and intro-
duce investors to Plaintiff. In return for her ser-
vices, Feng was to receive 10% of all investment 
capital she brought into the company. 
4. In her position as a consultant with MedSpring, 
Feng had access to confidential information regard-
ing MedSpring's products, including the S-99 and 
S-100 Gauze. Accordingly, MedSpring requested 
that she execute a Mutual Non-Disclosure Agree-
ment. 
5. On May 31, 2002, Feng executed a Mutual Non-
Disclosure Agreement ("Non-Disclosure Agree-
ment"). Under this agreement, Feng agreed not to 
disclose MedSpring's "Confidential Information," 
including trade secrets, for a period of three years 
from the date of the Non-Disclosure Agreement. 
6. During the Spring and Summer of 2002, Feng 
raised approximately $50,000 in capital for Med-
Spring. 
*1274 7. During her fund raising efforts, Feng re-
searched hemostatic gauze on the internet and 
learned that there were numerous manufacturers of 
hemostatic gauze in China. Her research further 
discovered that one of these manufacturers, Beijing 
Textile Research Institute ("Bejing Textile"), owns 
Chinese patents for the S-99 and S-100 Gauze and 
has filed patent applications for the S-99 and S-100 
Gauze in Europe and with the Patenl Cooperation 
Treaty. 
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8. In or around June of 2002, Feng traveled to 
China and met with Beijing Textile to obtain in-
formation regarding their S-99 and S-100 hemostat-
ic gauze products. 
9. Feng disclosed the results of her research and the 
information she obtained from Beijing Textile to 
Richard Baggett and Ralph Thomson, officers of 
MedSpring. 
10. On July 20, 2002, Feng and Ralph Thompson 
met with Beijing Textile regarding its manufactur-
ing of hemostatic gauze. 
11. During this meeting, Beijing Textile made it 
clear to MedSpring that it was the patent holder in 
China for hemostatic gauze, including the S-99 and 
S-100 gauze. 
12. On August 1, 2002, MedSpring's Board of Dir-
ectors sent Feng a Confidential Memorandum re-
garding "Protocols-Negotiating with Beijing Tex-
tile Research Institute." This memorandum set 
forth MedSpring's decision to pursue entering into a 
deal with Beijing Textile regarding the hemostatic 
gauze project and made clear that Feng was to have 
no future contact with Beijing Textile. The Board 
requested that Feng sign the memorandum indicat-
ing her understanding and complete acceptance of 
the policies set forth therein. 
13. Feng did not sign the memorandum. Instead, on 
August 1, 2002, Feng sent an e-mail to the Board of 
Directors informing them of her decision to resign 
from MedSpring. 
MedSpring's Marketing of the S-99 and S-100 Gauze 
14. MedSpring currently markets the S-99 Gauze 
and S-100 Gauze under the trade names of He-
moStyp, ActCel and M+D Gauze. 
15. MedSpring does not, as it alleges in its Com-
plaint, have an "exclusive worldwide right to mar-
ket" the S-99 and S-100 Gauze. The S-99 and S-
100 Gauze are subject to several patents, none of 
which are owned by MedSpring. 
16.. There are numerous manufacturers of hemostat-
ic gauze throughout China. One of these manufac-
turers, Beijing Textile, owns Chinese patents for 
the S-99 and S-100 Gauze and has filed patent ap-
plications for the S-99 and S-100 Gauze in Europe 
and with the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 
17. MedSpring has never entered into an agreement 
with Beijing Textiles to purchase these patents and 
Beijing Textile has never given, licensed or as-
signed MedSpring the rights to any of its products, 
including the S-99 and S-100 Gauze. 
18. All medical devices must be registered with and 
approved by the United States Food and Drug Ad-
ministration ("FDA") before they can be sold in the 
United States. 
19. MedSpring has registered its S-99 and S-100 
Gauze with the FDA and obtained FDA approval. 
20. MedSpring's President and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Richard W. Baggett, has extensive knowledge 
regarding the methods and requirements imposed 
upon small manufacturers of medical devices by the 
FDA and has been hired in the past as a consultant 
to assist companies with obtaining* 1275 FDA ap-
proval of their medical devices. 
21. MedSpring relied upon Mr. Baggett's experi-
ence and understanding of FDA requirements in re-
gistering the S-99 and S-100 Gauze with the FDA. 
22. Because of his experience registering medical 
devices with the FDA, Mr. Baggett knew that FDA 
regulatory Class I, the class for devices which pose 
the lowest risk to the patient and/or user, is the 
most desirable class to register a device under. Us-
ing his knowledge and experience of FDA proced-
ures, Mr. Baggett was able to register the S-99 and 
S-100 Gauze under Class I by defining the device 
as a "sponge for internal use." 
23. MedSpring markets its products to 
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"non-traditional" markets within the medical in-
dustry. 
24. The majority of manufacturers and distributors 
of medical devices sell to "traditional" medical cus-
tomers, i.e., hospitals and out-patient surgical cen-
ters, because they are the most lucrative to sell to. 
MedSpring, knowing the difficulty of breaking into 
this market when not part of a large "buying 
group," decided to market the S-99 and S-100 
Gauze to non-traditional customers such as emer-
gency service providers, municipalities, police and 
fire departments, veterinarians and dentists. 
25. The identity of MedSpring's customers is a 
closely guarded secret. 
26. Currently, MedSprmg's largest customer is Act-
Sys Medical Systems ("ActSys"). 
27. Tri-Anim is a distributor for ActSys. 
Feng's Marketing of "BloodSTOP " 
28. After resigning from her position with Med-
Spring, Feng started her own company, Regional 
Medical Solutions, Inc. dba LifeScience PLUS 
("Regional"). 
29. Regional has negotiated an agreement with 
Beijing Textile to import and sell Beijing Textile's 
S-99 and S-100 hemostatic gauze products into the 
United States. 
30. Regional obtained FDA approval of its S-99 
and S-100 hemostatic gauze products and is cur-
rently marketing these products under the name of 
"BloodSTOP." 
3 L In December of 2004, Feng hired an FDA regu-
lation consultant by the name of Dr. Richard Fang 
to assist Regional in complying with FDA regula-
tions and getting FDA approval of the 
"BloodSTOP" products. Dr. Fang had previously 
worked with Johnson & Johnson as an expert on 
FDA applications and issues. 
32. After conducting some research on how to re-
gister the "BloodSTOP" products with the FDA, 
Dr. Fang advised Feng to list the "BloodSTOP" 
products under FDA regulatory Class I, under regu-
latory category 878.4450, i.e., "gauze sponge for 
internal," instead of filing a 510k application as 
Feng had planned. Dr. Fang was paid $640.00 for 
his consulting work. 
33. Information regarding how to properly classify 
and describe gauze is also available on the FDA 
website. 
34. The process for obtaining FDA approval of a 
medical device is a public process. 
35. In an effort to market the "BloodSTOP" 
products, Feng purchased a database of nearly 
5,000 different medical supply purchasers. Region-
al has been marketing "BloodSTOP" to the com-
panies and individuals identified in the database. 
36. Feng has been in contact with MedSpring's 
largest customer, ActSys, to discuss ActSys' pos-
sible purchase of "BloodSTOP" products. 
*1276 37. ActSys is easily identified by a simple 
internet search as a company which purchases he-
mostatic gauze. 
38. A Regional salesperson has contacted Tri-
Anim, a distributor of ActSys, in an effort to mar-
ket the "BloodSTOP" product. 
39. Tri-Anim is listed as a medical supply pur-
chaser in the database of medical supply purchasers 
which Feng purchased. 
40. Tri-Anim is listed as a ActSys distributor on 
ActSys' website. 
CONCL USIONS OF LA W 
The Tenth Circuit has held that in order to obtain 
injunctive relief, a moving party must establish 
that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of prevailing 
on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm 
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unless the preliminary injunction is issued; (3) that 
the threatened injury outweighs the harm the pre-
liminary injunction might cause the opposing party; 
and (4) that the preliminary injunction if issued will 
not adversely affect the public interest. Prairie 
Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 
1234, 1246 (10th Cir.2001). 
A. Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits 
MedSpring's request for injunctive relief is based 
on its claim that Defendants have misappropriated 
MedSpring's trade secrets in violation of the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act and/or in breach of the 
Non-Disclosure Agreement. In order to obtain the 
injunctive relief requested, MedSpring must first 
establish that it is likely to prevail on at least one of 
these claims. 
1. Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
[1][2] The Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("Trade 
Secrets Act") defines trade secret misappropriation 
as: 
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another 
without express or implied consent by a person 
who.... 
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge 
of the trade secret; or.... 
(B) acquired [the trade secret] under circum-
stances giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use .... 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2)(b)(ii)(B) (2001). The 
threshold issue in determining whether a trade 
secret has been misappropriated is "whether, in 
fact, there is a trade secret to be misappropriated." 
Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc., 
46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 1212 (Utah Dist.Ct.1998) 
(quoting Microbiological Research Corp. v. Mima, 
625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981)). The Trade Secrets 
Act defines a trade secret as: 
[Information, including a formula, pattern, com-
pilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by prop-
er means by, other persons who can obtain eco-
nomic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4). The burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove the existence of a trade secret, and 
there is no presumption in his favor. Novell, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2dat 1212. 
MedSpring does not dispute that Feng has the right 
to sell hemostatic gauze products. MedSpring 
claims, however, that in selling the BloodSTOP 
product, Feng has illegally misappropriated three of 
MedSpring's trade secrets: (a) MedSpring's* 1277 
method of completing the requirements imposed by 
the FDA for registering a medical device; (b) Med-
Spring's method of marketing the S-99 and S-100 
gauze; and, (c) the identity of MedSpring's custom-
ers. 
a. Method of Obtaining FDA Approval 
Richard Baggett, MedSpring's President and CEO, 
has extensive knowledge of the requirements im-
posed upon small manufacturers of medical devices 
by the FDA, knowledge which he has accumulated 
over the last twenty years. Mr. Baggett used his 
knowledge of the FDA registration to register the 
S-99 and S-100 Gauze with the FDA and obtain 
FDA approval. He defined the S-99 and S-100 
Gauze as a "sponge for external use" so that it 
would fit within the FDA regulatory Class I, the 
most desirable class to register a device under. 
MedSpring alleges that this method of classifying 
and defining the S-99 and S-100 Gauze with the 
FDA constitutes a trade secret because it is unique, 
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not generally known in the industry, and is protec-
ted by MedSpring as a secret. 
[3] The court finds that the process for obtaining 
FDA approval of a medical device is a public pro-
cess. The FDA website contains general informa-
tion on the different regulatory classes and on how 
to properly classify and describe medical devices. 
In addition, once a product is registered, its device 
name, classification, device description and regula-
tion number all become available to the public. For 
example, a search on the FDA website for "gauze" 
results in a list of gauze devices which have been 
registered under Class I and gives the device names 
and descriptions under which they were registered. 
[4] In order to constitute a trade secret, the informa-
tion "must be unknown; it should not be in the pub-
lic domain nor within the knowledge of the trade 
...." Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 
P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981). The process for regis-
tering a medical device with the FDA is clearly in 
the public domain. At the very least, MedSpring's 
method for seeking FDA approval is within the 
general knowledge of the trade as evidenced by the 
fact that other manufacturers have registered their 
gauze devices with the FDA by using the same 
methodology as the one used by MedSpring. Med-
Spring has therefore failed to meet its burden of 
proving that its method of obtaining FDA approval 
constitutes a trade secret. 
Even if MedSpring could successfully argue that its 
method of obtaining FDA approval constitutes a 
trade secret, it is not likely to succeed in arguing 
that its method was misappropriated by Feng. Feng 
has registered the "BloodSTOP" product with the 
FDA under the same class and definition as that 
used by MedSpring. MedSpring alleges that there is 
no way that Feng could have amassed the know-
ledge and expertise to register her product in this 
same way without misappropriating the information 
from MedSpring. The evidence shows, however, 
that Feng hired an FDA regulation consultant in 
December of 2004 by the name of Dr. Richard Fang 
for the purpose of assisting Regional in getting 
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FDA approval of the "BloodSTOP" products. After 
conducting research on how to register the 
"BloodSTOP" products with the FDA, Dr. Fang ad-
vised Feng to list the "BloodSTOP" products under 
FDA regulatory Class I, under regulatory category 
878.4450, i.e., "gauze sponge for internal," instead 
of filing a 510k application as Feng had planned. In 
light of this evidence, it is not substantially likely 
that MedSpring will prevail on its claim that Feng 
misappropriated information obtained by Med-
Spring in registering her "BloodSTOP" device. 
*1278 b. Method of Marketing the S-99 and S-100 
Gauze. 
MedSpring markets its products to 
"non-traditional" customers within the medical in-
dustry. The majority of manufacturers and distribut-
ors of medical devices sell to "traditional" medical 
customers, i.e., hospitals and out-patient surgical 
centers, because they are the most lucrative custom-
ers to sell to. MedSpring, however, knowing the 
difficulty of breaking into this market when not part 
of a large "buying group," decided to market the S-
99 and S-100 Gauze to non-traditional customers 
such as emergency service providers, municipalit-
ies, police and fire departments, veterinarians and 
dentists. MedSpring claims that its targeting of non-
traditional customers is a unique marketing plan 
which is not generally known, and so constitutes a 
trade secret. 
[5] Although MedSpring's marketing plan may not 
be generally known, it does not constitute a trade 
secret if it is "within the knowledge of the trade 
...." Muna, 625 P.2d at 696. MedSpring claims that 
the difficulty of marketing new medical devices to 
traditional customers is known only to those with 
knowledge of how purchases of medical devices are 
made, and would not be known to someone like 
Feng who has no experience in the medical in-
dustry. Regardless of whether MedSpring's market-
ing method would be unknown to someone with no 
experience in the medical industry, by MedSpring's 
own admission, it is generally known within the 
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medical device industry. 
In addition, MedSpring's claim that it made efforts 
to keep its marketing strategy confidential is dis-
puted by MedSpring's own testimony. MedSpring 
testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that 
Mr. Baggett recently told Feng and Feng's boy-
friend, who were trying to start a business selling 
hospital beds, of the difficulty of trying to sell to 
hospitals when not part of a large buying group. 
MedSpring relied on this testimony to support its 
claims that Feng had knowledge of MedSpring's 
marketing strategy. The fact that Mr. Baggett dis-
closed MedSpring's marketing strategy to Feng's 
boyfriend, someone who was not subject to a non-
disclosure agreement, evidences that reasonable ef-
forts were not made to maintain the secrecy of 
MedSpring's marketing strategy. The court there-
fore finds that MedSpring's marketing strategy does 
not constitute a trade secret. 
Even if MedSpring's marketing strategy were a 
trade secret, MedSpring has failed to demonstrate 
that Defendants have misappropriated this market-
ing strategy. Regional has purchased a database of 
nearly 5,000 different medical supply purchasers 
and has been marketing "BloodSTOP" to the com-
panies and individuals identified in the database. 
This marketing strategy differs substantially from 
the marketing strategy relied upon by MedSpring. 
MedSpring's claim that its marketing strategy has 
been misappropriated by Defendants is simply un-
supported. 
c. The Identity of MedSpring's Customers. 
MedSpring additionally argues that the identity of 
its customers constitutes a trade secret. Feng has at-
tempted to market the BloodSTOP product to Act-
Sys, MedSpring's largest customer. Feng has also 
contacted one of ActSys' distributors, Tri-Anim. 
MedSpring alleges that the only possible way that 
Feng could have learned that ActSys was Med-
Spring's customer, and identify Tri-Anim as a dis-
tributor of ActSys, was by misappropriating the 
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identify of MedSpring's customers. 
[6] [7] In order to constitute a trade secret, the iden-
tity of customers must not be "readily ascertainable 
outside the employer's business as prospective users 
or *1279 consumers of the employer's service or 
products ...." Munay 625 P.2d at 700 (quoting Leo 
Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 328 N.Y.S.2d 
423, 278 N.E.2d 636, 639-641 (1972)). A simple 
internet search for the term "hemostatic gauze" 
identifies ActSys as a company which distributes 
hemostatic gauze under the product name ActCel. 
ActSys is therefore readily ascertainable as a pro-
spective consumer of hemostatic gauze. ActSys' 
home page on the internet includes a list of its cur-
rent distributors, including Tri-Anim. In addition, 
Tri-Anim is listed as a medical supply purchaser in 
the database purchased by Feng. The identity of 
Tri-Anim is therefore readily ascertainable as well. 
Because MedSpring's customers are readily ascer-
tainable by others, their identity does not constitute 
a trade secret. 
MedSpring has failed to meet the burden of proving 
the existence of its three alleged trade secrets. Med-
Spring has also failed to establish that Feng has 
used any of these alleged trade secrets in marketing 
the BloodSTOP product. MedSpring therefore has 
not established that it has a substantial likelihood of 
prevailing on its claim that Defendants have viol-
ated the Trade Secrets Act. 
2. Breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement. 
MedSpring's Motion is also based on its claim that 
Defendants have misappropriated or disclosed 
MedSpring's confidential information in breach of 
the Non-Disclosure Agreement. Pursuant to this 
agreement, Defendants are not to disclose or use 
MedSpring's "Confidential Information" for a term 
of three years from the date of the agreement, or 
until May 31, 2005. The agreement's definition of 
"Confidential Information" is broader than the 
Trade Secret Act's definition of "Trade Secret." 
Trie fact that MedSpring is not likely to prevail on 
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its claim that Defendants violated the Trade Secrets 
Act, therefore, does not preclude a finding that De-
fendants misappropriated confidential information 
in breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement. 
f8] As explained in Paragraph 1.2 of the Non-
Disclosure Agreement, "Confidential Information" 
does not include information that: 
(b) is developed by [Defendants] independently 
of any of the Confidential Information received 
in confidence from [MedSpring], as evidenced by 
[Defendants'] written records;.... 
(d) is or becomes generally available to the pub-
lic other than as a result of a disclosure by 
[MedSpring]; or 
(e) is disclosed by [Defendants] to a third party 
without confidentiality restriction .... 
MedSpring alleges that Defendants have breached 
the Non-Disclosure Agreement by misappropriating 
MedSpring's method of applying for FDA approval, 
its method of marketing medical devices, and the 
identity of MedSpring's customers. As explained 
previously, however, all of the information al-
legedly misappropriated by Defendants was either 
developed by the Defendants independently, was 
generally available to the public, or was disclosed 
by MedSpring to a third party without restriction of 
confidentiality. Pursuant to Paragraph 1.2 of the 
Non-Disclosure Agreement, therefore, none of the 
information allegedly misappropriated constitutes 
"Confidential Information." 
MedSpring has not demonstrated a substantial like-
lihood of success on its claim that Defendants 
breached the Non-Disclosure Agreement. The court 
therefore finds that MedSpring has failed to estab-
lish the first element necessary to obtain injunctive 
relief. 
B. Irreparable Harm 
[9][10] MedSpring also fails to establish that it will 
be irreparably harmed if a *1280 preliminary in-
junction is not entered. Irreparable harm is suffered 
where an injury cannot be adequately atoned for in 
money. Pierce, 253 F.3d at 1250. MedSpring 
claims that the damages it will suffer over time as a 
result of the Defendants misappropriation of its 
trade secrets, such as the loss of its customers and 
the loss of its stake in the hemostatic gauze market, 
are intangible and cannot be atoned for in money. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Non-Disclosure Agree-
ment, Defendants are bound not to disclose Med-
Spring's "Confidential Information,'' including 
trade secrets, only for a period of three years from 
the date of the agreement. The three year term ex-
pires on May 31, 2005. From this point forward, the 
Defendants can freely disclose MedSpring's 
"Confidential Information". MedSpring's damages 
are therefore limited to the time from which De-
fendants allegedly first misappropriated Med-
Spring's confidential information until May 31, 
2005. Any damages incurred by MedSpring during 
this discrete period of time will be identifiable and 
so can be calculated and atoned for in money. Med-
Spring, therefore, has not established that it will be 
irreparably harmed if a preliminary injunction is 
not issued. 
G Balance of Hardships 
[11] The court also finds that the harm which will 
result to Defendants from the issuance of a prelim-
inary injunction outweighs any threatened injury to 
MedSpring. Defendants are contractually obliged 
not to use or disclose MedSpring's Confidential In-
formation only until May 31, 2005. Any threatened 
injury to MedSpring, therefore, is for a very limited 
period of time. The issuance of a preliminary in-
junction, however, would prevent Defendants from 
marketing or selling its "BloodSTOP" device for 
the duration of the litigation thereby causing it to 
lose the benefits of efforts it has already spent pub-
licizing the product. Defendants would lose clients, 
lose market power and lose credibility within the 
trade. The issuance of a preliminary injunction at 
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this time would also be particularly harmful to De-
fendants in light of the upcoming trade show which 
it would be prevented from participating in 
D. Public Interest 
[12] Medsprmg additionally fails to establish that 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction would not 
adversely affect public interest As demonstrated by 
Utah's adoption of the Trade Secrets Act, public 
policy does support the development of new tech-
nologies by authonzmg mjunctive protection of 
trade secrets Novell 46 U S P Q 2d at 1215 This 
goal, however, must be balanced against the pub-
lic's interest m encouraging competition and sup-
porting an individual's right to exploit his own skill 
and knowledge Utah Medical Products Inc v 
Clinical Innovations Assoc Inc 79 F Supp 2d 
1290, 1312 (DUtah 1999) Preventing Defendants 
from using information which is within the public 
domam, readily ascertainable, or generally known 
withm the medical device manufacturing trade to 
compete against MedSprmg would be adverse to 
this interest In light of the evidence presented by 
the parties, the Court finds that the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction in this case would adversely 
affect the public interest in encouraging competi-
tion 
E. Summary 
MedSprmg has failed to establish that it has a sub-
stantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of 
either its claim that Defendants violated the Trade 
Secrets Act or that Defendants breached the Non-
Disclosure Agreement by misappropriating Med-
Spnng's "Confidential Information" *1281 The 
court additionally finds that MedSprmg will not 
suffer irreparable harm unless the preliminary in-
junction is issued, that the harm which will result to 
Defendants from the issuance of a preliminary in-
junction outweighs any threatened injury to Med-
Sprmg, and the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
would adversely affect the public interest The Mo-
tion for Preliminary Injunction is therefore deniedFN1 
FN1 Although the court has ruled in favor 
of the Defendants by denying the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary injunc-
tion, it notes that Mr Griffin's use of sar-
casm and personal attacks against the 
Plaintiff and the Plaintiffs counsel at the 
preliminary injunction hearing was im-
proper and unhelpful 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregomg reasons, and good cause appear-
ing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
(1) MedSpnng's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
(originally filed as a motion for temporary restrain-
ing order in the state court action) is DENIED, and, 
(2) The Temporary Restraining Order issued by 
Judge Thomas L Kay of the Second District Court 
of Davis County, State of Utah on March 24, 2005, 
is hereby DISSOLVED 
D Utah,2005 
MedSprmg Group, Inc v Feng 
368 F Supp 2d 1270 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORA-
TION, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff and Re-
spondent, 
v. 
Nadeem M. MUNA, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 16643. 
Jan. 22,1981. 
Employer brought action against former employee 
to enjoin defendant from competing with employer. 
The Second District Court, Davis County, J. Duffy 
Palmer, J., granted employer injunctive relief, and 
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
C. J., held that: (1) once employer's board of direct-
ors had knowledge of 1968 employment contract 
entered into with employee, no subsequent change 
of personnel required a new notice of the terms of 
the agreement, and employee, who had been re-
moved as managing officer, did not violate his fidu-
ciary duty to employer by failing to reveal terms of 
the 1968 agreement during the negotiation of a 
1978 employment agreement; therefore, the 1978 
employment agreement entered into between em-
ployer and employee was not a nullity, and employ-
ee was not bound by the noncompetition clause in 
the 1968 employment contract; (2) evidence was in-
sufficient to sustain trial court's finding that em-
ployer had trade secrets in the manufacture of cer-
tain diagnostic kits which defendant had developed 
while an employee, since evidence established that 
the processes of employer constituted skill and 
knowledge of the trade and not confidential inform-
ation; and (3) employer failed to sustain its burden 
of proof that the names and location of its custom-
ers were a trade secret, since there was no evidence 
that, by the nature of employer's business, ex-
traordinary effort was involved in compiling a cus-
tomer list. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
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the use thereof to the plaintiffs damage. 
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MAUGHAN, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff, Microbiological Research Corporation, 
hereinafter identified as M.R.C., initiated this ac-
tion to obtain injunctive relief and damages against 
its former employee, Muna. Upon trial before the 
Court, an order was entered enjoining defendant 
from competing with M.R.C. in any of its product 
lines or services for a period of two years from the 
date of entry of the judgment and restraining de-
fendant from soliciting M.R.C.'s customers for the 
sale of products presently manufactured by M.R.C., 
whose identity and location Muna learned of during 
the course of his employment. The judgment is re-
versed and remanded for disposition in accordance 
with this opinion. 
M.R.C. is a Delaware corporation with its principal 
offices and place of business situated in Bountiful, 
Utah. At the time of trial M.R.C. was engaged in 
the production of four medical diagnostic kits, 
which it sells to hospitals and clinical laboratories 
to detect human diseases. By utilizing the immuno-
fluorescence technique of tracing diseases, a labor-
atory can detect lupus erythematosis (A.N.A. kit), 
Toxoplasmosis (Toxo kit), Herpes I and Herpes II 
(Herpes kits) and infectious mononucleosis (I.M. 
kit). M.R.C. also engages in some testing for these 
diseases. 
*692 The defendant, Dr. Muna, was awarded his 
Ph.D. in Immunology and Microbiology in 1968. 
From 1956 to 1968, he has worked with the immun-
ofluorescence technique of tracing diseases. In 
1966, he, in cooperation with two other scientists, 
published an article in the American Journal of 
Clinical Pathology describing a procedure to test 
patients for lupus erythematosis by using immuno-
fluorescence to perform an antinuclear antibody test 
(A.N.A.). In 1956 and 1957, defendant developed 
an immunofluorescence test for Herpes virus, while 
he was at U.C.L.A. While studying for his doctor-
ate at the University of Utah, defendant was taught 
a technique for growing large batches of tissue cul-
ture cells by placing them in Pyrex baking dishes 
and covering the container with Saran wrap. 
In 1968, defendant met a stock broker, Edward J. 
Mawod, who is currently President of M.R.C. Dr. 
Muna described a research project in which he was 
engaged, which had the objective of developing a 
new method to detect cancer. Mr. Mawod, in asso-
ciation with several others, raised the capital to or-
ganize a corporation to develop and market the can-
cer kit. Microbiological Sciences, Inc., the prede-
cessor to M.R.C, was incorporated and a laboratory 
was built. By a contract, dated September 4, 1968, 
Dr. Muna was employed as President and general 
manager of the corporation. By May 1969, the 
funds of the corporation were depleted, and the 
company had been unable to procure the tumors re-
quired to develop the cancer detection kit. Dr. 
Muna suggested the company utilize its existing 
laboratory facilities to produce an A.N.A. kit. De-
fendant testified he commenced working on the 
project in July and had the A.N.A. kit on the market 
by September 1969. In 1972, M.R.C. began market-
ing the Toxo kit, and in 1976, the Herpes kit was 
added to the company's line of products. At the 
time of trial, there were several competitors to 
M.R.C. in the manufacture of A.N.A., Herpes, and 
Toxo kits. 
Defendant served as President of M.R.C. until Feb-
ruary 1978, when as a culmination of a proxy fight, 
Mr. Mawod became President. On February 28, 
1978, by written agreement, Dr. Muna was em-
ployed by M.R.C. as a consultant, research microbi-
ologist and Director of the Laboratory. On July 30, 
1978, Mr. Mawod terminated defendant's employ-
ment. Thereafter, Dr. Muna initiated plans to manu-
facture a line of products similar to M.R.C.'s. In 
September 1978, the corporation commenced this 
action, and since that time, defendant has been re-
strained from competing with M.R.C, first by a 
temporary restraining order, then by a preliminary 
injunction, and finally by a permanent injunction. 
The trial court found that defendant, while Presid-
ent of M.R.C, learned of its confidential, propriet-
ary, and secret methods of operation, such as, clien-
tele list, combinations of chemicals, and methods of 
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production; that this information was of substantial 
and significant value to the plaintiff in the success-
ful conduct of its business. In the manufacture of 
the A.N.A. kits, Toxo kits, Herpes 1 and 2 kits, and 
the I.M. kits, plaintiff had trade secrets, which con-
ferred upon it an advantage in the market place. 
These trade secrets were developed by defendant 
for plaintiffs benefit while defendant was em-
ployed to develop these human diagnostic kits. 
Plaintiffs processes for the test kits, taken as a 
whole, were not known to the industry and were 
guarded by security precautions. The trade secrets 
were specifically described as the plaintiffs use of 
certain chemicals and nutrients in the propagation 
of its cell lines and its techniques and chemical for-
mulations in the manufacturing process of the kits. 
Die trial court further found that in February, 1978, 
defendant lost his bid for re-election as President of 
M.R.C., and thereafter entered into an employment 
agreement, dated February 28, 1978. Defendant had 
previously been employed under a contract, dated 
September 4, 1968, which he had entered into with 
plaintiffs predecessor corporation. On February 28, 
1978, according to the findings, plaintiff, through 
its officers and directors, had no knowledge of the 
existence of the 1968 employment contract; defend-
ant knew of the 1968 contract and the lack of 
plaintiffs knowledge thereof.*693 Defendant was 
found to have failed to reveal and to have deliber-
ately concealed the existence of this agreement, 
while he was negotiating the 1978 employment 
contract. The 1968 contract contained conditions 
limiting defendant's right to compete with plaintiff, 
which the court found in full force and effect and 
valid and binding on defendant. 
Finally, the trial court found that unless restrained, 
it was likely defendant would solicit plaintiffs cus-
tomers which became known to him during his em-
ployment and would appropriate for his own use or 
for others the secret and proprietary information of 
M.R.C. The use of such information would cause 
plaintiff irreparable damage, the amount of which 
could not be exactly established and for which no 
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adequate remedy at law existed. 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
M.R.C.'s formulations of chemicals and nutrients 
used in the propagation of cells and used in the 
manufacture of its diagnostic test kits were propri-
etary information and trade secrets; it would be un-
just to allow defendant to use this information for 
his own benefit or that of others. The defendant 
should be restrained for a period of two years from 
competing with plaintiff in its present product liens, 
to wit, the A.N.A., Toxo, I.M., and Herpes 1 and 2 
kits and all of the components therein. 
The trial court further concluded that defendant had 
a fiduciary duty during the negotiation of his 1978 
employment contract to reveal to the new officers 
of the plaintiff the existence and the terms and con-
ditions of his 1968 employment contract and that 
his concealment thereof nullified the 1978 employ-
ment contract. 
On appeal defendant challenges the rulings of the 
trial court in regard to the 1968 and 1978 employ-
ment contracts and that trade secrets were involved 
in the manufacture of the diagnostic test kits.[FNl] 
Plaintiff responds that the permanent injunction is-
sued by the trial court can be sustained on two al-
ternative grounds: first, there existed an express 
contract between the parties prohibiting the conduct 
enjoined; second, there was an implied obligation 
on the part of an employee not to reveal trade 
secrets or other confidential information. 
FN1. During the course of the trial, de-
fendant agreed by stipulation not to manu-
facture for sale any I.M. kits, although he 
did not concede any secret processes were 
involved therein. 
I. The Contract 
The 1978 agreement was entitled ''Employment 
Agreement." Its first provision stated: 
"1. All previous employment agreements and 
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understandings in connection therewith are 
hereby mutually terminated and settled." 
In this 1978 agreement, Dr. Muna was employed as 
a consultant and research microbiologist and as Dir-
ector of the Laboratory. The contract further 
provided: 
"6. During the term of the agreement Muna 
shall not act as consultant for, or accept employ-
ment from any competitor of Micro nor shall he 
compete directly or indirectly with Micro. 
"7. Micro shall be the owner of all the research 
data, ideas and materials discovered or developed 
at Micro by Muna during the term hereof." 
Thus, the noncompetition clause was limited to the 
period of defendant's employment, which termin-
ated in July 1978, about five months after its incep-
tion. 
The 1968 agreement was entitled a "Management 
Contract," wherein Dr. Muna was employed as 
President and General Manager for a period of five 
years and thereafter from year to year, unless ter-
minated by either party by written notice at least 
sixty days prior to any anniversary date (September 
4) of the agreement. Defendant agreed therein that 
any and all developments, processes, inventions 
and/or procedures developed, invented, or pro-
cessed by him during the term of the agreement 
would belong to and be the sole and absolute prop-
erty of the Company. 
The 1968 agreement further provided: 
"6. Muna agrees that during the terms of this 
Agreement he will not engage*694 in any other 
commercial activity in any way competitive with 
the business of the Company, or its affiliated 
companies, and that, for a period of five (5) years 
after leaving the employ of the Company, he will 
not engage in any way, directly or indirectly, in 
any business competitive with the Company or its 
affiliated companies any (sic) any state in which 
any of them do business. Muna further agrees 
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that he will not disclose to any other person any 
information which is the property of the Com-
pany or its affiliated companies." 
Although the trial court declared the 1978 contract 
a nullity and the 1968 contract valid and binding on 
defendant, the actual effect on this action was to 
nullify provision 1 of the 1978 agreement and to re-
vive Paragraph 6 of the 1968 Management Con-
tract. The other provisions of the 1968 agreement 
were not invoked, e. g., the requirement that de-
fendant could only be removed as President and 
General Manager by sixty days written notice prior 
to September 4, the anniversary date of the con-
tract. The basis of the trial court's ruling was that 
defendant had a fiduciary duty to reveal the exist-
ence of the 1968 contract and specifically para-
graph 6 therein to the present officers of the corpor-
ation, who had no knowledge of this matter. This 
ailing cannot be sustained. 
Plaintiffs current President, Mawod, testified that 
at the time the 1978 agreement was signed, he did 
not know of any other agreement, and defendant 
did not so inform him. Mr. Mawod further testified 
that at the time he assumed his position he combed 
through the files of the company, and he could not 
locate a written agreement with defendant. Mr. Ma-
wod stated that he did review the minutes of the 
Board of Directors for 1970 and 1975, wherein 
there were references to the need of the company to 
have a written contract with Dr. Muna. After this 
action was filed Mr. Mawod contacted plaintiffs 
former legal counsel, who produced a copy of the 
1968 contract from his files. 
There was no evidence that Mr. Mawod ever asked 
Dr. Muna about the existence of any prior written 
agreements. The concealment found by the trial 
court can only be inferred by Dr. Muna's failure to 
speak and the fact there was no copy of the agree-
ment in the files. At the trial the only inquiry of Dr. 
Muna concerning the 1968 contract involved the 
identification of his signature, neither counsel pur-
sued any line of questioning concerning this agree-
ment. [FN2] There was evidence that during the 
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time Dr. Muna was President, the company always 
employed a business manager and that for a period 
an executive committee of which Mr. Mawod was a 
member participated in the management of the 
company, which negates any exclusive control by 
Dr. Muna of the company's business records. 
FN2. There is an affidavit in the record in 
connection with a pretrial motion in which 
Dr. Muna has sworn that he did not recall 
ever having received a copy of the 1968 
agreement, until the hearing on the prelim-
inary injunction. He further swore at the 
time he executed the 1978 agreement, he 
did not remember and was therefore, not 
aware of the specific terms of the 1968 
contract. 
[1] Plaintiffs counsel drafted the 1978 agreement; 
such a document should be strictly construed 
against M.R.C.[FN3] There was introduced at trial 
a copy of an employment agreement, which was 
drafted in 1974 or 1975 and contained a confidenti-
ality and noncompetition clauses. Initially, only 
new employees were required to sign such a con-
tract, but subsequently all employees were required 
to do so. Dr. Muna was never requested to sign 
such a document, although during the time period 
of approximately 1974 to 1976 he was not the final 
authority in the company. Since 1978 all employees 
were required by plaintiff, as a condition of em-
ployment, to execute agreements with noncompeti-
tion clauses, the omission of such a clause in Dr. 
Muna's 1978 contract is consistent with an inten-
tional choice on the part of plaintiff rather than the 
result of some deliberate concealment on the part of 
Dr. Muna. 
FN3. Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 
198-199, 450 P.2d 467 (1969); Skousen v. 
Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 171, 493 P.2d 1003 
(1972). 
*695 The finding of the trial court that the officers 
and directors of plaintiff had no knowledge of the 
1968 contract cannot be sustained under the evid-
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ence. Plaintiff introduced into evidence Exhibit 28, 
which Mr. Mawod identified as a document from 
the business files of the company. This exhibit was 
the minutes of the first board of directors' meeting 
on September 4, 1968. The minutes indicate the 
management contract of Dr. Muna was introduced 
and discussed. The board then unanimously adop-
ted the following resolution: 
"Resolved, that the officers of this corporation 
shall be and they are hereby authorized and direc-
ted to execute and deliver to Dr Nadeem M. 
Muna, the president and general manager of the 
corporation, the management contract presented 
to this meeting, an executed copy of which shall 
be inserted in the minute book of the corporation 
immediately following the minutes of this meet-
ing." 
[2] A corporation, being once charged with notice 
of the character of a transaction, continues to be af-
fected by such notice whatever changes may occur 
in the personnel of its working force."... A fortiori, 
notice to the board of directors of a fact, at the time 
of a transaction in regard thereto, is notice to the 
corporation, and no subsequent change of directors 
can require a new notice of such fact ..."[FN4] 
FN4.3 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 
(1975 Rev.Vol.) Sec. 801, pp. 38-39. 
Plaintiff is confronted with a dilemma, unless the 
board of directors, with full knowledge of all its 
terms, authorized the 1968 contract employing the 
company's president, there would be no valid and 
binding agreement; [FN5] on the other hand, once 
the board of directors had knowledge of the con-
tract at the time of the transaction, no subsequent 
change of personnel requires a new notice of the 
terms of the agreement. 
FN5.19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, Sec. 
1081. pp. 528-529; Sec. 1155, pp. 583-584. 
[3] The trial court ruled that defendant had violated 
his fiduciary duty to plaintiff by his failure to reveal 
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the terms of the 1968 agreement during the negoti-
ations of the 1978 agreement. These negotiations 
occurred after defendant's removal as a managing 
officer. When a corporate officer ceases to act as 
such, because of his resignation or removal, the fi-
duciary relationship ceases. However, where a 
transaction has its inception while the fiduciary re-
lationship is in existence, an employee cannot by 
resigning and not disclosing all he knows about the 
negotiations, subsequently continue and consum-
mate the transaction in a manner in violation of his 
fiduciary duties. [FN6] This exception is well illus-
trated in Glen Allen Mining v. Park Galena Mining 
Company,[FN7] wherein the defendants while of-
ficers of the company developed and put into mo-
tion the plans that ultimately resulted in certain 
contracts disadvantageous to the corporation. This 
court ruled that under such conditions, an officer 
cannot avoid responsibility for violating his fidu-
ciary duties by delaying the final execution of a 
contract until the expiration of his relation. 
FN6.3 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 
(1975 Rev.Vol.) Sec. 860, pp. 203-204; 
Bentz v. Vardaman Manufacturing Co.. 
Miss.,210So.2d35,41 (1968). 
FN7. 77 Utah 362, 382-383, 296 P. 231 
(1931). 
[4] The aforementioned exception is not applicable 
in the instant case, for the 1978 employment con-
tract was not the result of plans and negotiations 
conducted by defendant while he was a managing 
officer of plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff, as ex-
plained ante, had knowledge of the 1968 agree-
ment. There was also substantial evidence that 
plaintiff, under the direction of Mr. Mawod, had 
embarked on a course of action of including 
nondisclosure and noncompetition clauses in its 
corporate agreements. Under all of these circum-
stances, the trial court's ruling was erroneous, viz., 
that the 1978 agreement was a nullity and defend-
ant was bound by the noncompetition clause in the 
1968 contract. The contractual relationship of the 
parties is to be determined in accordance with the 
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1978 contract, which was drafted by plaintiffs *696 
scrivener and is thus to be construed accordingly. 
The first provision of this agreement, mutually ter-
minating and settling all previous employment 
agreements, is particularly appropriate because of 
the radical change of circumstances, viz., Dr. Muna 
was discharged as chief managing officer and em-
ployed as a consultant. This provision is completely 
consistent with an intention to abandon mutually 
and completely all prior agreements and to initiate a 
new relationship.[FN8] The permanent injunction 
against defendant cannot be predicated on the 1968 
Management Contract, for the 1978 contract consti-
tuted a novation and controls the relationship 
between the parties. 
FN8. Jewett-Gorrie Insurance Agency, Inc. 
v. Visser, 12 Wash.App. 707, 531 P.2d 
817,822(1975). 
Trade Secrets 
Defendant further contends that plaintiff failed to 
sustain its burden of proof that trade secrets were 
involved in the manufacture of the kits. This issue 
is of particular importance since plaintiff urges the 
permanent injunction can be sustained on the al-
ternative ground that defendant should be restrained 
from appropriating or using plaintiffs trade secrets. 
(This would not be grounds to restrain Dr. Muna 
from using the test kits to conduct testing, which 
could have only been sustained under the no com-
petition clause of the 1968 contract.) 
[5][6][7] A trade secret, whether it be a secret for-
mula, process, pattern, device, compilation of in-
formation or otherwise, is under the majority view 
held to be property, with power in the owner there-
of to make use of it to the exclusion of the world or 
to deal with it as he pleases. [FN9] As a property 
right, the trade secret is protected against its appro-
priation or use without the consent of the 
owner. [FN 10] The trade secret is a type of intellec-
tual property, in effect, a property right in dis-
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covered knowledge.[FN 11 ] 
FN9. 2 Callman Unfair Competition, 
Trademarks and Monopolies (3rd Ed.), 
Sec. 51.1, pp. 349-350. 
FN10.Id.atp. 351. 
FNll.Id.atp. 352. 
[8] The threshold issue in every case is whether, in 
fact, there is a trade secret to be misappropriated. 
The secret is of value only so long as it remains a 
secret. The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove its 
existence as a secret, and there is no presumption in 
his favor. [FN 12] 
FN12.Id,Sec. 53.3, p. 387. 
"Thus, a unique combination of generally 
known elements or steps can qualify as a trade 
secret, if it represents a valuable contribution at-
tributable to the independent efforts of the one 
claiming to have conceived it. The combination 
must differ materially from other methods re-
vealed by the prior art. The subject matter of the 
trade secret must be unknown; it should not be in 
the public domain nor within the knowledge of 
the trade, i. e., known only to the owner and pos-
sibly several others to whom it was disclosed 
with the admonition that its secrecy be main-
tained ..."[FN 13] 
FN13.Id,p. 388. 
"A secret may not be in the public domain if 
extensive effort is required to pierce its veil by 
assembling the literature concerning it and 
thereby uncover its parts. If this can be readily 
done by one who is normally skilled in the field 
and has a reasonable familiarity with its trade lit-
erature, the secret may no longer be entitled to 
protection as such ..."[FN 14] 
FNRId., pp. 391-392. 
[9] An employer to obtain relief must establish that 
his former employee's product is a copy of his own 
product, that its method of production was secret 
and that the former employee has used or intends to 
use confidential information acquired during his 
employment. The conflict must be resolved 
between the employer's right to protect his trade 
secrets and the employee's right not to be unreason-
ably hampered in the use of what he has learned 
during the *697 employment. There must be a de-
lineation between the general knowledge and exper-
ience of the employee and the trade secrets of the 
employer. Furthermore, the employee is protected 
by the rule that the owner may not arbitrarily pro-
nounce anything a trade secret.[FN 15] 
FN15.Id., Sec. 54.2, p. 415. 
[10] Upon termination of his employment, an em-
ployee has the prerogative to use his general know-
ledge, experience, memory and skill, however 
gained, provided he does not use, disclose, or im-
pinge upon any of the secret processes or business 
secrets of his former employer.[FN16] The distinc-
tion between general and special knowledge can 
only be resolved by a balancing of the conflicting 
social and economic interests of two desirable 
goals. The law encourages competition and sup-
ports an individual right to exploit his own skill and 
knowledge; on the other hand, the lav/ should grant 
established businesses reasonable protection against 
unfair trade practices.[FN17] There has not been 
devised any ready formula to differentiate clearly 
between general and special knowledge so as to de-
termine the manner and type of information an em-
ployee may use. One approach has been to recog-
nize the distinction between the case of an employ-
ee, who leaves one employer and uses his own fac-
ulties, skill and experience in the establishment of 
an independent business or in the sendee of anoth-
er, and the case of one who uses confidential in-
formation, secured solely through his employment, 
to the harm of his previous employer. 
FN16.Id., Sec. 54.2(a), p. 416. 
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"... Confidential information of an employer, 
however, loses any protection to which it may 
have been entitled after it has been merged into 
the employee's own faculties, skill and experi-
ence. Since experience is something a man ac-
quires, a standard must be found to test whether, 
in a particular case, an employee's experience is 
such as will permit of its use after termination of 
the employment, even though it may prove detri-
mental to his former employer. 
"The distinction is between confidential in-
formation and * skill and knowledge of the trade' 
or, as one court expressed it, the knowledge 
which the employee might have acquired in pre-
vious employment. [FN 18] 
FN18.W., pp. 418-419. 
"The distinction between general experience 
and special knowledge will still be difficult to 
draw even after the formulation of an arbitrary 
rule of thumb. The more important an employee's 
job, the more difficult will it be to separate the 
knowledge he is free to use from that which 
should be within the secret sphere of the business 
owner. Where the employee is an expert in a 
newly developed science, whose creative mind 
established a manufacturing department on the 
basis of his own plans and ideas, or is a man 
known to and desired by industry, any attempt to 
draw the line between that which was or has be-
come, by trial and error, a part of his own intel-
lectual equipment and that which he cannot use 
or divulge without a breach of confidence neces-
sarily involves some injustice to one party. The 
problem is highlighted by modern industry in 
which inventors have now become an important 
addition to management as part of the company 
team. 
"Complete justice is an ideal difficult to attain. 
Old-fashioned concepts of loyalty are of no legal 
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significance where complicated technical prob-
lems disrupt the balancing of economic 
interest."[FN19] 
FN 19.Id., pp. 420-421. 
[11] In an action based upon a secret process and 
unfair competition, the plaintiff must establish the 
following: (1) his possession of knowledge or in-
formation not generally known (i. e., the secret); 
and either (2) his communication of the secret to 
the defendant under an express or implied agree-
ment limiting its use or further disclosure, *698 and 
trie defendant's use thereof in violation of the con-
fidence, to the injury of the plaintiff; or (3) the de-
fendant's acquisition of the secret by some wrong-
ful manner and the use thereof to the plaintiffs 
damage.[FN20] 
FN20.Id.,Sec.58.1,p.478. 
[12] The trial court found that plaintiff had trade 
secrets in the manufacture of the diagnostic kits, 
which defendant had developed while an employee. 
These secrets were identified as certain formula-
tions of chemicals and nutrients in the propagation 
of cell lines and certain techniques and chemical 
formulations in the manufacturing process of the 
kits. Defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to sus-
tain its burden to establish the foregoing were trade 
secrets on the grounds that all the information was 
published in the literature, including work done by 
defendant on the A.N.A. techniques prior to his em-
ployment, that the techniques and processes were 
known to others in defendant's field of expertise, 
and that the processes and techniques were an in-
tegral part of defendant's own skill and knowledge. 
Plaintiff called two witnesses to establish the secret 
nature of its manufacturing process. Both witnesses 
conceded that M.R.C. provided them with their first 
opportunity to observe a laboratory involved in the 
commercial production of test kits; consequently, 
they were unfamiliar with the technics of other 
companies. The evidence further established that 
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M.R.C. had competitors producing A.N.A., Toxo 
and Herpes kits. Both witnesses thought it was un-
usual to grow the cells on slides in pyrex dishes 
covered with saran wrap; neither had read in the lit-
erature on tissue culture of using this method for 
mass production of tissue culture slides. Dr. Muna 
testified that he had learned this technique with all 
his fellow students in the virology department at the 
University of Utah. Dr. Muna further testified that 
at the inception of production of the A.N.A. kit he 
had utilized coverslips as he had in his tissue cul-
ture work prior to his employment with plaintiff. A 
competitor, Virgo, marketed an A.N.A. kit using 
slides, which were more convenient; so M.R.C. 
changed from coverslips to slides. 
Plaintiffs witnesses further identified as combina-
tions peculiar to M.R.C. in production of the 
A.N.A. and Herpes kits: 1) the specific nutrients 
added to the media in which the cells were grown; 
2) the rinsing of the slides three times with sodium 
bicarbonate; 3) the use of isopropyl alcohol as a 
fixative. 
Plaintiffs witness, Leibovitz, testified there were 
alternative methods of making media as effective as 
M.R.C/s. He further testified that the basic tech-
niques for making A.N.A. and Herpes kits were not 
difficult; the problem was mass production. He 
opined that one would have to proceed on the basis 
of trial and error, using a large number of combina-
tions in order to devise a procedure; he estimated it 
would take three to six months. 
Dr. Muna introduced into evidence the article he 
wrote in 1966, which described the techniques he 
utilized in producing the A.N.A. kit for M.R.C. For 
the tissue culture he used FL, a strain of human am-
niotic cells, which are currently utilized by M.R.C. 
in the A.N.A. and herpes kits. The nutrients added 
to the media, which plaintiffs witness, Dr. Golden, 
described as black magic, were additives which Dr. 
Muna had used since he was introduced to tissue 
culture at U.C.L.A. in 1956. (In the article Dr. 
Muna had recommended growing the cells in any 
suitable sustaining media.) Dr. Muna testified that 
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the work described in his article involved standard 
laboratory procedures in the tissue culture field. 
There were two distinctions in the process de-
scribed in the article and M.R.C.'s process; in the 
former, the rinse was buffered saline, and the fixat-
ive was ether-alcohol; in the latter, the rinse con-
tained sodium bicarbonate and the fixative was iso-
propyl alcohol. Dr. Muna testified that he used iso-
propyl alcohol as a fixing agent prior to 1968, but 
he had used ethyl alcohol on FL cells prior to 1968 
because it was a more refined alcohol; in his opin-
ion there was no difference in either as a fixing 
agent. Other*699 witnesses testified there are sev-
eral equally effective fixing agents. Neither of 
plaintiffs witnesses knew whether the use of sodi-
um bicarbonate in the rinse had any effect on the 
process. 
In the production of the Toxo kit both Dr. Muna 
and Dr. Golden testified the procedures utilized fol-
lowed those described in a publication of the Center 
for Disease Control. The only departure from this 
published procedure was that M.R.C adds a sur-
face-reducing agent, Tween 80, which is also used 
by others in the field. 
Dr. Marcus, whose process is used by M.R.C. to 
manufacture the I.M. kit, testified thai a competent 
microbiologist would need nothing further than the 
information published in the literature and his own 
general knowledge in order to manufacture the 
A.N.A., Toxo, and Herpes kits on a commercial 
basis. 
The conclusion is compelling that from the evid-
ence adduced the processes of plaintiff constitute 
skill and knowledge of the trade and not confiden-
tial information. Dr. Muna cannot be enjoined from 
using his knowledge, skill, and experience in an in-
dependent business. It should be further observed 
that of the chemicals utilized by M.R.C, which it 
contends are secret, there are alternative choices 
which Dr. Muna could select in producing the kits. 
The instant case is similar to Abbott Laboratories v. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Norse Chemical Corporation, [FN21 ] wherein 
plaintiff claimed the existence of trade secrets in 
the areas of manufacture and sales. The court ruled 
the claim could not be sustained. The court ob-
served that in order to constitute a trade secret, pro-
tective by injunctive relief, Abbott had the burden 
of proving a formula, process, or compilation of in-
formation known only to Abbott or its employees to 
whom it was necessary to confide in secret. In its 
analysis the court observed the alleged trade secrets 
were published and were commonly known in the 
trade and readily discernable in the chemical engin-
eering field. In the area of manufacture defendants 
had utilized basic chemistry for a basic process 
consisting of a series of well known, published 
steps. There was no showing the defendants had 
copied any plans or taken any drawings, designs, 
specifications, or specific details from Abbott. Each 
element of the entire process was based on know-
ledge of chemical engineering, which the former 
employee acquired by working with the process, 
applying different engineering techniques at its 
various stages, and being aware of the outcome. 
The court characterized this type of information as 
skill, which cannot be blotted out of an employee's 
mind and cannot be labeled a trade secret. 
FN21. 33 Wis.2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 529. 
538(1967). 
The court recognized that the former employee had 
certain knowledge of particular engineering tech-
niques which could be applied at a given point 
more advantageously than another technique. This 
was a result of his training and his experience in his 
profession rather than a direct copying of Abbott's 
process, and the skill and knowledge he possessed 
from working in his profession should inure to his 
benefit. 
In the Abbott case, the court further ruled that the 
customer list was not a trade secret. The list con-
tained only the names and addresses of the custom-
ers and the individual to be contacted. There was no 
complicated marketing data, which had been labori-
ously compiled, concerning projected market needs 
Page 12 
of the customer or the customer's market habits. A 
policy of confidentiality as to the customer list had 
not been invoked by the company. The court quoted 
the following: 
" '... Written customer lists generally have been 
regarded as trade secrets when the nature of the 
industry permits the list to be kept secret and the 
list cannot be readily duplicated by independent 
means. The size of the list and the type of inform-
ation it contains about the customers may be rel-
evant to the latter determination, as may the 
amount of time and *700 effort which went into 
its composition.' "[FN22] 
FN22. At p. 541 of 147 N.W.2d. 
Abbott argued that it had spent substantial time and 
money on its customer list. The court responded 
that the time and money was, in reality, spent on 
the development of the market which the customer 
list represented. Defendant was only attempting to 
sell to this market, and Abbott's customer informa-
tion, in view of its public nature, should not be pro-
tected so as to prevent competition. 
[13] In the instant case there was neither evidence 
adduced that defendant had a copy of a customer 
list or that such a list constituted a trade secret. The 
order of the trial court compelled defendant to sur-
render any list, memoranda, or written record of 
any nature whatsoever, concerning the identity or 
location of any customer of which he learned dur-
ing his employment; and to account for any sales 
made to such a customer since February 28, 1978. 
In addition, defendant was restrained from solicit-
ing plaintiffs customers, whose identity and loca-
tion defendant had learned of during the course of 
his employment. 
At the trial the sole evidence in regard to the cus-
tomers concerned the expenditures in an unidenti-
fied sum of plaintiff to develop a market; there was 
no evidence that by the nature of plaintiffs business 
extraordinary effort was involved in compiling a 
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customer list. Most of the customers were clinical 
laboratories and hospitals, the location and identity 
of which were readily accessible through public 
sources and trade journals. Plaintiffs evidence con-
centrated on the fact that a major customer, a dis-
tributor in Germany, identified as B.A.G., termin-
ated its contract. However, a specific provision in 
this contract conferred on B.A.G. the right of ter-
mination after ninety days notice, if Dr. Muna were 
no longer associated with M.R.C. 
The principles applicable in the instant case are 
clearly set forth in Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream.[FN23] 
FN23. 29 N.Y.2d 387, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423, 
278 N.E.2d 636, 639-641 (1972). 
"Generally, where the customers are readily as-
certainable outside the employer's business as 
prospective users or consumers of the employer's 
services or products, trade secret protection will 
not attach and courts will not enjoin the employ-
ee from soliciting his employer's customers. 
(Citations) Conversely, where the customers are 
not known in the trade or are discoverable only 
by extraordinary efforts courts have not hesitated 
to protect customer lists and files as trade secrets. 
This is especially so where the customers' patron-
age had been secured by years of effort and ad-
vertising effected by the expenditure of substan-
tial time and money. (Citations) 
"In the absence of express agreement to that ef-
fect between the parties, or a demonstration that a 
customer list has the several attributes of a trade 
secret, courts, without more, should not enjoin an 
ex-employee from engaging in fair and open 
competition with his former employer. The limit-
ing effects upon the former employee with re-
spect to his ability to earn a living are marked 
and obvious..." 
M.R.C. failed to sustain its burden of proof that the 
names and location of its customers were a trade 
secret. In addition, the order enjoining defendant 
from soliciting any customer of whom he gained 
knowledge during his employment was overly-
broad and constituted a restraint of trade. 
HALL and CROCKETT,[FN*] JJ., concur. 
FN* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this 
case before his retirement. 
STEWART, J., concurs in result. 
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but resigned be-
fore the opinion was filed. 
Utah, 1981. 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna 
625 P.2d 690, 214 U.S.P.Q. 567 
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United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Divi-
sion. 
UTAH MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLINICAL INNOVATIONS ASSOCIATES, INC., 
William Dean Wallace, Christopher A. Cutler, 
Steven R. Smith, and Does 1-10, Defendants. 
No. 2:97-CV-0074 B. 
Oct. 28, 1999. 
Owner of patent for intrauterine catheter sued 
former employees for infringement, false advert-
ising, misappropriation of trade secrets and breach 
of fiduciary duty. On defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, the District Court, Benson, J., held 
that: (1) patent was not infringed; (2) defendant's 
advertising was not false; (3) no trade secrets were 
identified; and (4) breach of fiduciary duty claim 
was time-barred. 
Motion granted. 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER 
BENSON, District Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case is between plaintiff Utah Medical 
Products, Inc. ("Utah Medical") and defendants, 
Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc. ("Clinical"), 
Dr. William Wallace, Dr. Christopher Cutler, and 
Steven Smith. Clinical and Utah Medical compete 
with one another in the manufacturing and selling 
of medical products. The case primarily involves 
two competing intrauterine catheters which meas-
ure the pressure of amniotic fluid within the uterus 
during a pregnant woman's labor and delivery. 
Utah Medical's complaint alleges claims against de-
fendants for patent infringement, false advertising 
under the Lanham Act, misappropriation of trade 
secrets, and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants 
move the Court for summary judgment on all 
claims. Defendants also filed two motions* 1293 in 
limine: (1) to exclude the expert opinion testimony 
of Robert W. Hitchcock regarding plaintiffs Lan-
ham Act claim, and (2) to exclude the expert opin-
ion testimony of Roger W. Blakely, Jr. regarding 
his legal opinions on claim construction and other 
patent infringement issues. The Court considers 
these motions in limine contemporaneously with 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Based 
upon the motions presently before the Court, the 
memoranda and exhibits submitted by both parties 
and the arguments presented in oral argument, the 
Court issues this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Utah Medical is a publicly traded corporation that 
designs and manufactures medical products, includ-
ing intrauterine catheters. In 1983, defendants, Dr. 
Wallace and Dr. Cutler, joined Utah Medical where 
they worked in a variety of positions, ultimately 
serving as Utah Medical's Chief Executive Officer 
and Vice President of Research and Development, 
respectively. During their time at Utah Medical, 
Wallace and Cutler invented and developed several 
products. Utah Medical obtained patents on many 
of Wallace's and Cutler's inventions, including the 
"161" intrauterine catheter at issue in this case. 
In 1992, Wallace's career with Utah Medical took a 
turn for the worse. Wallace was indicted in federal 
district court for violations of securities laws and 
for tax evasion. Shortly after these charges were 
filed, Utah Medical's board of directors placed Wal-
lace on administrative leave and appointed Cutler to 
serve as the acting president. Eventually, Utah 
Medical named Kevin Cornwall as Wallace's per-
manent replacement and as president of the com-
pany. After Wallace was placed on leave, but be-
fore a verdict was reached in the criminal case 
against him, Utah Medical's board of directors de-
termined that Wallace's services were no longer 
needed and terminated his employment with Utah 
Medical. In December 1993, Cornwall instructed 
Wallace to clean out his office and asked Cutler to 
ensure that Wallace did not remove any trade secret 
or proprietary documents. Wallace took with him 
three boxes containing 17,000 pages of documents. 
Cutler issued a memorandum to the Utah Medical 
Board of Directors on January 4, 1993, attesting 
that no proprietary or trade secret materials were 
contained in the documents Wallace had taken. 
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Utah Medical now alleges that Cutler did not actu-
ally review the documents and that many of the 
documents Wallace took contained proprietary in-
formation and trade secrets. Shortly after the ap-
pointment of Cornwall, Wallace's trial concluded 
and Wallace was acquitted of all charges by the jury. 
On April 1, 1993, after Wallace's termination from 
Utah Medical, Wallace formed Clinical Innovations 
Associates, Inc. On June 1, 1993, Cutler also left 
Utah Medical and began work at Clinical. Steven 
Smith, who was a senior research and design engin-
eer at Utah Medical from November, 1992 to May, 
1993, also left Utah Medical in June 1993 and 
thereafter began working for Clinical. Wallace, 
Cutler, and Smith have equity ownership in Clinical 
and serve on its board of directors. One of Clinic-
al's first products was its "Clearview" uterine ma-
nipulator, which is used to position the uterus to fa-
cilitate laparoscopic surgical procedures. Utah 
Medical alleges that Wallace took proprietary in-
formation from Utah Medical that aided Clinical in 
the development of this uterine manipulator. In 
June, 1996, Clinical began marketing the 
"Koala" intrauterine catheter, which Utah Medical 
alleges was developed from its trade secret and 
confidential information and infringes on one of 
Utah Medical's patents. Clinical advertised the Ko-
ala as being "sensor tipped." Utah Medical alleges 
that such advertising is false and misleading be-
cause the Koala does not contain a transducer in the 
tip of the catheter. 
Ten years before Clinical released its Koala cathet-
er, Utah Medical began work on a series of in-
trauterine catheters. Utah Medical's first line of in-
trauterine catheters was the Intran product line. The 
*1294 "Intran I" was developed by Wallace and 
was introduced to the market in 1987. The Intran I 
contained a pressure transducer at the tip of the 
catheter and was patented by Utah Medical. In an 
effort to improve the Intran I, Utah Medical re-
leased the 'intran II" in 1989. The Intran II was 
patented under United States Patent No. 4966,161 
(the "161 patent"). The 161 patent lists Wallace 
and Cutler as inventors and assigns the patent to 
Utah Medical. The Intran II removed the transducer 
from the tip of the catheter and placed it at the base 
of the catheter, outside of the patient's body. By re-
moving the transducer from the catheter tip, Utah 
Medical was able to reduce the tip si2:e and catheter 
stiffness. The Intran II was sold until 1995 when it 
was replaced by the "Intran Plus," which due to 
technological advances allowing for smaller pres-
sure transducers, places the transducer in a dispos-
able catheter tip. The Intran Plus remains Utah 
Medical's principal intrauterine catheter. Because of 
its disposable transducer tip, it is slightly more ex-
pensive than other catheters that can reuse the 
transducer. While the Intran product line has been 
on the market since 1987, and the Koala since 
1996, these catheters were not the first to measure 
intrauterine pressure. Indeed, simple liquid or air-
filled balloon catheters have been in existence for 
decades. 
Although the Intran II (specifically the 161 patent 
claims) and the Koala will be analyzed in detail in 
this Opinion, as background to the discussion that 
will follow, the Court provides the following addi-
tional general description of the involved catheters. 
The Intran II, also know as the 161 device, is inser-
ted into a woman's uterine cavity in order to monit-
or the intrauterine pressure during labor and deliv-
ery, as depicted below in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1 ('161 
The 161 device is comprised of a catheter that is 
approximately 30 inches in length. The tip of the 
catheter that is inserted into the uterus contains sev-
eral holes that allow amniotic fluid to enter the 
catheter. See Figure 2. Amniotic fluid enters the in-
terior of the catheter into what is called the "first 
chamber." At that point the liquid fills the first 
chamber, but is prevented from traveling further up 
the catheter into the "second chamber" because of 
the air that is being sent into the second chamber 
through the "first lumen" of the catheter from the 
opposite end. The amniotic fluid forms a liquid 
column in the first chamber between the holes that 
let in the liquid and *1295 the surface of the liquid-
air interface. The amniotic fluid in the first chamber 
and the air coming from the second chamber come 
in direct contact with one another. This boundary 
between the first and second chamber is variable 
Patent Figure 10) 
because it exists where the liquid column and the 
air come in contact and moves depending on the 
amount of pressure exerted from each side. The 
possible surfaces of this liquid-air interface, or 
boundary of the liquid column, can be seen below 
in Figure 3. As the uterus exerts pressure, the liquid 
column increases in size and as a result air pressure 
increases and is transmitted through a pressure 
sensitive diaphragm in the pressure transducer. The 
transducer converts the pressure reading into an 
electrical signal that is transferred to the patient 
monitor where the medical staff can monitor the 
uterine contractions. 
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FIGURE 2 ('161 Patent Figure 1) 
(first chamber volume) 
(catheter tip) 
3D (second chamber) 
(holes)
 Q 
(holes) 
if ii is 
(poiaible sur-
faces of body 
fluid) 
(plug or seal) (second lumen) 
FIGURE 3 ('161 Patent Figure 3) 
Beyond measuring intrauterine pressure, the 161 
device provides a separate means for the infusion or 
withdrawal of liquids into or out of the uterus. 
There is another set of holes near the tip of the 
catheter that allow amniotic fluid to enter what is 
called the "second lumen." The second lumen is 
sealed off by a plug from the first and second 
chambers of the catheter and is comprised of a sep-
arate tube that runs parallel to the first lumen from 
one end of the catheter to other end. This *1296 
second lumen is completely separate from the first 
lumen, as depicted below in the cross section of the 
catheter in Figure 4. The second lumen provides ac-
cess to the amniotic fluid through the catheter. 
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(first lumen) 30 
31 (cylindrical tube) 
28 (second lumen) 
FIGURE 4 ('161 
The accused device, the Koala, performs the same 
general function as the 161 device, monitoring in-
trauterine pressure. In developing the Koala cathet-
er, Clinical consulted with Dr. Donald Bobo regard-
ing the application of his patented technology that 
was assigned to his company, InnerSpace, Inc. The 
Bobo patent discloses the use of a gas-filled pres-
sure flexible membrane at the end of a lumen to 
sense intracompartmental body cavity pressure. 
Clinical entered into an agreement with InnerSpace 
to license its rights under the Bobo patent for use in 
an intrauterine catheter. Using the technology li-
cense under the Bobo patent, as well as its own al-
leged innovations, Clinical developed and marketed 
the Koala. While in many ways the accused device 
is similar to the 161 device, there are several differ-
ences between the two catheters. 
Patent Figure 7) 
surrounds an air-pressurized balloon. Rather than 
allowing the air and amniotic fluid to come in dir-
ect contact with one another, the Koala isolates the 
air within the balloon structure. When amniotic flu-
id enters the plastic housing it surrounds and com-
presses the air contained within the balloon, thus, 
increasing air pressure within the balloon. The air 
pressure exerted by the contracting balloon is con-
ducted to a pressure sensing diaphragm that trans-
mits the information into an electrical signal and 
sends it to the patient's monitor, as depicted below 
in Figures 5 and 6. 
*1297 FIGURE 5 (KOALA) 
The Koala is comprised of a plastic housing that 
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Inner Tube, 
Fluid-Tight 
Connection 
Protective Outer H o t e $ 
Sleeve 
FIGURE 5 (Koala) 
Luar connector 
Pneumatic connector 
(to connect to pres-
sor* transducer) 
FIGURE 6 (KOALA) 
The Koala transmits the air through an internal tube 
that is not attached to the interior of the catheter. 
Surrounding this internal tube, or first lumen, is a 
second lumen that allows amniotic fluid to flow 
around the inner tube and be removed from the 
catheter, similar to the 161 device, which also al-
lows access to amniotic fluid. Clinical is in the pro-
cess of registering its own patents on the Koala, and 
two patents are currently pending before the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office. 
The Koala competes directly with Utah Medical's 
Intran Plus catheter. Utah Medical claims that Clin-
ical is out to destroy Utah Medical. As a result, 
Utah Medical brought this suit against Clinical, al-
leging that the Koala infringes upon the patented 
technology of the Intran II. Additionally, Utah 
FIGURE 6 (Koala) 
Medical alleges that Clinical misappropriated trade 
secrets in developing Clinical's medical products, 
that the advertising claims are false and misleading, 
and that Wallace and Cutler breached their fidu-
ciary duties owed to Utah Medical while employed 
there. The current dispute illustrates the complexit-
ies that are often interwoven amidst competition 
and technology. 
On July 20, 22, and 26, 1999, the Court heard oral 
argument on defendants's motion for summary 
judgment. Argument was presented by Raymond 
Etcheverry and David Mangum for the Defendants 
and by Richard Burbidge for the Plaintiff. After 
listening to the arguments advanced by both sides, 
the Court took defendants' motions under advise-
ment. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)"mandates the 
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entry of summary judgment ... against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that 
party's*1298 case, and on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appro-
priate when no reasonable jury could return a ver-
dict for the nonmoving party, the facts in the record 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
and the moving party is entitled to summary judg-
ment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making such a determin-
ation, the Court construes all justifiable factual in-
ferences in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party. See id. 
A. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Patent In-
fringement Claims 
Plaintiff alleges that Clinical's Koala catheter (the 
accused device) infringes literally, as well as under 
the doctrine of equivalents, on Claims 1 through 35 
of Utah Medical's 161 patent. Defendants argue that 
plaintiff cannot establish that Clinical's Koala cath-
eters infringes on any of the claims of the 161 pat-
ent either literally or under the doctrine of equival-
ents. Defendants contended that a comparison of 
the properly interpreted 161 patent claims with the 
accused device conclusively demonstrates that the 
Koala catheter does not have all of the requisite ele-
ments of the 161 patent claims and thus cannot in-
fringe on that patent as a matter of law. 
[1][2][3] Patent infringement can arise either liter-
ally or under the doctrine of equivalents. "To estab-
lish a literal infringement, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that every limitation in the claim is literally 
met by the accused device." Enercon v. Int'l Trade 
Comm'n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed.Cir.1998). Ac-
cordingly, the absence of just one claim element 
mandates a determination of noninfringement by 
the Court. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 
140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998). Utah Medical 
argues that even if a literal infringement is not 
found, the Koala infringes under the doctrine of 
equivalents. An accused device infringes under the 
doctrine of equivalents if every limitation in the 
claim or its equivalent is found in the accused 
device. An "equivalent" is something that only dif-
fers from the claim limitation insubstantially. See 
Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing 
Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed.Cir.1993). To 
find an infringement under the doctrine of equival-
ents, the Court must determine whether the accused 
device performs substantially the same overall 
function in substantially the same way to achieve 
substantially the same overall result as the element 
of the patented device, or whether the substitute 
element plays a role substantially different from the 
claimed element. See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 
F3d 1154, 1160(Fed.Cir.l998). 
Before a determination can be made whether an in-
fringement has taken place, the Court must first in-
terpret the patent claims. See Mar km an v. West-
view Instrs., Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 
134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Under Markman, the 
"construction of a patent, including the terms of art 
within its claims, is exclusively within the province 
of the court." Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 116 
S.Ct. 1384. When interpreting patent claims, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit has instructed the district courts to "look first 
to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent it-
self, including the claims, specification and, if it is 
in evidence, the prosecution history." Vitronics 
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 
(Fed.Cir.1996). The "words in a claim are generally 
given their ordinary and customary meaning" un-
less "a special definition of the term is clearly 
stated in the patent specification or file history." Id. 
[4] The Court recognizes that the patent at issue in-
cludes several "means-plus-function" claims. As set 
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), a means-plus function 
is not limited to the structure described in the spe-
cifications. The Federal Circuit has stated that when 
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interpreting means-plus-function limitations such 
limitations shall be construed to cover the structure 
described *1299 in the specification and equival-
ents thereof. See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 
F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1985). The Federal Cir-
cuit defines "equivalent" in the § 112(6) context as 
"an insubstantial change which adds nothing of sig-
nificance to the structure, material, or acts disclosed 
in the patent specification." Valmoni Indus, v. 
Reinke Man/. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 
(Fed.Cir.1993). Accordingly, in its analysis the 
Court must determine whether the accused device 
performs the same function as set forth in the claim 
with an equivalent structure to that described in the 
patent specification. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech 
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed.Cir. 1998). 
Once the Court has interpreted the claims of the 
patent, the Court next compares the properly inter-
preted claims to the accused product to determine 
whether each element in the claims is present in the 
accused product. See Kahn v. GMC, 135 F.3d 
1472, 1476 (Fed.Cir. 1998). The second step is typ-
ically a factual question for a jury. However, if the 
Court finds that "no reasonable jury could find that 
every limitation recited in the properly construed 
claim is .... found in the accused device" and "where 
the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could 
determine two elements to be equivalent," summary 
judgment of noninfringement should be granted. 
Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 
(Fed.Cir.1998). As a practical matter, this Court 
finds that combining the Markman hearing and the 
motion for summary judgment is an efficient and 
sensible approach to what could otherwise be an 
unnecessarily lengthy and multi-phased process. 
As directed by Markman, the Court now proceeds 
to interpret Claims 1 through 35 of the 161 patent, 
as well as determining whether each element in 
these claims reads upon the accused Koala catheter. 
L Construction of Claim 1 and Its Application to 
the Koala 
Under proper claim construction methodology, the 
Court begins its analysis of the 161 patent by ex-
amining the actual language of the claims. See 
Bell Comm. Research, Inc. v. VHal ink Comm., 
Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed.Cir. 1995). Claim 1 
reads: 
An apparatus for continuously measuring in-
tracomparmental fluid pressures exerted by a li-
quid contained within a body cavity comprising: 
Pressure-sensing means for insertion into said 
body cavity so as to detect said intracompart-
mental fluid pressures therein, said pressure-sens-
ing means comprising first chamber means for 
defining a first volume which is in fluid commu-
nication with said liquid such that said liquid will 
enter said first chamber means and form a liquid 
column therein having a liquid-air interface, and 
further comprising second chamber means for de-
fining a second volume which is air-filled and is 
in fluid communication with said first chamber 
means; 
Pressure transducer means attached to said 
pressure-sensing means for generating an elec-
trical signal proportional to fluid pressure com-
municated by said pressure-sensing means to said 
pressure transducer means; and 
Wherein a ratio is defined by said first and 
second volumes such that the ratio of said first 
volume to said second volume is such that, at 
maximum fluid pressures exerted within said 
body cavity, said liquid column in said first 
chamber means will tend to be minimized so as 
to minimize hydrostatic pressure error resulting 
therefrom and such that said liquid-air interface 
will be prevented from entering said second 
chamber means. 
Claim 1 has several distinct requirements that must 
read upon the Koala in order to find infringement. 
There is no question that the Koala is "an apparatus 
for continuously measuring intracompartmental flu-
id pressures exerted by a liquid contained within a 
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body cavity," and it is undisputed that the Koala in-
corporates "pressure-sensing means for insertion in-
to said body cavity so as to detect said intracom-
partmental*1300 fluid pressures therein." 
However, the interpretation of several elements 
within Claim l's "pressure sensing means" are dis-
puted. Specifically, the parties dispute the interpret-
ation of the elements requiring: (1) a first and 
second chamber means, (2) a liquid column, (3) flu-
id communication between the chambers, (4) a li-
quid-air interface, and (5) a ratio defined by first 
and second volumes. The Court now proceeds to in-
terpret these disputed elements. 
[5] Claim 1 requires that the pressure-sensing 
means is comprised of a "first chamber means for 
defining a first volume which is in fluid communic-
ation with said liquid such that said liquid will enter 
said first chamber means and form a liquid column 
therein having a liquid-air interface, and further 
comprising second chamber means for defining a 
second volume which is air-filled and is in fluid 
communication with said first chamber means." 
The first chamber must holds a volume of amniotic 
fluid that comes in contact with the air coming from 
the second chamber. The second chamber must 
contain air that is pumped into the catheter from an 
external source to provide a means of measuring 
the amount of pressure asserted against it from the 
first chamber when the air therein is compressed. 
Clinical contends that Claim 1 requires a first and 
second chamber means that are distinctive from the 
Koala. Clinical argues that the first chamber means 
must be interpreted to require a cavity inside of ri-
gid, physical walls or other such surrounding struc-
ture so as to surround the first volume. However, 
Utah Medical argues all that is required is an area 
that holds amniotic fluid, such that when the amni-
otic fluid enters the Koala and surrounds the air-
filled balloon, it comprises the first chamber and 
the air-filled balloon comprises the second cham-
ber. While the Court finds Utah Medical's interpret-
ation very broad, the specification appears to allow 
such a broad reading. However, the first chamber in 
Claim 1 must have the capacity to enclose within its 
surrounding structure a first volume of amniotic 
fluid, forming a liquid column that comes in contact 
with the air-filled second volume. In order to form 
a liquid column, the first chamber must be com-
pletely enclosed without any holes that would pre-
vent a liquid column from functioning properly. 
[6][7] Claim 1 requires that the amniotic liquid will 
enter the first chamber and "form a liquid column 
therein." As established above, the first chamber 
must be enclosed by the walls of the catheter. This 
is because according to Claim 1 the liquid column 
forms below the section of the catheter where the 
holes allow the amniotic fluid to enter the catheter 
and is enclosed where it comes into contact with the 
air from the second chamber. The column must be 
formed on the inside of the plastic housing, as the 
claim requires it to be "therein." The column is an 
uninterrupted volume of liquid between the air from 
the second chamber and the free flowing amniotic 
fluid that enters the tip of the catheter through the 
holes in the tip. A column is defined as "a rigid, rel-
atively slender, upright support, composed of relat-
ively few pieces [or] a decorative pillar, most often 
composed of stone and typically having a cylindric-
al or polygonal shaft ...; any column like object, 
mass, or formation a column of smoke." THE 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE 407 (2d ed.1987). Taken from 
the plain meaning of the word column, the liquid 
column-cylindrical in shape-must fill the interior of 
the first chamber and be bound by the cylindrical 
sidewalls of the first chamber. While Clinical ar-
gues that the accused device does not have a liquid 
column as required by Claim 1, Utah Medical ar-
gues that the Koala does in fact have a liquid 
column. Applying the Court's interpretation of the 
required liquid column to the accused device, the 
Court finds that a liquid column does not exist in 
the Koala, either literally or under the doctrine of 
equivalents. The Koala could only be substantially 
equivalent by eliminating necessary structural and 
functional requirements from Claim 1, which would 
be *1301 improper. The "doctrine of equivalents 
cannot be used to erase 'meaningful structural and 
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functional limitations of the claim on which the 
public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement.' 
" Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 
1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1994). Utah Medical argues 
that the Koala has a column that is in fact a hollow 
cylinder that surrounds the air balloon within what 
Utah Medical argues is a first chamber. However, 
the area that Utah Medical argues is the liquid 
column is in reality the same as the area in the tip 
of the 161 device where the holes allow the amniot-
ic fluid to enter the catheter. The housing around 
the Koala is for the purpose of inserting the catheter 
into the uterus. If the plastic housing were removed 
from the Koala once in the uterus, the device would 
still provide an accurate reading based on the amni-
otic pressure exerted on the balloon. Conversely, 
the 161 device is dependent upon the plastic hous-
ing wherein a liquid column is formed between the 
amniotic fluid and the air. Without such a housing, 
the 161 device would not operate. 
[8] Clinical next argues that the Koala cannot in-
fringe because it does not have any open passage-
way between any first chamber means and any 
second chamber means, and thus has no "fluid com-
munication" between the first and second chamber 
means. Utah Medical counters by arguing that the 
term fluid communication is simply describing a 
smooth and continuous function of communicating 
intrauterine pressures from the first chamber means 
through the second chamber means to the pressure 
transducer. Thus, Utah Medical argues that this ele-
ment of the claim reads upon the Koala. Claim 1 
uses the term "fluid communication" twice. First, it 
requires that the first volume, which is in the first 
chamber, be in fluid communication with the amni-
otic liquid such that the amniotic liquid will enter 
the first chamber. Second, it requires that air-filled 
second volume be in fluid communication with the 
first chamber means. The Court finds that in order 
to be in fluid communication with the amniotic flu-
id, as in the first case or the air as in the second 
case, the amniotic fluid or air must be allowed to 
enter the first chamber and form, or come in contact 
with, the liquid column that has been created so that 
when the pressure changes the liquid column can 
move within the first chamber, as indicated by the 
possible surfaces of amniotic fluid depicted above 
in Figure 3. The term "fluid" is an adjective de-
scribing the ability for the liquid and air to move 
within the catheter, and, depending on the pressure 
exerted by the amniotic fluid, communicate that 
pressure to the transducer. Thus, all this element re-
quires is that the amniotic pressure has the means to 
communicate with the air pressure so that pressures 
are able to be transmitted from one end of the cath-
eter to the other end. 
[9] Clinical next argues that Claim l's requirement 
for a "liquid-air interface," cannot read upon the ac-
cused device because the Koala has an air-filled 
balloon that acts as a barrier between the air and li-
quid. According to Claim 1, the liquid column must 
have a "liquid-air interface" with the second air-
filled volume. An interface is defined as "a surface 
regarded as the common boundary of two bodies, 
spaces, or phases." Id. at 993. There is no dispute 
that this liquid-air interface occurs in the first 
chamber of the 161 device between the amniotic li-
quid and the air from the second chamber. Clinical 
argues that such an interface requires molecule-
to-molecule contact between the amniotic liquid 
and the air for such an interface to exist. Utah Med-
ical asserts that such an interface is simply an ex-
change between two different surfaces, arguing that 
nothing in Claim 1 requires a direct molecule-
to-molecule interface, and that the interface can ex-
ist even if a membrane (such as the balloon in the 
Koala) acts as a barrier between the air and the li-
quid. The description of the liquid-air interface in 
the claim specifications describe an interface 
between the partially filled liquid and air chamber 
(161 patent at column 5, line 68 to column 6, line 
2), as well as a maintenance of pressure ratios 
between the air and the amniotic liquid to prevent 
the liquid*1302 from entering the air-filled second 
chamber (\6\ patent at column 13, lines 20-28). 
Because Claim 1 describes this interface in con-
junction with the requisite liquid column, the Court 
finds that Claim 1 contemplates direct contact 
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between the air and the amniotic liquid. Accord-
ingly, the Court interprets Claim 1 to require an ac-
tual interface-molecule-to-molecule-between the 
amniotic liquid and the air. Applying this claim in-
terpretation to the accused device, the Court finds 
that the accused device does not involve such an 
air-liquid interface and therefore does not literally 
infringe on this aspect of the 161 patent. Whether 
the accused device infringes under the doctrine of 
equivalents is a question of fact. 
[10] Claim 1 finally requires that there be a ratio 
volumes that will minimize hydrostatic pressure er-
ror and prevent the liquid-air interface from enter-
ing the second chamber means. Utah Medical ar-
gues that the Koala infringes upon this element of 
Claim 1 because the balloon must contain the same 
ratio to function properly. Clinical, however, argues 
that this element should be interpreted to mean that 
the ratio must be maintained so the liquid column 
will not be allowed to enter the second chamber, 
which, Clinical continues, is impossible to read on 
the accused device because no liquid can penetrate 
the balloon in the Koala. The Court finds that the 
ratio referred to in Claim 1 is generally indicating 
that the amount of pressure exerted by the amniotic 
fluid in the first chamber and the air in the second 
chamber must balance so the liquid column is con-
tained within the first chamber. This is stating that 
Boyle's law (vl x pi = v2 x p2) must be complied 
with in order for the device to provide an accurate 
reading. Furthermore, the Court finds that this ele-
ment of Claim 1 literally requires a device that 
would not allow the liquid to enter the second 
chamber. Any other interpretation would render the 
phrase "and prevent the liquid-air interface from 
entering the second chamber means" meaningless. 
Additionally, although not briefed, at oral argument 
defendants pointed out that another purpose for 
maintaining the proper liquid-air ratio, pursuant to 
the language of Claim 1, is to minimize hydrostatic 
pressure by reducing the length of the liquid 
column, which cannot be done in the accused 
device because the Koala has no liquid column 
upon which hydrostatic pressure can be exerted 
upon it. The Court interprets Claim 1 to require a 
physical device that allows for a liquid column that 
can be adjusted to a height that will minimize the 
effect of any hydrostatic pressure. Because there is 
no question that the accused device does not con-
tain such a liquid column, the Court finds as a mat-
ter of law that the accused device does not infringe 
this claim element either literally or under the doc-
trine of equivalents. On this point at oral argument, 
plaintiff argued that any hydrostatic pressure to 
which the column itself would be exposed would be 
so minimal as to be insignificant. Even if that is the 
cctse, it remains that such is a literal part of Claim 1, 
in words chosen by the plaintiff. 
In accordance with the foregoing, after comparing 
the accused device to Claim 1 of the 161 patent, as 
construed by the Court, the Court finds that the ele-
ments requiring a liquid column are not present in 
the Koala either literally or under the doctrine of 
equivalents, and Claim l's requirement of a liquid-
air interface is not literally present in the Koala, but 
may be equivalent to the 161 device. Thus, as inter-
preted, the Court finds that plaintiff cannot demon-
strate that every limitation in Claim 1 is literally or 
equivalently met by the accused device. Accord-
ingly, the Court must find that the Koala does not 
infringe upon Claim 1 of the 161 patent.™1^ 
*1303Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 
1449, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that the ab-
sence of just one claim element mandates a determ-
ination of noninfringement by the Court). 
FN1. In keeping with the above analysis, 
the Court notes that based upon its review, 
to interpret Claim l's elements as plaintiff 
requests would require the Court to con-
strue the elements of Claims 1 so broadly 
as to find that the 161 device essentially 
holds a patent on simple fluid mechanics. 
Were the Court to interpret the claims of 
the 161 patent as broadly as Utah Medical 
is requesting, it would appear to be tan-
tamount to an invalidation of the 161 pat-
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ent for prior art and obviousness. Claim 1 
cannot be interpreted so broadly as to cov-
er the fiindamental laws of air pressure and 
fluid mechanics, including the basic prin-
ciples used to measure those pressures 
within body cavities. 
2 Construction of Claims 2 through 17 and Their 
Application to the Koala 
[11] Claims 2 through 17 are dependent upon Claim 
1 and incorporate the requirements of that claim. 
aOne who does not infringe an independent claim 
cannot infringe a claim dependent on (and thus con-
taining all the limitations of) that claim." Wah-
peton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 
1546, 1552 n. 9 (Fed.Cir.1998). Because the Court 
has found that Claim 1 is not infringed upon by the 
Koala, the Court similarly finds no infringement as 
to Claims 2 through 17. 
J. Construction of Claims 18 through 32 and 
Their Application to the Koala 
Plaintiff also alleges that the accused device in-
fringes upon Claim 18 and its dependant claims 19 
through 32. Claim 18 is very similar-in fact nearly 
identical-to much of Claim 1. Claim 18 reads as 
follows: 
An apparatus for continuously measuring in-
trauterine fluid pressures exerted by amniotic flu-
id within the uterus comprising: 
A catheter for insertion into said uterus so as to 
detect said pressures, said catheter comprising a 
first chamber formed in a distal end of said cath-
eter at the interior thereof for defining a first 
volume, said catheter further comprising a plural-
ity of apertures formed at said distal end of the 
catheter for providing fluid communication 
between said amniotic fluid in the uterus and said 
first chamber such that amniotic fluid will enter 
said first chamber and form a liquid column 
therein having a liquid-air-interface, and said 
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catheter further comprising a second chamber 
formed with in the interior of said catheter for de-
fining a second volume, said second chamber be-
ing airfilled, and wherein a ratio is defined by 
said first and second volumes such that the ratio 
of said first volume to said second volume is such 
that the ratio of said first volume to said second 
volume is such that at maximum fluid pressure 
exerted during a contraction of the uterus, said li-
quid column will tend to be minimized so as to 
minimize hydrostatic pressure error resulting 
therefrom and such that said liquid-air interface 
will not enter said second chamber; and 
A pressure transducer means for generating an 
electrical signal proportional to said fluid pres-
sures communicated to said transducer from said 
second chamber of the catheter. 
Both parties present the same arguments as to 
Claim 18 as they did when arguing for and against 
infringement under Claim 1. Because the Court has 
found that under Claim 1 no reasonable juror could 
find literal infringement for each element of Claim 
1, it is unnecessary to undertake the same analysis 
regarding Claim 18. Therefore, the Court finds that 
Claim 18, as well as its dependent Claims 19 
through 32, do not read upon the Koala catheter for 
the same reasons articulated for Claims 1 through 17. 
4. Construction of Claim 33 and Its Application to 
the Koala 
Plaintiff further alleges that the accused device in-
fringes on Claim 33 of the 161 patent. Claim 33 
presents the Court with another substantial analytic-
al challenge. It reads: 
An apparatus for continuously measuring in-
trauterine fluid pressures exerted by amniotic flu-
id within a uterus, comprising: 
*1304 a catheter for insertion into said uterus 
so as to detect said fluid pressures, said catheter 
comprising a cylindrical tube formed a long an 
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interior wall of said catheter so as to form a first 
lumen which extends through a substantial por-
tion of the interior length of said catheter, said 
first lumen terminating at a distal end thereof a 
selected distance from a distal end of said cathet-
er such that a chamber is formed in at least a por-
tion of the interior space of said catheter defined 
by the space between the distal end of said first 
lumen and the distal end of said catheter, said 
chamber defining a first volume, and said first lu-
men defining a second volume, said catheter fur-
ther comprising a second lumen formed in the re-
maining space between said cylindrical tube and 
said interior catheter wall and said second lumen 
being coextensive in length with said first lumen 
and said second lumen being sealed at a distal 
end thereof to prevent fluid communication 
between said chamber and said second lumen, 
said catheter further comprising a first plurality 
of apertures formed at said distal end of said 
catheter to provide fluid communication between 
said amniotic fluid and said chamber, and further 
comprising a second plurality of apertures formed 
through said catheter to provide fluid communic-
ation between said amniotic fluid and said second 
lumen; 
a piezoresistive semiconductor pressure trans-
ducer comprising a pressure diaphragm for de-
flection in response to intrauterine fluid pressures 
exerted on one side of said diaphragm; and 
connector means for housing said pressure 
transducer therein and for providing electrical 
between said transducer and an electrical cable, 
said connector means comprising means for con-
tinuously venting and opposite side of said dia-
phragm to atmospheric pressure, and said con-
nector means further comprising a valve means 
for selective positioning between a first and 
second position such that when said valve means 
is in said first position, said one side of said dia-
phragm is vented through said connector means 
to atmospheric pressure, and when said valve 
means is in said second position, said one side of 
said diaphragm is in fluid communication with 
intrauterine fluid pressures communicated 
through said first lumen, and said connector 
means further comprising a fluid port through 
which amniotic fluids are infused into and 
through which amniotic fluid samples are with-
drawn form said second lumen, and wherein fluid 
communication from said fluid port to said 
second lumen is provided by an aperture formed 
through said catheter at a location adjacent said 
fluid port. 
While Claim 33 is similar in some respects to 
Claim 1, there are several additional elements that 
the Court must interpret and compare to the ac-
cused device. Specifically, Claim 33 has three ma-
jor components: (1) "a catheter for insertion into 
said uterus so as to detect [ ] fluid pressures," com-
prised of a "first lumen" and a "second lumen," (2) 
a "pressure transducer," and (3) a "connector means 
for housing said pressure transducer therein and for 
providing electrical connection between said trans-
ducer and an electrical cable." Each of these major 
components has various sub parts. For example, the 
"connector means" also contains a "valve means" 
for venting the apparatus to atmospheric pressure. 
The parties dispute the interpretation of the follow-
ing elements: (1) a first lumen, (2) a second lumen 
that is sealed and contains separate apertures, and 
(3) a valve means. 
[12] Claim 33 requires a "first lumen" that runs 
throughout the interior of the catheter, having an 
opening in the chamber of the catheter. The claim 
describes the first lumen as "a cylindrical tube 
formed along an interior wall" of the catheter. The 
first lumen is essentially a passage way that trans-
mits air from the air source into the second chamber 
as described in Claim 1. "Lumen" is defined as "the 
canal, duct, or cavity of a tubular organ." THE 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF *1305 THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1144 (2d ed.1987). The 
proper construction of the "first lumen" turns on the 
meaning of the phrase "formed along an interior 
wall." Clinical argues that this restriction requires 
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the Court to interpret the claim as requiring the first 
lumen to be a cavity within rigid, physical cyl-
indrical walls of a tube that is physically attached to 
the interior catheter wall as depicted by the cross-
section of the 161 device in Figure 4 (161 Patent 
Figure 7). See supra p. 1296.However, Utah Med-
ical contends that all that Claim 33 requires is a 
cylindrical tube on the interior of the catheter cap-
able of conveying air pressure from the chamber to 
the transducer. Utah Medical further argues that 
just because the tube is "formed along an interior 
wall" of the catheter does not require that the tube 
be attach to part of the catheter. The 161 specifica-
tions show that the actual design of the 161 device 
attached the first lumen to the wall of the catheter, 
stating: "As best illustrated in FIGS. 7 and 8, the 
first lumen [ ] is comprised of a cylindrical tube [ ] 
which is formed along the interior wall of the cath-
eter...." (161 Specification at Column 10). Figure 7 
of the 161 specifications clearly shows that the first 
lumen is attached to the interior wall of the cathet-
er. However, Utah Medical argues that according to 
the Federal Circuit, such additional limitations ap-
pearing in the specification should not be read into 
the claim. See Lai tram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 
F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed.Cir.1998) (noting the 
"well-established principle that a court may not im-
port limitations from the written description into 
the claims"); Electro Med. Sys. v. Cooper Life Sci-
ences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048^ 1054 (Fed.Cir.1994) 
(stating that "claims are not to be interpreted by 
adding limitations appearing only in the specifica-
tion"). Accordingly, the Court does not look to how 
the device was actually constructed according to the 
specification, but rather looks to the language of the 
claim. The relevant meaning of "form," when used 
as a verb, is defined as "to give a particular form or 
shape to; fashion in a particular manner." THE 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE 752 (2d ed.1987). "Along" is 
defined as "through, on, beside, over, or parallel to 
the length or direction of; from one end to the other 
of." Id. at 59. Based on the plain meaning of the 
claim language the Court finds that "formed along" 
only requires that a circular tube run within the 
catheter parallel to the interior walls of the catheter. 
The Koala has an interior tube that transmits air 
from the air pressure source into the balloon that is 
within the chamber of the catheter. Utah Medical 
argues that the Koala tube is in fact a first lumen 
and this portion of the claim reads literally on the 
Koala. There is no doubt that the Koala has a lumen 
that runs within the catheter walls. The Koala's air 
lumen is an independent tube. Although not at-
tached to the interior wall of the catheter, it does 
run parallel to the interior walls of the catheter. 
[13] Claim 33 next requires there to be a "second 
lumen." The second lumen performs a task separ-
ate from that of measuring intrauterine pressure. 
That purpose is for the infusion or withdrawal of li-
quids into or out of the uterus. Claim 33 requires 
that the "second lumen [be] formed in the remain-
ing space between said cylindrical tube and said in-
terior catheter wall" and be "coextensive in length 
with said first lumen." Simply put, the second lu-
men is comprised of the interior space of the cathet-
er absent the first lumen and must run along the 
first lumen from one end of the catheter to the other 
end. Such a requirement initially appears to read 
upon the accused device. However, Claim 33 also 
requires that the "second lumen [be] sealed at the 
distal end thereof to prevent fluid communication 
between said chamber and said second lumen." 
The plain language of this element specifically re-
quires that there be a seal between the chamber and 
the second lumen. Such a seal is created in the 161 
device by the use of plug as depicted above in Fig-
ure 3. Such a seal or plug is absent from the ac-
cused device. Nevertheless, Utah Medical 
argues* 1306 that the Koala has such a seal that re-
stricts the amount of flow between the second lu-
men and the chamber in such a way that the fluid 
infusion and withdrawal does not interfere with the 
pressure measurement within the first chamber. 
Utah Medical acknowledges that the Koala does not 
have a "fluid tight seal," but argues that the Koala's 
"flexible seal" nevertheless infringes upon this ele-
ment of the patent. The Court is not persuaded by 
Utah Medical's argument and interprets this ele-
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ment of Claim 33 to require a device that com-
pletely seals off the area between the chamber hold-
ing the amniotic fluid and the second lumen. The 
accused device has no such fluid-tight seal. Nor 
could any reasonable fact-finder find the equivalent 
of a fluid-tight seal in the accused device. Accord-
ingly, the Court finds that the defendants' device 
does not infringe on this element of Claim 33 either 
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 
[14] Finally, in relation to the second lumen, Claim 
33 requires a "first plurality of apertures" allowing 
amniotic fluid to enter the chamber, as well as a 
"second plurality of apertures" allowing amniotic 
fluid to enter the second lumen. The Court finds 
that Claim 33 requires two separate sets of aper-
tures that function independently of one another. 
Indeed, the second set of apertures is required be-
cause the seal in the second lumen prevents any flu-
id from passing from the chamber that is fed by the 
first set into the second lumen. According to the 
Court's interpretation of Claim 33, these two sets of 
apertures must function independently of one an-
other. Although plaintiff does not dispute this ele-
ment in its brief, the accused device appears to have 
only one set of apertures that allow amniotic fluid 
to enter the chamber and also pass into the second 
lumen. Furthermore, because there is no fluid tight 
seal in the Koala, any apertures that may be located 
beyond the Koala's alleged "flexible seal" cannot 
be said to operate independently of the fist set of 
apertures. The Court, therefore, finds as a matter of 
law that the Koala does not literally infringe on this 
element of Claim 33. There is however, a factual 
dispute whether the Koala device infringes on this 
element under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Claim 33 also requires a "connector means" that 
contains a pressure transducer, that mechanically 
joins together the transducer and the catheter, and 
the electrically connects or joins together the trans-
ducer and the patient monitor. Through this connec-
tion, intrauterine fluid pressures are communicated 
from the catheter through an internal pressure dia-
phragm to the patient monitor. While the connector 
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means is generally undisputed as to its application 
to the Koala, the connector means further requires a 
"valve means," the application of which is disputed. 
The "valve means" language requires a means-
plus-function analysis under section 112(6) to inter-
pret this element of Claim 1. See York Prods., Inc. 
v. Cenfral Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 
1568, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1996). As' stated above, 
means-plus-function analysis requires the court to 
determine whether the accused device performs the 
same function set forth in the claim with an equi-
valent structure-that is one with no substantial 
change-to that described in the specification. 
[15] The "valve means" in both the 161 patent and 
the Koala undoubtably serve the same function. 
Claim 33 of the 161 patent states: "valve means for 
selective positioning between a first and a second 
position such that when said valve means is in said 
first position, said one side of said diaphragm is 
vented [opened to the outside air] through said con-
nector means to atmospheric pressure, and when 
said valve means is in said second position, said 
one side of said diaphragm is in fluid communica-
tion with intrauterine fluid pressures communicated 
through said first lumen...." The pneumatic con-
nector in a housing that mechanically joins the 
pressure transducer and the catheter in the Koala 
serves the same function. When the *1307 Koala is 
unconnected, it is basically in a first position, al-
lowing the diaphragm to have contact with the out-
side air, and when the Koala is connected, it is in 
the second position due to the contact with the fluid 
pressure. 
Thus, the Court turns to the specification to determ-
ine if the corresponding structure is defined by the 
language "valve means." The specification states 
the "valve means is comprised of a slide valve that 
is seated with a channel formed in the housing ... 
[and t]he slide valve has a knob at its upper end to 
permit movement back and forth of the slide valve 
within the channel." Additionally, the slide value is 
specified as having "a generally square cross-
sectional shape as opposed to the circular shape of 
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channel...." The Court construes the "valve means" 
element in Claim 33 to cover a structure equivalent 
to that described in the specification for the purpose 
stated in the claim and rejects Clinical's argument 
that the valve means requires a "mechanical switch." 
Although the Koala's pneumatic connector serves 
the same function as the valve means in Claim 33, 
the pneumatic connector is not the same or an equi-
valent structure as that found in the 161 patent spe-
cification. The pneumatic connector is not a slide 
valve with a knob at its upper end that permits 
movement of the valve back and forth within the 
channel. To serve the same function of positioning 
between a first and second position, the pneumatic 
connector must be disconnected not slid. The Koala 
pneumatic connector does not have a knob that per-
mits movement back and forth within the channel. 
To be considered an "equivalent" of the specifica-
tion structure under section 112(6), the pneumatic 
connector must only have "insubstantial change[s 
that] add[ ] nothing of significance to the struc-
ture. . . ."^ Valmont Industries, 983 F.2d at 1043. 
The pneumatic connector's structure is substantially 
and significantly different from the 161 specified 
structure. To perform the same function as the 16Ts 
motion along the channel, the pneumatic connector 
must be disconnected. Furthermore, the Koala is 
designed to switch between the two positions 
without some of the specifications of the 161 
patent, such as the slide valve and the knob at the 
upper end of the slide valve. The two devices are 
neither structurally the same nor equivalents, thus, 
the court holds that the Koala does not literally in-
fringe the 161 patent with respect to Claim 33's 
valve means element. 
In sum, while under the Court's interpretation of 
Claim 33 the requirements of a first lumen may 
read upon the Koala, each and every element of a 
claim must read upon the infringing device in order 
for the Court to find infringement. See Litton Sys., 
Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1454 
(Fed.Cir.1998). Because the Court interprets that 
Claim 33 contains elements requiring the second lu-
men to be sealed and have a separate first and 
second pluralities of apertures for the first chamber 
and second lumen, as well as a valve means struc-
ture conforming to the patent specification, the 
Court holds that under its interpretation no reason-
able jury could find that each element of Claim 33 
reads literally upon the Koala. The Koala has 
neither an fluid-tight seal, nor a first and second 
plurality of apertures, and the pneumatic connector 
is not structurally identical or equivalent to the 161 
specification. Consequently, the Court must find as 
a matter of law that the Koala does not literally in-
fringe upon Claim 33 of the 161 patent. Addition-
ally, because the Court cannot eliminate the neces-
sary structural and functional requirements of the 
sealed second lumen, the Court finds that the ac-
cused device does not have all the necessary equi-
valent elements. See Conopco, Inc. \\ May Dep't 
Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1994) 
(holding that the "doctrine of equivalents cannot be 
used to erase 'meaningful structural emd functional 
limitations of the claim on which the public is en-
titled to rely in avoiding infringement' "). Thus, as 
to the absence of a fluid-tight seal, the Court finds 
that Koala device does not infringe under the doc-
trine of equivalents. Accordingly, the accused 
*1308 device cannot be found to infringe upon 
every element of Claim 33. 
5. Construction of Claims 34 through 35 and 
Their Application to the Koala 
Claims 34 and 35 are dependent upon Claim 33 and 
incorporate the requirements of that claim. "One 
who does not infringe an independent claim cannot 
infringe a claim dependent on (and thus containing 
all the limitations of) that claim." Wahpeton Can-
vas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546. 1552 
n. 9 (Fed.Cir.1998). Because the Court has found 
that Claim 33 was not infringed upon by the ac-
cused device, the Court must find that Claims 34 
and 35 are not infringed upon for the same reasons 
that no infringement was found for Claim 33. 
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In conclusion, plaintiffs patent infringement claim 
as to infringement of the 161 patent cannot stand as 
a matter of law. See Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 
F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed.Cir.1998) (finding that 
when "no reasonable jury could find that every lim-
itation recited in the properly construed claim is ... 
found in the accused device" and "where the evid-
ence is such that no reasonable jury could determ-
ine two elements to be equivalent," summary judg-
ment of noninfringement should be granted). Thus, 
defendants' motion for summary judgment will be 
granted. 
B. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's False Ad-
vertising Claim Under the Lanham Act 
Plaintiff alleges that Clinical's Koala promotional 
materials, particularly their reference to the Koala 
as "sensor tipped," contain a false and misleading 
description of facts in violation of the Lanham Act, 
and that those descriptions are likely to cause con-
fusion as to what is actually embodied at the tip of 
the Koala catheter. Plaintiff maintains that pur-
chasers of the Koala will be mislead into believing 
that it has a pressure transducer located at the tip of 
the catheter. Ironically, Utah Medical advertised the 
Intran II (the 161 device) as sensor-tipped when 
that device also had the transducer in proximal end 
of the catheter outside of the patients body. Utah 
Medical now states that this too was false state- ment. 
[16] Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a 
cause of action against: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, 
uses in commerce any word, term name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading repres-
entation of fact, which ... in commercial advert-
ising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of 
his or her or another person's goods, services, or 
commercial activities. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). In order to establish a 
claim under the false or deceptive advertising prong 
of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove: 
(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a 
commercial advertisement about its own or an-
other's product; (2) the statement actually de-
ceived or has the tendency to deceive a substan-
tial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is 
material, in that it is likely to influence the pur-
chasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its 
false statement to enter interstate commerce; and 
(5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured 
as a result of the false statement, either by direct 
diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a 
loss of good will associated with its products. 
United Industries Corp. v. C lor ox Co., 140 F.3d 
1175, 1180 (8th Cir.1998); see also Johnson & 
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Pharm,, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 130 (3d 
Cir.1994) (further noting that "the Lanham Act 
plaintiff 'bears the burden of proving actual decep-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence' "). 
[17][18] To satisfy the first element and prove a 
statement is false within the *1309 meaning of the 
Lanham Act, "the plaintiff must demonstrate either 
that the challenged advertisement is literally false, 
or, although literally true, that it is still likely to 
mislead or confuse consumers." L & F Products v. 
Procter & Gamble, 45 F.3d 709, 711 (2d Cir.1995). 
Utah Medical pursues its Lanham Act claim only 
under the theory that defendants' claim that the Ko-
ala is "sensor-tipped" is literally false. Accordingly, 
plaintiff argues that by establishing that the com-
mercial claim is literally false, consumer perception 
is irrelevant, and the Court should evaluate claims 
of literal falsity according to the objective industry 
standards without reference to consumer confusion. 
See Johnson & Johnson-Merck, 19 F.3d at 129 
("If a plaintiff proves a challenged claim is literally 
false, a court may grant relief without considering 
whether the buying public was misled. A determin-
ation of literal falsity rests on an analysis of the 
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message in context."); United Industries, 140 F.3d 
at 1180 ("If a plaintiff proves that a challenged 
claim is literally false, a court may grant relief 
without considering whether the buying public was 
actually misled; actual consumer confusion need 
not be proved.")- Defendants, however, argue that 
the law requires evidence of falsity based on the ad-
vertisements as a whole as viewed by the relevant 
consuming public. While actual consumer confu-
sion is not necessary to assert a claim of literal fals-
ity, the perspective of the relevant consumer popu-
lation is necessary in determining whether the ad-
vertising could be viewed as false. Thus, in order to 
assess whether an advertisement is literally false, 
the Court must analyze the message conveyed with-
in the full context of the advertisement. Making 
such a determination as to the full context requires 
the Court to look at the audience. See Sandoz 
Pharm. Corp. v. Richards on-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 
222, 229 (3d Cir.1990) (noting that " '[c]ontext can 
often be important in discerning the message con-
veyed and this is particularly true where, as here, 
the target of the advertising is not the consuming 
public but a more well informed and sophisticated 
audience' [; h]ence, a target audience's special 
knowledge of a class of products is highly relevant 
to any claim that it was misled by an advertisement 
for such a product" (quoting Plough, Inc. v. John-
son & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 532 F.Supp. 714, 
717 (D.Del.1982))). This Court finds such an in-
quiry relevant in determining if advertising the Ko-
ala as sensor-tipped is literally false in light of its 
targeted audience. Plaintiff bears the burden to 
show that the Koala advertisements were false as 
commonly understood by the consuming population 
of obstetric and gynecologic clinicians based on 
their knowledge and experience. 
[19] As an initial matter the Court finds that Utah 
Medical failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
find that the term "sensor-tipped" is literally false. 
The tip does in fact "sense" amniotic pressure. The 
advertisements do not state that the device is 
"transduce-tipped." Such a statement would be lit-
erally false as applied to the Koala. The inquiry 
thus becomes whether Utah Medical has sufficient 
evidence that the relevant consuming population in-
terpreted "Sensor-tipped" as meaning the trans-
ducer was in the tip of the catheter. On this point, 
Utah Medical only offer Mr. Hitchcock's uncorrob-
orated opinion. 
Furthermore, Utah Medical's expert focuses only on 
the bald statement that the Koala is 
"sensor-tipped." In fact, it is undisputed that Ko-
ala's promotional materials fully describe the device 
and detail the respective locations of the pressure 
sensing membrane and the pressure transducer. In 
those advertisements, Clinical states that the Koala 
"senses the pressure at the catheter tip" and com-
municates amniotic pressure "to a transducer loc-
ated in the reusable cable"; that the Koala system 
has a "pressure sensor in the uterus and external 
transducer in the reusable cable"; tteit "when pres-
sure is exerted on the membrane, it is transmitted ... 
to the reusable connector which contains a pressure 
transducer"; and that "pressure [is] measured at the 
tip with internal sensing membrane; [and then] air-
coupled to reusable* 1310 transducer located in in-
terconnect cable." Plaintiffs expert admits that he 
viewed Clinical's advertisement statement in isola-
tion and that the only thing he found important with 
respect to he Koala advertisements was that they 
used the term "sensor tip." Accordingly, the Court 
finds that plaintiffs argument does not take into ac-
count the proper context of the statement. Further-
more, plaintiffs expert offers no insight into how 
an educated and skilled labor and delivery clinician 
could misled into believing that there is a pressure 
transducer in the Koala catheter tip when the 
product literature repeatedly states that the external 
transducer is located in the reusable cable. 
Utah Medical offers no support of its claim in con-
text of the entire advertisement or as to the targeted 
audience. Utah Medical supports its allegations 
solely through the expert testimony of Robert W. 
Hitchcock, a biomedical engineer, who opines that 
the Koala advertisements are false because the 
"balloon at the tip of the Koala catheter is not a 
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sensor according to industry defmitions."Hitchcock 
claims that in order to be sensor-tipped under en-
gineering parlance, an intrauterine pressure catheter 
must contain a silicon chip pressure transducer in 
the catheter tip. In his deposition, Hitchcock made 
several revealing admissions in connection with 
Utah Medical's false advertising claim: (1) that he 
had not done any research at all with respect to how 
a clinician in labor and delivery would understand 
the term sensor tip in conjunction with intrauterine 
catheters; (2) that he had not had any discussions 
with any intrauterine catheter consumer that ex-
pressed any confusion regarding the Koala's advert-
ising; (3) that he had not talked to any purchasers of 
intrauterine catheters prior to putting his report to-
gether; and (4) that he was speculating with regard 
to the purchaser of an intrauterine catheter. As sub-
sequently explained, the Court finds that the expert 
opinion of Robert Hitchcock regarding plaintiffs 
false advertising claim should be excluded under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. However, even if the 
Court were to allow Hitchcock's expert opinion re-
garding this issue, and allow it to go to the weight 
of the issue, the Court finds that Hitchcock's testi-
mony is not enough to allow plaintiff to present this 
claim to a jury. 
Plaintiff must also prove that the challenged state-
ment is material. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue 
Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir.1990) ( "The 
[Lanham Act] plaintiff must ... show that defend-
ant's misrepresentations material in that it is likely 
to influence the purchasing decision."). Plaintiff of-
fers no such evidence. Nothing in plaintiffs expert 
report rises to the level that a reasonable juror could 
use in supporting a finding that the Koala advertise-
ments was material and influenced purchasing de-
cisions of relevant consumers. 
Based upon all of the evidence submitted by 
plaintiff, the Court finds that no reasonable jury 
could find that defendants have falsely advertised 
the Koala as sensor-tipped when viewing the Koala 
advertisements as a whole in the relative context. 
The Koala advertisements clearly disclose that 
while the Koala is sensor-tipped it has a pressure 
transducer housed at the other end of the catheter. It 
would be another matter if the Koala advertise-
ments read "transducer-tipped," but they do not. 
Thus, the Court finds that the sensor-tipped advert-
isements are not literally false as a matter of law. 
Even if plaintiff had claimed that the advertise-
ments were misleading, plaintiffs claim would have 
failed because it has no support that consumers 
were confused or mislead. If there were some factu-
al basis to support the claim that from the perspect-
ive of the relevant consumer the advertisements as 
a whole could be viewed as false, the Court would 
allow this claim to go to a jury. But, there is not. 
Hitchcock's claims are supported by nothing more 
than his opinion as an engineer that the term 
sensor-tipped does not mean what Clinical claims it 
does. Accordingly, the Court finds that no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and that summary judg-
ment*1311 is appropriate on plaintiffs false advert-
ising claims under the Lanham Act. 
C Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Misappro-
priation of Trade Secrets Claim 
[20] Plaintiff alleges that Clinical has misappropri-
ated Utah Medical's trade secrets, specifically al-
leging that Clinical used its trade secrets and con-
fidential information to develop and market Clinic-
al's Clearview uterine manipulator and Koala cath-
eter. To establish a claim for misappropriation of 
trade secrets, plaintiff must show "(1) the existence 
of a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade 
secret to [the defendant] under an express duty not 
to disclose or use it, and (3) [defendants'] use of the 
secret that injures [plaintiff]." Water & Energy-
Systems Tech., Inc., 974 P.2d 821, 822 (Utah 1999) 
(citing Microbiological Res. Corp. v. Mima, 625 
P.2d 690, 697-98 (Utah 1981)). Clinical argues that 
it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs 
misappropriation of trade secret claim because Utah 
Medical has not and cannot establish that its 
claimed information is a trade secret or that Clinical 
used any claimed trade secret information. 
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"The threshold issue in every case is whether, in 
fact, there is a trade secret to be misappropriate." 
Muna, 625 P.2d at 696. The Utah Supreme Court 
further recognized that "[t]he burden is upon the 
plaintiff to prove its existence as a secret, and there 
is no presumption in his favor." Id. a trade secret is 
statutorily defined. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
which has been adopted by Utah, reads: 
"Trade secret" means information, including a 
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, 
and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain econom-
ic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-2(4) (1999). 
Plaintiff alleges that much of the 17,000 pages of 
documents in the three banker boxes that Wallace 
took from Utah Medical contained confidential 
trade secret information. According to one ' of 
plaintiffs expert reports, the documents that Wal-
lace took from Utah Medical can be separated into 
the following five categories: (1) business strategy 
documents, including 1989-1993 company goals, 
1993-1995 strategic plans, strategy regarding the 
Intran catheter, and a joint venture with Malinck-
rodt Medical regarding a pressure monitoring cath-
eter which uses a "special membrane"; (2) market 
analysis documents, including development agree-
ments, Dr. Buschmann agreement, documents relat-
ing to fetal oxymetry, Intran marketing and test re-
search, Intran complaints, and Intran II specifica-
tions and market research; (3) product developing 
and testing documents, including the 1990 Intran 
Plus design and development, 1990 Intran II clinic-
al trials, and Intran II design with balloon, analysis 
of Intran II clinical trial failures, and intrauterine 
catheter design suggestions for proximal sensor, 
air-filled catheter, and distally-mounted flexible 
membrane; (4) manufacturing and production docu-
ments, including standard operating procedure man-
ufacturing documents, Intran Plus through-put and 
procedures, Intran II manufacturing through-put 
and vendors; and finally (5) sales and distribution 
documents, including Intran sales forecast, 1987 
sales numbers, Deltran's sales strategy and market-
ing plan, Intran sales forecasts, and 1992 VP sales 
and marketing work objectives. See Hitchcock 
Trade Secret Report at 6-7. Utah Medical argues 
that having access to these documents would 
provide substantial assistance to Clinical in devel-
oping and introducing its Koala catheter by redu-
cing the amount of time necessary to evaluate 
product opportunity, develop *1312 and test proto-
types, and produce and distribute the product, as 
well as provide quicker market penetration, en-
hanced competitive strategies, and reduced devel-
opment time and opportunity cost. 
[21] Utah Medical further alleges that defendants 
had access to other unknown trade secret informa-
tion that has been withheld by the defendants, as 
evidenced by information that appeared in Clinic-
al's business plan regarding its uterine manipulator 
but was not in the documents turned over by Wal-
lace to Utah Medical. Such allegations, lacking fur-
ther support, will not be entertained by the Court. 
Without additional evidence, the Court will not in-
fer trade secrets have been misappropriated. The 
burden is upon the plaintiff to establish the exist-
ence of a trade secret, and plaintiff must substanti-
ate more than vague and unsupported allegations as 
to unknown trade secrets in order to satisfy its bur-
den. 
In determining whether the documents taken by 
Wallace constitute trade secrets, the Court looks to 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Microbiolo-
gical Res. Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 
1981), which is remarkably similar to the instant 
case. Muna involved a claim of misappropriation 
brought by a medical diagnostic kit company 
against its former president, a doctor and the de-
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veloper of its diagnostic kits. While employed by 
plaintiff, the defendant conceived and developed 
diagnostic kits used to detect diseases, and the 
plaintiff manufactured these kits and sold them to 
hospitals and labs. The plaintiff terminated the de-
fendant, and thereafter the defendant began plans to 
manufacture a line of products similar to the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiff sued, alleging misappropri-
ation of its claimed trade secrets. See Muna at 692. 
Based on these facts, the Utah Supreme Court was 
faced with several of the same issues that this Court 
is now faced with regarding Utah Medical's claim. 
The Muna court offers several valuable insights as 
to Utah trade secret law. The court recognized the 
balance that must exist in this area, observing that 
the law encourages competition and supports an in-
dividual's right to exploit his own skill and know-
ledge, yet should grant established businesses reas-
onable protection against unfair trade practices. 
See id. at 697. Accordingly, the court stated that 
"[u]pon termination of his employment, an employ-
ee has the prerogative to use his general knowledge, 
experience, memory and skill, however gained, 
provided he does not use, disclose, or impinge upon 
any of the secret process or business secrets of his 
former employer." Id. In Muna, the plaintiff failed 
to establish any claimed trade secret because the 
court found that the information the plaintiff 
claimed as its secret was expertise known to those 
ih the industry such as Dr. Muna. The court con-
cluded that it would be unfair to preclude Dr. 
Mima's use of his expertise, stating that he could 
not be enjoined from "using his knowledge, skill 
and experiences in an independent business." Id. at 
699. 
[22] Given Wallace, Cutler, and Smith's collective 
knowledge and experience with Utah Medical and 
its products, it is difficult to delineate what they 
knew and what would be a secret. See id. at 697 
("There must be a delineation between the general 
knowledge and experience of the employee and the 
trade secrets of the employer."). This is why the 
plaintiff has the burden to bring forth specific trade 
secret information that is not generally known or 
readily ascertainable. This standard cannot be 
viewed as whether the information is generally 
known and readily ascertainable to the general pub-
lic, but, based on the defendants' knowledge and 
experience, whether the information was known or 
ascertainable to them. See id. at 699 (recognizing 
that information that was published and commonly 
known in the trade should not be considered a trade 
secret). Moreover, the "subject matter of the trade 
secret must be unknown; it should not be in the 
public domain or within the knowledge of the 
trade'Vrf. at 696. 
*1313 Utah Medical must define its claimed trade 
secret with the precision and particularity necessary 
to separate it from the general skill and knowledge 
possessed by Wallace, Cutler, and Smith. The Court 
finds that the plaintiff has not done so. Simply 
identifying documents and claiming that they con-
tain trade secret information is not enough. Plaintiff 
must establish that the information in the identified 
documents is not published or readily ascertainable 
information to those in the field. Additionally, 
plaintiff has reiterated in deposition and at oral ar-
gument that defendant could not help but use trade 
secret information in doing what they are doing. 
Yet, plaintiff has failed to identify with specificity 
exactly what trade secrets were used. Such vague 
assertions fall short of what is required by the law. 
Even if Utah Medical could establish that defend-
ants had trade secret information, it must be able to 
establish that defendants used such information. 
See id. at 696. Plaintiff claims Clinical's very 
products demonstrate the use of Utah Medical's 
trade secret information. Shortly after Clinical's in-
ception in April of 1993, it developed its Clearview 
uterine manipulator. By June 11, 1993, Wallace de-
veloped a prototype for the Clearview without per-
forming any marketing studies on the uterine ma-
nipulator. Clinical also generated a business plan in 
July of 1993, describing various potential products, 
including its uterine manipulator. Portions of the 
business plan, such as the product description and 
market analysis sections for a disposable uterine 
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manipulator appear to have been copied nearly ver-
batim from Utah Medical documents. Clinical has 
admitted that it was able to avoid formal marketing 
evaluations for both the Koala and Clearview uter-
ine manipulator. Clinical has acknowledged that it 
did not perform any marketing analysis for the Ko-
ala due to its principals' knowledge of Utah Medic-
al's experience with the Intran I and Intran Plus. 
Certainly Clinical was able to circumvent some pre-
liminary market research on the Koala and Clear-
view, allowing them to compete with Utah Medical 
sooner than someone who was just entering the 
market. However, Wallace, Cutler, and Smith were 
not just entering the market, and the law will not 
prevent competition just because a former employ-
ee has the potential to be an immediate competitor. 
Plaintiffs allegation regarding misappropriation of 
the uterine manipulator trade secret information 
falls short as a matter of law. Plaintiff does not 
identify any aspect of Clinical's Clearview product 
that it contends was a copy of any trade secret, but 
rather only identifies Clinical's business plan, 
which discusses general information about the pur-
pose of uterine manipulators and the various com-
peting uterine manipulators available to clinicians. 
From the record in this case, the Court finds it is 
undisputed that such information is generally 
known or readily ascertainable to those in the in-
dustry. 
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that Clinical's user 
specifications for the Koala are virtually identical 
to the user specification for the Intran II, which 
were among the documents taken by Wallace. Re-
garding the Intran II user specifications, that in-
formation contains general background information 
as to what intrauterine catheters are, their clinical 
use, and existing devices on the market. The Court 
is not satisfied that this information qualifies as a 
trade secret as a matter of law. 
Finally, plaintiff alleges that the idea of placing a 
membrane in the tip of the Intran II was contained 
in the documents that Wallace had and that he used 
that idea in developing the Koala. However, the 
Court finds that given Wallace's expertise and ex-
perience with intrauterine catheters., plaintiff has 
not established that this idea to place a membrane 
or balloon in a catheter was a trade secret. See id. 
at 697 (finding that "the employee is protected by 
the rule that the owner may not arbitrarily pro-
nounce anything a trade secret"). It is beyond any 
factual dispute that Wallace possessed this know-
ledge with or without any written reference there to 
in documentation he received from Utah Medical. 
*1314 Other than plaintiffs two examples of Clin-
ical's copying portions of its business plan discuss-
ing the uterine manipulator and the user specifica-
tions for the Koala, neither of which contain trade 
secret information, Utah Medical offers nothing 
more than argument for the proposition that the 
trade secret information contained in the Wallace 
documents and other trade secret information that 
Wallace, Cutler, and Smith left with in their heads 
must have been used by Clinical Innovations in its 
efforts to compete with Utah Medical. Plaintiff ar-
gues that the defendants' use of trade secrets was 
inevitable. Statements such as "I don't know how 
they couldn't have used trade secrets" are too tenu-
ous to allow the Court to send such a claim to a 
jury. This case does not factually rise to the level of 
being an inevitable disclosure case. See PepsiCo 
v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir.1995) (finding 
the at a former PepsiCo employee could not help 
but use time sensitive and highly specific marketing 
plans for the upcoming year in his new position 
with a competitor). Because plaintiff has failed to 
identify any trade secret with the particularly re-
quired by law, or adduced any evidence of use of 
any such trade secret, the Court finds that defend-
ants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs 
misappropriation of trade secrets claim. 
D. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty Claim 
[23] Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim is 
based on Wallace's and Cutler's failure to sign an 
employee agreement and Wallace's possession of 
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Utah Medical documents. Defendants assert, and 
this Court agrees, that plaintiffs breach of fiduciary 
duty claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
There is a three-year statute of limitations applic-
able to plaintiffs claim. SeeUTAU CODE ANN. § 
78-12-27 (1999). For the statutory period to begin 
to run, "[t]he shareholders or directors must have 
knowledge of the wrongdoing or facts that put them 
on inquiry and must be sufficiently independent to 
be able to assert a claim on behalf of the corpora-
tion." United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park 
City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). The stat-
ute commences when the corporate officers obtain 
sufficient information "to put them on notice and to 
make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or ques-
tions." Id. at 886. In this case, plaintiffs did not 
file their claim until January 30, 1997. Accordingly, 
the question is whether Utah Medical had know-
ledge or notice of the wrongdoing before January 
30, 1994. Based on the undisputed facts, Utah Med-
ical had knowledge or notice sufficient to spur fur-
ther inquiry in 1993. 
Defendants assert that plaintiff had knowledge of 
Wallace and Cutler's alleged failure to sign the em-
ployment agreement in 1993. At the latest, Utah 
Medical should have known or made further in-
quiry into this issue at the time Wallace filed his 
wrongful termination suit in the Spring of 1993, 
which should have provided Utah Medical with the 
opportunity to fully explore Wallace's employment 
terms. Utah Medical has not disputed that it had no-
tice of Wallace's alleged failure to sign an employ-
ment agreement prior to 1994. In addition, Utah 
Medical's president admitted that he knew in May 
1993 that Cutler had not signed an employee agree-
ment. Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition does 
not address this aspect of defendants' argument. 
Therefore, it is undisputed that plaintiff had know-
ledge of these events prior to 1994. 
[24] With respect to the second argument in 
plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim, Utah 
Medical knew that Wallace had Utah Medical docu-
ments in his possession long before January of 
1994. Plaintiff attempts to recast its claim as chal-
lenging Wallace's use of the documents, not his 
mere possession of the documents. However, this 
shift does not affect the statute of limitations defect. 
Under the standard set forth in United Park City 
Mines, the statute begins to run when corporate of-
ficers or directors obtain sufficient information "to 
put them on notice to make further inquiry if they 
*1315 harbor doubts or questions." Id. at 886. In 
United Park City Mines, the Utah Supreme Court 
makes no reference to any requirement that the of-
ficers have knowledge of actual "use" of the in-
formation. It is sufficient that Utah Medical had 
sufficient information that a reasonable person 
would "harbor doubts or questions." In July of 
1993, Utah Medical obtained copies of all the docu-
ments Dr. Wallace had in his possession. Utah 
Medical had ample opportunity to review the docu-
ments for any alleged confidential and proprietary 
information. At that time they were put on notice of 
what the documents contained. As evidenced by 
plaintiffs trade secret claim, Utah Medical certainly 
claims that the documents contained alleged trade 
secrets. Therefore, Utah Medical had sufficient no-
tice well before the January 1994 critical date, and 
their claim is barred. 
[25] Even if the plaintiffs' claim was not precluded 
by the statute of limitations, summary judgment 
should be granted because Utah Medical cannot 
demonstrate that it suffered any harm as a result of 
any alleged breach. To avoid summary judgment on 
its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Utah Medical 
must demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as 
a result of the alleged breach. See Viernow v. Eur-
ipides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 797-98 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (upholding summary judgment where 
plaintiff could show no harm as a result of breach 
of fiduciary duty). Utah Medical has failed to sub-
stantiate that it suffered any harm from the alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants argue that it is 
immaterial whether Wallace and Cutler signed an 
employment agreement. A formal employment 
agreement is not necessary under Utah law to create 
a duty of confidentiality. See Envirotech Corp. v. 
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Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 497 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
Thus, a duty of confidentiality existed between 
Wallace and Cutler and Utah Medical under the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act independent of any em-
ployment agreement. Therefore, Utah Medical 
suffered no harm even if Wallace and Cutler were 
obligated to sign the employment agreement, and 
failed to do so, as Utah Medical posits. Moreover, 
Utah Medical eviscerates its claim by admitting that 
the agreement contained no covenant not to com-
pete. Even if Wallace and Cutler had signed the 
agreement, they were not forbidden to compete 
with Utah Medical. Plaintiff argues that because 
this is a bifurcated trial, they do not have to make a 
showing of damages. However, the fact of damages 
is an essential element of Utah Medical's cause of 
action that must be substantiated to overcome sum-
mary judgment. See Viernow, 157 F.3d at 797-98. 
Because damage is an essential element to a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty, Utah Medical's claim 
fails as a matter of law. 
Finally, any complaint as to the employment agree-
ments would have been more appropriately brought 
under a breach of contract claim. No such cause of 
action was filed. The Court also finds that plaintiffs 
fiduciary duty argument is coextensive with its mis-
appropriation of trade secrets claim. Plaintiff is 
simply attempting to recover under another theory 
that is improper. The law will not allow plaintiff to 
seek recovery by simply repackaging their claim in 
another improper theory. 
E. Defendants' Motions in Limine to Exclude Ex-
pert Testimony 
Defendants move to exclude the expert opinion 
testimony of Robert W. Hitchcock regarding 
plaintiffs false advertising claim, and to exclude 
the expert opinion testimony of Roger W. Blakely, 
Jr. regarding his legal opinions on claim construc-
tion and other patent infringement issues. Defend-
ants' argue that the proposed expert testimony does 
not satisfy, inter alia, the requirements of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702. 
Rule 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized know-
ledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, exper-
ience, training, or education, may *1316 testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
FED.R.EV1D. 702. (1999). Under the Supreme 
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 
125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), this Court is required to 
assume a "gatekeeping" role to guarantee that under 
Rule 702 an expert's testimony is "not only relev-
ant, but reliable." Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Thus, 
the Court must determine first whether the expert's 
proposed testimony is scientific knowledge, and 
second, whether the evidence "fits" the current is-
sue and will assist the jury. See id. at 592, 113 
S.Ct. 2786; see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Car-
michael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 
L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (holding that Daubert 's gate-
keeping obligation applies not only to scientific 
testimony, but also to all expert testimony, and that 
Rule 702 does not distinguish between scientific 
knowledge and technical or other specialized know-
ledge). 
[26] Robert Hitchcock opines that advertising the 
Koala as "sensor-tipped" is literally false. As ex-
plained more fully in the false advertising section 
above, Hitchcock reaches this conclusion based on 
his engineering experience. In accordance with the 
Court's holding, plaintiffs Lanham Act claim is 
contingent on analyzing the advertisement in full 
context as viewed by those to whom the advertise-
ment was directed. Hitchcock never analyzed the 
full context of the advertisements or how they were 
perceived among the clinicians whom the advertise-
ments targeted. While Hitchcock's expert opinion 
may be reliable as to the methodology he used to 
opine on the meaning of "sensor-tipped" in the 
medical engineering industry, the Court does not 
need to address that issue. Even if Hitchcock's 
methodology for reaching his opinion is reliable, 
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the opinion must be relevant. Hitchcock's testimony 
is deficient in this area. The Court finds that Hitch-
cock's testimony does not satisfy the relevance 
prong of admissibility under Dauber and Kumho 
Tire and will not be helpful in assisting a trier of 
fact as required under Rule 702. Therefore, the 
Court finds that Hitchcock's expert report as to 
plaintiffs false advertising claim is inadmissible 
and should be excluded. 
[27] Next the Court turns to Roger Blakely's expert 
opinion. Plaintiff has designated Blakely, a patent 
attorney, as an expert witness to testify on claim 
construction, infringement, and the pioneer status 
of plaintiffs patented device. As stated earlier, pat-
ent claim construction is a question of law and uis 
exclusively within the province of the court." 
Markman v. Westview Instrs. Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 
372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Fur-
thermore, patent claims generally will be construed 
solely upon intrinsic evidence, which includes the 
patent claims, the patent specification, and the pro-
secution history of the patent, without resort to ex-
trinsic evidence, such as expert testimony. See 
Bell & Howell Document Mgt. Prods. Co. v. Altek 
Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed.Cir.1997) (holding 
that "patents should be interpreted on the basis of 
their intrinsic record, not on the testimony of such 
after-the-fact 'experts' that played no part in the 
creation and prosecution of the patent"); Vitronics 
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 
(Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that "where the patent doc-
uments are unambiguous, expert testimony regard-
ing the meaning of a claim is entitled to no 
weight"). In this case, the Court sees no need to re-
sort to any outside legal expert even one with Mr. 
Blakely's experience. Accordingly, Blakely's expert 
opinion as to claim construction is excluded. 
Defendants next argue that Blakely's opinion 
should be excluded as to his testimony on whether 
the accused device infringes upon the 161 patent 
and as to the pioneer status of the 161 patent. The 
Court agrees that such legal opinions attempt to 
define the legal parameters which in this case 
should be left to the Court and to the jury. See 
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 807-810 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (allowing an expert to proclaim a legal 
conclusion would "circumvent the jury's decision-
making function by telling it how to decide the 
*1317 case"). While arguing that this testimony 
should be admissible, plaintiff acknowledges that 
the admissibility of such testimony is within the 
discretion of the district court. See Markman v. 
Westview Inst, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980-81 
(Fed.Cir.1995). Under its discretion, the Court finds 
that Blakely's testimony is unnecessary and not 
helpful to the Court or the fact finder pursuant to 
Rule 702. Accordingly, Blakely's expert opinion as 
to infringement and the pioneer status of the 161 
patent is excluded. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that in 
light of its interpretation of the 161 patent, no reas-
onable juror could find that the accused device in-
fringes, either literally or under the doctrine of 
equivalents, upon Claims 1 through 35 of the 161 
patent. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants' 
motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs 
claims for patent infringement. 
Additionally, the Court finds that the plaintiff has 
not presented sufficient evidence to sustain its false 
advertising, trade secrets, and fiduciary duty 
claims. Thus, the Court GRANTS defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs claims 
for false advertising under the Lanham Act, misap-
propriation of trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary 
duty. Finally, the Court GRANTS defendants' mo-
tion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of 
Robert Hitchcock as to his expert report on the ana-
lysis of the term "sensor tip" as applied to the Ko-
ala device, as well as defendants' motion in limine 
to exclude the expert testimony of Roger W. 
Blakely regarding his legal opinions on claim con-
struction, infringement, and the pioneer status of 
plaintiffs patented device. 
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It is so ORDERED. 
D.Utah,1999. 
Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations 
Associates, Inc. 
79 RSupp.2d 1290 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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same area. 
The revised version will be distributed prior to the meeting. 
Thanks 
Elke Martini 
PacifiCorp 
(tel) 503-813-6170 
(fax) 503-813-7251 
(email) Elke.Martim@pacificorp.com 
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Executive Summary: While a water-cooled plant is the lowest cost 
alternative, it now appears that there will be significant 
public opposition to using Utah Lake water for cooling 
a power plant. Furthermore, efforts to acquire Utah 
Lake Water for the project have not progressed as 
rapidly as hoped and are not now expected to be in 
place as soon as necessary to meet IRP requirements 
for an in-house build alternative. Therefore, it is 
recommended that the Company develop the 
alternative using an air-cooled condenser and that it 
purse acquisition of sufficient water to support the air-
cooled option. 
Key Issue(s) for Discussion: 
Sponsor: 
Author (if different): 
Evaluation of the preferred option for CCCT 
development 
Consideration of water acquisition for the air-cooled 
option 
Andy MacRitchie, EVP Strategy and Major Projects 
Barry Cunningham, SVP Generation 
Bill Edmonds, Director Environmental Policy 
Rand Thurgood, Managing Director Asset Optimization 
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0\TERVIEW 
CCCT plants can be designed to operate with either air or water-cooled condensers. 
Although wet cooling is more widespread both wet and dry cooling are available 
technologies for power plants. Conceptually, each has its advantages and disadvantages 
- power plants with wet cooling systems are less costly to build and are more efficient in 
generating power, but dry cooled plants require minimal amounts of water and less 
problems with wastewater disposal. 
This paper examines the broad impacts of the selection of water versus air cooling. 
While it concentrates on an evaluation of environmental impacts, it also includes a 
discussion of economic development, permitting considerations and stakeholder 
engagement. 
While a water-cooled plant is the lowest cost alternative, it now appears that there will be 
significant public opposition to using Utah Lake water for cooling a power plant. 
Furthermore, efforts to acquire Utah Lake Water for the project have not progressed as 
rapidly as hoped and are not now expected to be in place as soon as necessary to meet 
IRP requirements for an in-house build alternative. Therefore, it is recommend that the 
Company develop the alternative using an air-cooled condenser and that it purse 
acquisition of sufficient water to support the air-cooled option 
POLICY CONTEXT 
The environmental policy of ScottishPower states that the Company recognize the value 
to society of biological diversity, cultural heritage natural resources such as land and 
water and will strive, within the scope of our operations, to secure their preservation. The 
PacifiCorp policy, which is consistent with the group policy, specifies that the Company 
will institute and maintain programs that further the aims of sustainable development, 
promote the environmental-stewardship, enhance fish and wildlife, prevent pollution, 
conserve energy, reduce consumption and waste, recycle materials and use recycled 
products. 
Neither ScottishPower nor PacifiCorp have a specific detailed policy concerning water 
use. When faced with a decision regarding wet or dry cooling of a plant, the company 
must evaluate site specific considerations. Key criteria for such an analysis must include: 
• Environmental tradeoffs: It is the company's goal to reduce our overall 
environmental footprint where opportunities arise. Choice of cooling technology has 
different impacts in the areas of water use, air emissions, noise, and visual impacts. 
These differences should be analyzed and balanced based on the environmental 
sensitivities at the specific site. In some cases environmental impacts can be 
mitigated as part of the project design and this possible mitigation should be 
considered as well. 
• Economic development: Providing low cost power that helps promote economic 
development is an important measure of sustainability. Also, prudent utility decision-
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making requires the company to be guided by the least risk, least cost solution. If one 
alternative offers substantially less risk, it may be selected even though it is not the 
least cost alternative. In the area of water use, a key matter for economic 
development considerations is: would a water-cooled plant be using water that is 
critical for another important economic purpose? 
• Government regulation and permitting: New energy facilities must receive a 
number of environmental permits and approvals as part of the siting process. The 
ability to get these approvals is one important measure of political preferences in 
balancing environmental, economic and social goals. 
• Stakeholder response: Stakeholders, such as customers, environmental groups, and 
water owners may take an interest in the company's choice of technological options. 
The strong preferences of stakeholders could impact our ability to move through the 
permitting process as well as have an impact on the company's reputation. 
ENVIRONMENTAL TRADEOFFS 
The environmental tradeoffs appear to rest in favor of an air-cooled plant, although this 
decision requires some judgement. The ten fold increase in water use from a water-
cooled plant is somewhat offset by an efficiency penalty (and a resulting 5% increase in 
summertime air emissions) as well as some noise impacts. While air quality impacts are 
of great concern along the Wasatch Front, the air impacts will not necessarily be within 
this critical airshed, but rather will be experienced within the PacifiCorp system. Lesser 
impacts, such as noise from the larger number of fans from a dry-cooled plant, can be 
somewhat mitigated through additional capital expense. 
The water cooled option might be seen as favored from the perspective of environmental 
tradeoffs when considering that the plant is only using 1% of the available industrial 
water. This is both a relatively small quantity and it is reasonable to expect this industrial 
water to be purchased by another industrial user if not by PacifiCorp. With this 
perspective., the efficiency penalty becomes meaningful and could push the balance 
towards the water-cooled option. 
a) Water Use 
With Utah being the second driest state in the nation and in the midst of its fifth year of 
drought it is almost certain that there will be growing public concern about how best to 
use the state's limited water resources. A dry-cooled plant reduces water consumption to 
less than one-tenth of the water used for a corresponding combined-cycle plant using 
water cooling. 
The plan for a water-cooled gas plant (as described in an April 10, 2003 CEC paper) is to 
access water from Utah Lake and pump this water through a new pipe to the plant site. 
The water used under this plan is industrial water now being sold by industrial users. 
For Water Cooled 
1) Water is a precious resource, however, the water PacifiCorp intends to use is 
allocated for industrial use and cannot be used for potable water. Utah Lake has fairly 
poor water quality and it is not used for potable water but can be used for agricultural 
purposes. If drought conditions continue, the clean up and use of this source might be 
possible, but it is not currently being considered as a potable source. 
2) Utah's Water Resources Planning for the Future (May 2001) shows that the 6,000 
acre-feet of industrial water that PacifiCorp is interested in purchasing is less than 1% 
of the total municipal & industrial water supply in the Greater Wasatch Area (Table 1 
in Appendix). Based on this analysis it is difficult to see a link between wet cooling 
at our plant and limits to water dependent industrial development in the region. 
For Air Cooled 
1) Agricultural water in the Mona area is limited and would not support a water-cooled 
option. There is sufficient water for the air-cooled option. 
2) Use of agricultural water will result in some local opposition but the extent of this 
opposition should be less due to the small quantity (less than 600 acre-ft) of water 
involved. 
3) The fanners in the Southern Utah Lake area currently pump out 12,000 acre-feet from 
the Lake for their use. PacifiCorp will be the single largest user of water from the 
Lake with its use of 6,000 acre-ft. It now appears that there would be significant 
public opposition to using Utah Lake water to cool a power plant While this 
opposition may eventually be overcome, it would take time and effort to do so. The 
opposition would most likely occur during public hearings associated with transfer of 
the title to ownership of the water. 
Conclusion: Water is a precious resource, conserving it in the Utah Coimty area will be 
seen as a positive environmental outcome. 
b) Air Quality and Plant Efficiency 
For Water Cooled 
1) Overall the emissions for the specific CCCT with a wet condenser and a CCCT with a 
dry condenser will be virtually the same. However, dry cooling is inherently less 
efficient than wet cooling, which decreases power output for comparable amounts of 
fuel consumed. During peak energy usage (hot summer days when dry cooling is at 
its least efficient), additional generation may need to be brought on line to make up 
the difference. Dry cooling would reduce the output of a 1,000 MW power plant by 
approximately 50 MW during the hottest period when customer demand is greatest. 
During peak demand, power would need to be imported or generated to make up this 
loss. This simply means that another plant would need to be operated somewhere, 
resulting in more air pollution per megawatt generated. 
For Air Cooled 
There is some reduction in particulate emissions (PM10) associated with an air-cooled 
condenser. This is of value because the plant has some impact on neighboring Utah 
County which is listed as non-attainment for PM10 emissions. There are no other 
significant air quality advantages to an air-cooled system. 
Conclusion: Air quality is perhaps the most critical environmental variable given the 
location of the plant near an area that is in non-attainment. There are no other significant 
air quality differences between technologies. The 5% efficiency "hit" during hot summer 
days does result in greater systemwide emissions under the air-cooled scenario. 
c) Visual Resources and Noise 
The visual view as well as the noise levels needs to be considered when making the 
decision between dry and wet cooled condensers.* 
For Water Cooled 
1) The structures of dry-cooling systems are generally taller (80 feet vs 40 feet) and 
larger than those of wet-cooling systems. 
2) Dry-cooling systems are somewhat noisier than wet-cooling systems because of the 
large fans used to move air through the cooling system and the higher location of the 
fans above ground leveL 
For Air Cooled 
1) Wet-cooling systems emit a visible plume of water from the cooling tower. The 
Mona site will utilize a plume-abated cooling tower that reduces the size and 
frequency of visible plumes to lower levels, however, the plume with still be visible 
to the local community and cars traveling on 1-15. 
Conclusion: The impacts in terms of noise favor wet cooling while the visual impacts 
favor air cooling. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The water-cooled plant is the lowest cost option identified within the least cost plan. The 
addition of the least cost option will put less upward pressure on rates and will have an 
overall beneficial impact on economic development and growth within the region. 
The only exception to this conclusion would be if the water use of the plant were likely to 
create another constraint on development (Le., that industrial water that no longer is 
available for use by new industry.) 
Conclusion: Given that the plant will only use 1% of the currently available industrial 
water, it does not appear that the water-cooled plant presents a real limit to growth. 
PERMUTING 
As water resources become more valuable permitting authorities may begin to deny 
permits or condition them on potential impacts to water resources- There currently is no 
indication from Utah that the state is leaning towards these restrictions, however, some 
other western states have begun initial policy deliberations regarding the use of wet-
cooling. The New Mexico Legislature, for example, considered enacting new regulations 
to review water efficiency in plants exceeding 50MW. The bill would have required an 
analysis of water use by all new power plants and consideration of dry cooling. In 2002, 
the Arizona Corporation Commission came close to requiring two proposed plants to use 
dry cooling technology, but stopped short of actually imposing this condition. 
For air cooled 
• It now appears that there would be significant public opposition to using Utah Lake 
water to cool a power plant. While this opposition may eventually be overcome, it 
would take time and effort to do so. 
Conclusion: Significant public opposition would delay the permitting process for a wet^ 
cooled plant. 
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS 
Some Environmentalists will fundamentally be against water-cooled plants. 
1) The Land and Water Fund of the Rockies recently published a report "The Last 
Straw: Water Use by Power Plants in the Arid West/7 The report concluded: In 
follow-up discussions with LWF, they suggest a clear preference towards air cooled 
plants but agree there could be other mitigating factors that could make water cooling 
acceptable. 
2) In March 2003, The Nature Conservancy of Utah and the Utah Mitigation 
Commission have completed the acquisition and protection of a key 440-acre wetland 
property at the southern end of Utah Lake. The wildlife-rich wetland parcel will be 
added to already-protected Mitigation Commission wetlands in the Goshen Bay area 
in a growing new wildlife preserve. This lesser-known part of Utah Lake supports 
migratory waterfowl, shorebirds, raptors and upland birds in impressive numbers. 
Conclusion: Environmentalists have a clear preference towards air-cooled plants. 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Right of Way 
In order to bring Utah Lake water to the Mona site, a 20-22 mile long pipeline will need 
to be built. PacifiCorp is currently looking at both the possibility of putting the pipeline 
in an existing transmission right-of-way or following county roads. People who live 
along the road and are worried about the construction may speak out against the plant. A 
dry cooled plant will most likely get water from a well very near the plant and will not 
require a significant pipeline. The location of the well and pipeline for the dry-cooled 
plant has not been determined. 
Wells 
PacifiCorp is intending to use well water approximately 20 miles north of the generation 
site in an area that has plenty of recharge coming from Utah Lake. We would sink new 
wells a minimum of XA mile from the nearest existing wells. There is the possibility that 
this would draw the H20 table of these smaller wells down slightly. Existing well 
owners will come out strongly against future water development in the Southern Utah 
Lake area. A recent Water Transfer Hearing drew over 280 people to protest the sale of 
water to the City of Spanish Fork since the development of this water could impact the 
quantity of water from existing wells. This Spanish Fork water sale has developed into a 
controversial issue in the region and PacifiCorp can expect similar controversy with a 
purchase of water in the same area. 
REP Process 
The RFP process now underway compares all the external bids against the Next Best 
Alternative (NBA). The NBA and the proposals under the RFP will be compared on a 
number of metrics including price, resource flexibility, and environmental considerations. 
The gas plants that may be submitted as part of the RFP process are not limited to air-
cooled technology. If the Mona site is restricted to the use of air-cooled condensers, this 
may force PacifiCorp's option (considered the NBA) to a different standard than the rest 
of the bidders. 
CONCLUSION 
While a water-cooled plant is the lowest cost alternative, it now appears that there will be 
significant public opposition to using Utah Lake water for cooling a power plant. 
Furthermore, efforts to acquire Utah Lake Water for the project have not progressed as 
rapidly as hoped and are not now expected to be in place as soon as necessary to meet 
IRP requirements for an in-house build alternative. Therefore, it is recommend that the 
Company develop the alternative using an air-cooled condenser and that it purse 
acquisition of sufficient water to support the air-cooled option 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 1. Present and Projected Total Municipal and Industrial Water Use by Basin 
Utah's Water Resources Planning for the Future, May 2001 
(acre-feet/yr) 
1 Basin 
1 Jordan River 
1 Weber River 
1 Utah Lake 
Bear River 
West Desert 
Total Greater Wasatch Area 
1 West Colorado River 
Sevier River 
t Kanab Creek/Virgin River 
Uintah 
Cedar/Beaver 
Southeast Colorado River 
Total UTAH 
Present™ | 2020m 
(acre-feet/yr) 
332,000 
170,000 
134,000 
50,000 
24,000 
710,000 
51,000 
48,000 
42,000 
24,000 
20,000 
9,000 
904,000 
449,000 
267,000 
207,000 
71,000 
35,000 
1,029,000 
55,000 
55,000 
86,00 
27,000 
33,000 
10,000 
1,295,000 
(1) The exact year of the data shown "varies 
(2) Projections represent future demands 
projections from the Governor's Office 
from 1992 to 1998. 
based on current use rates and future population 
of Plaruiing and Budget Actual demands may be less 
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Ability to Use Water Acquired from the Southern End of Utah Lake 
There are two issues associated with the risk of not being able to use the water taken from the southern end of Utah 
Lake. The first issue is whether the point of water extraction can be transferred to the southern end of Utah Lake. 
This issue will be addressed in the Acquisition Agreement (yet to be negotiated) wherein the acquisition will be 
subject to State approval for taking the water at the southern end of Utah Lake - a practice consistent with Utah 
water law. Initial discussions with the State Engineers Office indicate that it will be acceptable to take the water 
from the southern end of the Lake. 
The second issue is the cost of transporting the water to the project site. The cost of moving water from its point of 
extraction to the project site depends upon how and where the water is taken from the Utah Lake drainage area. To 
address this issue we engaged Hansen, Allen and Luce, a highly respected hydrological Utah engineering firm with 
significant experience and knowledge with respect to the Utah Lake area. The results of their work and that of a 
similar effort conducted by Panda, ensures us that extraction from an appropriate location can be done, that it will 
be supported by the State Engineer's Office and that it will be economic to transport the water to the selected 
project site. 
PacifiCorp Does Not Build a Generation Resource at Mona 
The second risk is that of not going forward with a PacifiCorp generation project along the Wasatch Front. If a 
response to the RFP produced a new resource with lower evaluated costs than one developed by the Company, this 
water could be sold to that entity to ensure that the project would be water-cooled and hence more economic. It is 
very unlikely that any project will have water going in to the RFP process. The risk of PacifiCorp not using the 
water is mitigated by the opportunity to sell the water to a winning KPF proposal or to others for whatever use. 
Water in Utah is in very short supply and there will continue to be a market for this very necessary resource. 
Marketability of the Water 
The third potential risk is that the market price for the water may be lower than what we paid for it in the event no 
generation asset is developed. Because water in Utah is in limited supply and the population continues to increase, 
the market price for water has historically increased with time. This critical commodity will only increase in value 
with time, although it is unlikely that the total amount of water could be sold in any single transaction. However, 
the real value of the asset to PacifiCorp lies in using the water to develop generation resources at the lowest 
possible cost in response to the IRP requirements. 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
The financial benefit of the proposed water acquisition is based on the incremental cost differences between a 
CCCT plant equipped with an air-cooled condenser and a CCCT equipped with a water-cooled condenser. Before 
describing those differences and providing the results, a few comments concerning the amount of water 
recommended for purchase are needed. We recommend the Company acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water. This is 
sufficient water for two 500 MW CCCT plants. We recommend that water for 1,000 MW of generation resource be 
purchased now while the opportunity is available. The financial analysis presented below is for two cases. In Case 
1 the cost of only half the water (3,000 acre-ft) is attributed to the first 500 MW plant. In Case 2 the cost of the 
entire 6,000 acre-ft is included in the first 500 MW resource. 
Table 1 shows the capital expenditures anticipated for both an air and water-cooled plant. The water cost is 
assumed to be $2300 per acre-ft (our expectation of what the final price will be) and only addresses 3,000 acre-ft of 
water being attributed to the first 500 MW plant. 
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Table 1. Capital Cost Comparison ($l,000s) 
Capital Cost Components Wet Cooling Dry Cooling 
Water - 3,000 acre-ft $6,900 
Water Pipeline (sized for 6,000 acre-ft) $ 15,400 
Water evaporation pond $5,000 
Incremental cost for dry condenser above that for wet system 
Total Capital Requirement $27,300 
$30,000 
$30,000 
Although the capital cost difference is relatively small, there are other major differences A plant with an air-
cooled condenser is less efficient (has a higher heat rate) and produces less power than does an equivalent plant 
equipped with a water-cooled condenser In addition, an air-cooled plant also has higher maintenance costs than a 
water-cooled plant 
Table 2 presents the mcremental PVRR benefit of wet vs dry cooling for Case 1 wherein only half the water (3,000 
acre-ft) is attributed to the first 500 MW project The results indicate that wet cooling has a PVRR advantage of 
$23,928,000 over dry coolmg The column showing cash flows without regulatory recovery represents the 
economics of a non-regulated project The column with regulated recovery shows the economics of a regulated 
project with a one-year regulatory lag Therefore, the purchase of water enables construction of the lowest cost 
alternative to ratepayers and is m the best interests of shareholders Representative cash flows are given m 
Appendix 1 Appendix 1 also contains a sensitivity analysis around several different variables such as heat 
rate Capacity, water pipeline construction costs, air-cooled condenser costs, market price, water costs, etc 
Table 2. Case 1 - Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling 
(Only costs for 3,000 acre-ft of water included) 
Project Economics ($1,000) 
Customer 
Revenue 
Requirement 
($23,928) 
Customer 
Revenue 
Requirement 
$15,250 
61 6% 
7 5% 
7 5% 
1 7 Years 
Cash Flow 
With Regulatory 
Recovery 
$1,265 
46 0% 
7 5% 
7 5% 
1 7 Years 
PVRR(d) 
Project NPV 
Project IRR 
Discount Rate Used 
Business Umt Cost of Capital 
Payback Period (years) 
Table 3 summarizes the mcremental PVRR benefit of wet vs dry coolmg for Case 2 wherein the total cost for all 
6,000 acre-ft of water is incorporated as part of the first 500 MW resource This appears to be a worst case 
scenano, in which PacifiCorp purchased the amoimt of water required for a 1,000 MW facility, but ended up only 
building 500 MW plant, and was unable to sell off its unused water rights We believe this would be a highly 
unlikely scenano Nevertheless, for this case the incremental PVRR benefit of wet vs dry coolmg is $17,288,000 
Sensitivity analysis and representative cash flows are also presented in Appendix 1 
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Table 3. Case 2 - Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling 
(Only costs for 6,000 acre-ft of water included) 
Customer Customer Cash Flow 
Revenue Revenue With Regulatory 
Project Economics ($1,000) Requirement Requirement Recovery 
PVKR(d) 
Project NPV 
Project IRR 
Discount Rate Used 
Business Unit Cost of Capital 
Capital Productivity Ratio 
Payback Period (years) 
The following economic analysis information is included in Appendix 1: 
Case 1 - 3000 acre-ft of water 
• Economic Results Summary 
• Analysis Inputs Detail 
• Sensitivity Analysis Graphs 
• Scenario Analysis Graphs (utilizing the top four sensitivity variables) 
• Capital/(Deferred) Expenditure Authorization - for PacifiCorp Board and above 
Case 2 - 6000 acre-ft of water 
• Economic Results Summary 
• Analysis Inputs Detail 
• Sensitivity Analysis Graphs 
• Scenario Analysis Graphs (utilizing the top four sensitivity variables) 
• Capital/(Deferred) Expenditure Authorization - for PacifiCorp Board and above 
Appendix 2 provides economic analysis information for water purchased at $2,700 per acre-ft (the maximum price 
for which authorization is being sought). It includes: 
• Economic Results Summary, assuming 3,000 acre-ft 
• Analysis Inputs Detail, assuming 3,000 acre-ft 
• Economic Results Summary, assuming 6,000 acre-ft 
• Analysis Inputs Detail, assuming 6,000 acre-ft 
We conclude that the economics of acquiring 6,000 acre-ft of water now while it is available are very favorable and 
that there is not significant risk in doing so. 
RECOMMENDATION 
We recommend approval be given to acquire 6,000 acre-ft of industrial water at a price not to exceed $2,700 per 
acre-ft for a total expenditure of not more than $16,200,000. We also recommend pursuing two parallel courses of 
action to acquire the water. 
First, we recommend continuing our discussions with Geneva to determine their creditors' interest in our offer. 
Second we recommend continued work with Kennecott for possible acquisition of water from them. We would 
then purchase the water from either source depending upon the final negotiated terms and price for the water. 
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($17,288) 
$10,414 
17.0% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
3.43 
6.4 Years 
$311 
8.2% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
1.07 
8.7 Years 
Appeiiuix 1 Economic Results nummary 
Project Name: Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling 
Case 1 - 3,000 Acie-ft 
($ 1,000s) 
Project Economics 
P V R R ( d ) 
Project NPV 
Project I R R 
Discount Ra te Used 
Business Unit Cost of Capital 
Payback Period (years) 
Capital Spending W o AFUDC 
Capital Spending w AFUDC 
Customer 
Revenue 
Requirement 
($23,928) 
2003 
$0 
$0 
Net Cash Flow Without Regulatory Recovery 
Annual $0 
Cumulative $0 
Net Cash Flow Wi th Regula to ry Recovery 
Annual $0 
Cumulative $0 
Incremental Earnings Before Interest & Taxes 
Without Regulatory Recovery $0 
With Regulatory Recovery $0 
Inc remen ta l E a r n i n g s @ 55.0% Debt Financing 
Without Regulatory Recovery $0 
With Regulatory Recovery $0 
Annua l Revenue R e q u i r e m e n t 
Calculated 
Recovered 
$0 
$0 
Cash Flows 
Without Regulatory 
Recovery 
2004 
$6,900 
$6,900 
($6,900) 
($6,900) 
($6,900) 
($6,900) 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$15,250 
61.6% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
1.7 Years 
2005 
($9,888) 
($9,474) 
$9,888 
$2,988 
$9,888 
$2,988 
$0 
$0 
$92 
$92 
$0 
$0 
Cash Flows 
With Regulatory 
Recovery 
2006 
$0 
$0 
$798 
$3,786 
$502 
$3,490 
$1,304 
$828 
$871 
$575 
($1,461) 
($477) 
$1,265 
46.0% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
1.7 Years 
2007 
$0 
$0 
$655 
$4,441 
$65 
$3,554 
$1,285 
$333 
$859 
$268 
($1,591) 
($952) 
2008 
$0 
$0 
$736 
$5,176 
($216) 
$3,338 
$1,381 
($152) 
$915 
($36) 
($1,672) 
($1,534) 
——————. 
2009 
$0 
$0 
$863 
$6,039 
($165) 
$3,173 
$1,556 
($100) 
$1,021 
($7) 
($1,835) 
($1,656) 
Page 7 
Appendix 1 Analysis Inputs Detail Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
o 
Tl 
O 
m 2! 
> 
Mona - Wet versus Dry Differential Analysis Inputs 
All Costs Stated in FY 2004 Dollars ($ 1,000s) 
Plant Data 
Capacity MWs 
Capacity Factor 
Generation GWhs 
WET 
Heat Rate btu/kWh 
mmBtu Required 
Variable O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored) 
Plant O&M 5/MWh $ 0.04 $ 
Water Delivery $/MWh I : $_ 
Total O&M $/MWh $ 0.04 $ 
Total O&M Dollars $ 113 $ 
CCCT 
434 
0.74 
2,816 
7,235 
20,377,183 
DF 
76 
0.3 
200 
11,998 
2,396,337 
Total 
3,016 
22,773,520 
Fixed O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored) 
Plant O&M $ 
Water Delivery O&M I 
Total O&M Dollars $ 
$ 
154 i_ 
154 $ 
113 
154 
CCCT 
430 
0.74 
2,788 
DRY 
DF 
75 
0,3 
198 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ $ 
_ 
-
-
300 
.. 
300 
s $ 
% 
% 
_ 
-
-
-
-
Total 
2,986 
7,307 12,118 
20,375,146 2,396,097 22,771,242 
WET minus 
DRY 
Total 
30 
2,277 
300 
113 
(146) 
> 
n 
o 
o 
•J71 
Capital (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored) 
Year Spent Inservice 
(beg. of year) 
Water Purchase 2004 2006 
Condenser Construction Cost 2005 2006 
Water Pipeline 2005 2006 
Evap. Pond 2005 2006 
Total Capital 
6,900 
15,400 
5,000 
27,300 
30,000 
30,000 
$ 6,900 
$ (30,000) 
$ 15,400 
$ 5,000 
$ (2,700) 
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Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis 
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det 
Output: Mona PVRR (d) 
Base Value: (23,928) 
Description 
Base 
Input 
Low 
Input Output 
High 
Input Output 
Output 
Swing 
Explained 
Variation 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Market Price 
Incr Dry Condenser Cost 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Evap Pond Construction 
Water Fixed O&M 
Water Residual Value 
Variable O&M 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Base 
15,400 
Base 
30,000 
300 
5,000 
154 
281% 
0 04 
2,300 
Low 
10,400 
Low 
29,000 
150 
3,000 
77 
100% 
0 02 
2,100 
(18,285) 
(29,733) 
(20,179) 
(22,768) 
(21,553) 
(26,250) 
(25,148) 
(23,079) 
(24,820) 
(24,506) 
High 
20,400 
High 
35,000 
450 
7,000 
231 
500% 
0.06 
2,700 
(33,286) 
(18,124) 
(27,835) 
(29,733) 
(26,303) 
(21,607) 
(22,709) 
(24,952) 
(23,037) 
(22,774) 
15,002 
11,608 
7,656 
6,965 
4,750 
4,643 
2,438 
1,874 
1,784 
1,732 
43% 
68% 
79% 
89% 
93% 
97% 
98% 
99% 
99% 
100% 
Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis 
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det 
Output: Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value: 15,250 
Description 
Base 
Input 
Low 
Input Output 
JHigh. 
Input Output 
Output 
Swing 
Explained 
Variation 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Market Pnce 
Incr Dry Condenser Cost 
Evap Pond Construction 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Water Fixed O&M 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Variable O&M 
Water Residual Value 
Base 
15,400 
Base 
30,000 
5,000 
300 
154 
2,300 
0 04 
281% 
Low 
10,400 
Low 
29,000 
3,000 
150 
77 
2,100 
0 02 
100% 
11,616 
19,197 
12,836 
14,460 
16,829 
13,721 
16,034 
15,670 
15,824 
14,752 
High 
20,400 
High 
35,000 
7,000 
450 
231 
2,700 
0 06 
500% 
21,274 
11,302 
17,765 
19,197 
13,670 
16,779 
14,465 
14,409 
14,675 
15,849 
9,658 
7,895 
4,929 
4,737 
3,158 
3,058 
1,570 
1,261 
1,148 
1,097 
41% 
68% 
79% 
89% 
93% 
97% 
98% 
99% 
99% 
100% 
CONFIDENTIAL 
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Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis 
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls !Risk Det 
Output: Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value: 62% 
Description 
Base 
Input 
Low 
Input Output 
High 
Input Output 
Output 
Swing 
Explained 
Variation 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Evap. Pond Construction 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Market Price 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Water Fixed O&M 
Variable O&M 
Water Residual Value 
15,400 
30,000 
5,000 
2,300 
Base 
Base 
300 
154 
0.04 
281% 
10,400 
29,000 
3,000 
2,100 
Low 
Low 
150 
77 
0.02 
100% 
126% 
51% 
86% 
73% 
57% 
59% 
60% 
63% 
62% 
62% 
20,400 
35,000 
7,000 
2,700 
High 
High 
450 
231 
0.06 
500% 
25% 
126% 
42% 
45% 
68% 
65% 
63% 
6 1 % 
61% 
62% 
101% 
75% 
43% 
29% 
11% 
6% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
55% 
85% 
95% 
99% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
Explained Variance Summary Table 
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRiskDet 
Description 
Outputs: 
Mona 
PVRR(d) 
Mona 
NPV w/o 
Reg. 
Recovery 
Mona IRR 
w/o Reg. 
Recovery 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Market Price 
Evap. Pond Construction 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Water Fixed O&M 
Water Residual Value 
Variable O&M 
26% 
43% 
9% 
11% 
4% 
4% 
1% 
i% 
i% 
i% 
27% 
41% 
10% 
11% 
4% 
4% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
55% 
1% 
30% 
0% 
10% 
0% 
4% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
"CONRDEiMTfAL 
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Appendix I Sensitivity Analysis Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
• Low 
• High Mona PVRR (d) 
P5 00O) 
Heat Rate/Capscrty 
Viler Pipeline CooslrucDon 
Market Price 
lna Dry Condenser Cost 
Plant Fixed OAM 
Ev»p pond Coostruaioa 
Water Fixed OAM 
Water Residual Value 
Variable OAM 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
High 
Base Value. (23 
PO 000) (25 000) 
10 400 
35 000 
H.jh 
450 
3000 
77 
500V. 
0 02 
2 100 
>928± 
(20 000) 
I 29 000 
3 
23 
Low 
(15 000) 
Low 
20 400 
150 
7000 
I 
J 00% 
006 
2,700 
(10 000) (5 000) 
• Low 
• High 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
lncr Dry Condenser Con 
Ev»p Pond Construction 
Plant Fixed OAM 
Water Freed OAM 
Water Cost pet Acre Foot 
Water Res dual Value 
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value: 15,250 
10 000 15 000 20 000 
CONRDENTWL 
Subject to Court Order 
Base 
Base 
Low 
20 400 
i t § 
Ltrw 
29 000 
7000 
150 
1 
1 
31 j 
2 700 
0 06 
100% 
i 
I \ 
High 
77 
2 10 
o tr 
I 50c 
3000 
10 400 
High 
35 000 
450 
O 
z 
c/, 
Base 
?AC005?T7 
Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
• High 
W»le Pipelme ConstractKm 
lncr Dry Condenser Cc* 
Evap Pond Construe! i on 
Wait COST per Acre FOOT 
Heat Rate/Cip*city 
PUnt Fued OAW 
W»ter Fixed OAM 
Wwe Res dual V»lue 
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value 62% 
20% 40% 60V 80% 100* 120% 140% 
20 400 
29 000 
7000 
2 700 
Low) 
Low! 
150 
231 
006 
J DOS 
! H 
•j 45 
2 100 
Hgh 
0 
77 
002 
500 V 
3 0O0 
10400 
35 000 
But 
15400 
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Appendix 1 Scenario Analysis Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
Risk Detective Scenario Analysis 
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:28:06 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det 
Scenarios: 81 
Boxed node represents first node in the tree. 
Node Description 
1 10 |Heat Rate/Capacity 
20 Water Pipeline Construction 
30 Market Price 
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
1 Node Description 
1 10 |Heat Rate/Capacity 
20 Water Pipeline Construction 
30 Market Price 
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
I Node Description 
10 [Heat Rate/Capacity 
20 Water Pipeline Construction 
30 Market Price 
1 Value 
Multiple-1 
10,400 
Low 
29,000 
Proba-
bility 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
Next 
Node 
20 
30 
40 
Value 
Multiple-2 
15,400 
Base 
30,000 
Proba-
bility 
50.00% 
50.00% 
50.00% 
50.00% 
Next 
Node 
20 
30 
40 
1 Value j 
Multiple-3 
20,400 
High 
35,000 
Proba- | 
bility 1 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
Next [ 
Node j 
20 
30 
40 
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost Endpoint Endpoint Endpoint 
Output Summary Table 
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:28:06 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det 
Decision Basis; Expected Value,Indepenc 
Output 
I Description 
Base 
Value 
ent Output Evaluation 
Expected 
Value Minimum | 
Distribution Values 
1 0 % j 5 0 % 1 90% [Maximum 
MonaPVRR(d) (23,928) (26,059) 
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recover) 15,250 16,663 
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery 62% 81 % 
(50,733) 
5,187 
15% 
(37,964) 
10,512 
25% 
(25,983) 
16,537 
62% 
(16,963) 
24,432 
130% 
(8,692) 
32,928 
202% 
Distribution Statistics 
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:28:06 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det 
Output 
Description 
Expected 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation! 
Variance Coef. of 
Skew ness 
Coef. of 
Kurtosis 
MonaPVRR(d) (26,059) 7,875 62,022,542 - 0 3 6 362 
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recover) 16,663 5,184 26,872,820 0.35 323 
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery 81 % 48% 23% 0.75 -3 
Distributions 
'CONFIDENTIAL 
Subject to Court Order 
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Appendix 1 Scenario Analysis Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
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Appendix 1 Scenario Analysis Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
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AppeDdix I 
Business: 
Department: 
PacifiCorp 
CAPITAIV(DEFERRED) EXPENDITURE AUTHORIZATION 
Water Rights Acquisition from Geneva Steel 
U.S. Energy - Generation 
Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft 
Total Amount Requested: $16,200,000 SAP Ref: N/A Date: 9-Apr-03 
Transition Initiative No: N/A 
{Description: Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water for use in a gas-fired genertion project to 
((Section I) to meet IRP requirements 
(Customer Benefit Achieved: Lower cost generation resources that meet IRP requirements. 
((Section 1) | 
[Classification: Profit Improvement Profit Maintenance 
1 Explicit Legal & Regulatory Implicit Legal & Regulatory 
I V Efficiency/ Cost Reduction Essential Business Support V I 
1 Health & Safety Transition Ennoblement j 
1 (Section 4) All Nominal $'s 
(Capital Expenditure Summary Budget Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan | 
I Year end 31st March: 
(Budgeted Spend 
(Proposed Spend 
| TOTAL 
$000 
0 
(2,574) 
2003 
$000 
0 
2004 
$000 
6,900 
2005 
$000 
(9,474) 
2006 
$000 
0 
2007 
$000 
0 
2008 onwards | 
$000 
0 j 
flnvestment Appraisal Summary J 
[ Year end 31 st March: 
US GAAP Impact 
(Free Cash Flow Profile (Section 2) 
EBIT Impact (Section 8) 
TOTAL 
$000 
102,979 
81,985 
2003 
$000 
2004 
$000 
(6,900) 
2005 
$000 
9,888 
2006 
$000 
1,231 
1^04 
2007 
$000 
1,211 
1,285 
2008 onwards | 
$000 I 
97,549 1 
79395 | 
UK GAAP Impact | 
[Capital Expenditure 
(Gross Margin 
OMAG 
IEBIT 
[Balance Sheet Impacts 
[Assets (provide detail) 
[Liabilities (provide detail) 
(2,988) 
78,804 
607 
79,411 
(2,988) 
0 
6,900 
6,900 
(9,888) 
(9,888) 
1,213 
18 
1,231 
1,179 
33 
1,211 
76,413 1 
556 1 
76,968 1 
INPV 15,250 i 
Discount Rate Used (%) 7.5% Inflation Rate Used (%) 3.0% I 
Sensitivities - Heat rate and Capacity, Pipeline Construction Cost, Market Prices, Dry Condenser Cost | 
IRR (%, post-tax, nominal) 61.6% 
[Submitted by: 
Business Approvals: 
Corporate Approvals: 
Name 
Barry Cunningham 
GEN1C 
PIC 
PPW Board 
Employee No. 
P07635 
Signature 
-
Date 1 
Seplembef 2001 Water Rtghls Appendix 1 »nd 2 x)» 
'CONFIDENTIAL 
Sub'ieiWQ Court Order PAC0053' 
1. Project Description, Objectives and Relevance to Approved Strategy 
Project description: 
Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water for use in a gas-fired generation project to meet IRP requnements 
Objective: Statement of customer benefits to be achieved 
Resource needs identified in the IRP are met m a lower-cost manner with a water-cooled CCCT, 
resulting m overall lower costomer prices than would otherwise be incurred 
Base case against which project is evaluated: 
The cost differences between a water-cooled CCCT and an air-cooled CCCT are quantified and show 
that purchasing water rights are economic 
Source and date of market power price assumptions: 
Official Forward Pnce Curves issued 10 December 2002 
Regulatory assumptions: 
Regulated Asset w/ regulatory kg of Approximately 1 year 
2. Summary Present Value of Revenue Requirement & Free Cash Flow Profile (excludes interest) 
[Present Value of Revenue Requirement (PVRR) Analysis: 
P VRR of Project Presented 
PVRR of Next Best alternative 
PVRR Difference (23,928) Analysis is a differential analysis of the relevant costs pertammg to 
! the decision to install Wet versus Dry cooling CCCT 
I Year end 31st March 
[Investment 
1 Capital Expenditure (Sect 4) 
I Capital Contribution (Sect 4) 
1 Terminal Value (Sect 6) 
(Impact on 
I Revenue 
I Cash Operating Costs 
I Change in Working Capital 
Cash Taxes (See below) 
[Free Cash Flow 
NPV at 7.5% nominal post-tax 
1 ax Calculation 
Operating Profit pre Deprec 
Tax Allowances (Sect 12) 
Taxable Profit 
Tax Payable @ 37 95 % 
Total 
$000 
2,988 
0 
20,581 
78,325 
1,086 
0 
0 
102,979 
15,250 
99,991 
2,988 
102,979 
39,081 
2003 
1
 $000 
0 
2004 
$000 
(6,900) 
(6,900) 
2005 
$000 
9,888 
9,888 
2006 
$000 
1,205 
26 
1,231 
1,231 
(89) 
1,142 
433 
2007 
$000 
1,170 
42 
1,211 
1,211 
254 
1465 
556 
2008 onwards 1 
$000 
20,581 
75,950 
1,018 
97,549 1 
97,549 
2,823 
100,372 
38,091 1 
CONFIDENTIAL 
3.a. Risk and Sensitivity Anatys.., t VRR 
1 Key assumptions impacting on project PVRR 
(Base Case 
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate 
J Water Pipeline Construction Cost 
HLH Official Market Prices 
[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost 
% Movement in 
key assumption 
-30% 50% 
-32% 32% 
Low High 
-3% 17% 
| Revised PVRR 
$000 
(23,928) 
(18,285) (33,286) 
(29,733) (18,124) 
(20,179) (27,835) 
(22,768) (29,733) 
Change in PVRR 
$000 
5,643 (9,358)1 
(5,805) 5,804 
3,749 (3,907)1 
1,160 (5,805)1 
3.b. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis NPV 
1 Key assumptions impacting on project NPV 
[Base Case 
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate 
[Water Pipeline Construction Cost 
HLH Official Market Prices 
[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost 
% Movement in 
key assumption 
-30% 50% 
-32% 32% 
Low High 
-3% 17% 
Revised NPV 
$000 
15,250 
11,616 21,274 
19,197 11302 
12,836 17,765 
14,460 19,197 
Change in 
$000 
(3,634) 
3,947 
(2,414) 
(790) 
NPV 
6,024 
(3,948) 
2,515 
3,947 
4. Investment Summary 
1 year end 31 st March: 
(Fixed Assets 
1 Land & Buildings 
1 Plant & Machinery 
1 Fixtures & Fittings 
I Design Expenditure 
1 Other Related Expenditure 
(Contingency 
AFUDC @ 6% 
(Surcharge @ % 
[Capital Contributions & Grants 
[Total Capita) Expenditure 
[Change in Working Capital 
Inventory 
Receivables 
Others 
[Total Working Capital Investment 
i Total 
$000 
0 
(15,038) 
0 
0 
12,050 
0 
434 
0 
0 
(2,574) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2003 
SOOO 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2004 
$000 
0 
6,900 
0 
6,900 
0 
2005 
$000 
(15,038) 
5,150 
414 
(9,474) 
0 
2006 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2007 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2008 onwards 1 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
oj 
Procurement Strategy Overview 
(If applicable, include a Summary of Quotes/Tenders Obtained) 
Supplier/Contractor 
Geneva Steel 
Value of Quote ($000) 
$6,900,000 
S«ptemk>« 2001 Water Rlghls Appendix 1 and 2 *b 
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6. Basis for terminal valuation 
ISectionfor describing valuation approach (sale liquidation, scrap, perpetuity/remainmg life calculation relating to 
\continuing business) and key assumptions 
Water nghts are sold at the end of the 35-year project life for a value equal to the purchase price 
plus escalation at 3% per annum 
7. Information on Discarded Assets 
Description of Asset 
Water nghts sold at end of 35 year project 
Net Book Value 
$000 
0 
Residual Value 
$000 
20,581 
Profit/(Loss) 
$000 
20,5811 
8. Profit Impact 
j year end 31st March. 
[Project Revenues or Cost Reductions 
[Less Project Direct Costs 
[Less Project OMAG 
Less Depreciation 
O p e r a t i n g Profit 
Interest @ 6 99 % 
Profit/(Loss) on Disposals (Sect7) 
Provisions 
Profi t Before Tax 
Tax 
Profi t After Tax 
Total 
$000 
78,325 
479 
607 
2,574 
81,985 
1,453 
20,581 
414 
104,433 
(39,632) 
64,800 
2003 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2004 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
$000 
0 
(265) 
414 
149 
(56) 
92 
2006 
$000 
1,205 
8 
18 
74 
1 3 0 4 
99 
1,403 
(533) 
871 
2007 
$000 
1,170 
9 
33 
74 
1,285 
99 
1384 
(525) 
859 
2008 onwards 1 
$000 
75,950 
462 
556 
2,427 
79395 1 
1321 
20381 
101,497^ 
(38318) 
' 62,979 1 
9 Timing and Milestones 
\(a) When is approval required by ? 
9-Apr-03 
\(b) When will contracts/orders be placed ? 
One to two months after PPW Board approval (expect Apnl 17, 2003) 
\(c) When will the project commence operation (month/year) ? 
Upon completion of purchase contract 
\(d) When will the project end (month/year) 7 
! Indefinite 
CONFIDENTIAL 
10. Post Investment Review/Audit 
Who will review/audit the project and when ? 
Appropriate reviews and audits will take place per current guidelines. 
11. Free Cash Flow Profile (excludes interest) 
(year end 31st March: 
[investment 
J Capital Expend 
1 Capital Contrib. 
I Term V»k>e (Seel 6) 
[Impact on: 
[Revenue 
ICash Operating Costs 
[Change in Working Capital 
[Cash Taxes (See below) 
Free Cash Flow 
[NPV at 7.5% nominal post 
tree Cash Flow T u Caknlaijon: 
[Operating Profit pre Deprec. 
[Tax Allowances (section 12) j 
Taxable Profit 
Tax Payable @ J H 5 y . i 
[ Total 
$000 
1 2,988 
0 
20,581 
78325 
1,086 
0 
(39,081) 
63,899 
15,250 
99,991 j 
2,988 
102,979 
39,081 j 
2003l 2004 
$000 $000 
(6,900) 
0 (6,900) 
2005 
$000 
9,888 
9,888 
2006 
$000 
1,205 
26 
(433) 
798 
1,231 
(89) 
1,142 
433 
2007 
$000 
1,170 
42 
(556) 
655 
1,211 
254 
1,465 
556 
2008 
$000 
1,269 
39 
(572) 
736 
1,308 
200 
1,508 
572 
2009 
$000 
1,446 
37 
(620) 
863 
1,483 
151 
1,633 
620 
2010 onwards 1 
$000 
20,581 
73,236 
942 
(36,899) 
57,860 
94,759 
2,472 
97,231 
36,899 ] 
12. Tax Allowances 
[year end 31st March: 
20 Year MACRS 
[Opening Balance 
(Additions 
[Allowances 
[Closing Balance 
15 Year MACRS 
[Opening Balance 
[Additions 
[ Allowances 
Closing Balance 
Other 
Opening Balance 
L^dditions 
[Allowances 
(Closing Balance 
Total Allowances 
Total 
$000 
5,556 
0 
9,888 
15,444 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(4,600) 
0 
(6,900) 
(11,500) 
2,988 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
$000 $000 $000 $000 
0 
371 
371 
0 
(460) 
(460) 
0 0 0 (89) 
2007 
$000 
371 
714 
1,085 
(460) 
(460) 
(920) 
254 
2008 
$000 
1,085 
660 
1,745 
(920) 
(460) 
(1380) 
200 
2009 
$000 
1,745 
611 
2 ^ 5 6 
(1,380) 
(460) 
(1,840) 
151 
2010 onwards j 
$000 
2356 
7,532 
9,888 
(1,840) 
(5,060) 
(6,900) 
2,472 
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Appendix 1 Economic Results Summary Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft 
Project Name: Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling 
($ 1,000s) 
Project Economics 
PVRR (d) 
Project NPV 
Project IRR 
Discount Rate Used 
Business Unit Cost of Capital 
Capital Productivity Ratio 
Payback Period (years) 
Capital Spending w/o AFUDC 
Capital Spending w AFUDC 
Customer 
Revenue 
Requirement 
($17,288) 
2003 
$0 
$0 
Net Cash Flow Without Regulatory Recovery 
Annual $0 
Cumulative $0 
Net Cash Flow With Regulatory Recovery 
Annual $0 
Cumulative $0 
Incremental Earnings Before Interest & Taxes 
Without Regulatory Recovery $0 
With Regulatory Recovery $0 
Incremental Earnings @ 55.0% Debt Financing 
Without Regulatory Recovery $0 
With Regulatory Recovery $0 
Annual Revenue Requirement 
Calculated 
Recovered 
$0 
$0 
Cash Flows 
Without Regulatory 
Recovery 
2004 
$13,800 
$13,800 
($13,800) 
($13,800) 
($13,800) 
($13,800) 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$10,414 
17,0% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
3.43 
6.4 Years 
2005 
($9,888) 
($9,060) 
$9,888 
($3,912) 
$9,888 
($3,912) 
$0 
$0 
$185 
$185 
$0 
$0 
Page 21 
Cash Flows 
With Regulatory 
Recovery 
2006 
$0 
$0 
$946 
($2,966) 
$788 
($3,124) 
$1,054 
$798 
$541 
$382 
($784) 
($256) 
$311 
8.2% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
1.07 
8.7 Years 
2007 
$0 
$0 
$779 
($2,187) 
$541 
($2,584) 
$994 
$610 
$511 
$273 
($465) 
($384) 
2008 
$0 
$0 
$861 
($1,325) 
$485 
($2,099) 
$1,094 
$487 
$578 
$201 
($589) 
($607) 
2009 
$0 
$0 
$991 
($334) 
$620 
($1,479) 
$1,273 
$675 
$693 
$322 
($793) 
($598) 
Appendix 1 Analysis Inputs Detail Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft 
Mona - Wet versus Dry Differential Analysis Inputs 
All Costs Stated in FY 2004 Dollars ($l,000s) 
Plant Data 
Capacity MWs 
Capacity Factor 
Generation GWhs 
WET 
Heat Rate btu/kWh 
rnrnBtu Required 
CCCT 
434 
0.74 
2,816 
7,235 
20,377,183 
DF 
76 
0.3 
200 
11,998 
2,396,337 
CO i-
CD' 
o 
O 
o 
o . 
CD 
^^/ariable O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored) 
Q Plant O&M $/MWh $ 0.04 
Water Delivery $/MWh 
Total O&M $/MWh 
Total O&M Dollars 
$ 
_: L. 
0.04 S 
113 $ 
P f f ixed O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored) 
"~? Plant O&M $ - $ 
1 Water Delivery O&M S \JA $_ 
ZZ2 Total O&M Dollars $ 154 $ 
> 
r*""t:apital (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored) 
Year Spent Inservice 
> 
n 
o o 
'J* 
Water Purchase 
Condenser Construction Cost 
Water Pipeline 
Evap. Pond 
Total Capital 
(beg. of year) 
2004 2006 
2005 2006 
2005 2006 
2005 2006 
Total 
3,016 
22,773,520 
113 
154 
13,800 
15,400 
5,000 
34,200 
DRY 
CCCT 
430 
0.74 
2,788 
DF Total 
75 
0.3 
198 2,986 
7,307 12,118 
20,375,146 2,396,097 22,771,242 
300 $ 
300 $ 300 
30,000 
30,000 
WET minus 
DRY 
Total 
30 
2,277 
113 
(M6) 
$ 13,800 
$ (30,000) 
$ 15,400 
$ 5,000 
$ 4,200 
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Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft 
Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis 
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:50:48 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslBisk Det 
Output: Mona PVRR (d) 
Base Value: (17,288) 
Description 
Base 
Input 
Low 
Input Output 
High 
Input Output 
Output 
Swing 
Explained 
Variation 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Market Price 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Evap. Pond Construction 
Water Residual Value 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Water Fixed O&M 
Variable O&M 
Base 
15,400 
Base 
30,000 
300 
5,000 
281% 
2,300 
154 
0.04 
Low 
10,400 
Low 
29,000 
150 
3,000 
100% 
2,100 
77 
0.02 
(11,644) 
(23,092) 
(13,539) 
(16,127) 
(14,913) 
(19,609) 
(15,589) 
(18,443) 
(18,507) 
(18,180) 
High 
20,400 
High 
35,000 
450 
7,000 
500% 
2,700 
231 
0.06 
(26,646) 
(11,484) 
(21,195) 
(23,092) 
(19,663) 
(14,966) 
(19^36) 
(14,978) 
(16,069) 
(16,396) 
15,002 
11,608 
7,656 
6,965 
4,750 
4,643 
3,747 
3,465 
2,438 
1,784 
41% 
66% 
77% 
85% 
90% 
94% 
96% 
98% 
99% 
100% 
Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis 
Created: 18^Mar-03 10:50:48 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls! Risk Det 
Output: Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value: 10,414 
Description 
Base 
Input 
Low 
Input Output 
.High. 
Input Output 
Output 
Swing 
Explained 
Variation 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Market Price 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Evap. Pond Construction 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Water Residual Value 
Water Fixed O&M 
Vanable O&M 
Base 
15,400 
Base 
30,000 
5,000 
300 
2,300 
281% 
154 
0.04 
Low 
10,400 
Low 
29,000 
3,000 
150 
2,100 
100% 
77 
0.02 
6,781 
14,362 
8,001 
9,625 
11,993 
8,885 
11,255 
9,420 
11,199 
10,988 
High 
20,400 
High 
35,000 
7,000 
450 
2,700 
500% 
231 
0.06 
16,439 
6,467 
12,929 
14,362 
8,835 
11,943 
8,732 
11,613 
9,629 
9,840 
9,658 
7,895 
4,929 
4,737 
3,158 
3,058 
2,523 
2,194 
1,570 
1,148 
39% 
66% 
76% 
86% 
90% 
94% 
96% 
98% 
99% 
100% 
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Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis 
Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis 
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:50:48 AM | 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det 
Output: Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value: 17% 
Description 
Base 
Input 
Low 
Input Output 
HiRh 
Input Output 
Output 
Swing 
Explained 
Variation | 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Evap. Pond Construction 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Market Price 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Water Fixed O&M 
Variable O&M 
Water Residual Value 
15,400 
30,000 
Base 
5,000 
2,300 
Base 
300 
154 
0.04 
281% 
10,400 
29,000 
Low 
3,000 
2,100 
Low 
150 
77 
0.02 
100% 
30% 
16% 
14% 
21% 
20% 
15% 
16% 
18% 
17% 
17% 
20,400 
35,000 
High 
7,000 
2,700 
High 
450 
231 
0.06 
500% 
11% 
30% 
21% 
14% 
14% 
19% 
18% 
16% 
17% 
17% 
19% 
15% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
0% 
49% 
79% 
86% 
92% 
97% 
99% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
Explained Variance Summary Table 
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:50:48 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det 
Outputs: 
Mona 
[ Description 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Market Price 
Evap. Pond Construction 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Water Residual Value 
Water Fixed O&M 
Variable O&M 
Mona 
PVRR(d) 
25% 
41% 
9% 
11% 
4% 
2% 
4% 
3% 
1% 
1% 
NPV w/o 
Reg. 
Recovery 
26% 
39% 
9% 
10% 
4% 
3% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
Mona IRR 
w/o Reg. 
Recovery 
49% 
7% 
30% 
2% 
6% 
5% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
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Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis l_.ase L - o,uuu /vcrc-n 
DLow 
• High Mona PVRR (d) 
(30 000) 
Heat Rate/Capacity 
W»icr Pipeline Construction 
Market Price 
Incr Dry Condenser Cost 
Plant Fixed OJtM 
Evap Pond Construction 
Water RcuduiJ Value 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Waier Fixed OAM 
Variable OAM 
High 
(25 000) 
10 400 
35 000 
Base Value: 
(20 000) 
t t 
Hifh 
450 
3000 
5 0 0 * 
2, 
j 
100 
77 
002 
(17,288 
(15 000) 
I) 
29 000 
Low 
150 
7000 
1 JOOtt 
; 
23 
2,700 
0 06 
(10 000) 
Low 
1 
j 20 400 
(5 000) 
DLow 
• High 
He»t Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
lncr Dry Condenser Coat 
Evap Pood Construction 
Prant Fixed O&M 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Waicr Residua! Value 
Water Fixed OAM 
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value: 10,414 
2000 4000 6000 B 000 10 000 12 000 14 000 16000 )8,000 
Low 
20 400 
• 
Low 
29 000 
7000 
150 
2 700 
>0 0% I 
">3I 
ow 
i • 
t : 
High 
21 
7 
3000 
450 
DO 
500% 
7 
0 02 
- »: 
10 400 
35 0OO 
High 
*£& 
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Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis Case i - o,uuu Acre-It 
• Low 
DHigh 
Water Pipeline Construction 
lncr Dry Condemn- Cart 
Heat Rare/Capactty 
Evap Pond Construction 
Water Cost per Acre Foot 
Plant Fixed O&M 
Water Fixed OAM 
Water Roichni Yah* 
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery 
Base Value: 17% 
10% 13% 20% 
20 400 t 
29 000 
Low 
7000 
2 700 
L 
»i ' t , n 
ow 
I. SO 
231 1 j 
0 0 6 | : 
1C I0%l 
|, -, , - . . . . ^ 
It 
t 
J 
t | 
I 
H 
jHi*h 
3DCO 
2)00 
igh 
30 
I ^ 
I 002 
50 I0> ; 
10 400 
35 000 
J5 4O0 
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Appendix 1 Scenario Analysis Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft 
Risk Detective Scenario Analysis 
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:30:40 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det 
Scenarios: 81 
Boxed node represents first node in the tree. 
[Node 
1 10 
20 
30 
40 
(Node 
1 10 
20 
30 
40 
[Node 
1 10 
20 
30 
Description 
jHeat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Market Price 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Description 
JHeat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Market Price 
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost 
Description 
JHeat Rate/Capacity 
Water Pipeline Construction 
Market Price 
Value 
Multiple-1 
10,400 
Low 
29,000 
Proba-
bility 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
Next 
Node 
20 
30 
40 
Value 
Multiple-2 
15,400 
Base 
30,000 
Proba-
bility 
50.00% 
50.00% 
50.00% 
50.00% 
Next 
Node 
20 
30 
40 
Value 
Multiple-3 
20,400 
High 
35,000 
Proba-
bility 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
25.00% 
Next 
Node 1 
20 
30 
40 
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost Endpoint Endpoint Endpoint 
Output Summary Table 
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:30:40 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det 
Decision Basts: Expected Value,Independen 
1 Output 
Description 
Base 
Value 
Output Evaluation 
Expected 
Value Minimum 1 
Distribution Values 
10% 1 50% 1 90% JMaximumj 
Mona PVRR (d) 
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery 
Mona IRR w/o Reg Recovery 
(17,288) 
10,414 
17% 
(19,418) 
11,828 
22% 
(44,093) 
352 
8% 
(31,324) 
5,677 
11% 
(19,343) 
11,701 
19% 
(10,323) 
19,597 
35% 
(2,051) 
28,093 
62% 
Distribution Statistics 
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:30:41 AM 
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det 
Output 
Description 
Mona PVRR (d) 
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery 
Mona IRR w/o Reg Recovery 
Expected 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Coef. of 
Skewness 
Coef. of 
Kurtosis 
(19,418) 7,875 62,022,542 -0.36 114 
11,828 5,184 26,872,820 0.35 84 
22% 12% 1% 149 -I39j 
Distributions 
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Appendix 1 Scenario Analysis ^a^c A - o,uuu /\ure-n 
inn°/ — 
90% 
80% 
* 70% 
"5 60% 
o 
u 
^ 50% 
1 •-
1 40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 1—•—•-
(50,000) 
ifift*/. • 
90% -
80% -] 
* 70% j 
» 50% 4 
at j 
g 40% 4 
1 E 
3
 r 
| 30% 4 
20% 4 
10% 4 
0% 4-*^—•— 
Mona PVRR (d) 
o j 
r^  
j 
_^-i ~ 
(40,000) (30,000) (20,000) 
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery 
L
—
J
—h-1—'—'—L-H—'—'—'—'—1—'—'—'—'—1—^~ 
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
EV (I9 4IS) 
1 1 1 1 L _ 
(10,000) 
EV UB3I 
1 1 1 J 1 L _ 
25,000 
-
30,000 
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Appendix 1 Scenario Analysis Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft 
JO 
© 
ft* 
100% 
90% 
80% 4-
70% + 
60% 
50% 
| 40% -f 
30% 
20% 
10% + 
0% 
0% 
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Subject to Court Order 
Page 29 
PArnn^oc 
Appendix 1 
Business: 
Department: 
PacifiCorp 
CAPITAL/(DEFERRED) EXPENDITUM: AUTHORIZATION 
Water Rights Acquisition from Geneva Steel 
U.S. Energy - Generation 
Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft 
(Total Amount Requested: $16,200,000 SAP Ref: N/A Date: 9-Apr-03 
1 Trans i t ion Initiative No: N/A 
(Description: Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water for use in a gas-fired genertion project to 1 
[(Section 1) to meet IRP requirements 1 
[Customer Benefit Achieved: Lower cost generation resources that meet IRP requirements. 1 
(Section 1) 
[Classification: Profit Improvement Profit Maintenance 1 
I Explicit Legal & Regulatory Implicit Legal &. Regulatory 1 
1 V Efficiency/ Cost Reduction Essential Business Support V 1 
j Health & Safety Transition Ennoblement | 
1 (Section 4) All Nominal X's 1 
Capital Expenditure Summary Budget Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan | 
Year end 31st March: 
[Budgeted Spend 
(Proposed Spend 
1 TOTAL 
SOOO 
\ o 
' 4,740 
t 2003 
1
 $000 
0 
2004 
$000 
13,800 
2005 
$000 
(9,060) 
2006 
$000 
0 
2007 
$000 
0 
2008 onwards | 
$000 
0 j 
(Investment Appraisal Summary j 
j Year end 31st March: 
[US GAAP Impact 
(Free Cash Flow Profile (Section 2) 
EBIT Impact (Section 8) 
TOTAL 
$000 
115,501 
73,512 
2003 
$000 
2004 
$000 
(13,800) 
2005 
$000 
9,888 
2006 
$000 
1,189 
1,054 
2007 
$000 
1,129 
994 
2008 onwards | 
$000 
117,095 1 
71,464 J 
U K GAAP Impact | 
Capital Expenditure 
Gross Margin 
loMAG 
EBIT 
[Balance Sheet Impacts 
[Assets (provide detail) 
[Liabilities (provide detail) 
3,912 
78,804 
(552) 
78,252 
3,912 
0 
13,800 
13,800 
(9,888) 
(9,888) 
1,213 
(24) 
1,189 
1,179 
(49) 
1,129 
76,413 1 
(479) 
75,934 1 
N P V 10,414 
Discount Rate Used (%) 7 .5% Inflat ion R a t e Used (%) 3 .0% 
Sensitivities - Heat rate and Capacity, Pipeline Cons t ruc t ion Cost , Marke t Prices, Dry Condenser Cost 
I R R (%, post-tax, nominal) 17 .0% 
[Submitted by: 
Business Approvals : 
Corpora te Approvals : 
Name 
Barry Cunningham 
GEN1C 
PIC 
PPW Board 
E m p l o y e e No. 
P07635 
Signature Date 
Seplembw 2001 Water Rlghls Appendix 1 and 2jds 
CONFIDENTIAL 
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1. Project Description, Objectives and Relevance to Approved Strategy 
Project description: 
Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water for use in a gas-fired generation project to meet IRP requnements 
Objective: Statement of customer benefits to be achieved 
Resource needs identified in the IRP are met in a lower-cost manner with a water-cooled CCCT, 
resulting m overall lower costomer prices than would otherwise be incurred 
Base case against which project is evaluated: 
The cost differences between a water-cooled CCCT and an air-cooled CCCT are quantified and show 
that purchasing water rights are economic 
Source and date of market power price assumptions: 
Official Forward Price Curves issued 10 December 2002 
Regulatory assumptions: 
Regulated Asset w/ regulatory lag of Approximately 1 year 
2 Summary Present Value of Revenue Requirement & Free Cash Flow Profile (excludes interest) 
Present Value of Revenue Requirement (PVRR) Analysis 
PVRR of Project Presented 
PVRR of Next Best alternative 
PVRR Difference (17,288) Analysis is a differential analysis of the relevant costs pertaining to 
the decision to install Wet versus Dry cooling CCCT 
| Year end 31 st March 
Investment 
Capital Expenditure (Sect 4) 
Capital Contribution (Sect 4) 
Terminal Value (Sect 6) 
Impact on 
Revenue 
Cash Operating Costs 
Change m Working Capital 
Cash Taxes (See below) 
[Free Cash Flow 
NPV at 7.5% nominal post-tax 
Tax Calculation 
Operating Profit pre Deprec 
Tax Allowances (Sect 12) 
Taxable Profit 
Tax Payable @ 37 95 % 
Total 
$000 
(3,912) 
0 
41,161 
78,325 
(73) 
0 
0 
115,501 
10,414 
119,413 
(3,912) 
115,501 
43,833 
2003 
$000 
0 
2004 
$000 
(13,800) 
(13,800) 
2005 
$000 
9,888 
9,888 
2006 
$000 
1,205 
(16) 
1,189 
1,189 
(549) 
640 
243 
2007 
$000 
1,170 
(41) 
1,129 
1,129 
(206) 
923 
350 
2008 onwards 1 
$000 
41,161 
75,950 
(17) 
117,095 
117,095 
(3,157) 
113,938 
43,240 
September 2001 W»lw Riphts Appendix 1 »nd 2 xJ* 
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I Key assumptions impacting on project PVRR 
[Base Case 
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate 
[Water Pipeline Construction Cost 
HLH Official Market Prices 
[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost 
% Movement m 
key assumption 
-30% 50% 
32% 32°/o 
Low High 
- 3 % 17% 
Revised PVRR 
$000 
(17,288) 
(11,644) (26,646) 
(23,092) (11,484) 
(13,539) (21,195) 
(16,127) (23,092) 
Change m PVRR 
$000 
5,644 (9,358)1 
(5,804) 5,804 
3,749 (3,907)1 
1,161 (5,804)1 
3.b. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis NPV 
1 Key assumptions impacting on project NPV 
[Base Case 
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate 
[Water Pipeline Construction Cost 
HLH Official Market Prices 
[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost 
% Movement in 
key assumption 
-30% 
-32% 
Low 
- 3 % 
5 0 % 
32% 
High 
17% 
Revised NPV 
$000 
10,414 
6,781 16,439 
14,362 6,467 
8,001 12,929 
9,625 14,362 
Change in 
$000 
(3,633) 
3,948 
(2,413) 
(789) 
NPV 
6,025 
(3,947) 
2,515 
3,948 
4. Investment Snmmary 
[ Year end 31 st March 
[Fixed Assets 
1 Land & Buildings 
1 Plant &. Machinery 
1 Fixtures & Fittings 
1 Design Expenditure 
Other Related Expenditure 
[Contingency 
AFUDC @ 6% 
Surcharge @ %_ 
Capital Contr ibut ions & Gran t s 
Total Capi tal Expendi ture 
Change in Working Capital 
Inventory 
Receivables 
Others 
jTotal Working Capi ta l Investment 
Total 
$000 
0 
(15,038) 
0 
0 
18,950 
0 
828 
0 
0 
4,740 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2003 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2004 
$000 
0 
13,800 
0 
13,800 
0 
2005 
$000 
(15,038) 
5,150 
828 
(9,060) 
0 
2006 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2007 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2008 onwards 1 
$000 
0 
0 
0 
ol 
1 0 
5. Procurement Strategy Overview 
(If applicable, include a Summary of Quotes/Tenders Obtained) 
[Supplier/Contractor 
[Geneva Steel 
Value of Quo te ($000) | 
$13,800,000 
S«pitmb« 2001 W»J« Rights Appendix 1 and 2 Jrts CONFIDENTIAL 
P A r n A C i o y 
6. Basis for terminal valuation 
{Section for describing valuation approach (sale, liquidation, scrap, perpetuity/remaining life calculation relating tc 
\contmumg business) and key assumptions 
Water rights are sold at the end of the 35-year project life for a value equal to the purchase pnce 
plus escalation at 3% per annum 
7, Information on Discarded Assets 
Description of Asset 
Water rights sold at end of 35 year project 
Net Book Value 
$000 
0 
Residual Value 
$000 
41,161 
Profit/(Loss) 
$000 
41,161 
8. Profit Impact 
! Year end 31 st March: 
Project Revenues or Cost Reductions 
Less Project Direct Costs 
Less Project OMAG 
Less Depreciation 
Operating ProOt 
Interest @ 6 99 % 
Profit/(Loss) on Disposals (Sect 7) 
Provisions 
Profit Before Tax 
Tax 
[Profit After Tax 
Total 
i 78,325 
479 
(552) 
(4,740) 
73,512 
(2,807) 
41,161 
828 
112,694 
(42,767) 
69,927 
2003 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2004 
s o o o _ 
0 
0 
0 
0__ 
2005 
. SQQQ 
0 
(531) 
828 
297 
("3) 
185 
2006 
, SOOO 
1,205 
8 
(24) 
(1351 
1,054 
(182) 
871 
.,,.. (331) 
541 
2007 
, SOOO 
1,170 
9 
(49) 
(135) 
994 
(170) 
824 
(313) 
511 
2008 onwards 1 
1 sooo 
75,950 
462 
(479) 
(4,469) 
71,464 1 
(1,924) 
41,161 
110,702 
(42,011) 
68,691 
9. Timing and Milestones 
S" 
U 
r 
U 
When 
When 
is approval required by ? 
will contracts/orders be placed 7 
9-Apr-03 
One to two months after PPW Board approval (expect April 17, 
When will the project commence operation 
When will the project end (month/year) ? 
(month/year) ? 
Upon completion o f purchase contract 
Indefinite 
2003) 
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H 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, 
INC., Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Steven L. KEIL, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 980250. 
Feb. 19, 1999. 
Employer alleged misappropriation of trade secrets 
by its former water treatment chemical salesman 
and sought preliminary injunction to enjoin disclos-
ure of trade secrets. The District Court, Farmington 
Department, Rodney S. Page, J., granted the pre-
liminary injunction. Employee's petition for inter-
locutory appeal was granted. The Supreme Court, 
Durham, Associate C.J., held that employer failed 
to establish prima facie case that its former employ-
ee misappropriated employer's product formulae or 
prices. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €^954(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XV1(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k950 Provisional Remedies 
30k954 Injunction 
30k954(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appellate court will not disturb a district court's 
grant of a preliminary injunction unless the district 
court abused its discretion or rendered a decision 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 65A(e). 
[2] Injunction 212 €^>147 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
2121 V(A)4 Proceedings 
212k 147 k. Counter Affidavits and 
Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
To establish substantial likelihood that applicant 
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, 
as element for issuance of preliminary injunction, 
applicant must at the very least make a prima facie 
showing that the elements of its underlying claim 
can be proved. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65 A(e)(4). 
| 3 | Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>414 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29T1V(A) In General 
29Tk414 k. Elements of Misappropri* 
ation. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5)) 
To establish a claim for misappropriation of trade 
secrets by employee, employer was required to 
show: (1) existence of a trade secret; (2) commu-
nication of the trade secret to employee under ex-
press or implied agreement limiting disclosure of 
the secret; and (3) employee's use of the secret that 
injured employer. 
|4| Injunction 212 €^>147 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Pro-
cure 
212IV(A)4 Proceedings 
212k 147 k. Counter Affidavits and 
Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Employer failed to establish prima facie case that 
its former water treatment chemical salesman mis-
appropriated employer's product formulae or prices, 
as required for preliminary injunction to enjoin dis-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(Cite as: 974 P.2d 821) 
closure of trade secrets; employer did not submit 
formulae or price sheets to trial court, and similarit-
ies between employer's formulae and the formulae 
for new employer's products could be explained by 
industry or regulatory demands. Rules Civ.Proa, 
Rule 65A(e)(4). 
*821 Joseph C. Rust, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for Appel- lant. 
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice: 
f 1 We granted appellant Steven Keil's petition for 
an interlocutory appeal from the district court's 
grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of 
plaintiff Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. 
("WEST"). 
f 2 For approximately twelve years prior to March 
2, 1998, Keil worked for WEST as a water treat-
ment chemical salesman. Keil voluntarily termin-
ated his employment with WEST on March 2, 
1998, and accepted a similar sales position with one 
of WESTs competitors, Brody Chemical 
("Brody"). Keil did not have an employment con-
tract with WEST nor did he sign a covenant not to 
compete with WEST should he terminate his em-
ployment with them. In the month prior to leaving 
WEST, Keil made several service calls for Brody 
and researched the availability of chemical ingredi-
ents for some of Brody's products. Keil also had 
meetings with Brody to discuss the viability of 
Brody's plans to increase its presence in the water 
treatment chemical business. During those meet-
ings, Brody assured Keil that Brody's products 
could compete with WESTs. 
f 3 While working for WEST, Keil had access to 
the formulae and prices for WEST'S water treatment 
chemicals. During *822 his employment, Keil de-
rived most of his commissions from sales of water 
treatment chemicals to Hill Air Force Base, Alliant 
Technologies, Laidlaw, Magnesium Corporation, 
Utah State University and E.G. & G. Immediately 
after leaving WESTs employ, Keil contacted the 
above clients to solicit their business for Brody, 
Page 2 
claiming that Brody's products were "very similar" 
to WESTs. 
H 4 On March 9, 1998, WEST filed a complaint 
against Keil in district court alleging misappropri-
ation of trade secrets. WEST claimed that Keil had 
misappropriated WESTs formulae and prices for its 
water treatment chemicals and supplied them to 
Brody, thereby giving Brody and Keil an unfair 
competitive advantage over WEST. At the time it 
filed the complaint, WEST also filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin Keil from contact-
ing the six major clients he had while working for 
WEST and to prohibit Keil from disclosing to 
Brody any confidential information obtained from 
WEST. The district court heard and granted 
WESTs motion for preliminary injunction. Keil 
then filed a motion for relief from the preliminary 
injunction and for a new trial. The district court 
heard and denied Keil's motion. Keil then filed a 
petition seeking permission to file an interlocutory 
appeal from the district court's grant of the prelim-
inary injunction. That petition was granted. 
Tf 5 In this appeal, Keil asserts that the district court 
erred in granting WESTs motion for a preliminary 
injunction because WEST failed to meet its burden 
of showing that (1) WEST would suffer irreparable 
harm unless the injunction issued, (2) the injury to 
WEST substantially outweighs the damage the in-
junction would cause Keil, and (3) WEST is likely 
to succeed on the merits of the underlying action. 
[I] 11 6 We will not disturb a district court's grant of 
a preliminary injunction unless the district court ab-
used its discretion or rendered a decision against 
the clear weight of the evidence. See Kasco Ser-
vices Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 90 (Utah 1992) 
(citing System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 
421, 425 (Utah 1983)). 
H 7Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure sets forth the elements that must be present be-
fore a preliminary injunction may issue: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm un-
363 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 1999 UT 16 
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less the order or injunction issues; 
(2) The threshold injury to the applicant outweighs 
whatever damage the proposed order or injunction 
may cause the party restrained or enjoined. 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be 
adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applic-
ant will prevail on the merits of the underlying 
claim, or the case presents serious issues on the 
merits which should be the subject of further litiga-
tion. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) (1998). Because we are per-
suaded that WEST failed to meet its burden under 
subsection four above, we reverse the district 
court's grant of a preliminary injunction. 
[2] H 8 To meet the requirements of subsection four, 
an applicant must, at the very least, make a prima 
facie showing that the elements of its underlying 
claim can be proved. See Utah State Road Comm'n 
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984) 
(suggesting that prima facie showing of the ele-
ments of the underlying claim is required for issu-
ance of preliminary injunction); see also Schwalm 
Elecs. Inc. v. Electrical Prods. Corp., 14 Ill.App.3d 
348, 302 N.E.2d 394, 397 (1973) (stating prima 
facie case of misappropriation of trade secrets is ne-
cessary to support issuance of an injunction); 
Paramount Office Supply Co. v. DA. hdaclsaac, 
Inc. 524 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I. 1987) (requiring 
prima facie evidence of misappropriation of cus-
tomer list prior to ordering injunction). 
[3] f 9 To establish a claim for misappropriation of 
trade secrets, WEST must show (1) the existence of 
a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade secret 
to Keil under an express or implied agreement lim-
iting disclosure of the secret, and (3) Keil's use of 
the secret that injures WEST. See Microbiological 
Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 
(Utah 1981). "An employer to obtain relief must 
establish that his former *823 employee's product is 
Page 3 
a copy of his own product." Id. at 696 (emphasis 
added). 
\ 10 Arguably, WEST established that its prices 
and formulae for its water treatment chemicals were 
secret and that it had an implied agreement with 
Keil limiting disclosure of the prices and formulae. 
In fact, even Keil's expert, Gary Loretitsch, testified 
that in the water treatment chemical business ~or-
mulae and prices are usually proprietary ana held 
confidential. 
[4] 11 11 However, WEST failed to establish that 
Keil copied its prices or its products and supplied 
them to Brody. At the hearing, Keil introduced cop-
ies of Brody's formulae and Keil's best recollection 
of WEST'S chemical formulae. The formulae are 
not identical. Furthermore, Keil's expert testified 
that although the formulae are somewhat similar, 
there are significant differences between Brody's 
and WEST'S formulae. Loretitsch explained that 
Brody's formulae differ from WEST'S in three 
ways. First, the individual ingredients in the formu-
lae are different chemicals. Second, the percentages 
of the individual chemicals present in each formula 
are different. Finally, the ratios of the individual 
components with respect to each other in Brody's 
formulae are not the same as in WEST'S. The expert 
then opined that Brody's formulae are not copied 
from WESTs. He then accounted for the similarit-
ies between WEST and Brody formulae by explain-
ing that to some extent all the chemical formula-
tions in this industry are driven by market and regu-
latory forces. 
U 12 In contrast, WEST neither submitted its formu-
lae to the trial court nor did it supply a price sheet. 
The court was forced to rely on Keil's best guess as 
to WESTs formulae and WEST'S representation 
that the prices were the same. WEST did not intro-
duce any expert testimony regarding whether 
Brody's formulae had in fact been copied from 
WEST. WEST relied on the self-serving statements 
of its president, Frank Leaver, who stated that 
Brody sold "almost duplicate products" after Keil 
began working for them. Notably, however, Leaver 
363 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 1999 UT 16 
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did not testify that Brody's formulae were copies of 
WESTs. 
f 13 In addition to his expert's testimony, Keil in-
troduced evidence illustrating that the water treat-
ment chemical industry is relatively easy to break 
into. Several industry publications set forth sugges-
ted general chemical make-ups for water treatment 
chemicals. Both Keil and Brody president John Lid-
diard described how Brody arrived at the formula-
tions for its products through consultation with 
Buckman Laboratories and affirmed that it did not 
copy its formulae from WEST. 
f 14 Finally, the district court's own findings sup-
port our conclusion that the injunction was improp-
erly granted. The court's findings indicate that it be-
lieved WESTs formulae, although not exact duplic-
ates, were "very similar" to Brody's. Similarities 
which can be explained by industry or regulatory 
demands cannot suffice to meet the requirement 
that Brody copied WESTs confidential formulae, 
especially in light of the abundant testimony that 
the formulae were not copied and the substantial 
amount of information in the public domain regard-
ing water treatment chemicals. WEST had the bur-
den of producing evidence that would establish that 
its formulae were in fact stolen by Keil for use by 
Brody. It is hard to see how this burden could pos-
sibly have been met when WEST never submitted 
actual formulae to the trial court for comparison 
purposes. 
K 15 In light of the foregoing, we find that the dis-
trict court's grant of the preliminary injunction was 
against the clear weight of the evidence. WEST did 
not meet its burden of establishing a prima facie 
case that Keil copied confidential information and 
supplied that information to Brody. Consequently, 
we reverse the district court's grant of a preliminary 
inj unction. 
Chief Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART, Justice 
ZIMMERMAN, and Justice RUSSON concur in 
Associate Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion. 
Utah, 1999. 
Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil 
974 P.2d 821, 14 IER Cases 1498, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1157, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 1999 UT 16 
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H 
2005 FED APP. 0446P 
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. 
Alexander A. STRATIENKO, M.D., Plaintiff-Ap-
pellant, 
v. 
CORDIS C O R P O K .\ I'U >\\ Defendant-Appellee. 
Argued: Sept. 21, 2005, 
Decided and Filed: Nov. 18. 2005. 
Background: Inventor brought diversity action 
against competitor alleging misappropriation of 
trade secret;, wrongful benefit, and breach of con-
tract. The United States District Court for the East-
ern DivStrict of Tennessee, Allan Edgar, Chief 
Judge, granted summary judgment for competitor. 
Inventor appealed 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit 
Judge, held that: 
(1) district court could consider declarations sub 
mitted by self-interested employees of corporate 
competitor when considering whether competitor 
met its burden on summary judgment, and 
(2) inventor did not show shared innovative fea-
tures between his device and competitor's device. 
A- 4. 
West Headnotes 
[1| Fitterai t.hil !** • <>ii,i - - *• \ €—^2539 
H;»A i edeiai Civii i i. ujd,:'« 
170AXVII Judgment 
170AXVII(C) Summary judgment 
170AXVII(C)3 Proceedings 
170Ak2536 Affidavits 
170Ak2539 k. Sufficienc :y of Sin >u " 
ing. Most Cited Cases 
District court could consider declarations submitted 
by self-interested employees of corporate competit-
or when considering whether competitor met its 
Page 1 
burden on summary judgment of demonstrate i*. ah 
sence of any genuine issue of material fact on in-
ventor's claim alleging misappropriation of trade 
secrets, since inventor did not impeach employees* 
credibility small possibility that documents were 
'•*^ i'»v;
 0r \iewed sub rosa by being in potentially 
ked office, negotiated revision of terms ,f 
iisclosure agreement, or retention of documents 
. . .i*w weeks, did not impeach employees' denial 
that the;- used or shared inventor's information 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 I I.S.C A.; W r 
T.C.A. §47-25-1701 etseq. 
|J | li.lil ,i,l n."" IM<»« RjjjjiLihuii ?*M <°;,-'4*2 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29T1V Trade Secrets and Propnrf.Tv Intonna 
tion 
29T1V(B) Actions 
29Tk429 Evidence 
29Tk432 k. Weight and Sufficiency of 
Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k 1002 Trade Regulation) 
Inventor did not show shared innovative features 
between his device and competitor's device, to 
show misappropriation of trade secret under Ten-
nessee law through circumstantial evidence, after 
competitor's employees denied use or sharing of in-
ventor's information after being given access to it 
through proposal, where inventor's experts did not 
state which characteristics of inventor's device, if 
any, rendered his device innovative or novel and 
gave him advantage in market over prior art and 
mere facts that inventor had trade secret and 
devices were generally similar did not mean that 
pertinent similarity had been shown to permit infer-
ence of use, West's T.C.A § 47-25-1701 etseq. 
i , - . j : K I - ; - . J L I ( I - - H 2 9 T € = > 4 1 4 
•i \ .,-iUbt anu iiuUe Regulation 
."•IP- Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
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29Tk414 k. Elements of Misappropri-
ation. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation) 
The four elements under Tennessee law for misap-
propriation of a trade secret are: (1) the existence of 
a trade secret; (2) communication of the trade secret 
to the defendant while in a position of trust and 
confidence; (3) defendant's use of the communic-
ated information; and (4) resulting detriment to the 
plaintiff. West's T.C.A. § 47-25-1701 et seq. 
[4] Federal Courts 170B €=^390 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision 
170BV1(B) Decisions of State Courts as Au-
thority 
170Bk388 Federal Decision Prior to State 
Decision 
170Bk390 k. Anticipating or Predict-
ing State Decision. Most Cited Cases 
Federal Courts 170B €^>391 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVT State Laws as Rules of Decision 
170BVf(B) Decisions of State Courts as Au-
thority 
170Bk388 Federal Decision Prior to State 
Decision 
170Bk391 k. Sources of Authority; As-
sumptions Permissible. Most Cited Cases 
Where a state supreme court has not spoken on an 
issue of state law presented in federal litigation, the 
task of a federal court is to discern, from all avail-
able sources, how that state court would respond if 
confronted with the issue. 
[5] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>432 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29T1V(B) Actions 
29Tk429 Evidence 
29Tk432 k. Weight and Sufficiency of 
Page 2 
Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 3 82k 1002 Trade Regulation) 
Sufficient circumstantial evidence of use in trade-
secret cases must demonstrate that: (1) the misap-
propriating party had access to the secret, and (2) 
the secret and the defendant's design share similar 
features. 
[6] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>431 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29TIV(B) Actions 
29Tk429 Evidence 
29Tk431 k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 3 82k 1001 Trade Regulation) 
On a trade secret claim, it is entirely reasonable for 
the jury to infer that the defendant used the 
plaintiffs trade secret once evidence of access and 
similarity is proffered. 
[7| Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T ©=>430 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29T1V(B) Actions 
29Tk429 Evidence 
29Tk430 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 3 82k 1000 Trade Regulation) 
Under Tennessee law, circumstantial evidence of 
use is permitted in a trade-secret case. West's 
T.C.A. §47-25-1701 et seq. 
|8] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^=>417 
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29TIV(A) In General 
29Tk417 k. Necessity That Information 
Be Secret. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation) 
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Under Tennessee law, misappropriation of a trade 
secret requires that an idea not be one that is 
already used by others. West's T.C.A. § 47-25-1701 
et seq. 
:
 f'•• ^ *-•• * ~ ade Regulation 29T €—>413 
?{>I Antitrust and I ade Regulation 
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
tion 
29 rrV(A) In Genera! 
29TM13 k. What Are "Trade Secrets" or 
Other Protected Proprietary Information, in Gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation) 
Under Tennessee law, identification of the trade 
secret that provides the owner with an advantage in 
the market is necessary for determining whether the 
pertinent similarity implies that a competitor used 
his secret; the analysis of similarity evaluates only 
relevant, innovative features, not all possible con-
gruence. West's T.C.A. § 47-25-1701 et seq. 
[10] Antitrust and I i ade Regulation 29T € ^ > 426 
2l) l Awnir.. •• niid Trade Regulation 
29 FIV iradc Secrets and Proprietary Informa 
tion 
29T1V(B) Actions 
2971426 k. In General Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 382k996 Trade Regulation) 
Tennessee law does not recognize a cause of action 
for conversion of intangible property, or trade 
secrets in. particular. West's T C.A § 47 25-1701 et 
seq. 
Patents 29! €=>328(2) 
291 Patents 
291XIII Decisions, ou UK- wdidir * oi,;t;,.,i^« , 
and Infringement of Particular Patent 
291k328 Patents Enumerated 
291k328(2) k. Original Utility. Most 
Cited Case;* 
5,066,285, • xo- M- .^d. 
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*594 ARGUED: Matthew D. Brown field, Grant, 
Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C., Chattanooga, Ten-
nessee, for Appellant. Kelsey I. Nix, Willkie, Farr 
& Gallagher, LLP, New York, New York, for ,<Vp 
pellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew D. Brownfield, John 
P. Konvalinka, Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, 
P.C., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kel-
sey I. Nix. Diane C. Ragosa, John M. DiMatteo, 
' -e, Purr & Gallagher, LLP, Mew York, New 
Y U- \ppdlr. 
Before: COLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; 
BECKW* VN i M„..f district Judge,™* 
! ' ' -\-' > i« t7 - ta i^_ X i . i J n . BtL-k'^Yn. 
Chief I hiked States District Ji dge for the 
Southern :>isinr- o,,[)hii> sim ie b^ de*tg 
nation. 
Plaintiff Dr. Alexander S;;MK:nM; -A*.- cleared J 
catheter device and shared hi: de^-is <or 'hi 
device with Defendant Cordis Corporation, brought 
this federal diversity suit against Cordis for mi sap 
propriation of a trade secret, wrongful benefit, and 
breach of contract. The district court; granted sum-
mary judgment to Cordis, and Dr. Stratienko ap-
peals. He challenges (1) the district court's reliance 
on self-interested declarations of Cordis employees, 
(2) the district court's determination that circum-
stantial evidence can never create a genuine issue 
of material fact in trade-secret cases, and (3) the 
district court's determination that the Tennessee tort 
of conversion does not extend to conversion of 
trade secrets. 
The district court properly relied on declarations of 
Cordis employees notwithstanding the employees' 
self-interest. Also, although Tennessee law likely 
provides that Dr. Stratienko was entitled to an op-
portunity to demonstrate that Cordis used his cath-
eter design by relying on circumstantial evidence. 
Dr. Stratienko failed to proffer sufficient evidence 
of similarity between his trade secret and Cordis' 
catheter to create a genuine issue of material fact 
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concerning use by Cordis of Dr. Stratienko's secret. 
Summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate on 
his claims for misappropriation, wrongful benefit, 
and breach of contract. Dr. Stratienko's other con-
tentions on appeal are without merit, and we ac-
cordingly affirm the judgment of the district court. 
I. 
Dr. Stratienko's device is a modified catheter used 
for gaining medical access to blood vessels. Cordis 
explained the conventional medical practice associ-
ated with catheters in the following manner, which 
is consistent with the description of conventional 
practice in Dr. Stratienko's patent: 
An interventional cardiology procedure gener-
ally begins by inserting a hollow needle into the 
femoral artery, which is located close to the sur-
face of the skin in the groin area. A wire called a 
guidewire is then inserted through the needle into 
the artery, and the needle is withdrawn. Another 
device called a sheath is then inserted over the 
guidewire into the artery. A sheath is a 4-9 inch 
hollow tube with a valve at the end which re-
mains outside the body ("proximal end"). The 
valve prevents excess blood loss. The sheath re-
mains in place throughout the procedure. 
*595 Next, a 35-40 inch hollow tube called a 
guiding catheter is inserted through the sheath 
and into the artery. The guiding catheter has a 
soft, flexible tip at the end that is inserted into the 
patient ("distal end"). The distal end positions the 
catheter into a specific blood vessel within the 
heart ("coronary artery"). The guiding catheter 
also remains in place throughout the procedure. 
Other medical devices such as angioplasty bal-
loons and stents can be inserted through the guid-
ing catheter and into the patient's coronary artery 
to treat the blockage. 
Appellee's Br. at 4-5. 
Dr. Stratienko submitted a patent application for a 
"sheath catheter." His design combines a sheath 
Page 4 
and a catheter with a preformed distal end. While 
the record is surprisingly unclear as to the benefits 
of the unified sheath-catheter, it appears that it al-
lows a smaller puncture hole while providing ne-
cessary support during the invasive procedure. The 
preformed distal end is soft and flexible, which al-
lows more precise engagement of targeted seg-
ments. His design also has holes at the end of the 
catheter, allowing direct delivery of x-ray contrast 
fluid to a segment of the targeted vessel; traditional 
delivery of contrast fluid must first displace blood 
to reach the intended segment. 
On May 25, 1999, Dr. Stratienko, a Tennessee res-
ident, sent a letter and Nondisclosure Agreement to 
Cordis Corporation. Cordis is a Florida corporation 
with its principal place of business in New Jersey, 
and is a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. In Au-
gust 1999, Cordis' Associate Manager of Business 
Development William Scheessele proposed changes 
to the agreement and faxed them to Dr. Stratienko. 
Over a period of months, the parties negotiated the 
terms of the agreement. Cordis deleted portions re-
garding remedies for breach and regarding return of 
the materials. The agreement specifically provided 
that Dr. Stratienko's information was a trade secret. 
The parties executed the agreement in November 
1999. On December 12, 1999, Dr. Stratienko sub-
mitted his patent application and a description of 
his "sheath catheter" to Scheessele. 
Cordis' internal written policy states that "Reviews 
[of submitted proposals] will be conducted by 
members of New Business Development, New 
Product Strategy, Legal, and to a lesser degree, 
senior members of R & D. It is our goal to minim-
ize exposing our innovative engineering talent pool 
to external ideas, to safeguard our interests to our 
own internal inventions." Scheessele provided Dr. 
Stratienko's submitted material to Cordis' in-house 
counsel Paul Coletti in mid-December 1999. Both 
Scheessele and Coletti declare that they discussed 
Dr. Stratienko's proposal, but they deny discussing 
the proposal with anyone else at Cordis or Johnson 
& Johnson. Scheessele declares that he kept the 
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proposal in his locked file cabinet at all times, but 
Coletti cannot remember whether he placed the 
documents in a locked cabinet or safe. On January 
17, 2000, Cordis advised Dr. Stratienko that Cordis 
was not interested in his proposal. Coletti returned 
the related documents, at the latest, by mid-
February and kept no copies. 
On April 7, 2000. , Cordis submitted a combined 
sheath and guiding catheter, which it called the 
Vista Brite Tip Introducer Guiding Catheter, for 
FDA approval. The FDA approved it on A pi il 28, 
2000. Cordis sales documents establish that Cordis 
manufactured and shipped "seventy-eight Vista 
Brite I ip IG Catheters as of May 29, 2000." 
Dr.. Stratienko alleges that Cordis has given varying 
reasons for its rejection of his proposal. According 
to Dr. Stratienko, *596 Scheessele originally told 
him that Cordis was not interested because Dr. Stra-
tienko's proposal was not within Cordis' product-
development budget, and Scheessele later told him 
that the company had no interest in his invention. 
Scheessele stated at his deposition that the proposal 
did not meet Cordis' needs. Dr. Stratienko further 
alleges that Coletti told Dr. Stratienko's patent at-
torney that a U.S. Patent (No. 5,066,285, the Hill-
stead Patent) disclosed a combination sheath-cath-
eter method similar to Cordis' Vista Brite Tip IG 
Catheter. Dr. Stratienko also stated in his affidavit 
that, for the first time in August 2002, Cordis in-
formed him that another U.S. Patent (No. 
5,897,497, the Fernandez Patent) disclosed the 
combination sheath-catheter. Cordis does not chal-
lenge that it gave Dr. Stratienko several reasons for 
its disinterest. 
Dr.. S'tratienko filed suit in I Iamilton Coun'ty Circuit 
Court on November 21, 2001, and Cordis removed 
the case to the federal district court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee in January 2002. Dr. Stratien-
ko alleged that Cordis had misappropriated, conver-
ted, and wrongfully benefitted from his ideas; 
breached the Nondisclosure Agreement; and com-
mitted theft of a trade secret under Tennessee's Uni-
form Trade Secret Act, Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 
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i. Lt - -"' * vid.^ .'MVWJ IJI **innlary judg-
ment <>; all o! I >? Stratienko's claim.. The primary 
pieces of evidence submitted were (1) deposition 
testimony and declarations of both Scheessele and 
Coletti and (2) Micheline Johnson and David Hill's 
expert reports submitted by Dr. Stratienko. David 
Hill was Dr. Stratienko's patent attorney. Both ex-
perts stated that neither the HiII.stead rioi the 
Fernandez patents "teach" the sheath-catheter 
design, and both determined that Dr. Stratienko's 
proposal shared all the "salient features" of the 
Vista Brite Tip IG, except for the holes at the distal 
end. 
In October 2003, the district court granted Cordis' 
motion for summary judgment in full. The district 
court reasoned that, because this circuit requires 
direct evidence of use in trade-secret cases and be-
cause Dr. Stratienko offered only circumstantial 
evidence of use, Dr. Stratienko was unabk- to 
demonstrate that Cordis used his idea. Witmsu* 
evidence that Cordis used his secret, Dr. Strarienku 
was unable to rebut the evidence of Cordis' em.Vioy 
ees, who denied discussing his ideas with M -UV, 
else. Dr. Stratienko's claims for misappropriation, 
breach of contract, and wrongful benefit all failed, 
therefore, as a matter of law. The coun alsr. -1« -a-
ined that there was no violation ol the b^-- ;r» 
Trade Secret Act because Cordis' alleged theft in 
April and May 2000 occurred before the July 2000 
effective date of the Tennessee statute. Finally, the 
district eojrt held that Tennessee does not recog-
nize a civ'- -••• of action for conversion oftra.de secrets. 
Earlier, during March 2003, Dr. Stratienko had 
moved for leave to amend his complaint so that he 
could add a patent-infringement claim involving a 
patent that is irrelevant to his trade-secret claims, 
and the district court had granted the motion in 
April. In February 2004, Dr. Stratienko moveJ =W 
voluntary dismissal of this claim, but the -.,* up 
denied his request. In March 2004, Cordis mi^ed 
for summary judgment, arguing that ->r. Strati en 
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ko's patent was not new because Cordis had paten-
ted a combined sheath-catheter in 1997, over a year 
before Dr. Stratienko filed his first patent applica-
tion, This was the first time that Cordis had pro-
duced any evidence of its patented 1997 Webster 
Guiding Sheath. On the eve of the summary judg-
ment hearing, Dr. Stratienko *597 moved for vol-
untary dismissal with prejudice of his patent-
infringement claim. The district court granted the 
motion in October 2004. 
Dr. Stratienko appeals the district court's October 
2003 grant of summary judgment in favor of Cord-
is. He challenges the rejection of each of his origin-
al claims, except for the claim under Tennessee's 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. We affirm because (1) 
the district court properly considered the declara-
tions of Cordis employees in determining that 
Cordis, as the moving party, satisfied its burden of 
demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact 
existed; (2) Dr. Stratienko did not respond with suf-
ficient evidence to create a genuine issue of materi-
al fact as to whether Cordis used his catheter 
design; and (3) Tennessee's cause of action for con-
version does not extend to conversion of trade 
secrets. 
II. 
This court reviews the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo. See United States v. 
Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 805 (6th Cir.2002). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and when the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This court must view the 
facts contained in the record and draw all infer-
ences from the record in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 
1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). This court cannot 
weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any 
matter in dispute, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
All U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 9*1 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1986), because this court determines only whether 
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the case contains sufficient evidence from which a 
jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party, 
id at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party 
fulfills its burden of demonstrating that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party, 
to receive a trial, must present some significant pro-
bative evidence creating a factual issue. Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Because Cordis met 
its burden and Dr. Stratienko failed to meet his, 
summary judgment was proper. 
III. 
[1] Cordis submitted declarations by Coletti and 
Scheessele, in which they deny sharing Dr. Stra-
tienko's information with anyone else at Cordis. Al-
though these declarations came from self-interested 
employees, Cordis can rely on those denials to 
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists because Dr. Stratienko has not impeached the 
declarants' credibility. Dr. Stratienko argues that 
the following language in Reeves v Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 
2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting 9A Charles 
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure at 300 (2d ed.1995)), precludes the 
district court from considering Scheessele and 
Coletti's declarations in deciding a motion for sum 
mary judgment and thus leaves Cordis with no 
evidence denying use: "[T]he court should give cre-
dence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as 
well as that 'evidence supporting the moving party 
that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to 
the extent that that evidence comes from disinter-
ested witnesses.' " rNI Dr. Stratienko misinter-
prets *598 the import of this language to mean that 
courts may never consider affidavits of interested 
persons when the affidavits are submitted by a 
moving party. 
FN1. Although Reeves concerned whether, 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, sufficient evidence 
existed to support a jury verdict in an age-
discrimination case, the unanimous Court 
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stated that "the standard for granting sum-
mary judgment 'mirrors' the standard for 
judgment as a matter of law, such that 'the 
inquiry under each is the same.' " Reeves, 
530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citations 
omitted). rhus, Reeves ' analysis is relev-
ant to our summary judgment analysis. 
This court has already considered this issue in Al-
mond v, ABB Indus. Sys., Inc., 56 Fed.Appx. 672, 
2003 WL 173640 (6th Cir. Jan.22, 2003) (per curi-
am), and held that courts can consider the testimony 
of a moving party's interested witnesses. The court 
held that the interpretation of Reeves advocated by 
Dr. Stratienko "leads to absurd consequences" be-
cause defendants will often be able to respond only 
through the testimony of their employees. Almond, 
56 Fed.Appx. 672, 2003 WL 173640, at *2. To sup-
port its conclusion, the Almond court cited addition-
al language from Federal Practice and Procedure; 
"The testimony of an employee of [the movant] 
must be taken as true when it disclosed no lack of 
candor, the witness was not impeached, his credib-
ility was not questioned, and the accuracy of his 
testimony was not controverted by evidence 
...."Wright & Miller at 287 n. 9. Almond 's holding 
is consistent with Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v, Mar-
tin, 283 U.S. 209, 218, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75'L.Ed. 983 
(1931), in which the Supreme Court stated that 
courts need not deny the conclusiveness of testi-
mony of the moving party that "is not contradicted 
by direct evidence, nor by any legitimate inferences 
from the evidence^]" because the rule requiring 
that testimony be considered by the jury is not "an 
absolute and inflexible one." Almond and Ches-
apeake establish that the issue, therefore, is not 
whether the district court could consider the affi-
davits of Cordis but instead whether the affidavits 
were uncontradicted 
Dr. Stratienko unsuccessfully contends that the fol 
lowing pieces of evidence so impeach or controvert 
the testimony of Scheessele and Coletti that their 
testimony is not sufficient for summarv judgment: 
(1) Cordis did not follow • ::>.;••••, .^h*-. P ) 
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(VleUi -.'-n hi> .'lila- unlocked. i3) Coletti :t:\tined 
Dr. Stratienko's information for weeks after he de-
clined the proposal, (4) Cordis recommended 
changes to the Nondisclosure Agreement, and (5) 
Cordis provided several reasons for declining the 
proposal. Because none of these facts, however, im-
peach Scheessele and Coletti's testimony, the dis-
trict court correctly relied upon Cordis" declara- tions. 
Cordis followed its internal policy, and thus the in-
ternal policy has no bearing on the declarants' cred-
ibility. Dr. Stratienko argues that Cordis' policy, 
stating that reviews "will be conducted by members 
of New Business Development, New Product 
Strategy, Legal, and to a lesser degree, senior mem 
bers of R & D[J" impeaches the declarants' testi-
mony that they were the only individuals to see his 
proposal. There is no inconsistency here. Cordis es-
tablished the policy "to minimize exposing our in-
novative engineering talent pool to external ideas, 
to safeguard our interests to our own internal inven-
tions." The policy does not mandate that other in-
dividuals read tf ic proposal. Its purpose, as evid 
enced by "to a lesser degree," is to limit the indi-
viduals who have access to secrets. In this case, 
consistent with the policy, Scheessele, a member of 
New Business Development, and Coletti, a member 
of the legal department, examined the proposal. The 
fact that the policy may have permitted others to 
view the proposal does *599 not create any evid-
ence that they, in fact, viewed it. 
Coletti's uncertainty as to whether he kept Dr. Stra-
tienko's documents in a locked or unlocked office 
fails to impeach his testimony that he did not share 
Dr. Stratienko's information with others at Cordis. 
Dr. Stratienko contends that Coletti said that the 
documents were left in an unlocked office. But 
Coletti, instead, said that he was unsure whether the 
documents were locked away. The small possibility 
that the documents were stolen or viewed sub rosa 
by being in a potentially unlocked office does not 
impeach Coletti's testimony that he did not share 
Dr. Stratienko's information with anyone at Cordis, 
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Likewise, Coletti's retention of Dr. Stratienko's in-
formation for weeks after he declined the proposal 
does not contradict the declarations. Although Dr. 
Stratienko argues that Coletti's retention of the doc-
uments creates a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Cordis used the documents, the retention 
does not demonstrate in any way that Cordis used 
the information or that Coletti shared the informa-
tion with anyone else. Any allowable inference that 
the retention of documents for a few weeks in-
creases the probability that Cordis shared them with 
Research and Development is too tenuous to create 
a genuine issue of material fact as to use. 
That Cordis had recommended changes to the 
Nondisclosure Agreement in no way impeaches the 
testimony of Scheessele and Coletti. Dr. Stratienko 
argues that, because Cordis' suggested changes af-
fected the remedies and the return of documents, 
the declarants' credibility is impeached. Both Cord-
is and Dr. Stratienko negotiated the details of the 
agreement, and the agreement contains several pro-
visions that protect Dr. Stratienko. Dr. Stratienko 
never explains how the revised terms, reached at 
arm's length, affect credibility or make it any more 
likely that Cordis used the proposal. 
Dr. Stratienko's final argument-that Cordis' several 
reasons for declining the proposal impeach the de-
clarants' testimony-also fails because the various 
reasons are not contradictory. According to Dr. 
Stratienko, Coletti gave only one reason: that the 
Hillstead patent disclosed the catheter-sheath com-
bination. Scheessele gave three reasons: (1) that 
Cordis was not interested; (2) that the proposal did 
not meet Cordis' needs; and (3) that the proposal 
was not within Cordis' budget. Dr. Stratienko also 
alleges that Cordis later said that the Fernandez pat-
ent disclosed the catheter-sheath combination. 
None of these reasons is inconsistent with another. 
Cordis could have been uninterested because the 
proposal was not within its budget and did not meet 
its needs. Reliance on two other patents also raises 
no inconsistency because Cordis was not limited to 
only one patent from which to glean inspiration. 
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Moreover, relying on two patents provides good 
reason why Cordis was uninterested. Even assum-
ing that the recitation of several reasons creates 
credibility issues as to why Cordis declined the pro-
posal, it does not make it any more likely that the 
proposal was given to others or used in any way. 
Dr. Stratienko's attempts to impeach the declarants' 
credibility thus are insufficient to require the con-
clusion that the district court could not consider the 
declarations submitted by Cordis in considering 
whether Cordis met its burden of demonstrating the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact. 
IV. 
[2] Because Cordis' declarations satisfied Cordis' 
burden, the burden of creating a genuine issue of 
material fact shifted to Dr. Stratienko, who failed to 
produce sufficient*600 evidence of use to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cordis 
used his secret. The district court held that Dr. Stra-
tienko could not demonstrate that Cordis used his 
design through circumstantial evidence of (1) Cord-
is1 access to Dr. Stratienko's secret and (2) the sim-
ilarity between Dr. Stratienko's secret and Cordis' 
catheter. Even assuming that circumstantial evid-
ence in the form of access and similarity may in 
some cases be sufficient evidence of use, such evid-
ence is not sufficient here. Dr. Stratienko's evidence 
fails to identify which, if any, innovative features 
his and Cordis' designs share, and he is, therefore, 
unable to show sufficient relevant similarity to per-
mit a circumstantial inference in this case. In light 
of the uncontested declarations of Cordis' employ-
ees and Dr. Stratienko's failure to produce suffi-
cient evidence of shared innovative features, there 
is no genuine issue of material fact that Cordis used 
Dr. Stratienko's design. 
[3] [4] The district court accurately described the 
four elements under Tennessee law for misappro-
priation of a trade secret: (1) the existence of a 
trade secret; (2) communication of the trade secret 
to the defendant while in a position of trust and 
confidence; (3) defendant's use of the communic-
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ated information; and (4) resulting detriment to the 
plaintiff. See Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L 
Labs,, Inc., 592 ' S.W.2d 583, 586 
(Tenn.Ct.App.1979) (citing Smith v. Dravo Corp., 
203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir.1953)). Ihe issue in this 
case concerns the third element-whether Cordis 
used the confidential information that Dr. Stratien-
ko communicated in his proposal. The parties have 
not referred to and we have not discovered any 
Tennessee cases considering whether parties may 
-*'!• MI Jicumstantial evidence to prove use of a 
•:a.i: secret. "Where the state supreme court has not 
^pu^n, our task is to discern, from all available 
sources, how that court would respond if confron-
ted with the issue." Rector v. Gen Motors Corp., 
963 F.2d "144, 146 (6th Or. 1992). 
|5J|()| Contrary to the district court's reasoning, a 
strong argument could be made that courts may 
properly consider circumstantial evidence concern-
ing similarity of design plus access to the design to 
imply use by a defendant of a trade secret. Other 
circuit courts have permitted such an inference in 
trade-secret and nondisclosure cases. See Sokol 
Crystal Prods., Inc. v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 15 
F.3d 1427, 1432 (7th Cir.1994); see also Leggett & 
Piatt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg., 285 F.3d 1353, 
1361 (Fed.Cir.2002); Pioneer Hi-Bred Ml v. 
Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1239 (8th 
Cir.1994); Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust 
& Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561-62 (4th 
Cir. 1990); Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon 
Co., 771 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1985); SI Handling 
Sys. v.. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1261 (3d Cir.1985); 
Droeger v. Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d 
790, 793 (9th Cir. 1976). Sufficient circumstantial 
evidence of use in trade-secret cases must demon-
strate that (1) the misappropriating party had access 
to the secret and (2) the secret and the defendant's 
design share similar features. See, e.g., Leggett & 
Piatt, 285 F.3d at 1361; Droeger, 541 F.2d at 793. 
These cases support the proposition that, once evid-
ence of access and similarity is proffered, it is 
"entirely reasonable for [the jury] to infer that 
[defendant] used [plaintiffs] trade secret," Sokol, 
n K3dat 1432. 
[7J Permitting an infereiu c ui u- *. -,•>, ;dence of 
access and similarity ^ ,:• l because 
"[misappropriation and misuse can rarely be 
proved by convincing direct evidence.'1 Eden Han-
non & Co., 914 F.2d at 561 (citing *6QlGreenberg 
v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F.Supp. 806, 814 
(E.D.Pa 1974) ). Presented with "defendants' wit-
nesses who directly deny everything," plaintiffs are 
often required to "construct a web of perhaps am-
biguous circumstantial evidence from which the tri-
er of fact may draw inferences which convince him 
that it is more probable than not that what the 
plaintiffs allege happened did in tact take place," 
Id. Thus, requiring direct evidence would foreclose 
most trade-secret claims from reaching the jury be-
cause corporations rarely keep direct evidence of 
their use ready for another party to discover. Case-
law from other circuits thus suggests that Tennessee 
law would most likely permit circumstantial evid-
ence of use in trade-secret cases.FN2 
F"N2, Our unpublished opinion in Americ-
an Relocation Network International v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 121 F.3d 707, i '9 ' 
WL 415313 (6th Cir July 21, 1997), is not. 
to the contrary. In American Relocation, 
the plaintiff shared with Wal-Mart her ide«i 
for an automated real-estate computer s> 
tei i i. Wal-Mart declined her proposal hvJ 
later allowed another entity, with whirl- ^ 
had. been dealing during this same period, 
to begin an automated real-estate vennu,. 
Id. at *l-*2. The district court granuvl 
summary judgment in favor of Wal-Man 
on all claims, including one for misappro-
priation of a trade secret, because the dis-
trict court determined that there was .-n 
genuine issue of material fact regarding 
unauthorized use of the secret. Id. at *2 
On appeal, this court affirmed with respect 
to the misappropriation claim, holding thai 
the plaintiff "only offers indirect evident 
from which a reasonable jury could M.I) 
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speculate and could not reasonably con-
clude that the defendants made unauthor-
ized use of [plaintiffs] secret. Because 
[plaintiff] offers no concrete evidence to 
overcome the motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court's decision should be 
affirmed."/^, at *3. 
The case does not hold that circumstan-
tial evidence is never sufficient for a 
plaintiff to withstand summary judgment 
in a trade-secret case. Instead, we held 
only that the plaintiff failed to present 
sufficient indirect evidence, such as 
evidence concerning the similarity 
between her idea and the automated pro-
gram that Wal-Mart ultimately em-
braced. We did not hold categorically 
that indirect evidence was never per-
missible or that direct evidence was 
mandatory. 
In the case at bar, we assume that Dr. Stratienko 
produced sufficient evidence of access: Cordis' de-
clarations demonstrate that Cordis, the entity that 
developed the Vista Brite IG Catheter, had access 
to the information. It would be very burdensome to 
require Dr. Stratienko to demonstrate that a particu-
lar inventor or designer had access. See Sokol, 15 
F.3d at 1432 (stating that any plaintiff "would be 
hard pressed to present direct proof of the flow of 
information inside the defendant's company"). 
Dr. Stratienko, however, has not presented suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence of similarity to with-
stand summary judgment. His evidence does not re-
veal which novel features Cordis' device shares 
with Dr. Stratienko's device. His expert reports es-
sentially state two facts: that (1) the Fernandez and 
Hillstead patents do not "teach" the features of 
Cordis' Vista Brite Tip IG Catheter and (2) the Stra-
tienko device shares "all of the salient features 
found in the Cordis IG."Both of these conclusions 
are based on irrelevant comparisons. The experts' 
first conclusion that Cordis' catheter is dissimilar 
from the Fernandez and Hillstead catheters has no 
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bearing on whether Cordis' and Stratienko's cathet-
ers are similar. The similarity inquiry is not a com-
parison of several products to determine which two 
products are the most similar. Dr. Stratienko must, 
instead, demonstrate similarity by comparing his 
secret with the features of Cordis' catheter, not the 
features of Cordis' catheter with the features of oth-
er catheters. 
[8] The experts' conclusions that the catheters share 
"all ... salient features" except the holes at the distal 
end are also insufficient because their findings do 
not reveal which feature was the secret that *602 
Dr. Stratienko sought to protect. Misappropriation 
of a trade secret requires that an idea not be one 
that is already used by others. See Hickory Spe-
cialties, Inc., 592 S.W.2d at 586 (stating that the 
device must give the creator "an opportunity to ob-
tain an advantage over competitors who do not use 
it"). Dr. Stratienko must demonstrate similarity 
between his secret idea (not his product in general) 
and Cordis' device. See Leggett & Piatt, Inc., 285 
F.3d at 1361. Instead, his experts state only that the 
Stratienko device has a catheter-sheath combina-
tion, a preformed tip, and holes at the distal end. At 
no point do his experts state which, if any, of these 
characteristics renders his idea innovative.FN3 It is 
entirely possible that the holes at the distal end, 
which the Cordis design lacked, distinguished Dr. 
Stratienko's device from prior art.FN4 We cannot 
find in the record that Dr. Stratienko has presented 
evidence of which features were novel to his 
design, and thus he has failed to show sufficient 
similarity between the innovative aspect of his idea 
and Cordis' device to provide enough of a circum-
stantial inference to create a genuine issue of mater-
ial fact. 
FN3. At oral argument, counsel stated that 
the combination of the sheath and catheter 
was the novel feature. But the record 
demonstrates only that Dr. Stratienko's 
device had such a combination, not that the 
features had never before been combined. 
FN4. Cordis, in its brief, relies on evidence 
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of its patented 1997 Webster Guiding 
Sheath that it claims was the first combina-
tion sheath-catheter device. Because Cord-
is did not produce any evidence of the 
1997 device at the time that the district 
court granted the motion for summary 
judgment in October 2003, we do not con-
sider it. See White v. Anchor Motor 
Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (stating that on appeal "we re-
view the case presented to the district court 
rather than a better case fashioned aftei the 
district court's order") (citation omitted). 
[9] It is true that the parties have already conceded 
that Dr. Stratienko had a trade secret. But this does 
not mean that sufficient similarity has been shown 
to permit an inference of use. The parties' implicit 
concession that a trade secret exists does not identi-
fy the secret. Identifying the secret that r-tirM-k--
Dr. Stratienko with an advantage in thv m.ir!-.•; 
necessary for determining whether the puu,; 
similarity implies that Cordis used his secret. I he 
analysis of similarity evaluates only relevant, in-
novative features, not all possible congruence. 
Without evidence of the advantage of Dr. Stratien-
ko's device over prior art, there is not a sufficient 
basis for a reasonable jury to make the circumstan-
tial inference of use. Dr. Stratienko, therefore, has 
not presented sufficient evidence to establish that 
there is any genuine issue of material fact as to use, 
and summary judgment was proper as to Dr. Stra-
tienko's claims for misappropriation, wrongful be-
nefit, and breach of contract, 
[10] The district court also correctly determined 
that Tennessee law does not recognize a cause of 
action for conversion of trade secrets because no 
decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee calls 
into doubt the state court of appeals' express hold-
ing rejecting a claim for con vers ion of intangible 
property. In B & L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorngren, 
Inc., 917 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn.Ct App 1995), the 
Page II 
Court of Appeals of I ennessee, after considering 
the decisions of other courts and determining that 
only a niinority of courts recognizes conversion of 
intangible property, held that Tennessee does not 
recognize an action for conversion of intangible 
property. That court; has subsequently relied upon 
its holding in B & L See *603Ra!ph v. Pipkin, 
2005 WL 1220132, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 17, 
2005); Corporate Catering, Inc. v. Corporate Ca-
tering, Etc., LLC, 2001 -;: - . M I ]
 lf *5 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Mar.20, 200 
Dr. Stratienko's invocation of language in a state 
supreme court opinion, which he claims supports 
recognizing conversioii of intangible property, is 
unavailing because he misunderstands the import of 
the language in that opinion. He points to the fol-
lowing sentence in Barger v. Webb, 216 1 mv 115 
391 S.W.2d 664, 665 (1965) (emphasis added): "A 
conversion, in the sense of the law of trover, >s Ik, 
appropriation of the thing to the party's o^ v-» use 
and benefit, by the exercise of dominion uvei ^ .. 1; 
He argues that, because "trover" appi-.^ \c personal 
property, which includes intangible property, the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee recognizes conve? >!<;n 
of intangible property. The Supreme uun of "or 
nessee's recognition that the modern tort of conver-
sion grew out of the old writ for trover,™5 
however, in no way implies that the modern tori ex-
tends to intangible property. Indeed, if anything, the 
opposite conclusion is implied by the historical fact 
that trover traditionally did not extend to intangible 
property. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & 
Keeton on Torts 91 (5th ed. 1984). Because no opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee calls uric 
doubt the state court of appeals' holding that i^n 
nessee does not extend its cause of action to* ,ov 
version to intangible property, we are unable to 
conclude that Tennessee law recognizes a ion for 
conversion of trade secrets. 
FN5. At common law, recovery for dam-
age to or loss of personal property e< ".,''< "H? 
sought through two actions: trove* ind 
trespass. The distinguishing feature 
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between these two causes of action was the 
remedy and procedure, not the kind of 
property subject to each action. Trover, 
which evolved into modern conversion, be-
came the preferred action because, unlike 
trespass, it did not require the plaintiff to 
accept the property in satisfaction of the 
claim; instead, the plaintiff could demand 
the full value of the property in damages. 
See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Kee-
ton on Torts 89 (5th ed.1984). The su-
preme court recognized this history by re-
ferring to conversion "in the sense of 
trover," and this is obvious from the con-
text. The next sentence in the opinion dis-
cusses damages, not categories of property. 
SeeBarger, 391 S.W.2d 664. 
VI. 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judg-
ment of the district court. 
C.A.6 (Tenn.),2005. 
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